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Abstract
Most studies in theoretical and methodological anthropology seek to 
contribute improvements in the systematic and rigorous collection of 
ethnographic facts. The present study seeks to redress what the 
author views as a chronic imbalance by attending to an exploration of 
the less systematic but no less rigorous task of presenting 
ethnographic facts. Using original research among urban Torres 
strait Islanders in Australia's North Queensland, the author 
explores how it is that the ethnographer uses the language of 
ethnography— his own living native tongue —  rather than the language 
of the people studied to present the ethnographic facts. It is a 
study of how to make facts make sense rather than on how to make sense 
of facts.
The principal exploration is of how it is that written words convey 
meanings initially foreign to the reader. Building on the concept of 
alternity— the capacity of language to depict events not actually at 
hand— the author proposes alternities: possible outcomes of 
activity which have not actually come about. It is by attending to 
alternities, by identifying and analysing them, that anthropologists 
put the case of the other culture; by discerning specific alternities 
within that other culture's frames of reference, the ethnographer 
begins to build a whole and detailed picture. This 'picture' comes 
alive when it begins to communicate to the reader how the other 
culture predicates sensible action. By exploring how ethnographers 
and others use written language to build on things known and familiar 
to the reader, the present study identifies some fundamental 
properties of texts and languages, and of how initially strange human 
actions of another culture are made sensible by explicating what it 
is those actions are predicated on.
The study explores the nature of texts, especially of ethnographic 
texts, and of the relationships between written texts and spoken 
language. It argues for the careful use of non-positivist 
ethnographic presentation in order to capture on the printed page as 
much of the living spoken idiom of any people studied. The author has 
found the basic act of social predication to be that enacted in the 
telling and hearing of any society's living stories, and suggests 
that the story form may be the minimum necessary vehicle for 
alternities. He argues for a principal responsibility on the part of 
the hearer of stories over that of the teller and extrapolates from 
this to an argument for the principal responsibility for the making 
of ethnographic sense to be on the part of the reader. The 
implication of this is for the establishment of a genre of 
ethnography responsive to its readers, a genre which values making 
sense over making facts, and which is prepared to harness the idiom, 
the human sense-making institution par excellence, in its task.
Table of Contents
page
Preface (iii)
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Just Passing Through 21
Chapter 2 From Here to Alternity 50
Chapter 3 Of Wrist-Things and Islandtaim 88
Chapter 4 On Education and Expulsion 111
Chapter 5 Bar kak mir. To talk with no curves. 144
Chapter 6 The License of Silence:
Means of Inaction in Torres Strait Talk 174
/Chapter 7 Meriam to Meriba
(the motion of the contentious self) 231
Conclusion STORYTIME:
Toward an Anthropology of Idiom 268
Notes 316
Acknowledgements 345
Bibliography 347
Index 357
The notion of witness has become considerably 
debased. The first thing that occurs to us when we hear 
the word is the witness we may be called upon to give 
when we have been present at some event. And so we 
develop a tendency to think of ourselves as 
recording-machines, and to treat witness as the mere 
playing-over of the record. Hence we forget the really 
important thing about witness; its attestation. That is 
the essential here. When I attest, I bind myself, but I 
do it of my own free will. In this sense it brings into 
being the closest and most mysterious union of necessity 
and liberty. There is no act more essentially human than 
this.
Gabriel Marcel, 
Being and Having
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PREFACE
'Jump, Pluto. Jump!'
There are two ways of doing ethnography. One way is to take the 
words of another people, their names and labels and concepts, and 
bring them surrounded in the language of the ethnographer where they 
are made to do a kind of danse macabre, dancing without heads or feet 
to a foreign tune. The other way is to take the words of the 
ethnographer's descriptions, the very language of ethnography and 
bend it, stretching its syntax, wending its grammar a new way until 
old words strain to new meanings and take them in.
The risks are different. In the first way it is ensured that the 
Others will always be strangers, partible objects of types and 
traits. They will always be there, inert and ready for ever more 
precisely honed analytics; they will never be here. While there is 
no risk of ever losing those objects who are the ethnographer's 
subjects, there is little chance of ever gaining the subjects who are 
the ethnographer's people. In the second way little is assured. In 
making the Others no longer Strangers, failure to make them familiar 
will make them forever strange. And in making living people of these 
ethnographic subjects, failure risks consigning them to the 
truncated existence of paper subjects, apparently real but only in 
their pages.
With the first way the risks come all at the end of the endeavor. 
It becomes more and more difficult to make analysis fit reality 
exactly; and if ever it finds such a fit, there is the grave risk that 
the reality which has been ever more accurately analyzed no longer 
exists. Seeking to avoid doing disservice to his subjects and the 
culture they have entrusted to him, the ethnographer serves no man in 
the end. With the second way all the risks come at the beginning. 
Every time a word is strained to capture an alien concept it is
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stretched out of shape, never again quite fit to mean what it means 
and nothing more. Seeking to avoid doing a disservice to his 
subjects and the culture they have trusted him with, the ethnographer 
becomes a custodian of the language he has dislocated, and serves his 
reader.
In this way ethnography is a theory of language. For me the first 
way of doing ethnography is doomed either to be never quite right or 
to be too late. It is also inhumane: respectful of science, it is 
expensive of persons. But the second way of doing ethnography is 
frightening. It makes of every ethnographer a reader of his own 
text: expending his own language, he must respect his reader and keep 
him close. The first way is to have lots of chances to get the 
ethnography right with the spectre of having it finally prove wrong. 
The second way means if you get it wrong the first time there will be 
no chance to get it right. The reason for this is that the 'it' that 
you get right or wrong is the capture itself, the first bringing of 
the Other into view. If the bringing into view means bringing into 
familiar language, then failure to make the reader immediately 
familiar with and sensitive to the Other relegates all subsequent 
attempts at correction to arguments about words in a sensibility 
which excludes people.
In ethnography proper there is only the writer and his reader. 
Because this is so, and due to the extraordinary burden on any writer 
who would put the Word of others with his own tongue, there is a risk 
that my reader shall find these accounts a little strange. This 
risk, one which is known to us both, is preferable to the more 
commonly taken less well-known risk of the ethnographer who pales the 
very Otherness of they of whom he writes in his own terrible wish to 
be well understood. This paling is abhorent, not for the merely 
moral culpability of anyone who would press Others, unwitting and 
unpresent, into his own service, but for the irrevocable disservice 
to his own reader whom he has impressed as an accomplice. Swayed by
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the former, and eschewing the latter, I may put myself too much into 
the text.
I mean the present work to enter the consideration of how it is 
human beings come to know the things they know. Because this is my 
intent, and since I know that it is always the reader who puts in the 
meaning (this is why each ethnographer must be his own first reader, 
so he can see how his text reads when meanings are put in) , I 
sometimes spend a great many words making sure of the sorts of things 
I do not mean. For instance, I do not mean for the present work to be 
seen as ethnography: quite simply, because it is about ethnography it 
cannot itself be an ethnography.
For another instance I should not like the more philosophical 
among the discussions which follow to be read as out of place here. 
Philosophy is as you find it. I found it on my way to beginning an 
ethnographic account of towndwelling Torres Strait Islanders among 
whom I lived in North Queensland in 1977-1978 and in 1980. Astride 
every word which purported Islander life in my early accounts was the 
burden of someone else's philosophy, every piece of my prose came out 
burdened with another's nuance. The act of writing an account of me 
and the Islanders came to beg a prologue, a pro logos, literally a 
word beforehand. Such a word, once past, promised a writing about 
Islanders— an ethno graph— in which the writing-about and the 
Islanders need no longer suffer from that dissociative 'about' ...a 
writing in which Islandmen might live BOTH on my pages AND in their 
Australian towns. Despite this prolegomenal nature, occasionally an 
Islander or two may come to life on the page. But for the most part 
such fortuitous quickness must wait until the present work is 
finished.
Being about ethnography rather than about living Islanders, the 
present work is about modes, codes, and nodes. These are words about 
situated social interaction and could be said to be, in other words, 
about the way in which, and in accord with what, and according to 
whom, respectively, Islandmen get on about their business. Often it
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is about Torres Strait Pidgin and the native languages and the 
proxemics and kinesics which are the codes of everyday activity; 
always, one way or another, it is about the nodes, these few persons, 
all men, according to whom everything which amounts to anything 
happens. And sometimes it is about how I came to understand 
something of the modes of Island life.
It is to the last of these that the title of this preface, 'Jump, 
Pluto. Jump!', alludes. Except for a short and largely anonymous 
stay in Townsville early in 1976 I arrived in that principal city of 
Islander activity on the Australian mainland with virtually no 
knowledge of what made these island men the Islandmen. But for a 
little reading of what Jeremy Beckett had written of these people in 
the 1960's , and A.G. Haddon and his Cambridge Expedition members had 
written of them a half-century before, whatever I was to learn of 
them would be, necessarily and obviously, subsequent to my arrival. 
What I did not then guess was that whatever this 'what' was that I was 
to learn of the Islandmen, it would not be simply subsequent to my 
arrival amongst them, it would be somehow pursuant to it. The 
apparently simple relation of ’afterness' which obtained between 
before-arriving and after-arriving fled before the complex mental 
onslaught of the realization that I was to find the sorts of things I 
was looking for in a people who would find in me the closest thing to 
an ethnographer they could come up with, each of us constantly 
rereckoning one another, and taking each other first understood, 
then misunderstood, then understood again, proving 'that things both 
can and cannot be'. (Quotations are identified in the Notes to the 
Preface, which begin on p. 316.)
"Jump, Pluto. Jump!" is what Clyde William Tombaugh might have 
muttered as he flicked the lever of his blinker, day after day. 
Tombaugh was a graduate student, in 1930, when he discovered the 
planet Pluto. I can't recall when I first heard the story; I first 
taught with it when I was teaching astronomy laboratories around 
1970. The version I shall use here comes from "The Case of the Planet
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Pluto", a short section in Gregory Bateson's book Mind and Nature.
Gregory died during the writing of this work, a work which his spirit 
pervades, and it is fitting that I conclude the Preface with a few of 
his words, words intended to illustrate in a context more familiar to 
most readers than may be the extraordinarily complicated one of 
anthropological fieldwork, the epistemological risk of thinking that 
we may so easily distinguish what we know from what we come to know, 
that we may so easily distinguish technique from method from process 
from theory. Gregory opens the Case of the Planet Pluto with these 
words:
Human sense organs can receive only news of difference, 
and the differences must be coded into events in time 
(i.e., into changes) in order to be perceptible. Ordinary 
static differences that remain constant for more than a 
few seconds become perceptible only by scanning. 
Similarly, very slow changes become perceptible only by a 
combination of scanning and bringing together 
observations from separated moments in the continuum of 
time.
Those familiar with Bateson's epistemology will recognize his 
style. What is less easily recognized is the anthropological 
application, that the differences in the ways of one people or 
another are differences only after some ethnographer, some human 
instrument, 'receives news of a difference' and passes this news 
along. We have lots of references to persons with blinkers on, meant 
to refer to someone or other who ought to have given us news of some 
difference. The curious twist for anthropology, at least as I have 
brought Gregory's story to bear on it, is that the ethnographer is 
the blinker.
From calculations based on disturbances in the orbit of 
Neptune it seemed that these irregularities could be 
explained by gravitational pull from some planet in an 
orbit outside of Neptune.
The object to be looked for would certainly be very 
small and dim, and its appearance would differ from that of 
other objects in the sky only in the fact of very slow 
movement, so slow as to be quite imperceptible to the human 
eye.
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This problem was solved by the use of an instrument 
which astronomers call a blinker. Photographs of the 
appropriate region of the sky were taken at longish 
intervals. These photographs were then studied in pairs 
in the blinker. This instrument is the converse of a 
binocular microscope; instead of two eyepieces and one 
stage, it has one eyepiece and two stages and is so 
arranged that by the flick of a lever, what is seen at one 
moment on one stage can be replaced by a view of the other 
stage. Two photographs are placed in exact register on the 
two stages so that all the ordinary fixed stars precisely 
coincide. Then, when the lever is flicked over, the fixed 
stars will not appear to move, but a planet will appear to 
jump from one position to another. There were, however, 
many jumping objects (asteroids) in the field of the 
photographs, and Tombaugh had to find one that jumped less 
than the others.
After hundreds of such comparisons, Tombaugh saw Pluto 
jump.
So, first the ethnographer is the calculator, surmising the 
disturbances in behaviour (once he can tell behaviour— meaningful 
activity from meaningless action: conspiratorial winks from nervous 
twitches— at all) as due to the pull of some other's behaviour. Then 
he's the methodologist, figuring out how to see behaviour in a way 
which will allow him to scan for news of differences. The problem is 
that the ethnographer's subjects are more like Walt Disney's Pluto 
than they are like Tombaugh's planet. And just when we get some 
behaviour accurately depicted, all set up for stage two of the 
blinker, the subjects jump off by themselves, not waiting for us to 
flick the lever. And after a few such retroductive exercises, we 
realize that in the world of real and very different people which is 
the world of ethnographic research, we don't have to flip photographs 
on the blinker to watch Pluto jump. Pluto is jumping all the time.
What we have to do, then, is to make as accurate record as we are 
able of Pluto jumping, and then treat ourselves as the blinker. The 
questions are not so much about how this society's 'jumps' are 
different from those of our own, but more about how it is that some of 
the jumps make sense and some do not. In order to avoid being 
condemned to see all practice as spectacle— to seeing Pluto's antics 
in the differences of others' socialities— we must begin to turn our 
attention away from the analogues which we so often proffer as what
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we know and toward the dialogues which say so much about what we have
come to know.
In what follows I try a view made more critical than it might 
otherwise have been by my readings of Bateson, and of Samuel Butler 
and William Blake and Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead, 
and of others, some of whom are directly referred to and many of whom 
may be read between the lines. They are 'a very great company, both 
living and dead: my authorities, my authors.' They have made me my 
self in ways that I know and in some ways that I doubtless do not, 
much in the same way that the Educated Men have been the authors of 
the society of the Islandmen. Because the ethnographer is_ the 
'blinker' , I have paid a great deal of attention from time to time to 
saying something of how it is that I, as the present blinker, came to 
be, in order that the reader may read through the impurities in the 
metal and imperfections in the lens. Sometimes, in my effort to 
explicate both why I see the way I do and why what I see looks like it 
does, I may fail in clarity, succeeding only in setting shadowy 
dramas moving in the background of awareness.
Where such a failure was avoidable, a shortcoming by dint of
scholarship, I stand culpable; and where an effect of too much
concentration on the agency of knowing at the expense of knowledge,
there too I am to blame, and apologize. I have tried, in Chapter 6
The License of Silence in particular, to show something of the
technical detail involved in winnowing out the merest differences
which make everyday behaviour mean one thing and not another. In
Chapter 5 Bar kak mir I have tried to set down something both of what
it is to inhabit a society where meaningful speech has its own code
and of how it was, in part, that I came to understand the awesome
/ /import of that fact and that code. Chapter 7 Meriam to Meriba is an 
argument for my own warrant, extant, for presenting anything of 
Islandmen at all, and begins a preliminary exploration of a theory of 
self based upon what it is persons are reckoned to be in our culture 
and in Islander culture. Other chapters deal with the 'jump' from
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our notion of time to Islandtaim, the 'jump' from a common Western 
pedagogy to an uncommon Islander one.
My Introduction is meant to set out some of the difficulties 
inherent in any ethnological prologue to ethnography, and a few of 
the difficulties which I anticipate involving readers unused to 
anthropological writing which tries to make full use of language. 
The Conclusion tries to make some headway toward an anthropology of 
idiom, with particular mention of the use of stories. It is 
conclusive only in that it tries to wrap up both the bundle of 
theoretical and epistemological concerns which pervade the entire 
work and the bundle of specific ethnographic concerns to which I pay 
attention. In a sense, it 'concludes' the work by wrapping those two 
bundles up together and making of that larger bundle something of the 
tool, the 'blinker', which is always present. But if my conclusions 
are right, then in a much larger sense it is only a very small 
beginning, a beginning of studying Others to make them Us. In 
becoming mindful of ourselves and others, we may begin to see what a 
self is, and what a mind is, and that "all of what we are is what we 
are" .
x
1"Never trust the teller, trust the tale," said Lawrence.
Susan Sontag, 
Against Interpretation
INTRODUCTION
Anthropology and Interpretive Essay
I mentioned in the Preface the modern citydwelling Torres Strait 
Islanders who are the subject matter of the present work. I should 
like to introduce, while attending further to the 'subject matter', 
what I might call 'the predicate matter' of the thesis. That is to 
say that these people from the Torres Strait who have come to town 
are, somehow, both the subject and object of the thesis-as-sentence, 
and that the remaining consideration is the verb, the predicate, the 
active link.
In a broad sense, anthropology is just such a predicative 
activity: Anthropologists have long engaged primitive peoples (and 
laterly others) as objects of research; recently, and especially 
since the advent of the emic/etic distinction, more and more 
anthropologists have sought to make these studied others the 
subjects of their own lives, intelligible to the layman as willful 
and learned actors in their own varied worlds. And the discipline of 
anthropology as a learned discourse has not only engaged other 
societies, first as objects and later as subjects, but also has 
attended to itself, to its own history, to the process of its own 
discourse. It has, further, sought to judge itself, to sit in 
judgment over the precepts of its activity and the behaviour of its 
practitioners. But it has been the normal practice to separate these 
acts of judgment— of weighing the worth of theories and suppositions
2and presuppositions —  from the actions of ethnography and ethnology 
proper. This dis-ease of separating has extended most rigourously to 
the division of ethnography and ethnological theory: A work is so 
easily taken to be either theoretical or ethnographical that those 
very words suffice as labels mutually exclusive... theory versus 
ethnography. And yet, the bases for all anthropological theorizing 
are found in the ethnographies, and all ethnographies are informed by 
some particular or general theory. It is my contention that much 
will be gained with the expansion of the anthropological discourse to 
include works which both recognize and assess their theoretical 
predilections and attend to their etnnographic facts. I propose this 
thesis as one such work.
Writing in a literary tradition, as I am, the selection of a form 
of writing in which to deal with theory and ethnography at the same 
time is neither wholly mine to make nor wholly the imposition of 
tradition. Moreover, there is a literate tradition within the 
anthropological discourse which offers certain forms. These are 
forms of essay, ranging from the straightforward literary-style 
essays of J.G. Frazer through the typically ancillary (typical of 
anthropologists in general, that is) essays of Robert Redfield and 
Oscar Lewis for instance to, say, the essays of Ernest Gellner and 
Clifford Geertz which, though very different, strike the reader as 
much less peripheral, much closer to the core of those writer's work.
It is in the vein of these last essayists (and perhaps back even 
to the Redfield essays on The Social Uses of Social Science) that 
this thesis is presented. It is presented in this vein for it intends 
to pay attention throughout to the value of the words, concepts, 
norms and forms of description of another people. Each chapter is an 
essay by virtue of its predication. But the chapters do not presume 
to adjudge their own value. Unlike literary essays, the interpretive 
valuation of these anthropological essays is left to the reader.
This leaving of assessment to the reader places a particular 
burden on the writer, for it prevents him from that fiction invidious 
in the so-called social sciences that he is somehow his own reader.
3Which is to say further that it prevents him, once and for all, from 
the fiction that somehow it is the described society which is 
presented to the reader. It is not. What the reader is presented is 
a piece of writing. While it is most commonly true to say that it is 
the intention of the ethnographer to present the society which he has 
studies, alas he is unable to present more than a few words, arranged 
in sentences, lumped into paragraphs and arrayed on printed pages.
It is my contention that this makes it incumbent upon the 
ethnographer to consider the nature of the activity of writing 
ethnography, and to make his considerations plain to the reader. 
Were it the case that this analysis were commonly done within an 
established critical tradition in anthropology, it would suffice 
each ethnographer to make some brief orienting reference to 
whichever school of interpretive thought his work conformed. Since 
this is not the case, each of us faces this task. The task is 
comprised of literary, philosophical, linguistic and other aspects. 
For instance, in writing an ethnography in English of a 
non-English-speaking people, as I am, it is necessary that the 
ethnographer understand not only translation and the obvious errors 
to be avoided in simple word-for-word glosses, but also 
interpretation and the much more complicated errors which arise with 
the attempt to describe the exotic in a language which is 
inextricably laden with familiars. The problem, at this juncture, is 
taken beyond consideration of form of presentation into 
considerations of worth and value, of the philosophical grounds of 
what may be changed in order to present an understanding of the other 
society when it is impossible to present, in writing, a simple view 
of it.
Interpretation and Explanation
That ethnography, the very activity of ethno-graphing— people 
writing— has always posed fundamental problems of selection is 
probably nowhere any longer debated. The ethnographer as
4observer/researcher sees, watches, participates in, queries and 
listens in order to get some comprehension of what it is that is 
going on in this otherness which is the foreign society. If he is 
sticktuitive, and lucky, he gets a comprehension. This is strictly a 
corn-prehension, a 'grasp around' the other society. It is a big 
enough grasp to surround enough connections so that things which 
occur in one arena of the society can be understood in connection 
with theretofore seemingly unconnected things in other arena. 
Whether or not his understanding of how these connections work is the 
same as the studied people's is another matter. It has sufficed for 
the ethnographer to comprehend and to understand his comprehensions. 
For the matter of the understandings themselves, there have been 
famous debates within and without the professional reaches of 
anthropology since the last century. Debates over nature v. nurture, 
nature v. culture, emics v. etics, ethics v. 'value-free', functions 
v. structures and both against 'culturism'. But these have been 
debates over the nature of understandings rather than over the 
comprehensions of various exotic societies. Sven Oscar Lewis's 
restudy of Robert Redfield's village produced only secondary, and 
then mostly minor, criticisms of Redfield's comprehension of what he 
had studied and participated in; firstly it was Lewis's 
uncomfortable task to criticize his mentor's folk model, the very 
understanding that Redfield 'brought back' and used to expose and 
explicate his village.
If this distinction makes sense to the present reader, let me
suggest a further twist: If I am right in elevating the
understanding-problem of the comprehension-problem, what if
/Redfield's comprehension of Tepoztlan was no different from Lewis's
later comprehension of the same society? I think it is safe to
imagine that such a thing is possible, if not between those two men
then between others of us, and rather frequently. If so, then the
/problem becomes one not of understanding Tepoztlan, but of
understanding the comprehensions of each other when we have both been 
/to Tepoztlan and have both comprehended the society there. Or, put
5another way, there is a problem of presentation when the
ethnographer, the presenter, is aware that his explanations of
society and culture are infused with his interpretations of what he
saw going on when he was there and participating. And, to make the
problem even more complicated (and more true to reality) , the
presentation problem is aggravated whenever the ethnographer is one
who realizes that his readers' understandings of the explanations
they are presented with will be in their turn infused with their own
/interpretations. If they, too, have 'been to Tepoztlan' their 
understandings of his explanations will be infused with their 
interpretations of what they saw there. This is the Lewis-Redfield 
case.
/But if they have not been to Tepoztlan— as most readers of
ethnographies have not— then their understandings of the
ethnographic explanations will be infused not with interpretations
/of what they saw in a Tepoztlan where they had never been, but with
interpretations of what they saw, or imagined they saw, somewhere
else. And therein lies the more common problem: That most
interpretations are built upon past interpretations which are in
turn built upon, or based on, past experience. This is what I mean by
their interpretations of 'what they saw or imagined they saw
/somewhere else'. For those readers who have not 'been to Tepoztlan', 
the interpretations which they bring to their reading of the 
ethnography must be from other readings (possibly, but not usually, 
on 'Tepoztlan') or from conversations (possibly, but not usually,
with those who have been to Tepoztlan) or from imaginations of some
/utopia which turns out to have been remarkably like Tepoztlan.
It is with this realization that the presentation problem seems at
its most insurmountable. We take it for granted that we can't all 'go
to Tepoztlan' (more than this, in anthropology we normally
discourage students from 'wasting their time' re-researching an
already 'done' society). But we also take it as granted that somehow
/the ethnographer is going to present us with Tepoztlan. That is, 
somehow it is taken— or has been assumed heretofore— that the
6explanations of all the Tepoztlans out there will come to us through 
the neutral filter of ethnography, and that they will be not only 
unencumbered by the authors' and our interpretations but also 
unencumbered by anything extraneous to the society itself. All of 
this in a form, the ethnography, which is fully known to be neither 
biography nor autobiography, neither history nor journalism. I have 
suggested here (and I am by no means the first to do so) that the 
simple fact that human beings understand things in light of their 
interpretations, interpretations both of the things in question and 
other, sometimes long-forgotten things, is a fact which riddles 
ethnography. More than this, it is a fact which, among the millions 
of facts at the hands of anthropologists, is the rare one in that it 
is always there. No matter whether the anthropologist is the 
observer-in-the-field, the reporter of his observations, the 
ethno-grapher, or the conversor on exotica, his comprehension and 
subsequent explanations are lit by interpretation.
Ethno- and graph: Text and writing
I have suggested that ethnography is known to pose fundamental 
problems of selection, and that among all the facts present there is 
the always inescapable fact that interpretation informs 
understanding. The selection problem is aided, in a sense, by the 
inescapability of this one fact, for it means that the ethnographer 
does not have to choose whether or not to select interpretation as 
one of the facts of his presentation. He can't avoid it. All he can 
do is choose whether or not to ignore it. As must be obvious, I have 
chosen in this thesis not to ignore it but to pay the strictest 
attention to it. I have chosen to pay such strict attention to 
interpretation as an inextricable part of ethnography because I find 
it so, and because I find ethnographies which do not pay attention to 
interpretation to be at best misleading.
7I have talked here about interpretation without distinguishing 
the interpretations which the studied people make of their behaviour 
from the interpretations which the ethnographer makes of their 
behaviour from the interpretations which the ethnographer makes of 
his own behaviour from the interpretations which the ethnographer 
makes of his readers' understandings in order to write his 
ethnography. In each case we can say that the interpretations are 
made, following recent anthropological practice on both sides of the 
Atlantic, of some text. The studied people comprise, in their 
presence and actions and cultural accoutrements, a kind of text. 
This text is interpreted both by the people themselves (in their 
histories and stories and philosophies and sciences) and by the 
anthropologist. And the readers of the ethnography, coming as they 
do from a literary tradition and language commensurate with the 
ethnographer's own, constitute a kind of text (though not one 
normally thought of as so formally intact as the 
exotic-society-as-text). This text is open to interpretation by 
both ethnographer and reader as participants in it and by the 
ethnographer as he makes the interpretations necessary to write for 
any audience at all.
There is, however, an additional text, a third text to which much 
less attention has been paid by those engaged in anthropological 
discourses. This is the text of the ethnography itself, the actual 
words and sentences printed in the books which we call ethnographies. 
The title of this section, "Ethno- and graph: Text and writing" is 
meant to call to attention the relatively recent understanding that 
the "ethno-" half of ethnography— the people studied— comprise a 
kind of text which the ethnographer presents/writes/explicates/ 
interprets or in some other manner "-graphs". I am in accord with 
this view, and this thesis is set in that vein, a vein not unlike 
literary criticism or hermeneutics in which the text-people are 
interpreted in written form (a form which is, in anthropology, the 
ethnography). What I want to propose for consideration is the 
further insight that the people are not really the text: the
8ethnography is the text. The relationship between text and 
interpretation is one which obtains between ethnography and reader 
as well as between people and ethnography. For the ethnographer who 
understands this relationship there can no longer be recourse to the 
fiction that it is the people studied who go onto the page he writes. 
What he understands is that it is a text that he writes, a text of 
interpretation which will be in its turn subject to the 
interpretations of his readers.
Ethnography and interpretation: Text and reading
If we understand that the ethnography is in itself a text, rather 
than some kind of uncritically imagined neutral conduit for some 
prior text (i.e. the people), then we can begin to ease the task of 
the ethnographer. The ethnographer's task is eased in that the 
nature of the enormous problem of selection is revealed, and by that 
revelation the arena of the selection activity located. The key 
selection is not the selection of facts and figures and bits and 
pieces of behaviour and activity of the studied people for inclusion 
in some compendium of such facts and bits called an ethnography; the 
key selection is the selection of interpretations for inclusion in a 
piece of interpretive writing called an ethnography. The criteria 
for selection become not any longer the criteria of how well the 
facts and bits fit together in the eye of the ethnographer who then 
records them as he sees fit; the criteria for selection become now 
the criteria of how true the text=ethnography can be made by the 
active writer. True is used here not in the sense of synonym for 
'fact'— some kind of congruence with some putative 'reality'— but in 
the sense that the text=ethnography is true if the understanding 
which the reader gets of the people studied is true to the 
interpretations which constitute the text.
This does not mean that we do not seek some kind of congruence 
between the actual activity of the people studied and the 
ethnographic presentation of that activity. We do. But we are now
9obliged to pay strict attention to what in my idiom I may call "the 
truth of the matter". That is, when everpresent interpretation is 
considered, it is no longer possible to even pretend that what goes 
on the page is anything at all of the people. It is of the 
ethnographer. The only test of concordance or congruence is the test 
made by the reader, and even then only by the reader who understands 
that he brings his own interpretive predilections to the exercise and 
seeks to identify them so that he may assess the truth in their 
light. It is, then, only the reader who may say if a text is true.
This is not to say that the reader may judge whether or not the 
facts and bits of some society are accurate. He may do so only if he 
has been there, and even then only if he has taken into account the 
interpretive predispositions which he arrived there with (and, 
further, only if he has gained some insight into the very act of 
entering another society and what that act may do to his interpretive 
framework). Of course, as has happened many times, a reader or two 
who has had experience of some society may well want to judge the 
facts and bits in the ethnography. In the case of the present thesis, 
it might well happen that Jeremy Beckett, or Bruce Rigsby, or George 
Kearney, or others with experience in and around and of Torres Strait 
and the Islanders may take issue with some of the facts and bits of 
Islander life. But even these few knowledgeable persons will be able 
to do so only in so far as they are competent readers of the text 
which is the thesis and competent 'readers' of the text=society (or 
some past text, such as the Reports of the Cambridge Expedition under 
A.C. Haddon before the turn of the century). For the majority of 
readers, there will be no knowledge of the text=society to juxtapose 
with the text=thesis. For the majority of readers and, thus, for the 
readership to whom the author addresses his writing, there is only 
the text=thesis (or text=book, or text=article).
It is not my intention to elaborate the obvious; merely to bring 
it to our attention here. I want to bring it to our attention for it 
is one of those obvious limitations which has been given less than 
its deserved attention in the discourse which is anthropology. The
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limitation is this: That the ethnographer is limited by those facts 
which he can bring to the reader with his text. I have said here with 
his text for two reasons. One, to distinguish the idea of a fact from 
the idea of a text. Among several distinctions, one important one is 
that the fact is something 'out there', or 'in the real world', or 
simply 'real', while the text is always something right here♦..the 
text may always be presently engaged, it is in front of us (or 
perhaps around us), always where we are and at the same time. And 
two, with the text is a phrase which speaks of con-text, of that 
which informs the text proper without being the words and phrases of 
it. Herein lies the particular problem of ethnology, and the probxem 
which sits on the shoulders of the ethnographer: That the
ethnographer must make a context— a con-text, must bring with the 
text— which is different from the context which the language of the 
ethnography brings inextricably welded to the page it sits on, the 
weight of centuries of shadings and meanings and connotations and 
lately, worse, denotations, which ride around on each word and make 
for each its own little con-text. So, the ethnographer must be not 
only the reader but also must he be the reader of his own text, for 
only he can see when the meanings of the English words shade into the 
meanings of the words of the people studies, only he is in a position 
to read both texts, to read both con-texts. And only in the movement 
between what the people mean and what the words mean, between what he 
means to write and what his reader will read to mean, can he search 
for the solutions to the problem of two contexts.
Idiom: Code, Mode, and Metaphor
What an ethnographer does is attempt an insinuation into the idiom 
of another society. It should be clearly understood that this use of 
idiom is a use from my idiom. What I am saying by it is more than I 
could say (in my idiom) by saying "an ethnographer attempts an 
insinuation into another society", or, "...into another culture". I 
wrote above that we are now obliged to pay strict attention to what
"in my idiom I may call 'the truth of the matter'". Idiom is not 
idiolect. In my use of 'the truth of the matter' I brought to the 
page a lot of recent American (and some other anglophonic) usage of 
that phrase, heavy with 'basics' and 'fundamentals' and even 'bottom 
line' . But since I used it with a slight skew it lies on the page with 
its context askew...it means something a little more serious and a 
little less jargonistic than it meant on TV or in the newspapers or 
wherever I last heard it. I laboured the change in meaning 'from the 
inside'. This, I submit, is the task of most ethnographers, to get 
'inside' the idiom of another society, to get to where they can use 
the words and phrases and weight of meanings 'like a native'.
In part, this requires basic manipulation of the code, the 
language of everyday— or special— life. I do not think that it is 
requisite, however, that the code (the language) be a subject of 
study (or, harking back to my discussion of ethnography as the 
predicate linking subject and object, that it need be an object of 
study). In fact, if the point of the study is the illumination of an 
idiom into which the ethnographer has managed to insinuate himself, 
then to make of the code itself an object of study will actually 
prevent the study of idiom, for idioms exist only where languages are 
transparent. To study the language will be to preclude the study of 
the idiom.
Again we are met with the problem of selection. In this case, to 
select the language (as focus or subject of study) is to reject the 
idiom. Idiom is a code already a step inside a language. And the 
language can be treated more formally (idiom is a code which may 
encode the code which is language). Only in the idiom of American 
Blacks, for instance, can 'ba-a-ad talkin' be understood as 
language. Perhaps a more difficult example: only in the idiom of 
urban Torres Strait Islanders is it understood that 'language' 
equals 'langgus' equals 'langgwiz' equals 'mir'; that is, even 
though these words are 'from' three or even four languages, they are 
equivalents in the one idiom (though not in any of the separate
languages). For those of us who work primarily with the spoken word,
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in its social setting and cultural (etc.) context, this is where the 
distinction between idiom and language (or between idiom and slang, 
or idiom and argot) pays off. It pays off when it is clear that a 
community— such as the urban Torres Strait Islander communities in 
North Queensland— shares a code, a means of communicating, which 
seems to cut across not only dialects but even languages.
In North Queensland, as in the islands, there are a number of 
modes of social action. Persons act conspicuously 'Eastern' or 
'Western', and among those two main areal distinctions may act or 
dress or cut their hair conspicuously in the manner of one island or 
another. In addition to these modes of dress and talk and action, the 
Islanders have brought to the towns of the Mainland two native 
languages and a number of dialects (or perhaps accents) of the 
English-based pidgin which is the lingua franca. And from each 
island group, and each language group, and each tribal group and 
sometimes each family, came metaphors... sharks for fierceness and 
pigeons for peace and north for heaven. Some are common to all (shark 
for fierce), and some have only been discovered as common since the 
Mainland communities have come into being; some are translated and 
shared around— the metaphor staying the same through numerous 
translations out of one tongue and into another— and some are shared 
around by the hearers listening and learning the original, so that 
Eastern metaphors pop up in Western conversations still clothed in 
the original Eastern words.
So it is the case that there is some communicational domain which 
comprises code, mode, and metaphor. An arena of communication into 
which one plunges when one 'leaves' one's own language. It is this, 
domain and arena, which I propose to call idiom. The present thesis 
becomes, then, an idiomatic exercise, joining their idiom with mine. 
And my obligation is made clearly two-fold: I must illuminate the 
urban Torres Strait Islander idiom, and I must pay strict attention 
to the explication of my own so that the finally unavoidable 
oscillation involving my context and theirs does not become 
irretrievably senseless.
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Tale and Teller: The Story as Idiom
The major 'theoretical' proposition of the thesis has to do with 
stories, or with the story form. My problem was to find some 
idiomatically common form, a form common necessarily to my idiom and 
the Torres Strait Islander idiom, but incidentally to the 
anglophone/Western/Judaic idiom and most other cultures. In other 
words, having recognized that both explication and investigation 
were going to have to go on in some idiom, the problem was to find 
something which either crossed from my idiom to theirs or existed in 
both. The former is the easier course. And I was lucky in being an 
American, one of the same ilk who had readily hired and prized Torres 
Strait construction workers newly arrived on the Australian 
mainland. But though it did cross over it was a narrow bridge, and 
interaction was limited by my sparse knowledge of American 
construction foremen overseas and the Islandmen's knowledge of a few 
American things apart from overseas construction foremen. So, early 
in 1978 it became clear that there was no way that I could parlay the 
limited connection provided by my American-ness into a broad and 
far-reaching matrix which might 'connect' me to all aspects of 
Islander society. I had, then, to take the second course, the much 
more difficult (though more normally anthropological) course of 
seeking something which had presence both in the Islander idiom and 
in my idiom.
Three years later, late in 1980, I found what I had been searching 
for: the story. As usual when I did find it it turned out to have been 
there all the time. This is one of the problems with idiom— idioms 
can be as transparent as language. We in the anglophone West grow up 
filled with and full of and filling ourselves with stories. There is 
no question about what a story is, except from time to time when a 
writer of major impact does something that clearly reads like a story 
but may not be yet enfranchised by the culture-police to be called a
story. (I'm thinking here of James Joyce's stories hidden behind
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almost impenetrable language and idiom; or Henry Miller's 
'autobiographical' writings, stories by virtue only of their 
incongruence with the facts of his own life, and in their turn making 
his life into theirs by virtue of his being their author; or of the 
ficciones of Jorge Luis Borges, some but a page or two long and so 
poetic as to straddle even the closest reading between the two 
forms.) In recent addition to the form which we know as the story, 
and including therein tales and nursery rhymes and fables, are movies 
and television, fraught with stories (though TV stories are largely 
lacking in con-text). And in writing there has been recently added 
the stories of the New Journalists, stories of real people and events 
which do not so much give the Who What When Where of front-page 
journalism but rather give setting and scene and situation and often 
take the reader into another life.
Clearly, story was part of my idiom, and just as clearly was a 
part not disarranged by my having lived outside my native United 
States for some years (not disarranged, that is, in the way that my 
diction and accent and slang have been). For me, story has remained 
idiomatically intact. What I did not know for so long, what took me 
years to find (or figure) out, was that Story is for urban Islanders 
idiomatically intact. And what is so clear now is that STORY is just 
about the only thing save biological relationship which has remained 
intact over the move from Islands to Mainland over the past three 
decades.
Of course, this all makes so much sense now, so much sense so 
easily that "Tale and Teller: The Story as Idiom", a title which has 
been taken from a section of the final chapter of the thesis, is one 
of those delightful rare titles that wrote itself. It connects the 
teller of [any] story to his tale while at the same time 
distinguishing them one from another; it connects Story and Idiom and 
promises for the nonce to consider the one as the other while at the 
same time permitting the primacy of Idiom; and by connecting the one 
pair, Tale and Teller, with the Story Idiom pair the title is an 
example par excellence of what it is that all language can do —  it
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makes a promise that what follows (the few paragraphs of this section 
of this introduction, or the body of the concluding chapter of the 
thesis) will be more than some simple exposition of the 
one-plus-one-equals-two 'arithmetic' of the pair connection. The 
title stands as a little map of what follows, a map of the movement 
which connects the parts and then joins them.
The epigraph for the concluding chapter is the one which appears 
at the head of this introduction. "Never trust the teller, trust the 
tale" was written around the time of the First World War. The writer 
was D.H. Lawrence, the work was his Studies in Classic American 
Literature which appeared in 1923 (NY:Viking). While I could have 
used the epigraph attributed to Lawrence, it seemed the more 
sociologically apt to use the quotation from Susan Sontag's 1965 
collection of essays Against Interpretation. Sontag recognized the 
worth of Lawrence, and quoted from his Studies which the literary 
critic Lionel Trilling has said "for many years won but little 
regard...now thought by many students of American literature to be 
one of the most illuminating works on the subject ever written". My 
point is partly to use what seems to me the truth about how it is that 
societies gain the interpretations which make up the sense of the 
social fabric. Lawrence's Studies hung around bereft of publishers 
and readers almost as long as Lady Chatterly's Lover. Unless we seek 
them out, individually, we are not party to the 
interpretations— values, choices, texts and contexts— which
Lawrence laid on American literature. But when a Sontag, a modern 
essayist, grabs a bit of Lawrence to say 'Here. This is a worthy 
interpretation' then we become party to Lawrence... except that it is 
impossible to see that early Lawrence except through the pane of 
interpretation with which Sontag frames the quotation. And in this 
paragraph I have added a smidgeon of a famous modern literary 
critic's interpretation which may have its own effect on the reader 
unfamiliar with Lawrence's Studies. What is important is that we 
remember always how complicated is the act of reading, how 
extraordinary it is that we can do it at all, and how thick words
16
are...can become...with the weight of centuries of just such thin 
layering upon layering of interpretations and hints of shadings of 
nuances of interpretation as I have done in this short paragraph.
(Let me add an aside here. It is for the reason that I am aware of 
how difficult any reading is, let alone 'reading' another culture, 
that I use so many modern English writers when I write. That is, I 
know from my studies that idiom is a supremely useful tool even when 
used consciously and carefully. But while it is easy to write in an 
idiom, it is very difficult to read it if it is not one's own— see, 
for instance, all the troubles readers had with Anthony Burgess's 
Clockwork Orange with its presentation of a fresh idiom. Because I 
hold that it is the task of anthropology to create idioms, I create 
an idiom for writing anthropology... only a new idiom can get beyond 
culture, can encode for others; reading the fruits of the experience 
of the ethnographer who stands at the same time outside his own idiom 
and not yet in the other. But the construction of this special idiom, 
this idiom of 'stories' and 'motion of self' in which I write, is a 
construction out of the materials of language from my post-war 
twentieth century American overlayed-with-Australian English 
covered-with-sociologese idiom as well as from the pidgin and native 
tongues of the Torres Strait Islanders. For the latter, since they 
are sufficiently little-known to warrant anthropological attention 
in the first place, I have the usual responsibility of any 
professional anthropologist to let my readers know what words are 
what and why they are used and how the speech works. But I have the 
same responsibility for the former. I am equally responsible to my 
reader for where my words and concepts come from. One of the ways to 
do this is to write in touch-points in the form of other writers' 
works, modern writers whose idiom and grasp of it is akin to mine. So 
for this reason, in order to let the unfamiliar reader know something 
of where to go in order to further investigate my idiom, I use 
writers of the present day. And because of my anthropological bent, 
because I value the anthropological imagination, I use modern 
writers who write of societies and cultures, writers knowledgeable
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in anthropology as are Kurt Vonnegut and Ursula LeGuin, writers who 
essay society like Susan Sontag or Paul Goodman, and those like Tom 
Wolfe and Hunter S. Thompson whose job it is to keep tabs on modern 
culture.)
So the present work is a kind of abstracted storyline (a story 
line is what scriptwriters use in abbreviated form to keep their 
dialogue going in the right direction... in a sense this introduction 
is itself something like a storyline or storyboard). It is 
abstracted in the sense that in one book there is not enough time to 
tell everything about everything. The simple choice is to tell 
everything about one or two things or to tell a little about a lot of 
things. Neither of these has been my choice. I have chosen to tell 
something of a few things of which I know enough about my own place in 
them to ensure that I am not getting any of the big points wrong. The 
stricture I have placed on myself is to not cheat the idiom. By that 
I mean that if 'the story' heads off in one direction momentarily 
when I would rather it continued in its analytically interesting 
direction that's too bad for me and I'll follow it where it goes. 
Sometimes this may strike the-reader as unnecessarily peripheral, or 
as undisciplined. In some cases I think it is. The only guarantee I 
can offer is this: As far as I am aware, of all the stories of 
Islander life which I know these are the best selection of which I am 
capable for presenting Islander life in this work. This does not 
mean that ray selection may not improve at some later day. Nor does it 
mean that my presentation may not improve. Well they may. What it 
does mean is that where I have erred I have erred in not being as able 
a reader of my own text as my readers are.
The Thesis: A story of Islandmen
Much of the thesis is couched in an idiom of movement. The first 
chapter, "Just Passing Through", opens a discussion of how it is that 
anthropologists may leave the circumstances of their own condition 
at all in order to pass through the lives of the Others whom they
18
study. The second chapter continues the discussion in an effort to 
come to terms with how it is, once loosed from his own circumstances, 
the anthropologist engages the "alternity" which he reports in his 
ethnography. Taken together, they suggest that in order to engage in 
present day anthropology we must have some idea of what minds are (or 
how they work); of what a person is, and of how it is that society 
makes persons and whether or not there is, in any person a part 
reserved from society; of what the nature of communication is and how 
language and words and speech make communication; and of what meaning 
is (or how it works).
The central chapters are essays on present day Islander life in 
the towns of North Queensland. Each essay has a beginning and middle 
and end. In contrast with the explicit treatment of the motion of 
metaphor in the first chapters, the essays which comprise the central 
concerns are meant to simply move about the places and times of the 
Islandmen. They are intended as ethnography, to expose and explicate 
aspects of modes and codes and metaphors of urban Torres Strait 
Islander life: how time is called and organized; how groups are 
organized; how city life is rendered sensible at all to people with 
little English, few possessions, and a code of behaviour 
antithetical to life in the Australian mainland society; how 
political power is exercised, and how it is possible in the absence 
of almost all traditional political structure.
The last two chapters return to the notion of movement. But now 
that notion is no longer metaphorical. Chapter 7 lays the groundwork 
for a theory of self which will accommodate the very real changes 
which any ethnographer goes through, alone, as he moves from one 
culture to another. In doing so it seeks to explicate the 'movement' 
anyone feels who changes from one person to another; and it presents 
my own warrant for the veracity of my own claim that I do not cheat 
the idiom. It is an account of how I came to know whereof I speak, one 
which is made in greater detail than those to which anthropologists 
are accustomed, a detail demanded by an epistemological position not 
in vogue. In part, that position respects the knowledge of persons
19
over the so-called knowledge in formulae and encyclopaedias and 
other impersonal holdings. It holds, there, with people who are 
moved— by music, by sunsets and waterfalls, by the experience of 
love or ethnographic research— and affirms that they truly are 
moved, and that their 'motion' demands of us not some irresistible 
move into metaphor but a move toward idiom. It is a move not unlike 
that demanded so long ago of the first ethnographers by the very 
presence of Others who had to be surrendered to in order to be 
'captured'.
The concluding chapter, STORYTIME, returns full circle to the 
considerations of "alternity" and what we glean when we 'pass 
through' another society. And it adds to those opening 
considerations some subsequent ones of where we stand when we address 
questions of speaking and language, of Others and ourselves. It 
suggests that the way to understanding the process of understanding 
is to watch very closely as we begin to make sense of original 
senselessness, and that the two practices of ethnography— the 
surrender to the societies we study and the captures we present in 
our writing— are perfectly suited to this path. It presents the 
theory that idiom is the principal mechanism whereby the individual 
encounters society, Self encounters Other, and members of a society 
severally engage their culture. It further proposes that the 
principal form of this mechanism certainly in the dyad of the 
Author-and-Islandmen and logically much wider, is STORY. Human 
beings make themselves into characters in their stories, and then act 
like those characters while trying to rewrite their stories. To 
understand the Islandmen we have to know which characters they think 
they are and who writes their stories.
Were the present work an ethnography proper— which is way of 
saying, were it the case that a genre of ethnography existed wherein 
new ethnographers could situate their own— this last would suffice, 
and the substance of the work would be an examination of Islandmen 
characters in their tales. But it is a work of anthropology, not 
ethnography, and bears a philosophical burden of explication. So, to
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be explicit, this is a work about reading; and because it is about 
reading it is more about mechanism and process than it is about plots 
and characters. Because it is about reading it is more about the 
ethnographer, the one who tells a tale of readings, than it is about 
those who told the tales. And, because every telling is itself a 
reading, it is about the more important things.
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I am concerned with changes in basic 
epistemology, character, self, and so on. Any 
change in our epistemology will involve 
shifting our whole system of abductions. We 
must pass through the threat of that chaos where 
thought becomes impossible.
Gregory Bateson, 
Mind and Nature
CHAPTER 1
Just Passing Through
This chapter is about— to borrow the words of Gregory 
Bateson— passing through the threat of that chaos where thought 
became impossible. The threat of chaos in the particular instance 
which provides both background and subject for this book was that 
chaos in the years of 1976 through 1980 where 
American-Australian-Western thought was useless to the point of 
irrelevance and Torres Strait Island thought was truly impossible. 
There were times, even months and months into the fieldwork, long 
after my wife and I had begun hanging around with Torres Strait 
Islanders, when the threat of that chaos was untenable. Winston 
Churchill's famous 'nothing to fear but fear itself' came to mind, 
but wryly, as do all those things which, ostensibly personal, are 
shown in the glare of the light shed by another culture to be merely 
the trappings of our culture, ineluctably social. Churchill's 
dictum was useless without the history, without the time in which it 
happened and the mentality which provides for its appreciation. And 
without its social use it was truly useless, as useless as it must 
have seemed to the RAF pilots and gunners of the time.
Unwilling to give up the fieldwork, to return to the world of 
Winnie's famous saying without bringing back something of the 
citydwelling Torres Strait Islanders who I had gone to study, I hung
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on, and emerged from that thought-threatening chaos. These pieces of 
writing are about that going, and fearfulness, and emerging. They 
are also about the people known as Torres Strait Islanders. It would 
be (if I read some of my colleagues aright) both easy and expectable 
to say that this writing is as much or more about me as about Torres 
Strait Islanders. If easy, this would be said with the ease of 
accuracy; what it misses is that it is, since it is writing, as much 
about my readers as it is about me or Torres Strait Islanders. In 
part, this is a low-key caution about taking the whole of this 
thesis, or any of its parts, as other than they are. This caution is 
prompted by a concern that a genre of writing has come about which we 
might characterize as soulless sociology. It has been suggested by 
writers before me that the jargon of such a genre be called 
' sociologese' . I would like to make two brief comments on the genre 
which has apparently come into being and about the criticisms of it 
which have been leveled at its excessive jargon.
In the past century or century and a half a number of students of 
society have written and published, have written to and against one 
another, have talked and talked about the problem of man, of 
humankind, of society, of societies. Sometime along the way a style 
of (mostly written) presentation got established, a dry and 
all-humanity-honed-right-out style which likely lay behind Edmund 
Leach's well-known (to fellow anthropologists) statement on how 
impossible he found other people's ethnographies to read. Doubtless 
his statement has become so well remembered because it says what so 
many of the rememberers have been thinking. There have been a number 
of critics who have proposed analyses of the problem of which Leach's 
boring ethnographies are a sympton. Among them my own view is 
closest to that of Ernest Becker, whose The Lost Science of Man is 
composed of two critical essays, one on "The Tragic Paradox of Albion 
Small and American Social Science" and the other a "Sketch for A 
Critical History of Anthropology". Becker traces, briefly, what he 
calls "the science of man as a Grand Vision" from Rousseau and the
philosophes to the lament in critical historical essay of Georges
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Gusdorf (i960): "Anthropology is becoming more and more of an exact 
science, but we know less and less exactly about what."^
Conscious of the invigorating influence of our point of 
view and of the grandeur of a single all-encompassing 
science of man, enthusiastic anthropologists may proclaim 
the mastery of anthropology over older sciences that have 
achieved where we are still struggling with methods, that 
have build up noble structures where choas reigns with us, 
the trand of development points in another direction, in 
the continuance of each science by itself, assisted where 
may be by anthropological methods.
Apropos this excerpt from Franz Boas' 1904 History of 
Anthropology, Becker writes, "What Herder, Spencer, and Tylor really 
achieved that was of lasting value, in Boas's words, was not a 
science of man but rather an attitude of historical, genetic inquiry, 
which 'sowed the seed of the anthropological spirit in the minds of
phistorians and philosophers'. ... That is to say, anthropology had 
hardly taken shape as a science when it abandoned its vision and 
became a method that anyone could use and that would be parceled out 
to the other disciplines." Becker says, harking to the cognate 
problems of Albion Small and early American sociology, "It is almost 
as though Albion Small were speaking in an adjoining room, and we 
could hear his echo through the wall. Anthropology (sociology) has 
no business lording it over the older disciplines in an 
imperialistic, superordinate pose; the older disciplines have built 
up sound method, real scientific stature, which we anthropologists 
(sociologists) must now strive to equal, if we are to be respected 
and accepted. The one thing that anthropology (sociology) has to 
offer the older disciplines is a unique method or attitude, which 
will help them invigorate their data".
What I am suggesting here is that the problem of boring and dull 
sociology and anthropology has been a normal outcome of a couple of 
disciplines which have for, say, the last half of the time since 
Rousseau, narrowed and specialized and imitated and copied other 
sciences until one of its historians (Gusdorf) wonders "whether the 
very word anthropology still has any meaning, and if it has, what 
that meaning might be".^ The present work is an experiment
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(experience) in what that meaning might be. Recognizing what Becker 
called, in the conclusion to his Sketch, "The Enormous Dimensions of 
the Problem", this is an attempt to return to the eighteenth century, 
to where the science of man "took root" (as Becker put it). Behind 
the essays and analyses which follow are the questions What is man? 
and Who are we?— entertaining both senses of we: the 'we' that is 
versus all the 'them's', and the 'we' that all humankind might 
someday become— and what is Character, Self, a self, society, 
culture? The knowing risk is explicitly against that which has become 
so common, the ordinary risk of boring readers by being too narrow 
and too specialized and forgetting why it is that we do anthropology 
or sociology, of how it is that the 'problem' of man came about; my 
risk is rather that of the man who, seeing his target to be both 
enormous and amorphous, chooses a shotgun over a rifle and, though he 
succeeds in hitting it (How could he miss?), the holes he makes are 
so small and seldom that the light shed through them is negligible.
The problem for me, and for the reader, is that of telling the 
whole story. In one rather simple sense, the 'whole story' is the 
whole Torres Strait Islander story. But in the telling of it, or of 
what are necessarily only parts of it, I do so in English, using a 
modern language which is not part of the Islander story, and using 
words which each imply all others.^ To imagine that I was doing 
otherwise would be to imply a theory of translation where words could 
be shifted from one language to the next— from the pidgin and 
indigenous languages of Torres Strait into my own 
Australian-American brand of English— when I know this to be not at 
all the case. What can shift from one language to the next is a 
person. In the present work I have limited myself to those times when 
I can shift from some Islander language to English. (Were I writing 
for an Islander audience I would seek to limit myself to those times 
when I could shift from English into Islander tongues; and my 
ethnography would have a very different shape from the present one.) 
I have been quite rigorous on this count. Nothing that appears 
herein is the result of speculation. Nor should any of it be read as
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implication. It is hard enough to tell a whole story without also 
implying and speculating other stories.
Throwing the ’Baby' Out with the Bath
"Give an anthropologist any problem and he will tell you," Jules 
Henry once wrote,^ "it cannot be understood unless the 'whole 
situation' is taken into account. This generally makes his 'more 
sophisticated' colleagues in other disciplines turn away in silence 
because they 'know' that most situations, particularly in our 
culture, are 'too complicated' to be grasped in their entirety. 'Too 
many angles,' of course, is what makes most people turn from 
understanding:
the international situation 
domestic politics 
local politics
how much they pay above the real price on installment 
purchases
the nature of the universe
advertising
their own children
adolescence
As Henry says, "we must not be bamboozled by the unnumbered crowds 
of Those Who Turn Away." Agreed. But what that leaves us with is the 
search for understanding the "whole situation" (or as I have put it, 
the whole story), for understanding what each and every 'whole 
situation' comprises. Henry's list of the international situation 
and domestic politics and the rest may be notionally duplicated for 
Torres Strait Islanders whose culture I tried to comprehend. It 
might look something like this:
the international situation in the Western Pacific 
North Queensland black politics
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national (Australian) white politics 
how to obtain instalment purchases 
the (islander) future in Australia 
Christianity 
Aborigines
Conspicuously absent in this list are "the nature of the universe", 
"their own children", and "adolescence" ("advertising" is missing 
also, but only incidentally). It is my understanding that categories 
of people such as children and adolescents (i think the distinction 
between adolescence and adolescents would not be important) are 
perfectly comprehensible within the Islander program for raising and 
educating children. Similarly, the 'nature of the universe' would 
be, I think, incomprehensible as an incipient question either 
because it was simply a misnomer ('nature' and 'universe' being 
redundant), or because 'the universe' is inseparable from what we, as 
outsiders, might call 'the Islander world'.
My point is that ethnography always tackles those things about 
snother culture which have 'too many angles' , those things which, if 
tackled in our own, would be greeted with the oppressive doubt of 
Those Who Turn Away. It may be that this is a not unfair 
characterization of the problem of too many angles in the human 
psyche until the advent of a Sigmund Freud. That is, part of the 
problem of the too-many-angles/those-who-turn-away paradigm lies in 
the second half, in the those-who-turn-away. And a large part of 
this problem is that the Turning Away is part of culture.
So are the angles. The task of the ethnographer is, then, (to 
continue the 'angles' metaphor) to establish a few points of 
reference for his readers so that they can follow his 'lines of 
argument' (and thereby see the angles). At least this is a fair 
geometric metaphor for what the usual ethnographies do. But one 
question presses itself louder and louder against the window of those 
who look out (of their— 'our'— culture) into the cultures of others: 
Are these few 'concrete' points of reference 'out there'? are they
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still 'in here' and we pretend then out there in order to describe 
the angles? or are they, as I suspect, on the window!?!
By 'on the window' I mean what is commonly taken to be some kind of 
filter operating between things: between us and them, between you and 
me, between 'me' and my perceptions, or, especially 
anthropologically, between one culture and another. In that sense 
the window is this filter, this all-but-transparent-meinbrane 
separating one 'culture' from another. Within this metaphorical 
stricture (one which has held sway, in one comparable notion or 
another, for quite some time— Roy Wagner says since synthetic 
anthropology's first "historical-diffusionist manifestation" around 
1871 ) I think my suggestion that the 'points' are on the window is a 
better metaphor. (I am reminded here of Clifford Geertz's note to
Ohis Notes on the Balinese Cockfight in which he puts, apropos his 
"coupling of the occidental great [Dickens] with the oriental lowly 
[Bali's cockfighter]" in discussing how social forms actually 
generate the subjectivities which they are normally taken only to 
display, the conviction, "for which Robert Graves claims to have been 
reprimanded at his Cambridge tripos, that some poems are better than 
others.")
But, better metaphor or not, resting in the metaphorical does not 
get us to where the fundamental questions of the comparability of 
cultures need be posed. As I prepare to attack this notion of 'the 
comparability of cultures', I ought to make clear that what I am 
proposing to attack (however briefly) is a thing of my reading; that 
is, it is from the way I read the people whom I think are holding for 
the comparability of cultures that I find the need to attack. I do 
not wish to mince words with anyone, nor to be read as attacking 
those who are fundamentally in agreement with me. What I do_ want to 
do is dispel the myth that cultures are comparable entities. In 
order to do this, I hereby attack those writers whom I take to be 
holding forth in the vein of cultural comparability. For this 
reason, I want to get out of the metaphor of the 'window into another 
world'. For in my investigations of Torres Strait Islanders and
28
their 'culture' I could find no membrane, no filter. And, it seemed, 
in finding no 'window' I could find no 'culture'. And, as it turns 
out, this was accurate. Cultures are functions of windows. Or, 
better, 'cultures' are functions of 'windows'.
By 'cultures' being functions of 'windows', I mean no more than 
the simple, and hardly uncommon, realization that the manner of 
observation has a great deal to do with what is eventually observed. 
In the grossest anthropological example of late, that of naive 
cultural relativism, anyone setting out to observe the natives 
having already concluded their culture to be judgeable relative only 
to their own behaviour or society is bound to observe a society or 
behaviour which is relatively sound according to the lights of that 
culture. (The neatest mnemonic for keeping this kind of preclusion 
in mind is in that very use of "bound": he's bound to find what he 
seeks.) In one sense, this is always the problem of definition. That 
is, as we understand definitions in their common dictionary 
versions, they are not about— cannot be about— discovery; rather, 
they are always after the fact. Strictly, they are always after the 
fact of someone having used the word to mean that definition, and 
very good historical dictionaries even record the first known such 
use. It would not be a good plan, then, to consult a dictionary in 
order to make discoveries about the meanings of words— or, strictly 
speaking, about what people can mean with words— since the 
dictionary records but what has already been meant by someone or 
other.
By this crude analogy with dictionary definitions I do not mean to 
say that it is not a good plan for would-be ethnographers to read any 
of the 'definitive' ethnographies written in the vein of cultural 
relativism. What I do mean is that it is not a good plan to read them 
for what they define. It may be a very good idea to read them for what 
they say about their studied peoples. But to read them for 
definitions would be as silly as reading a dictionary to find out 
what a poet meant...all the dictionary will say is what somebody else 
meant, and then only in some truncated normalized context.
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So the problem with convicted cultural relativists is not that 
they might find some society where action is truly assessable only in 
terms of its own culture. Certainly, a very great deal of what we 
find enacted by members of other societies is assessable only in 
terms of their own culture. No, the problem with ethnographers who 
pre-conclude relativism is that they preclude other means of 
assessability. In seeking to eradicate the crude and often 
ill-grounded theories of progressive social evolution, and the 
ethnocentricity on which most such theories rested, cultural 
relativists opted out of the assessment racket altogether. My 
contention is that this was unnecessarily wasteful; that in their 
initial eagerness to rid the discipline of one taint they introduced 
another. Let me suggest that the problem, in my view, with the social 
evolutionists and diffusionists was not so much in their mode of 
characterization but in their manner of observation. In this, I am 
not unlike the cultural relativists who also suggested that only 
ethnographers who get out there amongst the natives ought to be 
trusted regarding what they bring back. But I and the relativists 
part company when the relativists, seeing the Lewis Henry Morgans and 
others characterize native societies as more or less advanced toward 
civilization, want to outlaw characterization and I, embarrassed at 
the unreal goody-goodyness of the resulting relativistic accounts, 
want to pursue the investigation of characterization itself. Or, put 
another way, we part company when they, desirous of changing the 
wrongly-characterized theoretical bath of ethnology, throw out along 
with the water the baby— for me, the only locus of character 
whatsoever. Unable to see the 'true character' of the native-baby 
through the milky water of past theorizing, they have thrown out the 
lot. The problem is that it is not always possible to get a new baby. 
Much of the ethnographic 'baby'— the societies of undeveloped 
islands and highlands —  is gone forever. There is no way to get at 
the 'true character' of those societies which, wrongly characterized 
from some current viewpoint or other, have changed or disappeared.
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Such disappearances are bothersome to those whose notion of 
making original ethnographic contributions entails making studies of 
hitherto unstudied societies, and utterly torments those whose 
inculcated definition of ethnography includes an ethnographic 
present preclusive of entertaining any study where someone has been 
already. Others, content to do a 'restudy' of a society already the 
subject of published ethnology, have most often set about describing 
a baby which, though displaced a decade or two in time, is 
'essentially the same baby'. And their studies have been often as 
concerned with the 'impurities' in their bathwater left by their 
forbear’s erroneous theorizing as they have been with ethnography.
The Baby Is the Bath, Too
This is ray suggestion for the eradication of the kind of problem 
which has plagued an anthropology overconcerned with its modes of 
characterization, its theories. More precisely here I refer to 
theoretical stances, or perhaps to theoretical camps. My concern is 
that the present study be not misunderstood as another 
deconstruction operation by a johnny-come-lately student armed with 
hindsight, a hindsight usually not even his own but that of his most 
recent mentor. So, for that reason, I shall concern myself only 
momentarily, and from time to time, with the differences between my 
way of going about ethnography and other ways extant, save this brief 
introductory discussion.
By saying that The Baby Is the Bath, Too, I mean to borrow the 
quick clarity of metaphor in order to fashion a perceptual hook on 
which to hang an ethnological distinction. My suggestion is that the 
'baby', which I have made to stand for the subject matter of 
anthropology, or for the object societies of ethnography, or for the 
primitive peoples of 18th century ethnology, is not really the whole 
of the object of study: that in fact the theories and hypotheses and 
preconclusions that the ethnographer takes to the field (even where 
his 'field' is the armchair in his study or on his back porch)
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insinuate themselves into the study, where they are little 
distinguished from the subject or object or primitive being 
examined. What this means is that the study— the ethnological 
treatise or ethnography or what have you— is actually the 
presentation of some native people and this native (albeit sometimes 
the ’natives' of the ethnologist's own society) people's behaviour 
and the ethnologist's rendition of this behaviour and his 
interpretation of what it means. Sometimes the interpretation is in 
terms of the native culture and sometimes it is in terms of some 
esoteric standard... often it used to be in terms of the ethnologist's 
own cultural standards— the ethnocentricism so objectionable to the 
cultural relativists.
So, harking back to my mention of character (i shall make more of 
this notion of character later on), let me put it simplistically: The 
ethnologist, who is a person of some individual character and 
characterized by his own society according to the tenets of his own 
culture, goes to observe and participate in some other society which 
he then characterizes, either according to the tenets characteristic 
of its culture or according to some others. What I have suggested is 
that the society is commonly thought to be The Baby, while the 
characterizations of it (and the sources for those 
characterizations) are thought to be the Bath (leaving the 
discipline of anthropology itself as the bathtub perhaps). My 
correction, then, is that we begin to realize that these distinctions 
are born of the artifice of easy theoretical— by theoretical here I 
mean impractical —  thinking. That is, while it may be the case that 
there is some Baby in the field, some Baby which pre-existed the 
ethnographer, there is no Baby once the ethnographer gets there. No 
pristine infans, anyway. Once the ethnographer gets there it's his 
Baby.
Do I mean by this that there is no difference between the 
ethnographer and the people he studies? No, certainly not. Nor do I 
mean that ethnographers are not, by and large and by virtue of their 
avocation, able to distinguish their subjects from themselves. What
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I mean is that their studies do not normally permit such distinction.
A distinction which is permitted in the study— ethnography, or 
ethnological treatise, or whatever— is a distinction between 
ethnography and reader. And it is a distinction which the 
ethnographer may make while he is writing ethnography and the reader 
while he is reading. (And I should mention here that it is a 
distinction which the reader may be certain, in the case of most 
readers, of making only upon the first comprehensive reading. By 
comprehensive reading I mean the first time he knowns that he 
comprehends what he reads; thus, what I have said is that the reader 
may know for certain that he is himself and that this ethnography is 
not part of him only until such time as he reads and comprehends it. 
After that, his certitude that he was one thing and the ethnography 
he has read was another is only as good as his memory.)
I shall return to the elaboration of this shortly. For the nonce, 
let me use this notion of ethnography as distinct from reader to 
inform my metaphorical suggestions about Bath and The Baby. In this 
case, the ethnography is The Baby. It preexists the reader, or at 
least it exists before he discovers it and reads it (a rare and 
special case is the ethnography-in-preparation which the reader 
awaits, and which he may have a hand in constructing or even 
writing). It will be there after the reader has read it, much the 
same as the societies which are the Babies of ethnographic research 
remain after we leave them. Now the question is where is the Bath? I 
said before the the Bath was the theories and hypotheses and 
predispositions which infuse the characterization of the studied 
society. But in the case of the ethnography, the society appears 
only as it is characterized— described, rationalized, assessed— by 
the ethnographer; there is no society, only a characterized society. 
The society and its weighted and coloured and otherwised 
characterized description come together, are together, are 
indistinguishable in the ethnography. This is the kind of 
relationship I allude to when I say The Baby Is the Bath, Too. The 
baby is always the bath, too. The saying about throwing the baby out
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with the bath can only have come out of a time when there were babies 
before there were babies-in-baths. And this makes sense, since no 
baby comes with its own bath. But societies do. The idea of some 
society as an entity apart from the characterizations of any extant 
knowledge of it is suitable only for that sort of mythical idea. (And 
societies, or putative ones, of that ilk do 'exist': The Amazons, 
Atlantians, etc.)
It may be rightly inferred from what I have written that this 
opaque bathwater, as I have equated it with the characterizations 
which invariably accompany the 'description' of some society, is 
here to stay. Or, at least, that opacity is guaranteed, no matter 
that the theories and hypotheses which shall underlie the 
characterizations to come may well change. I think this is the case. 
I think, too, that if we see some society-Baby in some future study 
barely discernable through the bath-muck, and this Baby has only one 
arm, we'd do well not to theorize the other arm on the strength of 
what the Baby must look like. For we may well find out that this 
never-before-studied society has only the one arm, and does quite 
well in its sinister fashion. And we shall have nought to do then but 
throw the bathwater out if we wish to get rid of that theorized 
second arm.
While I don't mind working this Baby-Bath metaphor, I shouldn't 
like it to get out of hand. My simple point is that there is only 
ideal discrimination possible between theory and theorized object. 
And while this in no way hinders those who wish to do idealist 
ethnography, nor but little hinders those who seek to make pure 
descriptions, it renders all objectivist theoretical anthropology 
untenable. So, for those who, like me, wish to pursue theoretical 
anthropology, there is the requirement to find something other than 
objectivism.
I could rather say here that an objectivism which permitted as its 
object The Baby/Bath/bathtub/bathwater/and so forth, would be all 
right. But I suspect that such an objectivism would not be 
entertained by those practitioners who hold that there is some kind
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of objective reality in the society (The Baby). In which case there 
is little point in entering some internecine objectivist debate over 
what exactly constitutes the Baby for, were I to win that debate, it 
would have to be determined thenceforward that EVERYTHING 
constituted the object. Of course, this is exactly what I think is 
the case. Or, more accurately, anything may constitute the object. 
This is, thus far, a strictly Kantian position, regarding the Ding an 
Sich, the thing itself, to be ascertainable or graspable only via the 
facts, and that we choose (in some sense) the facts of any Thing.
But I may do a disservice to Kant, allying him post mortem to my 
cause as I have done here. For it may have been that Kant thought 
that there was some Thing which was the object of investigation, and 
that he was somehow disappointed that we (humans) were stuck with 
getting at any Thing only through the infinite number of facts which 
we might choose about it. For my part, I am not disappointed at all, 
for I suspect that we do an idealistic disservice to the nature of 
knowing itself when we imagine there to be some object, some Ding an 
Sich Thing both different from and larger than the facts which we 
ascertain about it. The specific disservice is the confusion of 
knowledge and imagination.
Knowledge and Imagination
When we imagine there to be some opacity in the bathwater caused 
by nonconcordance of the theories of our practice (to wit: ethnology) 
with our practice itself, an opacity which obscures our view of the 
Baby we know to be there, that is when we do a disservice to both 
knowledge and imagination. For what is the case is that it is the 
water which we know something about, and the Baby which we imagine. 
But this is not a widely held view, and certainly not widely 
promulgated, so it may behoove me to elaborate. I may add, in passing 
but hardly incidentally, that this very philosophical first chapter 
is a case in point, an example of the way not to proceed normally with 
an anthropological thesis. Therefore, my elaboration of what I mean
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by thus distinguishing knowledge and imagination will have something 
of the flavour of a justification in addition to its being an 
explication.
A good first question might be, How do we know what we know? Or, 
How do we know that we know? If we push this sort of question far 
enough, playing willy-nilly with subject and object, we can get to 
'How do I know that I am?'...the question A.E. van Vogt called, in a 
recent novel, the "Zen placebo". So, though it may be an OK first 
question, as a way of going about questioning it may not be so good. 
If we let "anything" stand for [what we know] in the first question, 
we get, How do we know "anything"? This may be closer to a better way 
of going about this, leaving as it does the question of what the 
"anything" is to some later investigation. And since this "anything" 
can be, literally and virtually, anything, let's make this first 
question, How do we know? Now this is getting us a little closer to 
the kind of intellectual investigation with which I feel more 
comfortable. For I can understand this question as a response. And 
responses, existing as they do in the real world of debate and 
discourse and interlocution, are familiar and have recognizable 
contexts and situations. I can say,
We know that Torres Strait Islanders live in Queensland.
And you can say,
How do we know?
This is the sort of ordinary speech in which the object— the 'that' 
of How do we know that?— is made by the first speaker, and becomes 
the subject of the second person's query. And notice here how the 
normally taught bounds of 'subject' and 'object' start to fuzz. I 
can say that the grammatical understood object, 'that' (How do we 
know [that]?), is the subject of the question. And if I do it from 
the point of view of a reporter, or some other third person, it is 
even clearer how 'object' is subject:
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The subject of the reader's question was the assertion that 
Torres Strait Islanders live in Queensland.
But I don't have to risk the objection to this wordplay that I am 
confusing grammar and semantics. I can simply offer these two 
typical descriptions of ethnographic research:
The subject of ethnography is the native society and 
culture.
The object of ethnography is the native society and culture.
Or, resuming my metaphor:
The subject of ethnography is The Baby.
The object of ethnography is The Baby.
I do not mean by these pairs to show that subject and object are 
interchangeable. And in fact, the feel of reading them suggests that 
there is a relationship of difference between them, that they are not 
interchangeable. There is a difference of predication. This is one 
of the hinges for my argument, and I shall return to it in order to 
discuss it in detail. For now, let me introduce it by the suggestion, 
which I have just made, that the subtle difference between using 
'subject' (The subject of ethnography is The Baby) and 'object' (The 
object of ethnography is The Baby) lies in the different next-thing 
which each demands. That is to say that each of the two wordings 
demands its own closure. In the wording using 'subject', the 
sentence can stand on its own. As long as it makes sense, it can just 
sit there...the answer to some previous question; a title; an opening 
sentence for an unfinished treatise, or the closing sentence to a 
finished one. As a sentence it satisfies Ian Hacking's notion of 
"sentential knowledge" and may exemplify Karl Popper's "epistemology 
without a knowing subject".^
The feel of the 'object' wording is subtly different, but much 
more demanding of a predicate. The idiomatic response which comes to 
mind on a third or fourth reading (i.e. after already being engaged 
in trying to get away from the pressure of the predicative demand) 
is, "So what?". And by come to mind there I mean it actually popped 
into my head while I was writing this paragraph, and after I had been
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glancing at the sentence with the 'object' wording sitting to my left 
on the preceding page of the manuscript. For those readers 
acquainted with the American idiom, that wherein the idiomatic So 
what!? resides, the 'pressure' I mention ought to be retroflectively 
apparent even if the pressure wasn't felt. 'So what' is a kind of 
admission of a failure of closure, a giving in to the inability to 
make anything of the sentence. It is, in its very frustration, an 
attestation to what I have called its predicative demand. It can't 
just sit there. Or, sitting there though it must (for I make it do 
so), it does so under an almost audible duress.
But consider how we might alternately predicate the sentence, in 
order to alleviate its misery. What if we say, instead,
The object of ethnography is the description of the Baby. 
(The object of ethnography is the description of native 
society.)
Am I right in reading this with little or no ensuing unease? What if I 
conventionalize it even more, say,
The object of ethnographic description is the elucidation of 
native society and culture.
In one sense, with all the "description" and "elucidation" in there, 
and with the adjectival "ethnographic" , this sentence will be bound 
to sound at least more familiar to most of us. And any 'pressure' or 
unease will be less for the familiarity, (if you don't think so, 
consider the sentence: Nazi technicians succeeded in exterminating 
six million Jews in the attempt to purify the Aryan race.) But there 
is, too, a reduction in the sitting uneasiness of the sentence. The 
next-thing which it demands is significantly reduced.
Now, let me suggest that the distinctions of reading which I have 
suggested (and which each reader may judge to be right or not) are 
not whimsical. They are not the result of some light play over the 
words. In the terms of the title of this section, they are 
distinctions known rather than imagined. And for my purposes it is 
important to bear in mind from the outset that reading obtains
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knowledge rather than imaginated things. This is, for me, an 
incredible realization (i use incredible there to signal a bigness 
whose notional limits are not yet known, rather than to indicate 
something strictly 'un-knowable'), redolent still of my discovery of 
it.
It seems to me that this has rather many implications for modern 
ethnography— this idea, or realization, that reading obtains known 
things rather than imagined ones. I suspect that this might, without 
some adumbration, seem to fly in the face of the commonest sense of 
what reading does. That is to say, for instance, if I write 
Black bananas are best for frying.
you will read it and will, providing that you do not suspect me of 
being all this time a Chinese parodist truly interested in flying 
bananas, get a kind of initial orientation of domain; to wit, that I 
am going to say (write) something more about bananas, and about 
cooking them, and about how we can use the colour of the meat or 
perhaps the skin to tell which ones are good for frying. But there is 
a question for the asking here about what it is that you know from 
reading this sentence. My surmise is that the endless possibilities 
proposed by your reading of it almost mask what is it that is known by 
reading it. (And, in addition, my frying/flying addendum proposed a 
universe of parodistic Chinese-English of the 'flied lice' variety, 
and another of mounting bananas like broomsticks, let alone what 
variations on this absurd theme your own playful reading may have 
come up with.)
All of these possibilities have to do with imagination rather than 
with knowledge. They are all imagined. They all have some sort of 
subject or other— bananas, me the writer, me the cook, me the flying 
Chinese—  and they all have some sort of predication— cooking, 
frying, flying, being best. Compared to the imagined stuff, the 
known things are few. Reading this sentence, we (i have joined the 
ranks of the readers now, reading from the top of this printed page 
rather than remembering what I meant when I typed the sentence in 
manuscript) cannot say that we know that black bananas actually do
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make the best frying ones... though those of us who have been educated 
in one or the other culinary traditions of which this is a tenet 
could maintain that we do know this, though it wouldn't be 'from' the 
sentence. Nor can we say (or, we would do so only incautiously at 
best), that the writer means that black bananas are best for frying, 
because I, shape-shifter that I am, can become the writer again and 
say that I really am that parodistic Chinese and 'banana' is a kind 
of fighting kite...and add sheepishly that I mistyped the r for the 1 
in "frying", and forgot the quotes around 'banana'.
This excursion into absurd sentences is not intended to pull the 
anthropologist reader by his ears into the realm of philosophy. A 
look at Donald Davidson on "Agency" or his "Action, Reasons, and 
Causes", and another at H.P. Grice's "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence 
Meaning, and Word Meaning" would suffice to familiarize the 
anthropologist reader with the long history of philosophical
occupation with such matters as raised in my simple questions of what
10the black banana sentence means.
My question is not about what I (as writer) meant or might have 
meant by that sentence. My question is about what we (you and I as 
readers) might know pursuant to that sentence. And this is where a 
kind of notional linguistic analogy fails the ethnographic 
investigator, for there is no good substitute for my 'pursuant' in 
that sentence, and even 'pursuant' brings with it a sense of after 
which may be misleading. For instance, we know something about 
"black" , but our knowledge of black is in no way after our reading of 
the sentence. Yet it has only to do with that sentence after we have 
read it. (This is the sense of 'after' which is used to some avail 
when we wish to adhere to some particular and original usage for 
which we wish to acknowledge the author.) And with not very much 
wordplay at all we can make it that what we know of "black" is running 
after the 'black' in 'black bananas' in order to get at its 
meaning...or, rather, in order to use the congruence to get at the 
writer's meaning. In some (albeit from an ordinarily formal point of 
view, playful) sense, we can say that our knowledge of "black" is
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literally pursuant to that sentence. But what we cannot say is that 
sentence teaches us something about black. Rather we must say that 
we use what we already know about black to decipher— to read— the 
sentence. But once read, the question of knowledge is moot. 
Imagination takes over. And pictures and images of nice juicy black 
bananas a-frying abound.
But here is a problem: When I wrote that sentence I saw nothing 
with my mind's eye of bananas, black or frying. In fact, almost 
immediately upon writing it for the purpose of this discussion of 
knowledge and imagination I saw the possibility of reading flying for 
frying and was already off and running, imagining some context for 
the typo. (Or perhaps the typo and the story in which it might figure 
all came to mind at once, so quickly did it all arrive in my 
awareness.) As is clear, I wrote the black banana sentence in order 
to make a few points about what it is that writing and reading do, and 
specifically about what it is that we can reasonable expect of the 
writing and reading of ethnographic writing. I, as writer, do not 
expect you to get the same kind of idea when reading that I had when 
writing. What I do want to do is make the best guess I can about the 
sorts of things you already know so that I can excite your 
imagination.
Normally I think this is the sort of arrangement which is taken 
for granted. But in the case of ethnography there are some things 
which must be spelled out, I think, very carefully. It may serve 
ordinary English vernacular for me to say that
Black bananas are best for frying
is a meaningful sentence. But the thing to remember is that such an 
assertion as 'This is a meaningful sentence' is a rare bird. It has 
some presence in language philosophy, but it would serve little 
purpose in the vernacular. The only time anyone has to say such a 
thing is when there is real or imagined, implicit or explicit 
contradiction to some sentence said. Perceiving (or imagining) this 
contradictoriness in his audience, the speaker can assert, 
meaningfully, "This is a meaningful sentence!" But, usually, because
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we make our meanings as we go about the daily business of talking and 
being heard, there is little cause to assert meaningfulness. More 
than this, the only cause for the assertion of meaningfulness is 
exactly where we suspect meaning has failed. Only where there is no 
meaning must we resort to its name.
One of the common genres wherein meaning has no existence at the 
outset is ethnography. The subject (or object) of ethnography being 
something of an alien society or culture, there is a built-in 
restriction on the sorts of meanings. And because of this, perhaps 
an inordinate amount of page-space has been taken up by ethnographers 
discussing meaning (instead of simply being meaningful in whatever 
their exposition). As Gilbert Lewis has recently written, 
"'meaning' is a word of such easy virtue, we would do well to be wary 
of its temptations".^ And we hardly have to refer yet again to the 
collation of 'meanings' in Ogden and Richards. Pierre Bourdieu has 
recently brought into English writing the observation of Charles 
Bally that whereas the speaker treats language as a "means of action 
and expression", there is an incipient intellectualism (Bourdieu's 
emphasis) in always seeing language from the standpoint of the 
listener, for "the listener is on the side of the language, it is 
with the language that he interprets speech". For ray purpose here 
let this be a reminder of the duality of language— speaker/creator 
and hearer/interpreter— and the problems this makes for all who 
would be unwary of meaning's easy virtue. In reference to the 
"disservice to knowledge and imagination" which sparked this 
discussion, however, we must have some idea how we are to deal with 
those things that questions like 'How does he know what he means?', 
or, even more of a problem, 'How do we know what he means?' are meant 
to get at.
Let me say that I have no problem in the area of 'knowing what I 
mean'. That is, for the duration of this piece of writing the reader 
is hereby licensed to take it as given that I know what I mean; this 
also licenses the corollary that I know what I am saying. (This 
leaves begging one of the commonest problems of ethnography reading,
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the problem of 'How do we know that what he says is so?', and I shall 
return to this one in my discussion of reading below.) In the first 
case, there is proposed, inter alia, subscription to one side of a 
long and involved philosophical debate concerning the nature of 
knowledge. While I shall not address these issues in any detail, let 
me, at any rate, affirm that I know which side of the knowledge fence 
I am on. Since this lies at the root of any practice of ethnography, 
it is crucial to address it at the beginning of any ethnographic 
writing. By leaving myself open to criticism from quarters unknown 
(i.e. by advising that I know what I mean throughout), I am claiming 
to know what I know. Simply that. And I have advised the reader that 
I will eschew those implications, inferences, ramifications, 
functionalia etcetera where I only 'think that I know'. (For some of 
the basic philosophy around this problem see Alan R. White, "Thinking 
That and Knowing That", or Ryle 1945-46, Ayer 1956, Geach 1957). All 
of this depends, of course on two things.
The first of these two things is unsolveable and therefore easily 
dismissed, for it has to do with the nature of the discourse carried 
on by me writing, then getting the writing 'passed' by some kind of 
editorial or other disciplinary entity, then published, and then you 
reading it. The first of these things is that you must believe me. 
Since there is no recourse save your writing a response— or, in the 
case of a reader who is a thesis examiner, failing the thesis; in the 
case of a publisher, rejecting it —  there is a kind of trade-off 
whereby the reader gets to read without the busy distractions of 
having to attend to the kinesics and proxemics and what-have-you of 
conversation and the writer has to write without knowing if the 
reader believes him. So all we (i) can do is to announce our 
culpability on grounds of dishonesty.
The second of these is the more serious, and because it has some 
bearing on modern philosophy as well as ethnography I shall spend a 
paragraph or two on it: I know when I know something versus when I 
only think I know. This is the epistemological ground of this 
thesis. More than that, any piece of experiential writing so
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grounded must have at its "experiential core" (to borrow Liam 
Hudson's term*' ^ ) such an awareness. So a commitment to only write 
what I know is not, in this case, a commitment to some philosophical 
stance on verifiability. It is not only incidentally not such a 
commitment, it is emphatically not. I am claiming as knower to be 
ipso facto verifier, thereby obviating verification. I am also, by 
that claim, abandoning any counter-claim to reproducability, in the 
sense in which social science 'experiments' have been said from time 
to time in the modern era to be reproducable (usually, as I take it, 
in order that there can be some test or verification).
So I am, in the very least, promising to both pay attention to 
what I write*'^ and to write nothing that I don't know. For instance, 
when I wrote above that "Cultures are functions of windows" I knew 
what I was writing, and I did not write therein anything I didn't 
know. Of course it is a most difficult thing to attempt to show that 
cultures, commonly thought to be a kind of thing, are really bits of 
interference which stand between us as observers and them, the 
members of other societies whom we observe. That attempt shall, on 
one account, occupy the whole of the present work. Since that is the 
case, it is well that I alert the reader at the outset to how it is 
that I have figured out to best put into words what I have discovered 
about cultures. But I only do it to provide some sort of signpost of 
cerebration, a way for the reader to refer to what it is that I am 
trying to show, and just one of a number of verbal signals which, 
taken together, may serve to confirm a sense of having arrived at 
what it is that I am getting at.
Let me also add here that it is my intention that the reader shall 
know what I am getting at (this is the normal intention of course) 
and in order to serve this intention I shall not be restricted by 
what I take to be normal restrictions operating on the language of 
ethnography. Let me give an example which may round off this 
discussion of how language— the language of writing ethnographies, 
as well as any other language— bears on what we know and what we 
imagine.
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Imagining the Teller; Knowing the Tale
I shall give this example in the form of a tale, or story. I do so 
not just to keep on the track of the solution promised hy the title of 
the present work, but also as a way of inveigling the reader into an 
introduction of the story as mental mechanism, as one of the means 
whereby the most basic and seemingly untraceable origins of our very 
experience come to occupy that experience. Quite simply, and not at 
all simplistically, I mean to suggest that there are things which 
enable 'cultural comparison' despite my earlier suggestion that 
cultures are not comparable. One of these things, or rather some of 
these things (which is to say one of these things is the form of 
story, or some of them are stories in particular detail), are 
stories, such as the one which will serve to exemplify my distinction 
between knowledge and imagination.
This is a story, a true account, of how one ethnographer cottoned
on to one of those hard-to-grasp expressions which plague all
ethnographers who worry at how to find what their informants, as
Professor Geertz has put it, "perceive 'with'— or 'by means of', or
'through' . . .  or whatever the word should be" (1976:224)* The
account comes as a story because that is how it comes to me every time
I think of it, or am caused to think of it. And it is unlikely that I
would censor this particular appearance of a story in view of my
theoretical assertion that stories are themselves the things we and
our informants 'perceive with, or by means of, or through'.
Certainly it is a fair account of how one ethnographer came to
understand an expression of assessment which was also an
ideal-typical concept, one which organized much daily experience.
/The expression was pakarar, a word in Meriam mir, the native language
of the Eastern Islands of the Torres Strait. I had heard it often on
the streets of Townsville, where the greater numbers of Eastern
Torres Strait Islanders over Central and Western Islanders is
/reflected in the greater incidence of Meriam mir words cropping up in
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the Torres Strait Pidgin (the lingua franca of all the islands of the 
Strait) which is the language of what I came to think of as the Torres 
Strait Mainland...a 'place' on the Australian mainland hut never of 
it.
Part of this Torres Strait Mainland, its headquarters in some 
respects, was the 'Islander public' sphere of downtown Townsville (i 
shall use 'Islander public' from time to time— though I shall drop 
the quotation marks pretty soon— to refer to that part of what most 
citizens would think of as public domain but which is from an 
Islander point of view, bound off from the white public and 
Aboriginal public who may well physically occupy it even while it is 
demarcated by Islanders as 'Islander public', much in the way Seattle 
urban nomads were 'invisible' to all but the police and social 
workers who passed them by, drunk and cold, in their doorways and 
under their old newspapers [Spradley 1970].) And it was in this 
everyday world of messages arriving from Saibai and Stephen— the 
outermost islands of the Strait— sooner by mouth than by telegram; 
of people arriving from the islands and departing for work or 
relations in the Queensland hinterland, of workers returning from 
'The West' to settle in the headquarter cities of Mackay and Cairns 
and Townsville.. .it was here that I began to learn my way around the 
Islander idiom. This story is suggestive of the rudiments of how we 
begin to know anything of the peoples we ethnographers study. But it 
also is intended to illustrate a distinction (one which I shall later 
discuss as a 'motion of self'), a movement from acting like an 
Islander— which I could see— toward becoming one— which I could 
feel.
The Story:
That's it! Pakarar...that's it!
(in a sense this is a story about an abduction. Abductions were 
C.S. Peirce's retroductive logical devices, ways of reasoning which 
were inductions, but the sorts of inductions which couldn't get 
anywhere without the active supervention of the thinker armed with a 
hypothesis in light of which, and only in light of which, the
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reasoning could proceed. In a way it is even about two abductions, 
the Islanders' hypothesis about my misunderstanding which enabled 
them to seize the moment to enlighten me, and my hypothesis about 
what was going on which finally reduced itself to such absurdity that 
even I had to look around for a new hypothesis. It is also, of 
course, a story about towndwelling Torres Strait and their 
anthropologist, in the vein of all ethnographic stories.)
We walked along the main street of Townville's small 
city center. There were four of us, and a curious mixture 
for this July. One of us was a leader of the Eastern 
Islanders' two were Western island leaders. I was the 
anthropologist, though an anthropologist by this time more 
than half Eastern Islander. So however you looked at 
it— two Easterners and two Westerners walking along 
talking, or Easterners and Westerners and this white 
bloke— it was a strange sight.
We had finished a light lunch not long before, at a
coffee shop in one of the arcades off the main street which
was promising to become a venue for this new East-West 
/detente. The first such meeting of East and West, without 
insult or slander, had been hardly a month before, and this 
was already the third.
We walked along the sunny side of the street, watching 
the shoppers strolling in and out of the late winter 
shadows on the other side. One of the big Western 
Islandmen spied a particularly noticeable young lady 
coming out of Woolworth's.
"W-w-w-w-o-o," he said, more breathing than speaking.
I tried to see just who he was looking at. This 
problem— my not getting in on this sort of off-hand casual 
men's comraderie because I couldn't quite get what they 
were doing— was pressing me acutely. Day after day 
somebody and I would walk the streets somewhere in 
Townsville or Mackay or Bowen and all this W-w-w-o-o-o 
business would happen. So today I was bound to not let it 
go by.
"Wanem," I said, using the all-purpose pidgin for 
'Huh?', 'Beg your pardon?', 'What?', 'Whatsisname', and 
'Whatchamacallit'.
"W-w-w-o," he repeated, briefly. "Oman dea." [That 
woman.] I figured it was the two who had come out of 
Woolies. But they were walking back into the shadows and 
we were still ambling along.
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"Wanera oman?" I asked.
"Diskain oraan," he said (This kind) , and moved his 
hand, right hand, from his stomach out and down toward his 
thighs, describing a kind of out-arcing curve roughly the 
shape of his ample belly. Then I got it. Of course: the 
pair who had come strolling out of the store. One was a 
nice looking fairly tall, say, eighteen-year-old. And the 
one she was apparently shopping with was shorter and very 
very pregnant.
The hand-arc description had aroused some interest from 
our fellow walkers.
"Gel," one of the others said (the Easterner, my 
nominal countryman. This was said in correction of the 
Westerner having called that too-young-a-woman 'Oman'.
"Wa," he agreed, "gel diswan." He paused, "Bat emi mata 
nice!" Everyone had a good hearty, and more than a little 
hungry, chuckle at that.
"Hee, hee. Mata nice," said the other Westerner, a man 
from Badu.
"Pakarar," my Eastern cohort said, obviously in 
confirmation.
"Wait a minute," I said, "wanem diskain 'pakarar'?" I 
had thought I was doing OK just trying to hang onto what 
was going on without interrupting until this pakarar came 
out. I knew 'mata nice' was one of those mixtures you 
find, especially in any community of more than one 
language: mata is the Western word for "very"; nice is the 
same as English "nice", adopted straight into Torres 
Strait Pidgin. And it had become a Pidgin phrase in the 
Island idiom. (Of course I didn't figure out exactly what 
it meant until after the day of the stroll in my story: I 
was still trying to figure out why these guys were checking 
out pregnant girls, saying 'mata nice', and making a hand 
sign as if they are rubbing down a pregnant belly some 
distance out from their own.)
"Meriam mir," said my Eastern friend. "Yu sabe 
pakarar," he added, recalling that he had explained its 
meaning to me before.
I think he has, yes. But now he has used it in apparent 
agreement with these other two using this "Mata 
nice"— which I understand to be a term of appreciation, 
but exactly what kind of appreciation I don’t know— and 
I'm feeling a little lost.
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/He had explained before that Meriam mir pakarar was the 
word which described expecially luscious and desirable 
Island women. And more than just luscious. To be truly 
pakarar there had to be a kind of virginal or pure or 
untouched or wholesome quality, (i hadn’t known, quite, 
and just fished around for some English men's adjectives 
to see if any rung a bell with him. They hadn't.) I had 
tried to gloss it according to categories— menstruating 
(of course), menstruating long (not necessarily), 
seventeen (nice!), sixteen (pakarar!), fifteen (sure!), 
is it a matter of age? (not necessarily) , is it hair 
(?)...I mean, beautiful hair (could be) . I had really been 
round the course. It had to do with attractiveness, and 
something to do with sexual matters.
Maybe it has to do with the fact that there has to have 
been sex in order to get that rounded belly of pregnancy? 
Maybe; so I ask.
"Diskain 'mata nice'," I ask, making the out and 
down-over-the-belly motion, "emi belly bl'em?" [is it the 
belly?], indicating my hand motion with a chin-nod.
"Wa," they nod, all of them. "Belly-pat," says the 
Easterner.
This is reason for great lewd mirth. 'Prapa belly-pat'
they cheer. I figure enough not to get fooled by the 'p'
for "fat", but I still don't understand. 'Fat belly?' But
why is that funny? More important, why is it lewd?
Fortunately there are a number of 'mata nice' young Island
girls walking the streets today. One very lovely willowy /Meriam girl walks by on the same side of the street as us. 
As she passes us the group erupts into a gaggle of "Nice", 
"Mata nice", and (i think I hear) "Pakarar". Not wanting 
to be left out I offer, "Belly-pat". This causes muted 
howls of lewd mirth I laugh along, without much 
conviction.
The Westerners turn down a side street toward their 
cars, and us 'Easterners' keep walking. Now I can ask.
/"Belly-pat," he says, in answer to my question, "kole 
ra mir: 'tummy
"Tummy!" I say. "Tummy doesn't have anything to do with 
pregnant!"
"Pregnant?!?" says he. "Who's talking about pregnant?" 
I am, now, really confused. We walk along silently, me 
trying to think.
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"So pakarar doesn't have anything to do with pregnant?"
I ask.
"Hahaha. Pakarar pregnant! Note kar." [Really not a 
thing!]
"So what are these great big fat bellies?" I ask,
imitating the hand motion.
✓  /"Nole, nole," he said, "just a little fat, a nice 
little round (he's almost slobbering as he gets into this 
description) tummy— real nice prapa little belly-pat 
W-w-w-o-o-o."
"Aha." I begin to get the picture. The two girls who 
came out of Woolies were one pregnant one plus one 'mata 
nice' one! We walk some more, turning down toward the wharf 
area and the small boat harbour. A young lady is sunbaking 
across the bow of one of the yachts. The scene triggers 
some California memories. I had forgotten about pakarar 
and was trying to concentrate on the more general lingua 
franca of "Mata nice", partly to get it glossed and mostly 
so I could stop feeling like a dummy. I'm sort of rolling 
'mata nice' around when, I guess, the sunbather and boat 
and memories all pop at once into my awareness.
"Wait a minute —  "I call out. He looks at me as if he 
has just about given up. He has tried three times now just 
to get across this little concept without which how could 
anyone knoA* what they were supposed to get all excited 
about and what they weren't.
"Just.a minute," I persist, catching up to him. "We 
have this word in American that doesn't mean any 
particular kind of girl except that she has to be the kind 
that absolutely turns you on." I can see I have him 
spellbound. He looks like he is about to get another 
lesson in comparative ethnography of speaking when all he 
wants to do is hang around this sun-bather's belly-fat.
"Wanem?" he asks, pro forma.
"Fuckable."
He stops looking at the blond, and looks off for a 
minute, trying out the word. He's never heard it before. 
His face lights up with that inner excitement he and I 
share, the thrill of getting things across cultures, of 
getting them right —
"That's it! Pakarar... that's it!"
50
When the roof leaks and the piano needs 
tuning, when the geyser explodes and the 
brother (home on leave) slips quietly 
into the jigs, what do I do? I send for 
the expert, the trained man, and leave 
the solution of my problem to him. When 
I want to read anything, however, I 
usually write it meself.
Myles na gCopaleen, 
'Cruiskeen Lawn'
CHAPTER 2
From Here to Alternity
In the fourth of the four Paul Carus Lectures read at the Meeting 
of the American Philosophical Association at Berkeley in December 
1930, the one entitled "The Implications of the Self", George Herbert 
Mead set the problem for which this collection searches for solution. 
I could have said, for which I have searched for solution in the 
essays which comprise this collection. But that would have been, 
while more in accord with the grammar, less in accord with the 
experience: less true to both my experience among the Torres Strait 
Islanders with whom my wife and I lived, and my experience working 
through the writing which constitutes the thesis. At the risk of 
offending the impatient reader unlikely to be any more sympathetic to 
this notion of truth than he is acquainted with it, let me explain 
why even here I have already departed the promised direction of the 
text in a necessary digression.
Every act of speaking, every piece of writing, any use of language 
at all might be or might have been... something else! Myles na 
gCopaleen, the Irish writer whose words I borrowed for my epigraph, 
might have left out that part about the brother. It would have made 
the epigraph more neatly suitable, and would have saved me the 
laboured decision over whether or not to leave it out, sans elipses
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in the manner of Jorge Luis Borges. The anthropologist has a kind of 
pact with empiric reality, a pact which speaks against this kind of 
peremptory alteration of the words which are the given, the facts of 
the epigraph; but the poet wants to make them a better fit, to take 
licence to alter the words as easily as he alters the context, 
ripping these few words twenty-odd years and a hemisphere south and 
east to serve with this text (con-text, literally 'with this text').
So what I did was write out seven variations of Myles's three 
sentences. Alas, to no avail. When I took out the part about the 
brother, the geyser was left all on its own, a single item offset by a 
comma from the two —  the roof and the piano— in the opening. Such a 
thing would never do, for though they did say from time to time that 
Myles was unbalanced, they were not referring to his writing. So I 
took both the geyser and the brother out. But that left only a piano 
and a roof holding the fort, and a piano and a roof hardly last long 
enough to build the suspense necessary for the 'I write it meself' 
payoff. And anyway, in the end, I recalled something Myles had 
written about James Joyce. Well, not exactly about Mr Joyce, but 
about a reviewer who had, "throughout his piece consistently 
referred to the master's last work as 'Finnegan's Wake'. That 
apostrophe (i happen to know) hastened Mr Joyce's end. To be 
insensitive to what is integral is, I fear, not among the first 
qualifications for writing an article on Mr Joyce."
So we might have entitled this Introduction "To Be Sensitive to 
What Is Integral", after Myles na gCopaleen. Or we might have 
emphasized the literary connections of some of the writing with, "On 
Being Sensitive to What Is Integral". "Integral Sensitivity 
Training" might have emphasized the modern psychological reality of 
doing any kind of close reading of another culture, whereas "The 
Sensitive Integral: An Essay in the Strict Sense of the Term" might 
have evoked a more anthropological flavour. At any rate, I, reminded 
by Myles of his own sensitivity to what is integral, decided not to 
change his words at all. The reason is precisely that I do not know
all that is integral in this passage from Myles's writing. I like its
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feel. And its faint foreignness is appropriate for a selection of 
writings about a foreign people. But, although I know that a geyser 
is some kind of water heater (and probably pronounced geezer), I 
don't know what these 'jigs' are that "the brother" slips quietly 
into; so with the caution that they might be found integral by a 
reader more sensitive than I, I left 'em in.
The reason for all this wordplay on the sensitive integral is to 
show, by taking the reader from one feeling to the next, something of 
the genesis of my concern for paying attention to what it is that we 
do when we write ethnography. That is, in some very simple sense we 
select from among all the experiences we had while we were out 
amongst the Kaingaing, or the Goodenough Islanders, or the Wallaby 
Cross Aborigines, or the Torres Strait Islanders. This necessary 
selection has exercised ethnographers since the earliest days of 
ethnography, and there is a wealth of literature covering what sort 
of data to select, and the logics for the many selectings, and the 
methodologies which will promote one kind of selection or another. 
Except that this is not, strictly speaking, a wealth of literature. 
Very little of it counts as literature, commanding neither the range 
nor the readership to warrant that designation.
Of course, it may not be a fair worry that anthropological writing 
counts rarely as literature. It may simply be the case that anything 
that truly feels like literature has to feel older than current. In 
the section of his Frontiers of Anthropology reserved for an 
appreciation of Sir James Frazer, Ashley Montagu writes of Frazer as 
"a gifted writer, whose style raised the anthropology he wrote to the 
level of literature" ("Anthropology into Literature", p.228). And 
while there is no doubt that Frazer and his writings are 'older than 
current' (Ashley Montagu says himself that "Frazer's reputation has 
today suffered something of an eclipse" [ibid.]), it is, I think, 
less certain that his writing feels older than current. Here is the 
opening to The Golden Bough.
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Who does not know Turner's picture of the Golden Bough?
The scene, suffused with the gold glow of imagination in 
which the divine mind of Turner steeped and transfigured 
even the fairest natural landscape, is a dreamlike vision 
of the little woodland lake of Nemi— "Diana's Mirror," as 
it was called by the ancients.
We can feel the 'literature' in that couple of sentences. And the 
inconclusiveness of simple rhetoric as a characterization of the 
opening question leads us even further out of the sort of thing which 
counts today as social science writing and into literature: Frazer 
ensures that there shall be no responses in the negative by 'writing' 
Turner's painting for us. Now even those of us who have not seen (who 
do not "know") Turner's painting can hang onto Frazer's prose long 
enough to see if we can get the point of whatever it is he fashions 
from these observations on Turner. Which is to say that we can hang 
on long enough to see what he means. But I think this is not a widely 
held view of 'meaning' at all. Yet it is the view that I hold, and 
around which much of what follows is twined. It is, simply put, this:
Meaning is the next-thing.
While I am fully prepared to risk some audacity here and there, I 
do not intend facetiousness, nor pretend facility. This is as simply 
as I can put what it is that glosses the notion of meaning for me. The 
"-thing" which is attached to "next" is neither the 'thing' (Ding an 
Sich) of Kant nor some phenomenon a la Husserl. It is simply any old 
'thing'— a perfectly good word taken from my own idiom— which comes 
next. What this thing comes next In is a matter of focus, attention, 
delimitation, custom, and so forth. I hook it to "next" with the 
hyphen so that it is impossible to read it without the (silent) 
reminder that this is an idiomatic usage flagged by an idiosyncratic 
diacritical dash. The reminder is this: any apparent 'thing' 
proposed as the meaning of something must be, or must turn out to 
have been, connected to that something, and moreover to be separated 
by no interventional connection. So it is a "next-thing" not only 
because it must be next and not just anytime after, but also because 
it must be a thing connected and not just any thing which happens to 
come along later.
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By this account, the phrases and equivalents written after 
entries in dictionaries are not meanings. This is both true and not 
true. As they sit there, in the closed Oxford on the shelf, we can 
imagine the typical word followed by its 'definition', typically 
after. In this case, what is there is not meaning. We can render it 
as meaning by a shorthand referencing practice which works (we can 
expect 'meanings' of new words to come 'after' the dictionary entry, 
even though we've never looked them up, or never in this particular 
dictionary, before); but a practice which, when stated as knowledge, 
fails for its faulty epistemology. In our imagination where we 
construct anticipated actions of looking up words in dictionaries, 
once we abstract the dictionary entry on its page, seize it in a 
still frame, the very word after loses its meaning. Once the action 
is gone, once the page with its entry is stopped and still, the 
definition is rightward of the entry. If the book opens front cover 
swinging eastward, then the definition is west of the entry. But 
there is no_ ' after' .
We can turn the dictionary around and, reading upside down, read 
the definition before we read the entry. We can read the definition 
first and read the entry after in any case. We can read fourteen 
entries and none of their definitions without ever thinking that each 
word read after its precursor is the definition of that precursor. 
Then, exhausted, we can go back to the top of the list and, finally, 
begin to read the definition which comes 'after' the first 
word...only to have the knocker sound Uncle Chuck's arrival, and, 
because it came after our first word, doom us to know 
tintinnabulation, n. [l ] . . . the sound of a heavy doorknocker 
thrice struck.
We who know how dictionaries work, who know that they are pretty 
much relegated to private reading, have no problem. We know that the 
"after" which makes the definition the next-thing for a dictionary 
entry is the real temporal after of action, the action of reading. We 
know if the knocker sounds that our cessation of reading attends our 
desisting from any discursive meaning in the domain of reading which
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we have quit. The requirement is, then, that Uncle Chuck's arrival 
is, if it means anything at all, connected to some past thing not in 
the dictionary reading domain. (Let me remind the reader again that 
this 'thing' that I use is in lieu of other conventions which propose 
particularity and in doing so often open Pandora's boxes of what 
George Steiner has called alternity: I might have said that Uncle 
Chuck's arrival is connected to some past event, or occurrence, or 
happening. Had I done so I could but have been proposing a 
distinction which promised to become a disconcertion, for I, not yet 
knowing Uncle Chuck arrives willy-nilly for a chat, might promise the 
reader an arrival connected to a past event only to have him find out 
that such a putative 'event' would lie somewhere along a causal chain 
between the 'event' of Chuck's being born to the same parents as was 
my father and my eventual birth to that brother.)
This is what I call the risk of the epigraph: that meaning is the 
next-thing, in any wise, and that ethnographers promise to make the 
acts and actions of alien peoples meaningful, where the actions are 
no more connected to the ethnography than the ethnographer's 
epigraphs.
The Risk of the Epigraph
A year or so ago Rodney Needham made a flying tour of Australian 
universities, giving, as is his wont, a number of articulate and 
polished seminars. And he spoke, more than once, of the importance 
of epigraphs; said he never let students get away from his ambit 
without impressing upon them the need for epigraphs in 
anthropological writing. On one occasion his mention of his habitual 
stressing of the epigraphic import came apropos of that paper's 
epigraph, drawn from "Doctor Brodie's Report" by Jorge Luis Borges. 
Doctor Brodie is Borges' fantastic old explorer, reporting on the 
fantastic tribe among whom he lived and whose ethnographic 
titillations he brought back, dangling from his travelogue like 
charms. Needham, having just dangled a felicitous sentence or two
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from Borges in order to better charm his seminar audience, stops
aside for a moment to exhort all of us to always write with
epigraphs, for it is with epigraphs that we remind ourselves and our
readers that we write in a literary tradition.
Borges, in the Preface to Dr. Brodie's Report, wrote, "Apart from
the text that gives this book its title and that obviously derives
from Lemuel Gulliver's last voyage, my stories are— to use the term
in vogue today— realistic." Thus does Needham, the anthropologist,
wend a link back to Jonathan Swift, a link which is but one in a whole
chain of Borges-Swift connections. In 1933 Borges became editor of
the new Revista Multicolor de los Sebados (Saturday Multicolored
Review) which, Borges’ biographer Monegal tells us (Monegal
1978:251-2), was the culmination of the desire of the editor of
Critica, Natalio Botana, who "had always wanted to have a cultural
magazine attached to Critica." (Monegal says that it was Botano who
"had introduced the style and method of United States' tabloids into
/Argentina", in the form of Critica, "a good example of how to produce
a sensational and, at the same time, literate paper.") As well as
contributing original pieces to the new magazine, "Borges also
selected and translated pieces from his favorite authors for 
/Critica. Chesterton, Kipling, Wells, and the German-Czech author 
Gustav Meyrink shared with Swift, Novalis, and James Frazer the gaudy 
pages of the supplement."
So not only was Swift a favourite of Borges, but also James Frazer 
was (and thus do we wend a way from Needham— alive and literarily 
aware anthropologist— back to Frazer— Needham's own forbear— and 
the Golden Bough of Turner). Fleshing out the literary link between 
Borges and Swift, Monegal introduces C.S. Lewis' novel Out of the 
Silent Planet which, like the travels of Gulliver and the report of 
'Dr. Brodie', is a mock-ethnography. "Lewis is placing a mirror up 
to earth," writes Monegal. "In the best tradition of Thomas More and 
Swift, he describes an imaginary visit to that planet and the society 
he finds there, to best describe our world, the silent planet of the 
title. Borges, in a more oblique way, does the same." (Here Monegal
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is talking of Borges' "Tlö’n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" in which Tlön is 
described "as an inverted version of earth" which, "being a rational 
version of earth, is a totalitarian world: the excess of reason leads 
to totalitarianism" [Monegal 1978:332—3]) • Monegal thus places 
Borges in the tradition of More and his successors in the chapter of 
his literary biography entitled "A Distorted Mirror to Reality" , 
which opens:
In May 1940, one year exactly after the publication of 
"Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote" in Sur, the same 
journal published "T16*n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius". This time 
the story did not pretend to be an essay, although it had 
all the external characteristics of one.
The reference to the essay "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote" is 
a reference to this now well-known 'essay' in which Borges essayed 
the attempt by 'a certain Menard', said to be a contemporary of 
William James, to rewrite Don Quixote. As Monegal puts it, "As is 
well known, Menard succeeds in writing a few chapters. In comparing 
them, the narrator finds that they are literally the same but have a 
completely different meaning". Monegal then quotes Borges' own 
words, as the narrator: "Cervantes' text and Menard's are verbally 
identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer.)" (Monegal 
1978:329, and quoting Borges from Labyrinths 1964:42.) Borges goes 
on to actually 'compare' the two versions, quoting pairs of literally 
identical lines and 'showing' them to have such very different 
interpretations since the one was written in seventeenth century 
Spanish by a native speaker of that language and the other so much 
later, and by a foreigner.
Let me return to Monegal on the distorted mirror of Borges's story 
of "T16*n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius", a mirror which distorts not by 
radical reinterpretation of words which both are and are not the
same, but by discovery and description of worlds:
It began by reporting a conversation between Bioy Casares 
and the author about a puzzling quotation the first had 
found in an odd volume of a pirate encyclopedia.
The quotation, and conversation, surrounded the question of the
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unknown land of Uqbar, and the story went on to recount the recovery
of that volume, and more discoveries about this ’Uqbar'.
It revealed the existence of a whole encyclopedia devoted 
to describing Tlb'n, the planet to which Uqbar belonged; 
finally, it explained, calmly, that the whole affair was a 
hoax perpetrated by a group of eighteenth-century 
philosophers and carried to its completion in this century 
through the patronage of an American millionaire.
With a characteristic Borgesian twist, the story ends with a 
postscript informing the reader that objects manufactured in Uqbar 
have been discovered on earth.
The encyclopedia describes the planet of Uqbar, Tlo’n, as a planet 
of peculiar reality in which the imaginary and the real are 
topsy-turvy. It is a world "made according to the theories about 
reality of the eighteenth-century British philosopher George 
Berkeley" (Monegal 1978:333; Monegal also notes the similarity 
between the name of the philosopher and Buckley, the name of the 
American millionaire of the story, and he refers us to James Irby's 
similar conclusion [irby 1971])• Tlön, then, is an 'inverted' earth, 
and doubly so, for it is both rational and immaterial. As Monegal 
describes it (1978:333)» "It is a world in which matter is denied and 
imaginary objects become real."
Again we have woven a line— the word "woven" is meant here to be
more real than imaginary, a true predication even though it is not
always clear what the warp and weft of the weaving might be —  through
reality and imagination back to another of Needham's forbears... this
one an 18th century philosopher rather than a 19th century
anthropologist. And all of this is what I mean to imply by "the risk
of the epigraph", and has to do with my proposition of meaning as
next-thing: Borges has said that each word in any language implies 
/all other words; Levi-Strauss has said, and demonstrated, that we can
begin anywhere in a culture and make our way to anywhere else.
Needham, by taking a few words from Borges to use for an epigraph,
implies (according to his epigrapher) all of these words from Borges
and readers of Borges which I have woven back to Frazer and Berkeley
/in what might be called a Levi-Straussian exercise. In a strange
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sense, but one which looses its strangeness with closer inspection, 
Needham implies his own forbears with his epigraph.
But so do we all. And to speak of implication is not to speak of 
meaning. Yet this is the risk of the epigraph. Needham, by no means 
alone in the anthropological peerage but perhaps the most forthright 
in this matter, exhorts us to write with epigraphs, to know and 
acknowledge that we (ethnographers) write within a literate 
tradition. And then Needham takes an epigraph from a writer whose 
biographer says he writes of worlds "in which matter is denied and 
imaginary objects become real". But in the weaving of implications 
this is not so far from Needham's own. In his Belief, Language, end 
Experience, an "investigation into the supposed capacity for belief, 
as a premise to social intercourse and as an essential human power" 
(p.245), Needham considers the nature of ethnographic reports of 
things believed in and things imagined. His conclusion (one which he 
acknowledges to be a conclusion rendered in process rather than en 
fin, see p.207) has to do with the non-presence of some real thing as 
the object of any belief (the sort of real thing which does really 
exist in the case of an imagination). Needham says, "To put the 
outcome very bluntly: Imagination is real, belief is not" (p.136).
'Imagination is real'— sounds like those objects from Uqbar are 
showing up on earth again! This, too, is something of what my 
catchphrase the risk of the epigraph is meant to imply: that the 
meaning of written words must be put in by the reader. According to 
Needham we must use epigraphs (and by 'according to' here I mean both 
the consent of accord and the harmony of accordance). In order for 
even that straightforward statement to have meaning I must put in the 
meaning. If we are talking to one another, he and I (we did, but 
briefly and on another matter), we can 'hear together'...he, meaning 
one thing, can check my responses to see if I seem to be catching his 
drift, and can, literally, check me if I seem to be hearing him 
differently than he, speaking, meant to be heard:
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RODNEY: [Raises head, and eyes, from seminar paper.] This is
why I always tell my students to write with epigraphs. It 
is only by epigraphs that—
LARRY : [Half-rising from his chair; brash, presumptuous.]
— that we can alert the reader—
RODNEY: [Only slightly wary of the interruption, figures the
interruptor for an American. Nods.] — Mmmhh—  (slight 
lilt) .
LARRY : — beforehand to our point. A kind of y'know sort of
a precis yeah a precis of our pa—
RODNEY: — No. Precisely not. An epigraph is rather
something which comes before our paper, which poses it a 
problem, as it were. The epigraph comes both literally and 
literarily
LARRY : [Sitting back.] — .
RODNEY: prior to our paper. [Returns to paper.]
So, if I may paraphrase the words spoken by the Rodney of this 
page (to wit: the epigraph comes both literally and literarily
prior), the paper is the meaning of the epigraph... for it is the 
next-thing. The risk of the epigraph, then, is that it will prove 
meaningless. The writer who presumes to take the words of another to 
plant at the fore of his own writing runs the risk of making the 
next-thing after the epigraph— the writer's
paper— incomprehensible, illegible, unreadable, and thereby
relieving the epigraph of meaning. This is not some idle risk, nor is 
language a stranger to it. If the reader cannot return to the 
epigraph and, in reading it, replace some meaning, then the writer 
will have destroyed any meaning 'destroyed' by a kind of pre-emption 
with nothing tendered) . (This has its counterpart in 
conversation— the person who, addressed, fails to respond and in 
doing so pointedly renders the addressor meaningless, a no-account.) 
The risk of the epigraph is the risk of failing to come to terms with
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the eipgraph. Needham's risk in writing "Imgaination is real, belief 
is not” is enormous: Not only may I, who have used it as a kind of 
epigraph, fail to come to terms with his 'imagination', 'real', and 
'belief' and by my failure render Needham meaningless, but also I 
may, in doing so, relieve that very proposition of any predicative 
meaning.
This is, in either case, unlikely. I am not the only one writing 
about Rodney Needham's Belief, Language, and Experience, and other 
writers would be able to braize any chinks in the Needham-armour that 
Rodney himself was not able to. But more importantly I am unlikely to 
be read, in the present work, by very many readers. And therein lies 
the saving of the language. For it is true that all modern writing is 
a coming to terms with existing meanings in a pre-existing language. 
The peculiar risk of ethnographic writing lies in the absence of a 
community of readers who may, en mass, 'come to terms' with any 
particular people ethnographed. In the case of the citydwelling 
Torres Strait Islanders who figure here there are fewer than a 
half-dozen readers, too few to constitute a community, capable of 
'coming to terms' with either the terms of my ethnology or the terms 
of Islander life sociologized— and among those half-dozen only 
Jeremy Beckett, anthropologist and expert Torres Strait 
ethnographer, capable of coming to terms with both. Yet in some 
sense do we (do i) continue to 'do' ethnography, to try to come to 
terms with strange and various versions of the human experience.
Coming to Terms
This idea of speaking of coming to terms as an instance of real 
motion, of really going or coming somewhere, is my own. It is one 
born of the frustration of trying to tell students and colleagues 
what it feels like to loose the bounds of self, inhabit the everyday 
world of some strange and differently thinking people, and come back 
to tell about it. It is the last part, the 'motion' of return, which 
is constituted by this sense of coming to terms. It is a two-part
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motion, partly akin to the 'hermeneutic motion' of Wilhelm 
Dilthey— that of Paul Ricoeur and his cohorts in modern European 
hermeneutics, and something of Clifford Geertz's cultural 
interpretations, and that of George Steiner's fourfold hermeneutic 
motion of translation— and partly it is returning to find a 
different world from the one departed from. This, too, is part of the 
coming to terms, for often the very words needed to describe the 
other society are dancing and shifting in motions of their own, and 
are only caught by writing them down. One of the problems generated 
by the petty fiction of 'meaning' as it is loosely used to refer to 
what words do is the problem of artificial concreteness.
The first part of this two-folding motion is the sort of spiraling 
back in Dilthey's hermeneutic spiral, where the interpreter 'brings 
back' what he has gleaned (so far) from the text (whereupon he heads 
back 'into' the text again...thus the 'spiral'). This is the sort of 
general problem of interpretation which has been beginning to occupy 
ethnologists of late, the problem of emics v. etics, and of 
ethnoscience generally, and of Geertz's (from Ryle) "thick 
description" and Pierre Bourdieu's 'practice'. It is the whole of 
the problem of anthropology as it appears illuminated by an 
interpretive consciousness. And while I shall pay no less strict 
attention to this part of the anthropological motion of coming to 
terms, I intend to be much more explicit in the attention I shall pay 
to the second part of ray 'motion' , for it is this sense of difference 
upon returning which has received the lesser anthropological 
attention.
Later on I shall speak of my notion of the 'motion of self' , and of 
how our sense of who we are may be (in my case, is) inseparable from 
our sense of where we are. As this notion applies here, to this idea 
of a two-fold coming to terms, it is the feeling that we have left our 
known world in order to inhabit the world of another people, only to 
return and find our world gone, (it is the feeling of dis-position 
which has accumulated labels such as Alvin Toffler's "future shock", 
the anthropologically inspired "culture shock", and everybody's 'jet
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lag'— in the first we don't go anywhere but our 'where' changes
around us; in the last we can either be gone to some new place or be
returning home and experience the disorienting 'lag' anyway,
anywhere; it is the second one which I shall be concerned with here.)
Some of us, so I am told ('us' being us ethnographers), return to our
homebase society feeling disorientated but ignore the disorientation
where it can be ignored, explain away (as 'culture shock') whatever
of it cannot be ignored, and get on with writing up the research. My
own contrary efforts have been guided by my own sense of motion— this
'motion of self' which I mentioned above— and by a kind of aphoristic 
/
nal'vete: social facts are where you find them.
I take this disorientation, literally dis-position, to be part 
and parcel of the problem of ethnography because that's where I found 
it...waiting for me when I returned from my sojourn among the 
Islanders. And herein lies the reality of the problem of 'coming to 
terms', the problem which is a recurring touchpoint for much of this 
thesis. The reality is this— I shall use terms from time to time 
which are likely to be unfamiliar to the reader (islander terms, a 
French or German term or two) , and I shall use terms which are from 
time to time unlikely to be familiar to the reader (such as in my 
phrase "coming to terms" where the term 'coming' retains a full, if 
unfamiliar, sense of motion).
In the first of these two cases, wherein the terms are unfamiliar
to the reader by virtue of not having come to him before, the motion
of the terms as they 'come' is, from the reader's point of view,
localized in the terms...the terms are coming. This is the sense in
/
which Islander terms such as maik le, and pakarar, and tag lu, and
even the pidgin islandtaim 'come' to the reader, appear, are
presented through the auspices of author and printer and page never
/
before seen, (it may also be the sense in which the term differance
strikes the reader who is acquainted with French but not with the
writings of Jacques Derrida and who suspects me of a misspelling or
the printer of a typographical error...or, too, the reader who is
/
competent enough in French to suspect the pun on difference but,
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having not read Derrida, does not recognize the neologism which, 
according to one of Derrida's translators, "does not function simply 
either as difference (difference) or as differance in the usual sense 
(deferral), and plays on both meanings at once".^5) jn this case of 
coming to terms the terms are actually brought to the reader: some 
ethnographer goes out among the Islanders, gets some terms (hangs 
around trying to pay attention while the terms 'come' to him, then 
tries to remember them long enough to get them back and written down 
in an ethnography) , types them out in some orthography, sends the 
typescript to be photo- or otherwise copied or typeset, bound, 
distributed (if even the few copies of theses which are sent to 
examiners and a library or two), and somewhere somebody actually 
hands ('brings') a copy of the ethnographic text to the reader. My 
point is that there is real motion. Readers come to terms with alien 
peoples because the terms come to the reader.
But what of the second case of coming to terms, wherein the reader 
is not familiar with the terms because he has not come to them before 
(has not had them 'come to him' before: 'That just came to me...I 
hadn't thought of it like that before'). This is the most difficult 
of the 'motions' of coming to terms to write about for the writing 
must of necessity be about things which seem so natural that they go 
without saying. Of course, in one simple sense it is easy to come to 
these terms:
here's MIND
and IMPLY
and there's SELF
/  /and maik le and differance are on that page back there 
and here is TO KNOW, an easy one
The strange thing about writing is that the writer actually brings 
the reader to the terms as much as he brings terms to the reader. In 
order to do this he has to use —  to write with— words which seem so 
natural that they go without saying. These are the words he uses to
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carry the reader along. Then everyonceinawhile he can throw in
something which doesn't go without saying. (My play here on 'saying'
was irrestible, hut once written down it can he instructive:
everyonceinawhile may not have gone [been read without pause]
'without saying' because you had to stop and read it aloud in order
to 'see' [hear] where the breaks were: every/once/in/a/while... even
that complicated sentence about seeing and hearing the words may have
to be reread. Fortunately one of writing's good points is that it can
/be reread. This is one of those differance-type differences that
1 r rJacques Derrida writes about ° [even his change of the e_ in
✓ / difference to the _a of his neologism differance is a silent one,
pointedly a difference of reading and not of speaking]: "difference
in neither time nor space and makes both possible" .) The problem is
that these things that go without saying are the very things of which
culture is woven. And in a very real sense we pay attention to them
only at the risk of culture.
I can get away with writing everyonceinawhile because it is
readable, perhaps even on first reading, and because it appeals to a
spoken language— an idiom— in which that is the way to say
every-once-in-a-while. (This leaves aside the question of fidelity
to my reader, I know; the question of how far the reader can trust me
not to lead him too far astray in my attempt to be faithful to an
idiom...mine, where we say "everyonceinawhile", or the Islanders,
/where we say maik le and islandtaim; or Derrida's, where we read 
dif ferance but cannot say it.) But the risk here is that a reader may 
feel when I think I am bringing him along that I am stringing him 
along. This is always a problem. But it is an especial risk for 
anyone who writes without a genre.
In writing, a genre is a discursive aggregate. It is the written 
equivalent of an idiom...pieces of writing and reading which are 
intended as written and to be read and read by members of a community 
of discourse. "Genre", like "idiom", is not reducible. Because it is 
not reducible (and here is one of those places where writers who have 
no genre have an extra burdensome caution: I would be incautious were
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I to use the word 'irreducible' here since that word has enjoyed a 
recent popularity in discussions of philosophical reductionism, 
which popularity may have come about only because of the accident of 
Latinate 'in-' negation prefixed transmogrifying to 'ir-' before 
connecting to ' r' words like reducible and producing, at least in its 
American and Australian pronunciations, the sonorous and familiar 
"Erie” or "eery" with the consonantal -ducible rolling along 
behind)...because it is not reducible it is not in any conventional 
sense definable. It may be that 'genre' and 'idiom' are what 
Wittgenstein called 'forms of life’— those things which must be 
accepted or taken as given. In any case, events in these 'forms of 
life' (and writing and reading are events no less than are speaking 
and hearing, though they have a different 'form', and though this 
difference may be closer to one of Derrida's differences than to some 
simpler anterior sense of 'different-ness' [Derrida calls these 
originary differances]) are events which are, as Ernest Gellner once 
wrote, "being lived through consciously from the inside, as it were" 
(Gellner 1973:56). (And it may be just such events of saying the word 
irreducible which generate idiom in this way: 'living through' the 
sounding and feeling of making the sound/word 'eery-ducible'.)
Idiom and Genre
Let it not be taken that I mean to equate idiom and genre. While
the two have some formal similarities, and prove similarly
problemmatic in attempts to treat them in writing, they are not
equals (nor is there some formal 'equation' for getting them
together, nor from one to the other). It is in this sense that 
ethnography is not a genre despite the sensibility of talking of an 
'anthropological idiom'. "Mother's brother" is a term from an 
anthropological idiom, and while there are a number of pieces in what 
we might call, idiomatically, amongst ourselves, the 'mother's 
brother literature', there is no genre of mother's brother writing.
There is no genre of ethnography at all.
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I f  t h e r e  were such a g e n r e ,  such  a form o f  w r i t i n g  which were 
g e n e r i c  by v i r t u e  o f  i t s  d i s c u r s i v e  community o f  w r i t e r s  and r e a d e r s  
' c o n s c i o u s l y  l i v i n g  th r o u g h  t h e  g e n re  from t h e  i n s i d e ’ , t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e p i s o d e  would be i n c o n c e i v a b l e .  I n  the  Harvey  L e c t u r e  f o r  
1979 Dennis  T e d lock  c o u n s e l s  and p l e a d s  f o r  a " d i a l o g i c  
a n t h r o p o l o g y " ,  an a n t h r o p o l o g y  i n  which r e a l  p e o p le  ( e t h n o g r a p h e r s )  
t a l k  r e a l  t a l k  ( i n d i g e n o u s  i d i o m s — id iom s  i s  my word f o r  my r e a d i n g  
o f  h i s  s e n s e )  to  r e a l  p e o p le  ( i n f o r m a n t s )  and where t h e y  do t h i s  
t a l k i n g ,  t h i s  d i a l o g u e  which " c r e a t e s  a w o r l d ,  o r  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  two w o r l d s ,  t h a t  e x i s t s  be tw een  p e r s o n s  who 
were i n d e t e r m i n a t e l y  f a r  a p a r t ,  i n  a l l  s o r t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  ways,  when 
t h e y  s t a r t e d  o u t  on t h e i r  c o n v e r s a t i o n " , an a n t h r o p o l o g y  i n  which 
t h i s  " b e t w e e n n e s s  o f  t h e  wor ld  o f  t h e  d i a l o g u e "  happens  i n  
p u b l i c a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  p r i o r  t o  i t  (T e d lo c k  1 9 7 9 : 3 8 8 -9 ;  a l l  
emphases  a r e  T e d l o c k ' s ) .
He c o n s i d e r s  t h e  r a r e n e s s  o f  such d i a l o g u e s  i n  t h e  e t h n o g r a p h i c  
' l i t e r a t u r e '  ( ' l i t e r a t u r e '  l i e s  be tw een  q u o t a t i o n  marks i n  o r d e r  to  
a v o id  t h e  l i e  o f  t h e  word u n a d o r n e d . . . ' l i t e r a t u r e ' as  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s  u se  i t  t o  s p e ak  o f  such  as  t h e i r  " e t h n o g r a p h i c  
l i t e r a t u r e "  i s  a word from t h a t  a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l  id iom  I  a l l u d e d  to  
above ,  and i t s  i d i o m a t i c  c u r r e n c y  i s  marked by n e a r - s e v e r a n c e  from 
i t s  o r i g i n  i n  l a n g u a g e ) . He a l s o  p o i n t s  ou t  a f e l i c i t o u s  i n c l u s i o n  
o r  two o f  r e a l  d i a l o g u e s  be tw een  e t h n o g r a p h e r s  and i n f o r m a n t s  (and 
p o i n t s  o u t ,  t o o ,  t h e  a l s o  too  p o p u l a r  d e n i g r a t i o n  o f  ' a r m c h a i r  
a n t h r o p o l o g y ' , some o f  which h a s  p roduced  th e  o n l y  r e c o r d e d  
d i a l o g u e s  o f  r e a l  i n f o r m a n t s  t a l k i n g  w i t h  r e a l  e t h n o g r a p h e r s  i n  the  
l i t e r a t u r e ) .  One o f  t h e s e  r e a l  d i a l o g u e s  i s  i n  B i l l i e  J e an  I s b e l l ' s  
To Defend O u r s e l v e s  ( 1 9 7 8 : 1 7 0 ) ,  an exchange  be tw een  I s b e l l  and an 
Andean v i l l a g e r ,  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Quechua and E n g l i s h  t r a n s l a t i o n .  
T e d lock  s a y s  " t h i s  may be t h e  f i r s t  p u b l i s h e d  t e x t  to  show an 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t  s p e a k i n g  t h e  n a t i v e  l a n g u a g e  i n  c om ple te  s e n t e n c e s  
and g e t t i n g  c o m p le te  s e n t e n c e s  i n  r e t u r n " .  His  c o n c e rn  i s  t h a t  such 
d i a l o g u e s  n o t  c o n t i n u e  to  be r e p l a c e d ,  a s  t h e y  have been  and a r e  now, 
by the  a n a l o g i c a l  d i s c o u r s e  o f  p u b l i s h e d  a n t h r o p o l o g y  ( l i t e r a l l y ,  as
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Tedlock mentioned in his lecture, the ana-logos or 'talking above' of 
the Greeks). Such is his argument for a dialogical anthropology. But 
here is the incident which struck me as inconceivable in any world in 
which there really was a genre of writing called ethnography. 
Following the sentence which I quoted above, the one in which Tedlock 
reckons that Billie Jean Isbell and her informant talking real 
Quechua may be the first such dialogue to hit the ethnographic 
newsstands, he elaborated:
Isbell informs me that the published version is only part 
of a much longer dialogue, shortened in a necessary 
compromise with an editor who had argued, with all the 
authority of that genre called "the ethnography" behind 
him, that a dialogue would be an imposition on the reader.
I shall not do justice to Tedlock and Isbell and Marcel Griaule 
and the other dialogical anthropologists whom Tedlock lauds. Some 
dialogues appear in the ensuing pages, and sometimes they are in 
Island idiom; but I think the only fair treatment is to save the 
richest dialogues for a book like Griaule's Conversations 
(Conversations avec Ogotemglli) , one unencumbered by the 
philosophical 'talking above' with which this one is riddled. In any 
case, my intention in using some of Tedlock's Harvey Lecture in this 
introduction is to present his comments regarding 'that genre called 
"the ethnography"' in full enough context so we could feel the 
wrongness of the editor's words (and, I suppose, the then inevitable 
wrongness of his position) . My point is that there is no genre called 
"the ethnography". Whatever collage of papers and reports and a book 
or two which his "the ethnography" refers to, it is not a genre. At 
most, it is probably a bunch of known-by-everyone writings about 
Quechua or Latin American Indians or something like that and 
everybody who is anybody in Latin American studies talks about "the 
ethnography". And the "the" is necessary for exactly that reason: 
this small bit of stuff is not ethnography (meaning ALL ethnography), 
only the ethnography (meaning ' the ethnography which we all know and 
use and write'... "the" is always a way of saying "we"). I shall 
return to this shortly, for it is in this kind of distinction that
easier access to idiom shall be found.
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For now let me simply try to make this point about genre. When we 
say "science fiction" we are saying one kind of genre. Once we know 
we are talking about science fiction, once we know we are speaking in 
the arena of science fiction writing and reading and plots and 
storylines and techniques and the rest, then we can say "in the 
genre". So when Philip Jose Farmer (who writes books by the score and 
novellas and stories at twice that, with science fiction titles like 
The Wind Whales of Ishmael and, more typical of what we expect of the 
genre, Timestop!) writes The Image of the Beast, which opens with the 
hero watching a film of a sadistic and sexual murder of his private 
detective partner, an acquaintance of Farmer's said, "'So you're 
writing pornography now?". We can take it that this acquaintance 
figured that Farmer was not only no longer "in the genre", but also
1 Rthat he was now in another genre, the one called "pornography". 
Theodore Sturgeon, a writer whom no one doubted was still "in the 
genre" (the science fiction one, that is) and a friend of Phil 
Farmer, responded thus:
There is a vast number of honestly simple-minded people 
who can, without hesitation, define
pornography science fiction
God communism
right freedom
evil honorable peace
liberty obscenity
law and order love
and think, and act, and legislate, and sometimes burn, jail, 
and kill on the basis of their definitions.
Whatever our feeling of Farmer's book, there is no doubt that some 
of his prose reads like some of the pornographers' prose reads. And 
whatever our feeling of his friend's defense (Sturgeon: "Simple 
truth is hard to come by. Virtually everything which looks like the 
truth is subject to question and modification."[pp.119-200]), there 
is no doubt that Farmer may be fairly questioned regarding his 
'pornography'. But most of all, and for my point here, there is no 
doubt that this comparison, and the comparison in Sturgeon's list 
("pornography" at the head of one column, "science fiction" the 
other), and the contradiction between Sturgeon and the
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"acquaintance", all make sense. They all make sense. And they make 
sense because these are two real genres; different, comparable.
But consider the following version of Sturgeon's postscript:
There is a vast number of honestly simple-minded people 
who can, without hesitation, define 
pornography ethnography science fiction
God sacrament communism
etcetera
We have now made his statement untrue. The truth of the genres 
themselves carried the burden of Sturgeon's argument when he was 
posing (juxtaposing) pornography versus science fiction. That is, 
since those two proposed genres are in fact genres of writing extant, 
Sturgeon could make the point that they are not defineable. (This 
has a double bearing on my use of it, per example, here: singly it is 
a nice instance of the world of real writers holding the truth of 
genres; it is doubly nice because one of these writers holds out the 
fact that genres cannot be defined, as I have said earlier about both 
genres and their bedfellows of the speaking world, idioms.) I could 
not use my version of his comparison to show, for instance, that 
Levi-Strauss's Savage Pansies (Les Pensees Sauvages) was not 
pornography, or that Finding the Center was about real Zuni 'inner' 
space (Tedlock 1978) and not Asimovian outer space. At least I could 
not do so by appealing to the notion of a genre in which Zuni poetry 
and 'wild thought' coexist.
So. Why do I bother with laying to rest the notion of some genre 
called ethnography? Do I bother simply because I am presenting, in 
the chapters which follow, a kind of writing which might not fit some 
readers' ideas of what constitutes ethnography or ethnology and I 
want to present a little defense on my own behalf beforehand? 
Perhaps. But in so far as that may be so, it is only from Sturgeon's 
"honestly simple-minded people" that I wish to pre-defend myself, 
and even then only by dint of having nothing like the weight of 
publication in my own 'genre' that Sturgeon does in his. For the 
rest, the readers, they who attend to the writings herein as written,
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I have no wish of defense; only of succour, or, at the least, of 
forbearance while I try to make myself clearer.
Why then do I bother so? Simply because there can be no discourse
without a community of discourse. I do not mean by this that first we
get a discourse going and then those who participate, either as
writers or as readers will turn out to be the community. No. The
discourse and the community come along at the same time. (And here I
am being deliberately vernacular in using time to mean something
which is sufficiently fluid that it permits the fluency of "come
along".) There is no way that the first piece of writing in any
discourse is in that discourse; yet, on the occasion of the first
reading of that piece in the general vein in which it was written,
/voila! le discours— the discourse exists. This has something of the 
flavour of my earlier parenthetic mention that 'the' is always a way 
of saying 'we': there is no discourse until there is the discourse, 
and "the discourse" doesn't make sense until there is some we_ who 
know what we are talking about when we refer without elaboration to 
"the discourse". (And it might be worth cautioning here with the 
mention that simply refering to some bunch of writings as 'a 
discourse' does not make that putative discourse so, simply because, 
if for no other reason, one Labeler does not a community make.)
Paul Goodman, a student of society who made his living as a 
writer, summarized his Speaking and Language thus:^
I have suggested that the wisest method of exploring 
language is to analyze how it operates in actual concrete 
situations, rather than deciding beforehand what 
"language" is.
"This is similar," he continues, "to the literary analysis of 
particular works." Earlier in the book he says, "In literary 
criticism it is possible to define literary genres and predict from 
them. But in analysis it will be found that only hack works conform 
to the genres." I mention this, in Goodman's words, to make it clear 
that I am not of the position that some genre that we could call 
"ethnography" ought to be established in order that we all have 
something in the future to conform to. What I am trying to convey is
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a sort of middle road between the hack works which conform to defined
genres (much of ethnography reads like hack work, the difference
being that the 'genre' existed only in the ethnographers' heads) and
the onus of each writer in anthropology having to establish his own
genre (which has been the case with, say, Levi-Strauss, or Clifford
Geertz, and James Frazer). Goodman suggests that "it is best to do
linguistics"— and here I might add ethnography, especially the
ethnography of speaking and communication which is my bent— "like
natural history or art criticism, reasoned by a_ posteriori, rather
20than like mathematics, as is the current style."
Goodman's notion of the similarity between the exploration of 
language as it ought to be done and literary criticism echoed that of 
Glifford Geertz, writing from within the ranks of anthropologists at 
about the same time.
Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of 
"construct a reading of") a manuscript— foreign, faded, 
full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, 
and tendentious commentaries, but written not in 
conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient examples 
of shaped behavior. (Geertz 1973:10)
This idea "remains theoretically underdeveloped", he writes later in 
the same collection (1973:448-9), "that cultural forms can be 
treated as texts, as imaginative works built out of social 
materials". He notes that such a notion of text carried beyond 
writing or speaking is not novel, but:
To put the matter this way is to engage in a bit of 
metaphorical refocusing of one's own, for it shifts the 
analysis of cultural forms from an endeavor in general 
parallel to dissecting an organism, diagnosing a symptom, 
deciphering a code, or ordering a system— the dominant 
analogies in contemporary anthropology— to one in general 
parallel with penetrating a literary text.
Let me return to Goodman. Having mentioned the similarity to
literary analysis, he continued:
...and, as in literary criticism, conversations and 
discourses fall roughly into genres, such as small talk, 
intimate talk, gang talk, public exchange of information, 
talk of different social classes, poems, journalism, 
dialogue, neurotic verbalizing, scientific exposition, 
etc.
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(My temptation was to overstate my own case here by noting aside the 
absence of "ethnography" ...but Sturgeon's pornography and science
fiction didn't make Goodman's list, either.)
Each of these might have, roughly, certain distinctive 
characteristics of pronunciation, grammar, lexicon, 
concreteness of denotation, assertion of propositions, 
personal engagement of the speakers, modifying of the 
standard code, tone of voice, interplay of speaker and 
hearer, intermixture of the non-verbal, order of 
exposition, etc.
"I may be mistaken," Goodman concludes, "but I think that a reasoned
description of such genres would tell us something about language
that we have not been getting from linquists, anthropologists, and 
21philosophers."
Goodman considers the argument from philosophy that we may
establish rules governing the appropriate use of formal or
22vernacular language. Such has been effectively if not explicitly 
the case during the several heydays of evolutionist, functionalist, 
structuralist, and culturist reign over anthropology. And there may 
be those who feel the impending reign of an interpretationist formal 
language. This will not, I think, be the case. Geertz, our reigning 
anglophone interpretationist, tells us that "anthropological 
interpretation is constructing a reading of what happens... tracing 
the curve of a social discourse; fixing it into an inspectable 
form... The ethnographer 'inscribes' social discourse; he writes it 
down. In do doing, he turns it from a passing event, which exists 
only in its own moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists 
in its inscriptions and can be reconsulted" (1973:18—19).
My guess is that we could aid the inscribing of ethnographers if 
we could make Goodman's "reasoned description" of the genre (though, 
as Geertz has pointed out [l973:19n3]» "Self-consciousness about 
modes of representation (not to speak of experiments with them) has 
been very lacking in anthropology.") "What does the ethnographer 
do?", Geertz asks. Well, though it "may seem a less than startling 
discovery, and to someone familiar with the current 'literature', an
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implausible one...— he writes." And therein lies the authority for 
so much of the informal at-tempts of this present writing: he writes.
Writing and Discourse J
Our double task is to uncover the conceptual structures 
that inform our subjects' acts, the "said" of social 
discourse, and to construct a system of analysis in whose 
terms what is generic to those structures, what belongs to 
them because they are what they are, will stand out against 
the other determinants of human behaviour.
This is, again, from Clifford Geertz (1973:27). My last long 
sections on Coming to Terms and Idiom and Genre were to illustrate 
the, albeit sorry, absence of any body of 'literature' which is 
generic to ethnography (and the absurdity of that editor who, with 
all the heft of a balloon, used the weight of "the authority of that 
genre called 'the ethnography"' to keep Isbell's dialogue out of 
print). Geertz continues, "In ethnography, the office of theory is 
to provide a vocabulary in which what symbolic action has to say 
about itself— that is, about the role of culture in human life— can 
be expressed." I have quoted Geertz on this matter because he neither 
eschews those "made-in-the-academy concepts and systems of concepts" 
which appear in his writings, nor does he hestate to "plunge into the 
midst of the political, economic, stratificatory realities within 
which men are everywhere contained". Simply, with my reading of 
Geertz we have a genre.
I know this is audacious (sounds audacious). But this is exactly 
how genres happen. Somebody writes something, sombody else reads it, 
and the reading makes the genre. Do I mean that everything now 
written in interpretive anthropology ought to be written like 
Geertz's stuff? No. But that is already starting to be attempted, 
and attempt after attempt is looking like Goodman said: only hack 
works conform to the genres. What I mean, then, is that a bunch of 
writing now coming into begin might read like it and Geertz's are in 
the same genre. This is how genres themselves are determined like 
natural history or literary criticism, "reasoned but a posteriori".
This is also a presentation of a theory of ethnography which is a
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theory of reading, much in the same way that Geertzian "thick 
description" (or, I suppose, Geertz's thick description a la Gilbert 
Ryle) is a theory of the close reading of cultures, or Borges' 
writing is out of his theory of writing-as-reading, or Richard 
Poirier's notion of reading as cultural performance.^
But the only way for such a theory of ethnography as a theory of 
reading to take hold is to make sure that one of the ties holding such 
an audacious theory to what Frazer called, at the end of The Golden 
Bough, "the melancholy record of human error and folly" is a theory 
of reading itself. And it is in the light of this necessity that I 
have brought philosophers and writers to bear in this introduction.
I have suggested that meaning is the next-thing in any meaningful 
occurrence. When religious people ask what is the meaning of life 
they are talking about the next-thing after life (death or afterlife 
or the next incarnate life). When someone says "Close the door!" to 
another, the meaning is something like doorclosednow. ^
This brings us to the question of how do we know what the meaning 
is. This is a real can of worms: the can being philosophy or 
epistemology and the worms being 'knowledge of other minds', 
philosophy of mind, 'conjectures and refutations', innatisms. My 
view is this: We go to another society, hang around, make ourselves 
known, establish some kind of presence, get admitted (graduate from 
dopey observation to dumb participation), and see if we can figure 
out what they mean. That's how we get to know what the meaning is, 
what the meanings are— and the reason we'd better start 
participating pretty quickly is because until we establish ourselves 
in some of Tedlock's dialogues we will only be observers to other 
people 'making sense to one another' , and that will be at the risk of 
being left out. In the vernacular of the American Rocky Mountains we 
have to "move in on 'em". And this movement is not physical; it is 
mental. And it is mental according to a theory of mind which holds 
that minds are not individual (in the sense of one-to-one correlated 
with the brains of individual humans), a sense of mind as 'an 
aggregate of interacting parts or components in which the
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interaction between parts is triggered by difference, where
difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not located in space or
time' (paraphrasing Gregory Bateson, though it sounds like one of
?7Derrida's differances again
What we move into is their minds. Extraordinary as this sounds, I 
am not back in the genre of science fiction. Rather, I am trying to 
sound out my community of discourse on the idea that we ethnographers 
really do, in some unusual (but I think not 'non-ordinary' in 
Castaneda's sense ) sense, move the locus of all the minds that our 
mind is part of (all the friends and family and enemies and 
anthropologists to date) to a locus which includes alien— in my case 
Torres Strait Islanders— minds. I do not mean that there is a 'mind 
of man' in its varieties. There is not.
The 'mind of man' is a fiction. Were there such a single and 
unitary mind, we would have no business seeking elsewhere for the 
answers to our deepest questions, "answers," as Geertz put is, "that 
others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given"; there 
would be no need to garner them, "and thus to include them in the 
consultable record of what man had said" (Geertz 1973:30). Having 
quoted Geertz earlier on the original meaning of 'fiction', I should 
not like to be mistakenly held to be denigrating fictional 
interpretations such as the 'mind of man'. Rather I want to take a 
position that all is fiction— fictio, makings— and that some 
fictions are better than others.
As the epigraph for his "Sketch for a Critical History of 
Anthropology", Ernest Becker chose these words of Rousseau.
I maintain that it is beyond dispute that anyone who has 
seen only one nation does not know man' he only knows those 
men among whom he has lived.
As a polemic for anti-ethnocentrism, for a non-exclusory science of 
man, this is apt. But it is not programmatic, and may not be read as 
if it had a positive converse, to wit, if we know other nations and 
live among other men then we will know man. This is the kind of
misreading which used to bother Korzybski, in this case, reading a
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problem in trying to think out what some words beg us to do (not claim 
to know man from knowing but a few men) as if it were a problem in 
logic (if we know other men then we will know man). It is a mistake 
easily made, as are other Korzybskian mis-takings of map for 
territory, when the difference between writing and discourse is not 
kept firmly in mind...in this case in the epistemological monitor in 
the mind. Writing, when it is part of a discourse, fools us into 
thinking we are talking when we are only reading (we mis-take words 
written as speech) . Stephen Tyler discusses collocations such as 
"the idiom 'If the shoe fits, wear it'", and other "formulaic
collocations" including "If then ", and "If (not)_____ then
(not)_____ ", which are forms of commonplace knowledge (Tyler
1978:229-34). Tyler calls many of these forms "idioms" ('So long!', 
'This and that' , 'Old as the hills'), and as long as we keep in mind 
that he is using writing to represent speaking within a discourse we 
will have no problems. But even this word collocation introduces 
trouble, for such phrases which Tyler calls "idioms" (which I would 
prefer to leave as 'idiomatic' , in order to always keep in sight the 
fact that these are words and phrases from some real existing idiom; 
they do not constitute whole idioms on their own) are only 
collocations of words by virtue of writing: In speaking there is no 
page; collocations happen only in writing and only because the ones 
which we analyze are short enough to fit onto one page.
The distinction which I propose is an epistemological one, one 
which suggests that the governance of discourse is of a different 
order from the governance of thought (though Wittgenstein may have 
shed eventual light on the processes which govern thought when he 
wrote about thinking as the "activity performed by the hand, when we 
think by writing"; but cf. Chomsky 1969, esp. n.15)* As Bateson 
often pointed out, in respect of one of his favourite stories— the 
ancient paradox of Epimenides (the Cretan who said he was a Cretan 
and Cretans always lie)— "logic cannot model causal systems, and 
paradox is generated when time is ignored".^ The point is that 
speech always includes time, and time precludes collocation (in two
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ways: simply, there can't be two phonemes in the same place at the 
same time and, more complicatedly epistemological, the idea of 
'place' applied to speech is used cautiously and advisedly at best). 
In fact, the meaning of Epimenides' paradox was probably not in 
speech at all. The meaning was whatever next-thing he intended, or 
whatever next-thing happened despite his intention (he may have been 
hit by some hearer who didn't want to be toyed with that way). The 
best meaning may be this: Epimenides announces that he is a Cretan 
and then tells you that all Cretans are liars. You delay for two 
seconds of thought (which oscillates from premise to proposition and 
back again) and then burst into laughter shouting, if you're an 
Australian and sticking to your own idiom, "You bugger!"
Again let me make my point as carefully as I can: Meaning need not
be in the same mode of communication, nor need it follow immediately
(Epimenides may hop on the Collins Street tram, consigning your
response to the lonely and unretaliative muttering of "Epimenides,
you bugger!" as you walk through downtown Melbourne). When a Texan
says to a Montanan, "Them's fightin' words" he is being a kind of
dictionary, saying 'Here is the meaning of what you just said...did
you really want to mean that?' When a Torres strait Islander's jaw
starts to drop as an Australian Aborigine enters the pub which counts
as Islander turf, his dropping jaw says that person simply can't mean
that collocation— he'd have to be a fool to cause the inevitable
next-thing from any collocation of Islanders and Abs. (Similarly 
/ /when an adult Meriam le chooses to not respond when he has not been 
enfranchised to be silent, the speaker's response is almost always 
disbelief— the disbelief of a disciplining father faced with the 
'silent treatment' from a teenage son— he simply can't mean to be 
doing this!?!)
Most of the chapters which follow are about things which the 
Islanders and I and others who feature do and don't mean to happen. 
While I shall apologize for taking, in this long introduction, too 
much of those reader's time who do not wish to dally so long so far 
from the 'data' , I should not at all like to be read as apologizing
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for writing fully as I can. My sentiments are squarely with Paul 
Goodman's ^ :
I do not think there can be a rule for the appropriate 
use of formal or vernacular language. Formal language can 
be prophylactic, but it can then become either pedantic 
and irrelevant, or it may prejudge experience and impose 
on it. The best is to try for a vernacular that molds 
itself to what is going on and to use it critically.
From Here to Alternity
The problem of writing in a discourse is the problem of keeping in 
mind that there is a writer and a reader, and that they together 
determine the operation on the matter which the writing is about. In 
order for the writer of an ethnography to give the reader a feel for 
the others whom his ethnography is about (and I realize that those of
*Z Aus concerned with feel constitute an anthropological minority^ ), he 
must write the reader into the text of the ethnography. Since it is 
only by dint of the strongest and most prolific efforts that the 
reader gets the feel of being a native other, he (the reader) is most 
often (though not always, nor by any means necessarily) invited in as 
if he were the writer...or, at least, as if he were 'in the writer's 
shoes'. (Explicitly he is armed with enough context so that he can 
stop aside, in the course of his reading, and say to himself— as if 
to the writer— Jeez, mate, if I were in your shoes I sure wouldn't do 
that!) The issue is the issue of, as I have come to put it, 
sensibility versus sensitivity. The job of the ethnographer is to 
write about the natives so that the reader may be sensitive to the 
natives all around him, as if they are all around him, as he reads. 
When such intellectual fashions as interpretation— our current 
fad— are moved to opt for making some kind of scientistic 
sensibility of native other-ness, then I am with Susan Sontag, 
"Against Interpretation".-^ (But if by interpretation we mean, with 
Clifford Geertz, "not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning" ( 1973:5) ,  I am for it.) The 
problem is partly, as always, what the words mean...which is to say,
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using a more rigourous discursive epistemology, the problem is what 
each writer means when he writes the words he writes.
This so-called 'problem' is even worse than this: only the reader 
can put in the meaning. This is the little fictiö— each reader's 
private making of each text read— which permits such things as 
dictionaries at all...the idea that words can have meanings without 
speakers. Speakers and hearers make sense because they make a deal 
to try to make sense and then they try to be sensitive to each other 
to make sure that sense is being made. They use feedback and 
feedforward, v sensitivity monitors, to keep the sensibility system 
going. Readers and writers have no such on-the-spot sensitivity 
monitors. A speaker can get away with breaches in sociolinguistic 
etiquette, exceptions to the vocabulary-of-rule, and all kinds of 
other things as long as he has the paralinguistic, kinesic, proxemic, 
etc. repertoire to encourage a sensitive hearing. This is one of the 
best reasons for writing with a good vernacular... or seeking to 
establish one, in a genre, if there isn't one. It gives the writer 
means of encouraging a sensitive hearing, a reading which is 
sensitive to an idiom instead of read in a language, (in language 
words can have manings that no one ever meant; in an idiom there are 
only words and phrases which once meant something. We, each of us, 
first learn an idiom, then we learn a language. Languages are parsed 
idioms. We learn 'I dn' wanna!' before we learn don'=don't=do not. 
And if 'I dn' wanna!' doesn't get our listeners to put in the 
meanings we mean for them to put in when they hear us, then in order 
to make sense we say something else.) The reason, then, that I have 
used the words of more writers than anthropologists in this 
introduction (and anthropologists who are writers, like Geertz and 
Needham) is that they understand that the writer has to inhabit a 
language (habit used to mean creative, fully present inhabitation^ 
Needham wrote, "The mind is not a condition of language but a 
construct from language" (1972:136). Language is, of course (as a 
matter of course), in its turn a construct from mind. In this sense 
neither is a condition of the other so much as a precondition of the
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other...but a condition/precondition distinction which, like Georg 
Simmel's form and content, "is composed of two elements which in 
reality are inseparable" (Simmel [1908] 1959:315)* So when I 
suggest, as I did earlier, that we ethnographers move into the 
natives' mind, my suggestion parallels those that translators move 
their readers into other languages and writers move their readers 
into other... other what? Other-ness. Other possible existences? 
Other places, other times; other events?
Whatever it is, I have perpetrated a momentary fiction in 
separating the ethnographer from the translator and the writer: 
ethnographers are only writers— ethno-graphers— too, as are 
translators. In all three cases the writer has to bring the reader 
into [something] and do something to him or with him. The something 
that the writer has to bring the reader into, in each of these 
instances, is the text. That is, he has to bring the reader into his 
own text, the text at hand (in our case, you and I, the text you are 
now reading). Once there, he can take the reader along into a 
penetration of an ancient foreign text (trans-late with the reader 
present) , or he can take the reader into a novel fictiö of his own 
contrivance, or he can take the reader into the midst of a bunch of 
natives via ethnography. What has to be recognized is that this 
first 'taking' of the reader is common to all of these activities, a 
commonality which bespeaks an affinity between ethnology and 
literary criticism even more pronounced than our reigning spokesmen 
would have. (Than our reigning ethnologists, that is; some literary 
critics, critics on the order of Richard Poirier, are leaning so far 
toward anthropology they are in danger of overbalancing right out of 
their disciplines— to the benefit of anthropology, I suspect.-^) The 
common concern must begin with the wonder of language to make for us 
anything different, strange, un-accustomed at all.
"Linguists and psychologists (Nietzsche excepted) have done 
little to explore the ubiquitous, many-branched genius of lies," 
writes George Steiner in After Babel. "Constrained as they are by
moral disapproval or psychological malaise, these inquires have
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remained this. We will see deeper only when we break free of a purely 
negative classification of 'un-truth' (— as he says earlier, "The 
very concept of integral truth— 'the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth'— is a fictive ideal of the court-room or the seminar in 
logic"— ) only when we recognize the compulsion to say 'the thing 
which is not' as being central to language and mind." Sometimes the 
thing which is not is simply not here, as in geography of other 
places; sometimes simply not now, as in histories of the past; 
sometimes the not yet of futurology or the not-real of fiction.
We need a word which will designate the power, the 
complusion of language to posit 'otherness'. That power, 
as Oscar Wilde was one of the few to recognize, is inherent 
in every act of form, in art, in music, in the 
contrarieties which our body sets against gravity and 
repose. But it is preeminent in language. French allows 
alterite, a term derived from the Scholastic 
discrimination between essence and alien, between the 
tautological integrity of God and the shivered fragments 
of perceived reality. Perhaps 'alternity' will do: to 
define the 'other than the case', the counter-factual 
propositions, images, shapes of will and evasion with 
which we charge our mental being and by means of which we 
build the changing, largely fictive milieu of our somatic 
and our social existence.
So does George Steiner introduce alternity, and bring to bear on the 
notion of language and mind— idiom— which I work in terms of the 
weight of translation theory to add to the weight of anthropological 
theory which accompanies Geertz's fictiö.
The remaining chapters are samples of moving from here to 
alternity. In some cases the alternity is my own case, the making 
which I have made of my own life and tha accretions of idiom and 
language and mind which make it important for me to say my own say in 
this way; in other cases, most of them, the alternity is Torres 
Strait Islanders. Why have I taken so long, so many pages of 
introduction to make what is really only this simple short point? 
Because there are a number of things which a reader must keep in mind 
when reading any piece of writing which begs of the reader an initial 
empathy. In Ronald Nelson’s film "Flight of the Doves" the children 
Finn and Dervil are awarded into the custody of their typically venal
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(from Irish eyes) step-father, Tobias Cromwell. Uncle Toby, after 
only the legacy which accompanies the children, can't wait to get it 
and them away from their good and lovely (from Irish eyes, of course) 
grandmother, one Mary Magdalene St. Brigit O'Flaherty. Hamming up an 
already transparent 'aggrieved father' act for Irish television 
reporters, the hapless Toby sobs and rambles until an Irishman 
spectator says, "The first Cromwell slaughtered the Irish, this one 
will talk 'em to death."
This is by way of apologia for those whose reading thus far has 
been laboured. But it is, too, to remind that alternity is real, at 
least as real as people are. I have had Irishmen refuse to talk with 
me, and one found himself unable to remain seated next to me in an 
airport. I am no more my Uncle Oliver than I am "Uncle Toby", yet 
there are those who have 'read' me as both, as there may be those who 
will find in their present reading meanings which I never meant, 
reading writing by a writer whom I've never been. In writing, in 
discourse, the alternity is in the reader. Because I think that this 
is, at least in its application to anthropology, a notion unsupported 
by a genre of text after ethnographic text, I have taken a long time 
getting to the point of the introduction. I am reminded of Thomas 
Kuhn's long essay, "Reflections on my Critics", most of which is 
comprised of prefatory and introductory remarks. Only finally in the 
last few pages does he say, "At last we arrive at the central 
constellation of issues which separate me from most of my critics. I 
regret the length of the journey to this point but accept only 
partial responsibility for the brush that has had to be cleared from 
the path". In the present case, I have neither the 'brush' of 
critics nor the advantage of their help in a dialogue. The dialogues 
herein are alternities in the vein of Dennis Tedlock's dialogical 
anthropology— they are dialogues with my Islander fellows and not 
with my readers. But this introduction _is_ a kind of dialogue with my 
reader (it has to be if I expect any reader to cope with a theory of 
ethnography which is based in a theory of reading); it's just that 
this kind of dialogue must be governed (since, as Goodman pointed
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out, "there is no active respondent, so a literary work has to 
incorporate both sides of the dialogue" [1973:227]) like literature, 
or philosophy, and "literature, history, and philosophy are 
discursive and not linguistic" (Wilden 1968:303)*
In a sense the 'motion' in this introduction has been into rather 
than from-to, through layers or into successive enclosures. Here at 
the center there is only the text. The text is, as I write it, with no 
positivist pretensions and no dogmatic intentions, my self, part of 
my very being. To pretend otherwise, or to avoid mention of that 
reality would seem to beg the question of what little truth Steiner's 
alternity permits. Borges writes of night DCII of tin Thousand and 
One Nights when "the Sultan hears his own story from the Sultana's 
mouth. He hears the beginning of the story which embraces all other 
stories as well as — monstrously—  itself." He asks whether the 
reader perceived "the curious danger— that the Sultana may persist 
and the Sultan, transfixed, will hear forever the truncated story of 
A Thousand and One Nights, now infinite and circular?" Nor do we, he 
says, have to go into fiction to find such inventions. Consider the 
philosopher Josiah Royce and his proposed map of England, so complete 
it had to have a map of the map of England, which in turn had to have 
its little map (Royce 1.899)*
"Why does it make us uneasy," Borges asks, "to know that the map 
is within the map and the thousand and one nights are within the book 
of A Thousand and One Nights? Why does it disquiet us to know that Don 
Quixote is a reader of the Quixote, and Hamlet is a spectator of 
Hamlet? I believe I have found the answer: those inversions suggest 
that if the characters in a story can be readers or spectators, then 
we, their readers or spectators, can be fictitious" (Borges, 
"Partial Enchantments of the Quixote"). Why may it disquiet us to 
know of the strange and senseless practices of the others, the 
natives, whom anthropologists go to study (let alone live among). I 
believe I have found the answer: these practices suggest that if the 
characters in our ethnographies can be made to make sense, then we,
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their obeservers, can no longer escape our own strange 
senselessness.
When Frazer asks who does not know Turner's "Golden Bough", he 
makes sure to describe it, so that everyone will know it, at least 
for Frazer's purposes. (And he describes the sanctuary of Diana 
Nemorensis, the real one, so the reader can be familiar with that, 
too.) He makes the stuff that his analysis is 'about' right on the 
page. All anthropology is like this. The text is the ethnography. 
For the ethnographer, of course, there was once a kind of 'text' 
comprised of the native practices he went to study. But many of those 
disappeared into his own memory once they made sense; and many of the 
rest lost the consciousness of even an analytical problem once he was 
sensitive to them. So for the discourse constituted by the writers 
and readers, only the ethnographies, and their reinterpretations, 
and the reinterpretations of them are the texts. The text of 
Frazer's The Golden Bough is not Turner's painting (though we can, as 
readers, bring more critical comprehension if we have seen the 
painting...and can recall it), nor is it the scene in Diana's wood: 
it is simply the words and punctuation that Frazer wrote, and even 
then only if it got past the printer and publisher.
Franz Boas wrote, toward the end of his life, of a kind of worry 
that anthropologists might, in the scientific metastasis their 
discipline was experiencing, lose sight of the problem of mankind:^®
Reviewing the development of anthropology as a whole I 
think we may rejoice in the many new lines of research that 
have been taken up . . .  . There is perhaps some danger 
that, engrossed in the difficult psychological problems 
involved in the analysis of culture, we may forget the 
importance of the general historical problem with which 
our science started, but I am certain that with the 
broadening of our view the varied approaches to an 
understanding of the history of mankind will be 
harmoniously elaborated and lead us to a better 
understanding of our own society.
Malinowski, too, so long ago wrote, "Anthropology is even now divided 
by many schools, tendencies and partisan approaches....This is 
perhaps the moment at which the squabbles, the skirmishes, and the 
fratricidal fights of anthropologists might be superseded gradually
36
.t 39by an armistice, and the reign of constructive peace. Ray 
Birdwhistell has, again and quite recently (Birdwhistell 1977), 
noted changing practices in the use of anthropological terminology 
("theory", "methodology", and, in particular, "ethnography") which 
presage a new version of Malinowski's bellum omnium contra omnes. I 
do not want these essays to be read as entering that fray, say on the 
side of 'art' versus 'science', or literature versus social science.
I think Birdwhistell is right when he says that "Ethnography, as a 
discipline, represents a tradition of research, a field of study with 
a substantive subject matter, and involves a range of training. It 
is not merely a term for reporting exotic behavior" (1977:106).
What I do want to add is not to ethnography, except in Geertz’s 
sense of an addition being 'another country heard from', but to 
anthropology. What I want to add is about ethnography, it is 
alternity and the awareness of the very language ethnos is graphed 
in. Liam Hudson, bringing to bear a similar awareness on his science 
of mind, and enriching it thereby, puts what he calls his 'writing in 
defiance' thus:^
In the entrenched sciences, it is possible to transmit the 
truth in prose that is as crabbed as it is evasive. But 
where foundations are shakier, style not merely limits 
what we find it natural to express; it is, in important 
respects, the very essence of that expression. For it is 
through our style, our mode of address, that we transmit 
all those messages that lie beyond the literal meaning of 
our utterance.
For Hudson's 'style' I would prefer 'idiom' (in the sense that jazz 
musicians and expressionist painters work in an idiom, which is the 
very same sense that I mean for idiom to have as it applies to 
speaking and writing). For if Needham (and others) are, as I read 
them, right, and language and mind are knotted together, then (from 
Hudson:) "although we accept that our minds' products must 
eventually be judged by the puritan rules of evidence and 
insight —  the strait gate through which they must pass— we seem in 
practice to draw what inspiration we possess from a hidden stockpile 
of images, metaphors and echoes, ancient in origin, but fertile and 
still growing".^
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In order to avoid unwanted prophylaxis, I choose to do ethnography 
in a vernacular, to make my idioms and the Islanders' read to each 
other on the pages I have written. I do this because it is quite 
possible that in those bits and pieces of "a process in conduct" (the 
words are Mead's from the quotation below)— the kind of stuff that 
Tedlock has shown doesn't normally make it onto the published 
pages— might lie something that my reader can find that I never see. 
In order to talk about what this knowledge is, and about who knows 
it, I have accustomed myself to talking about self as a locus or 
subsystem of (Batesonian) mind. This has its roots in the 
philosophers known as the American pragmatists— Dewey, Mead, and 
especially Peirce. Since there is always, in the pages which follow, 
the self of the reader working to know something of the writer and of 
the stranger selves which the writer makes on the page, let me close 
with the quotation from the Carus Lectures of George Herbert Mead.
I have indicated the position which I assume over 
against the so-called epistemological problem, namely, 
that knowing is an undertaking that always takes place 
within a situation that is not itself involved in the 
ignorance or uncertainty that knowledge seeks to 
dissipate. Knowledge is not then to be identified with the 
presence of content in experience. There is no conscious 
attitude that is as such cognitive. Knowledge is a process 
in conduct that so organizes the field of action that 
delayed and inhabited responses may take place. The test 
of the success of the process of knowledge, that is, the 
test of truth, is found in the discovery or construction of 
such objects as will mediate our conflicting and checked 
activities and allow conduct to proceed.
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Confucius said, 'Is it easy to work from 
preconceived ideas? Heaven frowns on 
those who think it is easy.'
Chuang Tsu 
"Human Affairs"
CHAPTER 3
Of Wrist-Things and Islandtaim
The title of this chapter is composed of two names of things— one 
a class of objects, the other a processual style— which have to do 
with the presence of time. That peoples operate according to 
calculations of time which differ one from another has been known for 
a long time; and differences among time-frames have been explicitly 
studied by psychologists, psychoanalysts, historians, 
anthropologists, linguists. Perhaps the most telling appreciations 
of different time-frames have been those of Eliade (1959), Hallowell 
(e.g. 1955), E.T. Hall (1959), and the specifically located studies 
of Whorf (1950) and Geertz ([l966]l973) • Taking a point from 
Kluckhohn (1950) that 'common human problems' are relatively few, 
Ernest Becker (1972: 118-124) proposed that there were, in fact, six, 
and that among these six was this question: I11 what kind of
space-time dimension does human action take place?
In her explication of "Warm Springs 'Indian Time'", Susan Philips 
opens with the observation that most treatments of culturally 
different time-frames have compared "'our' western European-derived 
concepts of time with those of 'other' cultures". Her point is that 
the concept of 'Indian time' is a notion widespread among North 
American Indians which "usually seems to have a 
boundary-maintenance function in that it is always something viewed 
as peculiarly Indian and not non-Indian. However, actual use of the
phrase conveys a range of nuances in meaning, depending on who is
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using the phrase..." (1974:107). Her explication is primarily 
concerned with those events which are characteristically Indian and 
with the progression of events as regulated by who must and who may 
participate. The boundary-maintenance function which she mentions 
is one which holds for other named time-frames among minority groups:
C. P. Time/Colored-People's Time (American Blacks); Blackfellas Time 
(Australian Aborigines); P.R. Time (Puerto Ricans). Among Torres 
Strait Islanders, throughout the islands of the Strait and on the 
Australian mainland, this boundary is marked by the notion of 
Islandtaim.
Certainly there is a general appreciation among these marked 
categories of a lesser import of clocks— of devices for measuring 
small periods of time. As for (Warm Springs) 'Indian time', 
Islandtaim is the marked category. Surrounded by alien time-frames, 
Islanders who do not normally speak of time say 'Islandtaim' 
frequently, marking off a domain of Island reckonings and enforcing a 
demarcation, a boundary of identity. It is clear that Islandtaim 
exists in a milieu of another kind of time reckoning. In the islands 
this is notably the clock-time of the schools, churches, and the
D. N.A. (Queensland's Department of Native Affairs had become the 
Department of Aboriginal and Islander Advancement but is still known 
to Islanders by its long-standing acronym). On the mainland it is 
the much more pervasive clock-time of shops, schools, jobs, public 
transport systems, offices, radio and television, and meetings held 
outside the bounds of the Islander community. This clock-time way of 
reckoning is called, variously, kole taim [whiteman time], waitaman 
taim [whiteman time], taim lo clock [time on (the) 
clock/clock-time]; it is, however, just as often called no Ilantaim 
[not Islandtaim]. The third time-frame extant on the mainland is the 
way of reckoning time ascribed to Aborigines. Except in 
distinguishing among possible ways of reckoning the time for events 
this time-frame is rarely named by Islanders, though they comprehend 
what is meant by an Aborigine who refers to 'Blackfella time' (or,
rarely, and more commonly among Pacific Islanders, to 'C.P. time').
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Islandtaim
The answer to Becker's question, "In what kind of space-time 
dimension does human action take place?", is Islander action takes 
place in Islandtaim. Except that this leaves us with a prepositional 
problem, the problem of whether Islander, or any other, actions take 
place _in time. In common parlance, as Edward Hall points out (1959), 
problems are created when things don't 'happen in time’. But the 
sense of in is at variance here with the generic sense of 'in 
space-time' in Becker's question. That is, it may suffice to begin 
an examination of another time-frame with a general appreciation 
that all action takes place in a space-time dimension, and that what 
we are doing is figuring out how this other time-frame reckons 
space-time. But this gives rise to the problem of what some putative 
universal space-time dimension might be, in order that we might test 
(compare) the efficacy of this other time-frame. Without 
reconsidering the philosophical problems attendant, it is 
nonetheless fruitless to engage this problem, for the point about 
Islandtaim is not what it is, but what it is not.
Simply, it is not anybody else's way of reckoning when to do 
things. It may not even be an Islander way of reckoning when to do 
things. What it is is a way of marking Islander things to be done in 
Islander ways. Its only import is that there are, in the Islander 
social environment (that is, in the wider context of which mainland 
Islanders comprise a social subsystem), other ways of doing things. 
Most obviously, there is a whiteman way of doing things which has to 
do with clocks. Clocks tell whitepeople when to do things. With a 
schedule of when (clock-time) something is to happen and a clock, 
whitepeople can be there. The schedule and the clock are sufficient, 
in principle, for the organization of those events which require 
attendance (e.g. focused gatherings [Goffman 1963]) by whitepeople. 
And a clock and schedule are sufficient, in principle, for the
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governance of the duration of those (white) events which entail a 
scheduled duration.
Neither schedule nor clock are sufficient for the organization of 
Islander focused gatherings. This is not to say that Islander 
children do not generally arrive at school in time for the start of 
the school day, not that Islanders do not arrive for appointments at 
doctors' and dentists' offices at the specified times, not that they 
do not use clocks or know how to tell time. They do know how to tell 
time, and they do use clocks. Principally they use clocks in order to 
function according to non-islander time. What they do not do is use 
clocks to measure time. Which, again, is not to say that 'time' is 
not measured, calculated, or otherwise quantified, but that the 
measure of time is not clocks.
The measure of 'time' is happenstance. Happenstance has to do 
with what has happened and what is happening. Likely happenstance 
has to do with things which are likely to happen in the near and 
knowable future. Regular gatherings of Islanders for church 
services are likely to happen next week (some churches have regular 
meetings three, four, or even five days a week). They may or may not 
happen the week after next, and their likelihood beyond two weeks 
hence is virtually incalculable. Jobs are normally daily things, 
usually beginning at a specified time and lasting until a specified 
time. Jobs are likely to be there tomorrow, and the next day, and it 
is likely that jobholders will be on the job tomorrow and the next 
day. School is regularly five days a week and, barring illness 
contracted today, it is likely that Islander children will attend 
school tomorrow; they are likely, too, to be in school the day after 
tomorrow, and may well attend all week. On the other hand, something 
may happen.
This last sentence, 'something may happen', encodes something of 
the logic of Islandtaim. The crucial thing is that to understand 
Islandtaim is to understand that this is never said. That is, in the 
sense that 'something might happen' to undermine or contradict plans 
made, it is not talked about. The only things which 'might' happen
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(in the future) which are subjects for discussion are those things 
which are likely to happen. For example, people are likely to die. 
The older people get, the more likely they are to die in the near 
future. It is, therefore, both possible and permissible to speak of 
someone's likely death...but death is not spoken of until it is 
likely. This is not quite the same thing as a requirement that death 
must be imminent before it is mentioned. Likelihood extends somewhat 
farther into the future than does the about-to-occur sense of 
imminence. The test of likelihood is whether or not something else 
looks like being more likely to happen. Very old people get 
increasingly less likely to continue living. And when they die it is 
likely that they will stay dead.
But it is by no means certain that they will stay dead. In fact, 
ghosts inhabit the mainland (though not in the profusion that they 
are thought to have inhabited the islands, especially in the days 
before the arrival of the missionaries). Ghosts are usually dead, 
and they usually remain dead, even when they remain around living 
people and bother them. But all ghosts are not dead. In the case of 
sarup [sea ghosts]— people who have disappeared over the ocean 
horizon and are, consequently, defined as dead— in the past, their 
reappearance has been in the form of children who, having died or 
disappeared and been presumed dead, have been returned to their 
families from the dead. Their reappearance, however, had to be on a 
different island from their home; that is, it had to be an 
'appearance'. Only an omniscient viewpoint could, in fact, have 
established that these sarup were people washed overboard, or washed 
out to sea from one island and washed ashore on another. For if the 
same person was washed up on his own island he was sarup, and sarup 
were particularly troublesome ghosts because they still had complete 
human bodies. They were ghouls, ghosts who manipulated human bodies 
and would go among the living. The only thing to do was to dispatch 
them forthwith. And there are numerous tales of people washed out to 
sea only to be washed ashore again on their own island, to begin 
hiding out in the bush or in the swamps until they could steal a canoe
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and escape to another island or to the Papuan coast. It is thought 
that few, if any, ever lived long enough to get away.
As far as anyone now knows, the last returned child from the land 
of the dead arrived before the turn of the century. And a number of 
white people lost at sea are said to have been adopted by the parents 
or families of lost children in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. (This theme is central to Ion Idriess' novel, Drums of 
Mer, whose protagonist is an English seaman washed overboard and 
adopted as the long lost son of an old woman on Mer.) These 
'returnees' were called lamar, and were distinguished from sarup 
which also came from the sea but who, rather than having been 
returned, were perpetrating a terrible masquerade in their human 
bodies.
Less spectacular is the exception to the likelihood that living 
people will stay living 'until they die'. Sometimes they do not. 
That is, in keeping with the idiom of my interpretation, sometimes it 
happens that living people have been other than alive for a time. 
This is most common during extreme illness, especially during 
illness which will, in all likelihood, prove fatal. It is the 
experience of coming to death's door, a trip which is experienced as 
out of body flight and reported by the sick person who subsequently 
recovers. The reports have been sufficiently consistent to have 
become typified, though the trip experience has not (to my knowledge) 
acquired a name. The reports are of the sick person 'finding himself 
high in the sky above his body' in the company of some kind of 
spirit-guide who escorts him eastward through the stars in a great 
arching curved path toward the mythical island, far to the east, 
whose inhabitants are The Educated who have passed on (this is the 
place which has been transmuted into 'Heaven' since the arrival of 
the Christians, who also assigned a 'Hell', originally the 
destination of the uneducated whose derelict souls also made their 
way eastward but to some nondescript place beneath the sea). Thus 
far the trip of the sick person out of his body conforms to the 
postulated voyage of all of The Educated who die.
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I suggested that this out-of-body experience was a trip to 
'death's door'. Actually, as the remembered reports go (the most 
recent one was some years ago made by an old woman who had lived to 
become the oldest Torres Strait Islander), no one has quite made it 
to whatever entrance to the island of the afterlife might pass for a 
'door of death*. Sometime along the way, often after passing the 
zenith of the great arc, the person is "returned". The return may 
have been relatively more abrupt than the outward trip, at times, 
though it has been reported to have been a retracing at a speed 
commensurate with that of the eastward flight. The most recent known 
voyage ended with awareness of a descent from the infinitely high 
skies, through the known sky, down over the body and its attendants, 
and back into the body to wake up almost immediately. This woman was 
full of wonderous description of her trip, of the flying and the 
great heights, as soon as she regained consciousness (which she 
reported as being immediately after her return to her body). She 
was, for a time, extremely likely to die. Her body looked like the 
comatose body of someone likely to die, and her report later 
confirmed that she had come awfully close. But something happened, 
and she returned.
It is sometimes said of these comatose travelers that 'they have 
died once' , but this is generally refined by the followup, 'well, it 
was like she was dead' . And then the story of her wonderful trip is 
retold, and perhaps others who have made the trip and returned are 
recalled. The retelling might reiterate what was reported of the 
duration of the voyage. None of these trips are remembered to have 
been instantaneous, and none to have taken a 'short time' (though it 
seems as if some of the travelers have gone further than others 
before being returned, a suggestion in such cases of a trip of longer 
duration since the distance from Torres Strait to the isle of the 
afterlife is constant, if not known). The apparent (relativistic) 
paradox is that those who have remained on the ground with the body 
have not experienced, at times, anything more than a 'short time' of 
unconsciousness. In terms of modern astral projection and other psi
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phenomena reported as out-of-body there is nothing strange about 
differential time-frames. What is noteworthy about the Islander 
'trips' is the absence of paradox. That is, in Islandtaim there is no 
paradox generated by the concurrence of 'short' and 'long' times. 
What I suggest is that it is clocks which enable the postulation of 
paradox. It is only clocks which can sit there and measure time with 
no one watching or caring.
This discussion of death and non-death in Islandtaim is to posit a 
system of reckoning in which not only is the specific instant of 
death unknowable, but also the fact of death unknowable. In 
Islandtaim only the dead know they are dead; for everyone else there 
is always something that might happen. And even this imposed rule of 
thumb is belied by the sea ghosts, those apparently living bodies 
which the sea tosses back onshore and who are so terrifying because 
they do not know they are dead. In a time-frame which disallows the 
certainty of death (which, actually, precludes such certainty) other 
timely certainties, even putative ones, are rare. This does not mean 
that it is impossible to be certain of when something is happening, 
rather that there is a distinct division between those who know the 
when of things and those who do not. And this division is between 
those who may know of things not experienced and those who may know 
only of those things to which they have been party. Those persons who 
have attended an event, or been party to a happening, may be said to 
know when the event happened and when constituent incidents within 
the event occurred. The men of knowledge, the educated men, may know 
when events occur to which they have not been party. It is only these 
few who have the sagacity with which to place events in relation to 
one another in the framework of Islandtaim.
The Framework
Islandtaim is an aggregation of happenings which are associated 
with those Islanders to whom things have happened and to those who 
have attended happenings. Events are ordered within the lifetimes of
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each person according to the importance of the events (some are 
negligible) and the efficacy of individual memory (some people 
forget events which were shared with others who still remember). 
Events, actions, and happenings which have import for wider Islander 
society comprise a framework of such events, actions, and 
happenings. Some of these events have been so earthshaking that they 
are known to have occurred, and their relationship to other 
extraordinary events generally placed within the framework of 
Islandtaim. Events such as the arrival of the first people in the 
islands of the Torres Strait, the first sighting of European sailing 
vessels, the first contact with a 'metal turtle' (oral history 
records this as the earliest reference to armour-clad Europeans) , 
the first awareness that 'metal turtles' were light-skinned human 
beings, the first man o' war to shell the islands with cannon, the 
'Coming of the Light' (the arrival of London Missionary Society 
missionaries on Darnley Island in July of 1871), the Second World War 
(and the Battle of Coral Sea, especially) are all placed in relation 
to one another in the overall historical framework of Islandtaim. 
Most of these events happened in the era known as 'our ancestors' 
time'. 'Ancestors' time' ends sometime around the 1860's, a time 
roughly in accordance with the advent of contemporary Islanders' 
great-great-grandfathers. It may be that five generations are the 
ongoing definition of the known immediate past. Though I have no 
evidence of this, five generations are said to be the traditional 
measurement of incest, and among those who still honour the tradition 
senior men from courting couples' families still gather to recite and 
compare possible relationships back to the time of each 
great-great-grandfather.
The examples of memorable events above are largely those which 
present a framework for reckoning Torres Strait history in its wider 
context. There are also those events which comprise a primarily 
inter-island history, and there are intra-island histories for each 
island. Events such as major battles, the decimation of one island 
by another, the death of a famous warrior, the arrival on an island
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(or in the islands) of a manifestation of any of the gods of the 
Torres Strait cults— especially the octopus manifestation of the 
most recent and Torres Strait wide cult, which reigned until after 
the arrival of the missionaries— and the transformations of those 
manifestations after their arrival, the eradication of the last 
physical vestiges of Torres Strait religion by the Christians, the 
general strike of 1936, the first people to be sent to work in the 
mainland cane fields, are each related to one another in the 
frameworks of intra- and inter-island histories.
These histories are the oral records of what has happened. Their 
logic is not chronology; it is the reckoning of subsequence. Within 
the broad framework of Island taim, from the beginnings of the 
Islander people in the timeless depths through the 'prehistory' of 
Ancestors' time to the five- or so generations of modern notions of 
history the measure of 'time' is subsequence: what happened after 
what. History is relationships of historical things, and the 
principal relation is subsequence. Subsequence has to do with two 
things: being after, and some (one) thing to be after. Any aggregate 
of nonconcurrent happenings may be deemed to exhibit subsequence. 
That is, all happenings in the aggregate may be said to be subsequent 
to one happening which is not subsequent to any other. The 
happening, in Islandtaim, may be itself an entity which is an 
aggregate of happenings. In this sense, Ancestors' time is the thing 
that all events since are after. The arrival of the legendary 
forbears is an event which all Torres Strait Islander events are 
after. The arrival of the Augud [Supreme Being] in his initial 
manifestation is a happening which all Augud-events are after. The 
'Coming of the Light' is an event which all Christian happenings are 
after.
What I want to make clear here is that the exclusion of sequence 
as a governing principle of Islandtaim is intentional. Sequence is a 
principle of ordering singularities. Historical sequence is enabled 
by an idea of temporal sequence, an 'as if' postulation of 
chronological points as in 'this point in time'. Points are by
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definition, and by popular accord, single dimensional locators which 
exist in relation to other points. A line is a measure of two points 
(along which lies an infinitude of points). It is not possible to 
speak of an Islandtaim 'timeline'. Most importantly, it is not 
possible to speak of 'points in time'. It is not even possible to 
gloss 'this point in time' to mean now, either in a general or more 
delimited sense of now. In fact, it is not possible to say "now". 
The closest delimitation of "now" that can be said is 'today' (or, 
perhaps more precisely, 'this day’). What is important about this is 
the impossibility of anything, anyone, any event existing at some 
putative 'point in t:me' in Islandtaim. Entities which may be placed 
in the framework of Islandtaim are not said to 'exist', or to 'have 
existed'; they either have happened, are happening, or are more 
likely than not to happen pretty soon. All of this is not to preclude 
Islander recognition of natural temporality, nor to ignore those 
natural changes which might be seen as natural sequences. But it is 
to lay the groundwork for examining natural rhythms in Islandtaim as 
non-sequential events.
There are a number of natural rhythms or cycles or progressions 
which are temporal facts. The movements of stars and the repetitions 
of seasonal cycles define years. The changes of waning and waxing 
moon define months. And there are diurnal cycles. Pre-colonial 
Islandtaim (which was not a named thing then, having arisen only to 
demarcate normal time from extraneous Christian and other 
clock-time) had names for diurnal phases, including 'pre-dawn', 
'imminent dawn', dawn, morning, later morning, afternoon, later 
afternoon, early evening, among others. There were also 'moons' 
(months). There were names for the two seasons, named for the East 
Wind and the West Wind. As far as we know, nothing was numbered. 
That is, cyclic changes were not taken to demarcate boundaries of 
things which could be then mapped onto numerical sequence. 
(Certainly if things were ever mapped onto numerical sequence, the 
sequences would have been short, since the numbers before English 
were one, two, two-and-one, two-and-two.) The arrival of the
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m i s s i o n a r i e s  e n t a i l e d  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  weeks ,  named ( a n d ,  h e n c e ,  
o r d e r e d )  d a y s ,  numbered y e a r s  b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  1871 , and named months;  
i t  a l s o  e n t a i l e d  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  t h e  word " t i m e " ,  b o th  i n  i t s  p r o p e r  
E n g l i s h  form and i n  t h e  t a im  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n a r i e s '  Sou th  Sea I s l a n d e r  
a i d e s  and t r a i n e e s  who spoke the  p i d g i n  E n g l i s h  o f  t h e  Sou th  P a c i f i c  
m a r i t i m e  i n d u s t r y .  And t h e  m i s s i o n a r i e s  b r o u g h t  c l o c k s ,  and th e  
c a r d i n a l  numbers which co u ld  a c c o u n t  f o r  t w e n t y - f o u r  h o u r s  to  t h e  
day .  ( i t  may a l s o  be t h a t  c a l e n d r i c a l  s e a s o n s  a r r i v e d  a lo n g  w i t h  t h e  
c a l e n d a r s ,  b u t  t h e s e  have n e v e r  been  adop ted  i n t o  I s l a n d e r  s p e e c h . )
What I  want  to  s u g g e s t  i s  t h a t  t h e  names o f  n a t u r a l  c y c l e s  were 
names which r e c o g n i z e d  t e m p o r a l i t y ,  b u t  which d i d  so by s i g n i f y i n g  
tempo and n o t  ' t i m e '  . Each s e a s o n  was h i s t o r i c a l  i n s o f a r  a s  i t  cou ld  
be r e l a t e d  to  some o t h e r  e v e n t ( s ) ;  i t  was t e m p o r a l  i n s o f a r  as  i t  
f o l l o w e d  th e  s e a s o n  which i t  was a f t e r .  Each day was day t im e  i n t o  
n i g h t t i m e  i n t o  d a y t i m e ,  w i t h  da y t im e  composed o f  p h a s e s  which were 
p r i m a r i l y  names o f  l i g h t - c o n t e n t  ( p e r h a p s  i n  t h e  same way t h a t  f i r e s  
a r e  t y p i f i e d  by t h e i r  c a s t  l i g h t s  i n  t e rm s  o f  amount ,  c o l o u r ,  
q u a l i t y ,  i n t e n s i t y ) .  Seasons  and days were n e v e r  h i s t o r i c a l  
e n t i t i e s .  Each y e a r  was n o t  marked by b i r t h d a y s ,  f o r  t h e r e  was no way 
o f  r e c k o n i n g  one day from a n o t h e r .  There were no s i g n i f i c a n t  a g e s ,  
a k i n  t o ,  s a y ,  age t w e n t y - o n e ,  f o r  t h e r e  was no way o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  
one y e a r  f rom a n o t h e r  ( s a v e  p l u s  o r  minus two-and- two  y e a r s  ago o r  
h e n c e ) .  What t h e r e  were were h a p p e n i n g s ,  n o t e w o r t h y  d i f f e r e n c e s  
f rom examples  o f  t h e  no rmal  g o i n g s - o n ,  o r  n o v e l  t h i n g s .  Each 
r e m a rk a b l e  e v e n t  happened  d u r i n g  a day d u r i n g  a month d u r i n g  a 
s e a s o n .  But days and months and s e a s o n s  a r e  r e c o g n i t i o n s  o f  t empos,  
and tempos a r e  no more one t h i n g  a f t e r  a n o t h e r  t h a n  t h e y  a r e  one 
t h i n g  b e f o r e  a n o t h e r .  I t  was h i s t o r y  which r e c o g n i z e d  h a p p e n in g s  and 
c o n s t r u c t e d  o f  them th e  s u b s eq u e n c e  o f  I s l a n d t a i m .
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Wrong Time
The preceding discussion is largely an interpretation of a 
distillation of my own understanding of Islandtaim. It is marked by 
two salient points of exegesis. The first is that Islandtaim is a 
no-thing, a formal designation of a style, a way of doing things, 
which, though it is called "— time" by its adherents, is in fact a 
demarcation of those things which do not happen in a time-frame. 
Islanders do occasionally specify exactly which time-frame an event 
is not happening in. They say, 'Islandtaim. Islandtaim. This isn't 
Aboriginal time!', or, 'We're doing that on Islandtaim, no kole 
taim.' The second point is that Islandtaim marks off a style of 
composing history according to what I have called subsequence, by 
which happenings are related historically to a single happening 
which they are after. In doing so, I am not proposing a calculus for 
deciding which happenings are former and which are latter. Formerly 
and latterly may be, in a logical calculus, related to one another in 
reverse (e.g. A. before B_ may be equal to _B after A). But in human 
affairs the reckoning of things in time has as much to do with how 
time happens as it does how things happen. Or, to borrow the words of 
Gregory Bateson (1977:147), "All descriptions are based on theories 
of how to make descriptions...And every description is based upon, 
and contains implicitly, a theory of how to describe."
What I want to do in this section is to examine some of the 
descriptions of things-in-time which Islanders have made. Some of 
these are explicitly in that clump of listenings and rememberings 
from which the preceding section was distilled. Some of them are 
things not-heard, things which I cannot construe as being utterable 
by a mainland Islander. The title of this section is one of these 
utterances never-heard. Wrong time. When I say "wrong time" is a 
thing not-heard I mean that it is an expression not ever heard spoken 
by Islanders. In fact it is heard quite a lot spoken to Islanders by 
mainland whitepeople. It is commonly used as both assessment (after 
the fact)— 'You went at the wrong time' - and prescription (before
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the fact) —  'Don't come at the wrong time'. Its corollaries are such 
as, 'You're late' , 'Don't be late' , and 'You people are always late' . 
Such things are usually not understood by the Islander addressees. 
Which is not to say that they fail to comprehend that they are about 
to do, are doing, have done, usually do something wrong.
Clearly, what they usually do wrong is arrive at a clock-time 
later than the clock-time indicated for the commencement of the 
affair. When Islanders do arrive later than the scheduled clock-time 
(which they almost always do), they almost always go on in. Whether 
or not their late entry is disruptive, it is obviously late. 
Islanders are characterized by whitepeople on the mainland as always 
late, a characterization most often remarked to other whites and not 
in the presence of Islanders. Such remarks often carry imputations 
of reduced dependability, some of which are ad hominem deductions and 
some of which are simply hooks upon which to hang racism.
The problem of 'wrong' time raises a host of problems in the 
morality of time. Related to 'wrong time' but sometimes 
differentiated is 'bad time', and 'bad timing'. Bad time has to do 
with doing something when the same something could be better done at 
another time. Bad time has to do with both time that is not a good 
time for the co-participant and time which turns out to be not a good 
time. Bad time is most often immediately or soon assessed, and is a 
way of describing. Bad timing names an action taken at a bad time 
which might have been foreseen, and is an assessment. 'Bad time' and 
'bad timing' are not characteristic of the aspersive time-sense 
depictions of Islanders by whites. The question which arises is, 
what is it about the (primarily) clock-time environment in which 
Islandtaim is situated which assesses actions governed by Islandtaim 
to be often at the wrong time, but rarely bad timing?
Quite simply, it is virtually impossible to be guilty of 'bad 
timing' in Islandtaim. Bad timing is an assessment of an action 
which may be effected at more than one time and which ought to be 
effected at a time other than the one when it is attempted or 
offered. It is an assessment which may be made as soon as the
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intention of the actor is perceived by the recipient or as soon as 
the mood of the recipient is perceived by the actor. Either may say 
its a bad time, and the proferred action may be deferred. Bad timing 
is essentially a way of remarking the mutual inadvisability of 
commencing an event whose efficacy is predictably less than it will 
be at a later opportunity. Islanders do not commit 'bad timing' 
because they do not commence actions whose efficacy is reduced when 
those actions may be undertaken at another time. Islanders may not 
commence conjoint activity until invited to do so; and, Islanders may 
not desist from conjoint activity once entertained; and, Islanders 
are not required to invite conjoint activity.
As for always doing things at the 'wrong time', this, too, has to 
do with how it is that events may be commenced in Islandtaim. In 
Islandtaim, an event begins when the minimum number of required 
participants arrives. It is impossible for an Islander to arrive at 
the 'wrong time'. If he is a required participant, the event may not 
commence without him (see, for example, the arrival of the Chairman 
to the meeting described in chapter 6). If he is the last required 
participant to arrive, or if he, by his arrival, constitutes a 
quorum, the event will commence forthwith. And, not only may he be 
(as is usually the case) unaware, prior to his arrival, that he will 
round out a quorum, he may also be unaware that he is a required 
participant. (This may be for a number of reasons, common among them 
that others have not been able to contact him to let him know that his 
participation is necessary in order to conduct certain activities, 
but it may also be that those who have already arrived have 
determined that he has become a required participant.) At times, a 
meeting arranged for some time and place fails to attract its minimum 
number of required participants. Those who might have gone but 
didn't may or may not ask about what went on. Those who did go but who 
were unable to hold the meeting say, 'There wasn't any meeting' , or, 
'No, we didn't have it' . (They may have waited two or three hours for 
whoever might show up.) According to clocks and days, that meeting 
will be held at a later time. But according to Islandtaim, where it
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is impossible to hold one meeting at another time: the meeting which 
never came off was never a meeting; it never commenced.
Commencement and Duration
In clock-time it is possible for persons who show up at a meeting 
only to hang around waiting for a quorum which is never constituted 
to be severely put-out at their absent cohorts. And the absentees, 
except those who have bona fide excuses, are expected to be contrite. 
The irritation of those who attend abortive clock-time meetings and 
the contrition of their absent fellows are understandable. At base, 
they are understandable because actions and events 'take time'. 
Taking time for an activity which does not eventuate is wasting time. 
And waiting for a clock-time meeting just to get started— sitting 
around doing nothing— is a waste of time much more acute than the 
time 'wasted' at those meetings which do begin but in which little 
business gets conducted. Accompanying this sense of time 'taken' and 
'wasted' is a constellation of conventions and expectations about 
meetings. Meetings have purposes, and are not called for 'no 
reason'. They have agendas, are governed by rules of order, and are 
devices for organizing the conduction of business. Clock-time 
meetings are exceptional if they go on 'too long’ and fail to finish 
at a reasonable hour.
Islanders spend a great deal of their time in meetings. There are 
meetings of both cooperative housing societies, the Aboriginal and 
Islander Co-operative Medical Center, Aboriginal Legal Aid, state 
and federal Aboriginal and Islander development entities, the Torres 
STrait Self-Determination Group, the Island Women's Council. In 
addition to these there are usually a number of locally organized 
special interest groups, and there are Parents and Citizens groups 
for each school, and the Parents Council of the Black Community 
School. There are three Islander churches, each of which may hold as 
many as three formal worship services a week plus choir practices, 
Bible study groups, and general organizational meetings. And there
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are frequent ad hoc meetings of people organizing fund-raising 
activities for schools and church groups, plus meetings for 
organizing Islander delegates to state and national bodies and for 
preparing presentations of Islander dancing and singing and cooking 
for various festivals and shows in North Queensland. It is possible 
for an Islander active in community affairs to attend a dozen 
meetings and church services a week.
Those of these meetings and gatherings whose constituent members 
are all Islanders happen on Islandtaim. Islandtaim meetings are 
schedules events, set to happen at a specified time on a specified 
day (usually not longer than a week hence, though occasionally two 
weeks hence). Regular meetings of church and school groups usually 
occur weekly or biweekly at the same time on the same day. Whether or 
not a meeting happens at its scheduled time and place depends upon 
whether or not the participants happen to arrive. If sufficient 
participants happen to show up, a meeting commences. Until a meeting 
commences (that is, until the requisite participants arrive), those 
who have already arrived do not say they are 'having a meeting' ; 
rather they say they are 'waiting for a meeting', or if the 
assemblage is lacking only one or two key participants, they may say 
they are 'waiting for So-and-so'. Once a meeting commences it is 
happening.
Meetings of secular organizations are normally scheduled for 
evenings during the week and are assigned a time, usually 7:30, 8:00, 
or 8:30. Occasionally someone will arrive at the appointed time, but 
like as not this punctuality has been the result of transport 
schedules or finding oneself in the area of the meeting place around 
the time of the meeting. A meeting scheduled for 7:30 will be 
unlikely to commence before 7:50 and unlikely to commence after 8:40 
if it is to commence that evening; 8:00 meetings may commence before 
8:30, or they may not commence until after 9:00. The happening of the 
meeting depends upon who comes and when they arrive. Some meetings 
fail to happen when early arrivals tire of waiting and depart before 
later arrivals show up. But most meetings which fail to commence do
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so when requisite individuals or numbers of participants don't 
attend. And the more important a meeting is taken to be, the less 
likely it will fail to happen, for those who arrive earlier are loath 
to leave in case a quorum arrive.
Regular church services at non-islander churches commence at or 
shortly after their appointed times. Islanders are usually late, 
though their lateness is normally less than for those who attend any 
of the three Islander churches. Islander church services are likely 
to commence within twenty or thirty minutes of the appointed hour, 
and often get underway within ten or fifteen minutes (which probably 
reflects Christian influence toward clock-time punctuality— and 
away from the community-based punctuality of Isalndtaim). Church 
services have a general form at each church though the number of 
hymns and the duration of sermons and extemporaneous Bible 
commentaries and the number and duration of incidents of healing and 
bearing witness may vary the duration of any one service from just 
over an hour to three hours and more. Church services are less likely 
to be delayed in their commencement by tardy arrival of key 
personnel, though services occasionally commence with only one of 
the three or four ministers and half the choir present.
Meetings of groups whose constituent members are both 
non-islanders and Islanders generally conform to clock-time 
rules-of-order meetings. Though the gavel rarely falls on the stroke 
of the appointed hour, it generally does so within a few minutes. 
Pre-circulated agendas are generally adhered to, though rarely 
finished, and such meetings are as often disbanded as a solution to 
irresolvable and escalating conflict as they are formally adjourned. 
Islanders usually arrive later than others, though they are often 
prepared to stay later in order to get business finished. Islanders 
are also less likely to attend meetings of mixed Islander and 
non-islander membership. There are a number of contributing reasons 
given by reluctant Islanders. Most noticeably (to them) has been the 
re-emergence over the past several years of Aboriginal-Islander 
violence and its escalation. The commonly posited cause of this
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resumption of interracial conflict, which broke what was said to have 
been nearly a decade of calm and growing cooperation since 1962, was 
the massive inflow of federally-funded projects and development 
programs for Aborigines. The logic of violence having been caused by 
competition between groups of principally Aboriginal membership and 
groups of principally Islander membership over cuts of this juicy 
housing, medical aid, legal aid, and welfare pie.
The Likelihood of Something Happening
The avoidance of mixed meetings for reasons of the possibility of
more and increasing violence between Islanders and Aborigines is
symptomatic of Islanders' reasons for attending gatherings. That
is, it is apparently saying something about violence, and
particularly about interracial violence between Islanders and
Aborigines. Certainly adult Islanders rarely participate in violent
encounters, and are constrained by their consociates to explain any
known public violent behaviour. The dictum which governs violence
explicitly prohibits offensive violence. More than that, the
stories and legends from which it derives make it quite clear that
even defensive violence is only permissible when one has been
attacked on one's own ground. At any other place one must seek
immediate extrication from the situation, even if one has been sorely
offended. However, the dictum also prescribes the form for
retaliative violence in defense: one must attack, swiftly and
silently, and one must win. The rule is made explicitly in the
/advising of the people of Mer by one of their Educated Ones in a story 
from the Ancestors' time. And his advice has also made explicit the 
governing principle: the principle of welcome. In the story he
reports to his people why he did not enter a foreign village after he 
had been seen by its residents but not welcomed. Implicit in this 
tale (and explicit in others) is the dictum that people are not 
obliged to welcome others. If you wrongly persist in forcing 
yourself where you are unwelcome you are liable to instant, lethal
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attack, for the persistence of the unwelcome constitutes aggression, 
an aggression which one cannot extricate oneself from since one 
cannot leave one's own ground. And it is instructive that one of the 
names for sarup, the sea ghosts who return with their bodies, is "the 
uninvited".
There are a couple of messages in this dictum from the Ancestors' 
time about the likelihood of things happening. One is that the 
likelihood of extreme violence greeting an uninvited aggressor is 
very great; the other is that violence is something done on one's own 
ground. For Islanders, then, to engage in violent conflict with 
Aborigines would be wrong, unless it was done in defense from 
Islander ground. Mixed Islander and non-islander meetings are never 
held on Islander ground. Usually they are held at some nominally 
neutral place which is in fact seen by Islanders as Aboriginal. It is 
not part of the Islander calculus of ground to account for the rules 
of non-islanders. So there is no question of whether or not the 
Aborigine will treat the Islander's entry into this ambiguous space 
as aggression. The Islander will be (theoretically) free to 
extricate himself. The problem is that he must, in order to attend 
the meetings, place himself in ambiguity. He may, once inside the 
meeting, be required to defend his person, having entered without 
explicit invitation and unable to extricate himself after the fact of 
entry.
The logic of his participation has to do with the increased 
probability of something happening. A battle waged not in defense is 
a happening which is bad. Bad happenings are to be avoided, for they 
mark their participants as uneducated, and the uneducated are 
throwbacks to the time when they were irresponsible children and not 
real men. Islanders who avoid mixed Aboriginal-Islander meetings do 
so because to do otherwise would be unwise. Some Islanders rarely 
avoid such meetings. Such men are marked by their knowledge, and are 
marked as the truly educated among the living. It is their place to 
know more about situations, and to reckon well the various 
likelihoods of things happening. In the ambiguity of whose place the
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putatively neutral meetinghall is they make it truly neutral by 
staking the claim of presence. They are physically the definition of 
neutrality, and their fellow Islanders may enter, not because he has 
established Islander suzerainty and may invite them in, but simply 
because it has become anybody's.
In the Islander idiom he is said to be pas [first]. This 
definition of 'first-ness' (the translation is problematical, and 
has to account for concepts in three languages, but the notion of 
'first-ness' is derived from a concept of "currently in the process 
of being first") is distinguished from the definition of apta 
[after], or 'afterness'. First-ness and after-ness lie on either 
side of a conceptual median which may be said to divide each 
reckoning of Islandtaim. First-ness is singular and marked, in the 
case of the neutralization of the meetinghall the man of presence 
both embodied first-ness and was the first (man). Everyone else was 
after, and the happening which was their entry into the hall was one 
in after-ness. On this occasion the man of presence was told, "Yu go 
pas" . There was no need to confirm that they would come apta, for in 
this constrained situation first meant after.
What I want to emphasize here is that there is no notion of 
'second', nor of third. It is not a matter of mapping events or 
happenings onto some notional sequence. It is not sequential at all. 
Had the man of presence not entered and redefined the territory there 
would have been no first and no after. By moving in, he altered the 
context of the Islander movement in the situation. The difference 
between the constitution of the commencement of this mixed meeting 
and the repeated meetings held by Islanders only on Islander 
territory in Islandtaim is striking. In each case the Islander 
commencement of the happening is what is not happening, but the 
likelihood or an Islander commencement of the mixed meeting was 
nearly zero, and the likelihood of the commencement of meetings in 
Islandtaim is always very high. The difference between the two is 
that the mixed meeting required the presence of first-ness while the 
common meeting usually requires just one more body.
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I suggested above that Islandtaim is a way of marking Islander 
things to be done in Islander ways. When participants are all 
Islanders, and are meeting on Islander space, Islandtaim is a word 
which is uttered in order to decide upon the way of doing things. 
When it is proposed at one meeting which has drawn on from 8:00 p.m. 
until 2:00 a.m. that any further business (there is always further 
business!) be taken up at a meeting same time next Tuesday, amid the 
tired gasps of assent the question may be heard, "Whiteman-time?, or 
Islandtaim". Those who want to try to prevent yet another meeting 
stretching to the wee hours of the morning will propose, 
"Whiteman-time. Whiteman-time!" These proposals may be countered by 
overwhelming calls for Islandtaim. If not, it is tacitly agreed that 
everyone will try to pay attention to the time next Tuesday. What is 
marked is done with a word which splits off Islander ways of doing 
things in space-time from all others, and which, in focusing on an 
appointed clock-time hour, poses the question "clocks or no clocks?"
For events of longer normal duration than evening meetings, 
clock-times are never used. Islandtaim is the only time for 
funerals, gravestone ceremonies, weddings, Saturday afternoon 
picnics. Large gatherings for gravestone ceremonies and funerals 
(2,000-3,000 people have attended some) are simply notified of the 
date; smaller gatherings such as those for weddings (and most 
funerals) have only to be notified of what's first and what's after: 
a Saturday afternoon wedding or picnic is scheduled by 'after 
shopping' (function to commence around 1-1:30 p.m.), or perhaps by 
'eat first' (function to commence sometime after 2:00).
The troublesome situations are those which are not governed by 
Islandtaim, for it is in these that time must be made. Each time the 
ambiguous situation must be resolved for Islander participation, for 
to participate in events outside Islandtaim is to do everything 'at 
(in) the wrong time'. To generate Islandtaim is to generate a 
time-frame of subsequence out of (for mainland Islanders 
particularly) a sequential environment. A first-ness must be 
enacted, and in doing so the after-ness is brought into being.
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Islandtaim, the way of marking Islander happenings, is a time-frame 
of injunction, of prescriptive description of the likelihood of 
something good happening.
Postscript♦ Tag lu, the Wrist-Thing
Tag is the Meriam word for hand/wrist/arm, lu is a thing. Since 
the Ancestors time the men of Mer have worn wristbands. They have 
worn them for dance, always for the sacred dance, and for war and for 
finery. Boys do not wear them (though they may do so for dance, and 
they pretend from time to time with plaited leather and grasses) . No 
one knows what they are for, or what they might have been for at one 
time.
/What they are for is for being a man of Mer. I met an Old Man who
/told me of a young whiteman who had been adopted by the people of Mer
and whom he had taken a great liking to. He had taught him things of 
/how to be Meriam-man, and had bought for him a fine dancing shirt. He 
said that this boy had turned out very fine indeed. Then he stopped 
and looked at my naked wrist.
'What! No tag lu?' He was aghast. 'You must have a tag lu. Then 
/you can be proper Meriam-man like that boy of mine'!
'Here,' he said, 'get one like mine.'
He held his arm up high and proud. Strapped to his wrist was a 
broken ten-year-old Seiko.
Culture cannot altogether be brought to 
consciousness; and the culture of which 
we are wholly conscious is never the whole 
of culture: the effective culture is that 
which is directing the activities of 
those who are manipulating that which 
they call culture.
T.S. Eliot
"Notes on Education and Culture"
CHAPTER 4
On Education and Expulsion
/The people of the island of Mer accord themselves the ancient
/  / / /  /  designation Meriam le— The People of Mer. To be a Meriam le, a
/Meriam person, is to command a set of forms for being and forms for
action (see Sansom, 1980). To be a Meriam le is to confirm a way of
being, a way recorded in and prescribed by the tonar - the corpus of
stories, legends, religious and secular forms, and the rules for
/  /social action and social being which they describe. Meriam le are 
not born; only children are born.
✓  /The way of being which is called Meriam le is, in the terms of
Peter Berger (et_ al_. 1974:94), a "package of consciousness"; "Meriam
le" is the name of the 'package' of The People. It is a package of
identity, and to use the name of the package is to identify persons.
Berger and Luckmann (1971:35) suggest that "different objects
present themselves to consciousness as constituents of different
spheres of reality", that we are conscious of "multiple realities". 
✓ /"Meriam" , in its sense as 'of Mer', adds things to a particular
reality, a reality which is in turn bound by all of those things
/which may be described as 'Meriam' . The agents of ascription are
/ / ✓ those persons who are Meriam le, persons who inhabit the Meriam
/reality, a reality whose boundaries incorporate all former Meriam le
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and all of the things which they have ascribed to the reality known 
/as Meriam.
/
The 'record' of prior ascriptions is this thing which Meriam
/people call their tonar— "Meriam tonar"— that which I have glossed
and translated as 'corpus' (cf. Cromwell, forthcoming). The tonar
provides names for sacred and mundane locations, places of
transcendental import in the days of the cults prior to the arrival
of Christian missionaries) and gardens and villages and reefs and
/shorelines on the map of everyday activity. Meriam tonar also
provides stories of legendary and historical activities and actions,
/and records the descent of contemporary Meriam people from those
legendary and historical actors. Most importantly, it embodies
events of exemplary behaviour, of forms for action and forms for
being which were established as, or taken to be, appropriate for
/those who would act and be Meriam le_. Goffman puts it this way
(1975:563), that "what people understand to be the organization of
their experience, they buttress, and perforce, self-fulfillingly.
They develop a corpus of cautionary tales, games, riddles,
experiments, newsy stories, and other scenarios which elegantly
confirm a frame-relevant view of the workings of the world."
/For Meriam _le_ there is no question of the reality of the tonar.
That is, in the simplest sense, there is no way to distinguish 'real'
tonar from 'unreal' tonar. In its everyday usages, tonar is glossed
by multilingual Islanders as custom, practice, way (as in a way of
doing something), habit, and in pidgin as we and pasen ['way' and
'fashion'], and is directly translated into its Western Torres
/Strait language equivalent, powa. The distinction which Meriam
people make is between the customs and practices of other
peoples— habits of observable daily life which may or may not be
informed by an actual corpus of examples and principles of
/behaviour— and the Meriam tonar. The distinction is made through
nuance, by motions of the head or hands, but is never articulated.
/There is no way to say what all Meriam people know, which is that the
tonar of other peoples is merely an aggregate of examples of current
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behaviour. The 'reality' of such behaviour is limited to the domain
of ordinary and observable realities. The difference is that while
/other people merely do things, Meriam people do things which are more
or less in accord with a template for doing things. To do things in
ways which are concordant with examples of doing provided in and by 
/the Meriam tonar is to do real things. It is in this sense that tonar
/is not open to questions of reality, for tonar— Meriam tonar— is the 
domain of reality itself.
/I have suggested above that it is 'Meriam' which ascribes things
to reality (or reality to things), and which does so by placing them
/within the bounds of the universe of tonar. To speak of 'Meriam
tonar* when the situation is a_ priori a Meriam scene is to be
incomprehensibly redundant, to introduce a notion of comparison with
some apparently other tonar, one which was not present in the
/conversation. But, aside from comparison, to speak of 'Meriam tonar'
when unmarked 'tonar' will do is to impute a larger domain within
which 'real' tonar (i.e. 'Meriam' tonar) and 'unreal' tonar are
opposed. Were this possible (i.e. meaningful), then those things
which enjoy reality or are assigned to unreality by reference to the
tonar would be subsets of real and unreal tonar, sets of tonar
distinguishable within some larger framework which included both
/reality and unreality. Such is not the case. For Meriam people the 
tonar (i.e. the tonar, the Meriam tonar) is the domain of final 
reference, the corpus of examples against which they may test their 
behaviour.
Insofar as the constituent items of the corpus are known to 
✓ /individual Meriam le, each may assess his ongoing behaviour as
according with models of behaviour (prescribed or proscribed, real
or unreal). But no one knows all of the tonar, and all tonar cannot
possibly be known, not only because all of the histories of all of
/the people who have inhabited the Meriam reality is too much for any 
one person to remember (or, put differently, the notion of tonar 
encompasses a 'reality' not bound by the known, but extending to all 
things ever known to be Meriam), but also because those 'real' people
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/ /who comprise the Meriam le are ascribers of tonar, actors whose
ongoing activity may be ascribed to an ever-generating tonar.
/Simply, then, people who know each other to be Meriam le perform
according to principles of behaviour provided by (their) tonar,
performances which, if they are taken to exemplify principles of
behaviour, may in turn be transformed into exemplary tonar. Persons
whose behaviour is consistently exemplary of the tonar, whose
actions are more likely than the actions of others to become examples
/  /  /  /of tonar, are called 'Meriam le kar'— 'real Meriam le'. They are
said to know, or to act according to, mamor tonar— true tonar.
(Mamor is used as an accentuator when applied to tonar, as a pointer
/toward ideal behaviour or toward the epitome of true Meriam action, 
rather than as appositional to nole mamor [not true] which may only
be used in reference to the tonar of other peoples.) The idiom of
/  /  /Meriam mir is kar, real. All Meriam le are not real, and few real
/  /Meriam le are real (i.e. act in 'true tonar') all the time. Insofar 
✓ /as any Meriam le can recognize mamor tonar when he sees it, any 
✓ /Meriam le can assess the reality of himself or others as actors. But
real-ness can, in effect, only be adjudged from 'within' the tonar.
The problem which arises from this perspective is this: While anyone
who can recognize mamor tonar can be deemed, ipso facto, to be
looking from a position situated 'within' tonar, persons who presume
/to adjudge behaviour as nole mamor tonar present themselves as always 
'within' the tonar. The specific problem, then, has to do with the 
ability to negate. In order to say that some action does not accord 
with the record of approved actions, the person who so says claims 
effective knowledge of all recorded actions.
✓  /Since it is recognized that all actions of all Meriam le cannot be 
recalled by even a consortium of knowledgeable men, let alone by a 
single man, the man who ideally would know all of the tonar is the man 
who actually knows the most tonar. There are few of them, and it is 
these few men who I have designated "the educated". They have each 
become educated by learning the tonar as taught by older educated 
men. Each educated man is both source and resource, saying what the
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particular tonar (qua model or template) is for any action or event, 
and turned to in matters of dispute.
Correcting a Sexual Assault
When his pronouncements are ex-tonar, when he is adjudging 
behaviour on the grounds of prescription or proscription provided in 
and exemplified by stories and legends and histories which make up 
the corpus, the nature of his pronouncement is straight forward. A 
niece of an educated man was assaulted in her flat late one night by a 
young man bent on sexual conquest. The niece was bruised and 
battered, but managed to stave off the sexual assault. Such an 
assault was a rare and distressing occurrence. The niece was 
sufficiently frightened to request of her uncle that he meet her 
after work each day and escort her home in order to prevent any 
further attacks.
In his account of the incident, the educated man expressed a
double distress. He was worried, as an uncle, that his niece should
have been victimized by adud tonar [bad 'practice' , or bad behaviour]
enacted by the young man, and he and other elder men in the family
took action to ensure that such victimization should neither
continue nor be repeated. But he was also worried, as an educated
keeper of the tonar, that the young man was a Meriam boy, and that
he had exhibited nole mamor tonar [not true behaviour], behaviour 
✓ /which was nole Meriam tonar. His subsequent actions were twofold, 
actions intended to mitigate both aspects of his dual distress.
He joined the other elder men in the family in ensuring both the 
protection of the young woman and the disuasion of the young man from 
pursuing his interrupted conquest. He and other male cousins and 
uncles provided escorts in public places, and protection of the niece 
at night. He sought the young man on the streets in order to render 
both emphatically preventative advice and punitively corrective 
blows. He was thwarted in this by the young man's knowledge of his 
relationship to the niece and the young man's powers of observation:
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every time he approached the young man the young man saw him coming
and ran away. The young man was not so fortunate where the niece's
other elders were concerned. Though he knew most of her cousins, he
failed to spot a couple of them on one occasion and received a severe
beating. He was more unfortunate in the case of her father, a man who
lived out of town and who was not widely known on sight. Though the
young man saw her father approaching him outside the railway station,
he didn't know who the man was until the father knocked him nearly
unconscious. Thusly attending to both protection and prevention,
the elder men responsible for the welfare of the young woman acted in
response to an act of adud tonar, acting according to the dictates of 
/
Meriam tonar, and attending to the perpetrator as they would have no
✓
matter whether he was the Meriam boy that he actually was or a boy of 
some other Islander or ethnic identity.
In addition to these attentions, the educated man alone paid
attention to the correction and prevention of adud tonar which was
expressly (given the identity of the perpetrator) nole Meriam tonar.
When he heard about the incident he visited the niece, and those
members of family to whom she had turned on the night of the assault,
in order to ascertain the particulars of the incident. He then
visited the last known place of residence of the young man, but the
young man had not been seen there for some time. He endeavoured to
locate the young man (who kept running at the sight of him in town) ,
and eventually got word of where he was staying. He went there, found
the young man not in, and left word with those present that the young
man's behaviour was now widely known, that it was adud, and that such
✓ /
behaviour was nole Meriam tonar and would not be tolerated. He 
received reports shortly thereafter that the young man was lurking 
around the niece's place of work, and he observed him following her 
one evening as he escorted her home. He returned to the house where 
the young man was staying, confronted him with the pronouncement that 
now not only would his behaviour not be tolerated but that his 
presence would no longer be tolerated. He ejected him from the house 
and told him that he did not want to see him in that town again.
117
Later, unconfirmed reports indicated that the young man had stayed 
that night with relatives on the other side of town, and that he had 
not been seen in town since the following day. A couple of weeks 
later a confirmed report from a member of the niece's family placed 
the young man in a town 300 miles away, a town which he left shortly 
thereafter for places unknown.
An important point in this series of events is that the
perpetrator of the assault was not a man, he was a young man. He was
referred to variously as a "young man" [English], "yangman"
[pidgin], "Ilanboi" [pidgin: Island (i.e. Torres Strait Islander)
boy], "Meriam boy" [English], "Meriam-boi" [pidgin], "Meriam werem"
[Meriam mir: Meriam boy-coming-to-be-a-young-man]. His
/identification as someone of Meriam heritage who was not yet a man 
characterizes his treatment. When asked if the assailant had been a
/ / s"Meriam le" , the educated man shook his head and said, "Nole kar. Emi
yangman." (Nole kar is an idiomatic expression composed of nole=no,
not, and kar=real, really. It is occasionally glossed in English
vernacular as 'No way!, and may be translated as 'Really not!', or
some other emphatic negative. It does not mean literally 'not real',
since kar in a following position renders it a modifier, and since
nole used alone expresses a state of existence (a particular state of
absentness) rather than expressing negation. When asked if he had
any money (bakir) , the man without any may answer 'Nole bakir kak'
[lit: no money without], or 'Ka nole bakir kak' [lit: I no money 
/without— nole and kak surrounding the absent thing as do ne_ + pas in 
French]; the man who is flat broke will likely say ' Nole kar! ' 
[Really none!] and pull out the insides of his pants pockets to prove 
it.) He followed his statement, 'He's a young-man' [pidgin: "emi 
yangman"] with a slight toss of his head and a considered staccato 
laugh. "Hah. Emi laki oli no killem" [He's lucky they didn't kill 
him] .
His luck, in this case, was due to the fact that he wasn't yet a
man. Because he was yet young, he belonged to that group of
✓ /not-yet-adult people for whom all Meriam le are responsible. He was
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not actually 'lucky' that he hadn't been killed, for to kill a child, 
one for whom one shares responsibility for upbringing, is a dire act. 
The statement 'emi laki oli no kilem' , one which could as easily have 
been uttered to the young man (e.g. Yu laki oli no kile yu [You're 
lucky they didn't/haven't kill/ed you]), is characteristically a 
statement of the educated man. In so saying he exposed a principle of 
retribution-for-offense which is grounded in tonar. The 'luckiness' 
was that luck of being identifiable (i.e. young-man) as belonging to 
a category of persons who are not liable for their actions (along 
with insane people [pidgin: krezi, kreziman, krezioman— 'crazy
woman'], senile people [usually referred to in pidgin as 
sile— 'silly'], people with identifiable specific physical and 
mental disabilities, and people of non-islander ethnic groups). 
Tonar provides a further categorical distinction between those who 
are not liable for their actions because they are inerradicably 
flawed (the physically and mentally disabled, old people insofar as 
they exhibit situational senility, and most adult members of 
non-islander ethnic groups who have been raised in a condition of 
nole tonar kak [no culture] or adud tonar [bad habits , bad customs]) , 
and those who are not yet liable for their actions because they don't 
know any better. The distinction is between the 'uneducable' and the 
'uneducated'. And killing is a form for social action which is 
retributive and punitive, but which is not corrective. Islander 
children are defined as uneducated, more or less (i.e. the closer 
they get to adulthood the more educated they are taken to be) . 
Corrective discipline is the discipline meted out to assist in the 
education of the (as yet) uneducated. Killing, because it is 
patently not corrective, is not an allowable educative device.
So the young assailant who might have been killed instead received 
several 'educative' pommelings. It was generally accepted by the 
adults involved that he had failed to learn from these, for he 
persisted in his attentions to the niece. The girl's father was 
reported to have said, after his encounter with the young man at the 
railway station had apparently failed to dissuade his attentions,
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"Emi prapa laki I no bi kilem" [He's damn lucky I didn't kill him]. 
The implication was that the young man's 'luck' from the point of 
view of the molested girl's father was in the fortunate restraint 
showed by the father in only knocking him unconscious. And the 
further implication, that the young man ought to realise when he's 
been lucky and desist. (Had the father actually killed the young man 
with a single blow, the incident would likely have been viewed in 
retrospect as understandable, if unforgiveable; the father's motives 
being weighted clearly on the side of protection and retribution, 
rather than on educative correction, a weight which might have caused 
a heavier blow than the father would otherwise have intended or 
delivered.) The dilemma for the niece and her elders was the 
inability to do anything more than beat the boy up and knock him 
unconscious. It was then that the educated man, the girl's uncle, 
stepped in to expel the assailant from the community.
Expulsion is a known form of correction. Its correctiveness is
two-fold, for it both removes the perpetrator and defuses the
potential escalation of the punitive expeditions by the girl's
family. Expulsion of adults dates from ancestral days, and includes
a range of effective expulsion from a familial living area to
expulsion from the known world. In the latter case, persons were put 
/
to sea from Mer never to be seen again. The definition was critical, 
for if they were seen again, if they attempted to return to the 
island under cover of darkness or by abandoning their canoe and 
surreptitiously swimming ashore, it was not them who were seen but 
their ghosts. By definition, anthropomorphic figures appearing on 
Mer alone and from the sea were lamar [Meriam mir: ghosts]. Ghosts 
whose host-bodies were convincingly human were frighteningly unreal, 
and men moved immediately to deprive the ghost of his body. So this 
legendary form of final expulsion was the redefinition of a person as 
a ghost, the instant of redefinition being the passage of the canoe
over the horizon.
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Persons so dealt with were always adults, and the
'correctiveness' of the action was the rendering unreal of someone
whose unconscionable act was taken to be an intentionally real
repudiation or flouting of tonar. In order for such action to be both
intentional and real, the actor had to be a person endowed by
definition with the ability to intend his actions and to have his
actions taken to be real [kar]. Persons so defined are the Meriam
le —  the (adult) people of Mer. These are the people who are
sufficiently educated in tonar to 'know better', who, even when their
comportment does not accord with recorded ideal examples, know how to
behave in accordance with exemplary principles. Children and young
people are not yet real people because they do not yet know what it is
✓to be a real person. Children of Meriam people are never referred to
as 'Meriam le' . The question asked of the educated man (above) about
/  /whether or not the assailant was a Meriam le was an elicitation of
the island-origin of the assailant. The response of the educated man
was an identification of the assailant as not-a-man. The elaboration
of the identification was subsequent, and only after it was
established that he was only a young-man was it made clear that he 
/was some Meriam people's young-man.
/Ideally such an attack would never be perpetrated on a Meriam 
/young-woman by a Meriam young-man. Both young people were around 
nineteen, no longer children [Meriam mir: omaskir], and old enough to 
have learned some basic principles of sexual behaviour. But such 
occasional errors are made by young people learning to be adults, and 
are matters for correction. The response of the girl's cousins was 
optional, as much governed by considerations of what they wouldn't 
let their age-mate get away with as by any concern for tonar, and not 
all of her brothers and cousins participated in the punishments. But 
the entry of one of the girl's uncles (in the first instance not the 
one whom I refer to as the educated man) was an exception to the tonar 
for dealing with adud [wrong, bad] behaviour of someone else's 
offspring. Normally the punishment would have been meted out by the 
boy's father, or perhaps by his mother (if he was younger, i.e.
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further away in years from the world of men) . And in the case of the 
punishment failing to correct the behaviour, it would have been the 
boy's family who expelled him by sending him to live with distant 
relatives. In regards the punishment, the boy's elders didn't render 
any; and they were preempted from effecting the expulsion by the 
prior intervention of the educated man. In fact, there was no 
knowledge extant among the members of the girl's family of any 
attitudes or actions of the boy's family at all.
The reason for this disinterest in the response of the boy's 
family had to do with the fact that they were known to not care about 
the tonar. In elaborating on the identification of the young-man, 
the girl's educated uncle said that he was a boy from a particular 
family, and that "Oli no prapa Meriam le, [pidgin: They aren't 
proper/true/real Meriam people] nole Meriam le kar [Meriam mir: not 
real Meriam lej." Though they were of Meriam stock, and had been born 
on the island, their behaviour since they had arrived on the mainland 
had been assessed as consistently nole mamor tonar [not true way]. 
There was not even a question of awaiting their proper response, and 
they were said to be people who were no longer even ashamed of such 
filial misbehaviour (it was said, "Oli no sem" —  'They have no 
shame') . It was up to others to correct the behaviour and rectify the 
situation. When the repeated public punishments failed, the social 
interaction resources were exhausted. The reality of the problem was 
transformed from an interactive domain to an active one. The 
accompanying shift in community perspective was from engaging in 
activity with the boy— speaking harshly to him and him listening; 
beating on him and him changing his ways— to engaging in activity 
toward him. With the reservoir of interaction exhausted correction 
became impossible with removal.
Actually 'removal' is not adequate. 'Absenting', with its accent 
on state of being after the act, its lack of distinction between in 
absentia and 'absent from' , is much better. What had to happen was 
the boy who would not learn had to be absented. This might, in 
circumstances of this kind involving other boys from other families,
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have been done by t h e  p a r e n t s ,  e i t h e r  by s e n d in g  him to  l i v e  w i t h  
r e l a t i v e s  e l s e w h e r e  ( a s  I  s u g g e s t e d  above)  o r  by a r r a n g i n g  f o r  
r e l a t i v e s  e l s e w h e r e  to  i n v i t e  o r  demand t h a t  he come s t a y  w i t h  them 
f o r  a w h i l e .  But w i t h  i n t e r c e s s i o n  by t h e  b o y ' s  f a m i l y  ou t  o f  t h e  
q u e s t i o n ,  someone e l s e  had to  a c t .  The g i r l ' s  f a m i l y  a c t e d ,  b u t  to  no 
a v a i l .  K i l l i n g ,  a k ind  o f  u l t i m a t e  a b s e n t i n g ,  was d i s s a l l o w e d  by th e  
p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  t o n a r  on t h e  k i l l i n g  o f  c h i l d r e n  (and t h e  c o n c o m i t a n t  
d e f i n i t i o n  p r o v id e d  i n  t o n a r  o f  t h e  a c t  o f  i n f a n t i c i d e  as  t h e  a c t  o f  
a c r a z y  p e r s o n ) .  Pe rmanen t  e x i l e  i s  a p o w e r f u l  e na c tm e n t  o f  t o n a r ,  
and one which i s  r e s e r v e d  f o r  p e r s o n s  ( i . e .  a d u l t s ,  f u l l y  m a tu re  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  t h o s e  who may be r e f e r r e d  to  an Meriam l e )  and must  b e ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  c o l l e c t i v e l y  e f f e c t e d  by a l l  o t h e r  p e r s o n s .  The means o f  
a b s e n t i n g  t h i s  young-man which rem ained  was t h a t  o f  e x p u l s i o n  by 
someone who was e n f r a n c h i s e d  to  s p e ak  e x - t o n a r ,  the  e d u c a t e d  man o f  
t h e  community (who ha p p e n e d ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e  b u t  n o t  i n  o t h e r s ,  to  be 
t h e  u n c l e  o f  the  a s s a u l t e d  g i r l ) .
Much o f  the  p r e c e d i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  h a s  t o  do w i t h  a s p e c t s  o f  
I s l a n d e r  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  w i t h i n  which  t h e  s p e c i f i c  e x p u l s i o n  
o c c u r r e d .  The a c t  o f  e x p e l l i n g  was a s p e e c h - a c t .  The e d u c a t e d  man 
s a i d  ' I  d o n ' t  want  to  s ee  you a round  h e r e  a g a i n ' .  The young-man 
d e p a r t e d  i m m e d i a t e l y ,  and l e f t  town t h e  n e x t  day .  The e d u c a t e d  man 
d id  n o t  s t r i k e  t h e  young-man,  f o r  i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  he was a c t i n g  n o t  
a s  u n c l e  bu t  as  one o f  t h e  e d u c a t e d .  S t r i k i n g  i s  a form o f  p u n i t i v e  
o r  r e t r i b u t i v e  a c t i o n ;  i t  i s  n o t  a form f o r  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Only a 
k i l l i n g  blow may be used  i n  a s t r i k i n g  a c t i o n  which p e r m i t s  no 
r e t a l i a t i o n '  any o t h e r  s t r i k i n g  blow i s  made i n  i n t e r a c t i o n .  An 
e n a c tm e n t  o f  an e x p u l s i o n  i s  p a t e n t l y  n o t ,  a s  I  have s a i d ,  an 
i n t e r - a c t i o n .  (Even s m a l l  c h i l d r e n  who a r e  s t r u c k  by t h e i r  p a r e n t s  
a r e  i n  an i n t e r a c t i o n ,  though  by s t r i k i n g  back  t h e y  i n v i t e  an 
e s c a l a t i o n  o f  blows which th e  l a r g e r  p a r e n t  i s  bound to  w i n . )  
Moreover ,  an e x p e l l i n g  s p e e c h - a c t  i s  one which i s  d e f i n e d  ( i . e .  
p r o v id e d  f o r  by models  i n  t h e  t o n a r )  a s  t a l k - o n l y .  Borrowing  from 
A u s t in  on s peech  a c t s  ( 1 9 6 5 : 8 ) ,  n o t  o n l y  i s  t h e  c r i t i c a l  a c t  o f  
s p e a k i n g  i m p o r t a n t ,  and a p p r o p r i a t e  to  i t s  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  b u t  a l s o
"it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or 
other persons should also perform certain other actions" (original 
emphasis).
The expelling speech-act, one which may be performed only by a man 
enfranchised to speak out of and for the tonar, is marked by the 
absence of 'other actions' . The speaker does no more than utter the 
enactment; the person so expelled neither speaks nor performs any 
other action save the critical one of immediate departure. He is, in 
this case, a young-man, a particular kind of individual identified as 
one who is learning to behave as a man. Were he to offer any response 
other than immediate departure (which ? s to say any response at all, 
since the act of departing is a reaction), he would be proposing an 
identity (making a "presentation of self", in Goffman's term) not in 
keeping with the extant social reality, a reidentification which 
would entail a redefinition of the encounter. Specifically, he would 
present himself as either a child or as a man. Both representations 
would place him at considerable risk.
The redefinition of the situation entailed in the young-man 
proposing that he be dealt with as a child renders the action of the 
educated man erroneous. To act in error when enacting the tonar is to 
risk the enormous establishment of erroneous precedent, for the 
'real man' [Meriam le kar] who acts within and on behalf of tonar 
generates tonar as he acts. Action which is taken not in accordance 
with tonar either implicates all recorded solutions to similar 
situations, or admits ambiguous tonar thereafter. The keeper of 
tonar cannot abide the imputed error, the error of someone not a 
member of a child' s family presuming to send him away. Nor can he 
abide the ancillary error, the imputation that in speaking the tonar 
he has misspoken, for the tonar does not lie. It is unlikely that the 
young-man would reduce his own presence as an almost-man, and even 
less likely that he would risk the wrath of the educated man by 
licensing his own discipline as a child.
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Nor would he be likely to attempt to resist the expulsion by 
presenting himself as a mature co-equal. The obvious risk is that, 
in admitting manhood, the young-man would be liable to death or 
permanent exile (the logic being that if he is a man now he was a man 
when he assaulted a girl who was not yet a woman; or, that he has 
somehow become a man since the assault, a transition belied by his 
refusal to desist in his attentions, and a particularly burdensome 
transformation requiring the virtually immediate reidentification 
of him as a man and the concomitant disposal of the assault into the 
realm of past childhood mistakes). The more likely risk is that he 
pretends, in presenting himself as a man, to making fools of the 
girl’s elders who have been dealing with him as a young-man. And he 
entertains an even greater risk to his own identity, for he renders 
his beatings at the hands of the girl's relatives to the ineffectual 
actions of a man who is not a real man, or the actions of a cowardly 
man who allows himself to be punished by boys (in the case of the 
girl's young-men cousins). And perhaps his greatest risk is that in 
confronting the man of knowledge of tonar with his new identity, he 
risks being dealt with (by the educated man and by others) according 
to tonar which he (even as a newly emerged full-man) cannot yet 
know— an evocation of especially potent unknown terrors.
All of these things are normally more or less known to the 
young-man as well as to the educated expeller. Such knowledge, 
shared by the participants in this rare occasion of expulsion, is 
part of the "preparatory conditions" (Searle 1969) of the expelling 
speech-act. In fact, in cases of utterances of expulsion, beyond the 
prerequisite of face-to-face encounter of the educated man and the 
young-man at the time of utterance, all of the preparatory conditions 
of shared knowledge and social reality. More precisely, the 
expulsion enacted by the educated man generates a new social reality, 
one which is different from the reality extant just prior to his 
expelling utterance. Simply it is a difference in personnel: the 
community is now one young-man short. But the nature of the 
difference lies in the nature of absence.
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Berger and Luckmann, building upon the sociology of knowledge of 
Mannheim and Scheler and others, and the critical redefinition of 
that sociology by Schutz (1964[vo1. II]:121) as having to do with 
the mechanism of the social distribution of knowledge, propose that 
"the sociology of knowledge, therefore, must concern itself with the 
social construction of reality" (1971:27)* In these terms, the 
young-man, the educated man, and the rest of the Islander community 
knew what was going on (i.e. could make sense of the expelling action 
and the boy's departure) because they knew what had happened, and who 
the young-man and the educated man were. Not only was their 
knowledge of the assault and subsequent events in terms of their 
appreciation of 'real' Islander events, but also their knowledge of 
the identities of the participants was grounded in the reality of 
Islander people. As Berger and Luckmann put it (1971:195-6), 
"Theories about identity are always embedded in a more general 
interpretation of reality", and must be understood "in terms of the 
logic underlying the latter"; finally, "psychological status is 
relative to the social definitions of reality in general and is 
itself socially available knowledge that the young-man had failed to 
learn. The encompassing theory, that which includes both persons and 
knowledge (culminating in the tonar which joins them), is the theory 
that real persons are emergent entities from a process of learning.
Since the notion that a person (i.e. the entity which I have been 
referring to as 'person') is a psychobiologically distinct member of 
any typical personnel which he characterises, there is a question 
about what it is that is 'real' in a 'real person' [le kar]. A boy 
child is destined to grow up into a 'real man'. But destiny
incorporates provisos: there is no destiny but the provisional one.
/  /In the destiny of a child of Mer there is the obligation of the Meriam
/le to provision him for maturity. This obligation remains in force
until a child demonstrates his uneducability.
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Provisions in an Educational Framework 
/In Meriam mir the dictum is erwer. Erwer encompasses
learning/education. A school (building) is erwer meta [education
house], and its curricular and other accoutrements are erwer lu
[education things]. But, while a child who is going to school may be
said to be going erwer metaem [education house-ward, with
suffix— ■em=1 toward1] as he boards the schoolbus in the morning, a
child who is 'going to school' as a function of his regular daily
life must be said to be erwerare [occupying a state of being in the
presence of education]. There is no inherent logic which posits the
educated 'improvement' of the child as the effect from the cause
which is the teacher. The logic of the language does not admit the
functional giving-receiving distinction of teacher-and-learner. The
'teacher' is erwer le— 'educated man' [man in/of
educatedness]— while his pupil is erwer kebile [little-man in/of
educatedness]. Pidgin provides analogous forms. Lern glosses as 
/
erwer in Meriam mir and as teach/learn in English: 'Yu lerne dempla 
kolera langgus.' [You teach them English (whiteman language).]
'Dempla lerne kolera langgus. [They are learning English 
(kolera=Meriam mir for "whiteman"; langgus-pidgin for "language").]
The telling case is the erwer kebile ['student'] who fails to
learn his lessons. The 'teacher' may shake her head in disgust at
such a state of affairs and say, 'I lernem bat em no lern' [i'm
teaching him but he isn't learning]. A teacher who so remarks on the
failure of some student to lern is commenting on a state of affairs.
This is critical. The dance-master [kab le=lit. dance man, both in
the sense of 'masterful dancer' and 'master of the subject of dance'] 
/ /who is erwer le to some erwer kebile for dance may remark on the state 
of affairs in which his students have (to date) failed to learn the 
dance(s): 'I bi lerne dem kebile bat oli no lerne dans' [i am/I have 
been teaching those kids/young-people but they aren't learning 
the/to dance]. His remark does not admit the interpretation of
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causal failure, nor does he exhibit distress. His remark is a report
of a state of affairs in which his students are no less erwerare for
not (yet) having learned the dance(s).
The distinction is that of provisioning versus improvement (or,
in another sense, between the common sense of improvement as
increased command or expertise and the sense of 'improvement' which
underlies the proof of matured alcoholic spirits or the proving of
bread dough after it has risen and been shaped and just before it
goes into the oven) . The dance-master who enters into erwer with
some young dance-learners enters a state of affairs which is given as
/
logistical. He provisions his erwer kebile with dance-stuff. His 
responsibility is to provide everything that goes into the making of 
one or more dances, including not only his expert command of dance 
steps and repertoire of whole dances but also the presence at any 
dance lesson of experienced drummers and singers. He is not 
responsible for scheduling the lesson, nor for ensuring the 
attendance of students. And he is, finally, not responsible for 
turning out competent dancers. In short, his responsibility is not 
pedagogical. He cannot 'fail' to teach dancing because he is finally 
not an educated man, he is a dance-man.
/
In opening my discussion of erwer above, I glossed erwer le as
'educated man' [man in/of educatedness]. This was a translational
device established in order to point out the principal distinction 
✓ /
between erwer le and their erwer kebile without ignoring the fact 
/
that the erwer le is who he is by dint of having learned enough
/
dance-stuff to become an expert. That is, in Meriam logic,
erwerare— occupying a state of being in the presence of
/
education— is a state of affairs both of and for erwer le and erwer 
/ /
kebile. Strictly, then, erwer le is 'education man' to the erwer 
kebile's 'education boy/girl', with the logical assumption that the 
normal course of events sees the erwerare happening in and to the boy 
or girl rather than to the man. (in fact, adults do learn things from 
children; but though the adult can say that he has been erwerare it
makes no sense to suggest that for the duration of that 'lesson' the
child was erwer le, for this requires the adult to become kebile
[child] to a child who would have been a 'whole' [i.e. adult]
/
person.) While it is sensible to gloss an erwer le as an 'educated 
man' in order to show that the adult is normally the participant in 
an education-state-of-affairs who has already been educated, it is a 
misnomer to refer to him as an educated man without marking the term 
(e.g. with single quotation marks) as one of situationally and 
processually restricted reference. The dance-man who is not, or who 
is no longer, instructing dance-learners may not be meaningfully 
referred to as an 'educated man' . He is properly a dance-man, one who 
provides dances and who may be called upon to provision 
dance-learners, and it is the one who may call upon him to do so who 
is truly educated man.
This truly educated man, the one who may command the resources of
/
others in the instruction of kebile, is the pedagogue. The 
requirement which this pedagogical reality imposes is the 
requirement of a primary framework (Goffman 1975:21-6 et seq.), one 
which imposes some constraints on interpretation which have been 
implicit in my description of the expulsion and of the 
dance-instruction. That is, in bringing in a dance lesson to inform 
an expulsion of a young-man I have implicated some third thing which 
is prior to both. The third thing is a whole framework of 
'education', a way of seeing what is going on, both in the common 
instances of dance (and other) instruction and in the rarer instance 
of expulsion. It is (borrowing from Goffman, 1975:25) "chiefly 
relevant and provides a first answer to the question 'What is it 
that's going on here?' The answer: an event or deed described within 
some primary framework."
From this, the 'question' could be 'What's going on in this 
confrontation of the young-man by the educated man?'; or, 'How are 
expulsions of young-men like dance-lessons?'; or, best of all, 'Why 
are young-men sometimes sent away and almost all children taught to 
dance?' The sense in which this last question is 'best' is in its 
sensible conformity to the terms of the framework. It elicits almost
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no other answer except that which, grounded in (or in terms of) the 
primary framework of education, "is seen by those who apply it as not 
depending on or harking back to some prior or 'original' 
interpretation" (Goffman 1975:21). Most importantly, the framework 
entails a domain of meaning (or meanings, or meaningfulness) such 
that responses to questions which elicit frameworks are not 
generally taken to be sensible if they question the framework. For 
example, the response 'What do you mean?' is not a sensible response 
to the question 'Why are some young-men sent away and almost all 
children taught to dance?' The question is such that the questioner 
knows (may be taken to know) the differences between young-men and 
children, between learning to dance and going away, and apparently 
suspects that there is a meaningful domain in which the differences 
(or something 'about' the differences) are the same. (I am assuming 
that the question is serious, explicitly precluding its utterance as 
a riddle or as a playful apparent absurdity.)
Depending upon the supposed knowledge of the questioner, the 
insight of the person questioned, and so forth, the answer may be 
more or less elaborate. The answer 'Education' is clear, but does no 
more than establish the framework in which (according to which) the 
two things may be connected. But this single-word answer is more 
appropriately responsive to the second question above, 'How are 
expulsions of young-men like dance lessons?', and presumes a great 
deal of concordance in what the questioner and questioned mean by 
'how'. 'Education' could also be an answer to the first question, 
but would be unlikely unless prior conversation had established the 
domain of discourse as the domain of interpretive frameworks (the 
question then actually paraphraseable as 'In which framework is this 
confrontation meaningful?').
The best answer is the one which takes into account the apparent 
knowledge of the questioner (though the apparent erudition of the 
question could be fortuitous, and the questioner taken momentarily 
to be more knowledgeable than he is ) , responds by applying a primary 
framework, and refines the response by exposing the similarity of the
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order of difference as it locates them. It is in the simple answer 
that the primary framework, applied in its own terms, renders "what 
would otherwise he a meaningless aspect of the scene into something 
that is meaningful" (Goffman 1975:21) most clearly. The framed 
answer has to select which of the differences (e.g. differences 
between young-men and children, being sent away and being taught to 
dance, young-men-sent-away and children-taught-dance, 'sending 
away' and 'teaching') embedded in the question are meaningful, and to 
expose the domain of that meaning. The well-framed answer to 'Why 
are young-men sometimes sent away and almost all children taught to 
dance?' is, 'Because they a^e uneducated.'
As Goffman points out (1975:25), once some primary framework is 
brought to bear by a meaningful answer, "then one can begin to worry 
about the microanalytic issues of what is meant by 'we', 'it', and 
'here'..." or on this Islander sample, about what is meant by "they" 
and "uneducated". The answer 'Because they are uneducated' clearly 
establishes a domain of meaningfulness (which I have encapsulated in 
education), but it also proposes a conjunction between
young-men— 'sometimes— and ('almost') all children which in turn 
informs what is meant by (or, what can be meant by) "they". 
Obviously, at base, it is clear that there are frameworks within 
which young-men and children are the same 'thing'. And it is clear 
that one of these frameworks is 'educatedness' (there may or may not 
be more than one, and this single question-and-answer does not 
establish whether 'educatedness' is one of several frameworks, the 
one which comes first to the answerer's mind, or perhaps the most 
important one). And, moreover, it is clear that the sameness, the 
'thing' (about young-men and children) which is the same, is a thing 
which isn't. It is a thing which isn't 'in' the young-men who are 
sometimes sent away and which isn't 'in' almost all children. The 
'thing' which isn't in them is education; 'educated' is that which 
they are not.
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In that last sentence I have exposed a double translational error,
/the correction of which will hark back to my discussion of the Meriam
word erwer. It is erroneous to speak, as I have done, of 'education
as the thing which isn't in the young-man and the children', for it
risks the retranslation back to erwer. There is no way that erwer can
be 'in' somebody. While it is possible for young Islanders to be said
to be "getting an education", 'an education' is not what he 'gets'.
And, while it is said that they are not educated, when they do become
educated, 'educated' is not what they are. This fundamental
distinction between education and erwer is the distinction which
Heidegger (1962) made between word-things [Wortedinge] and
significations [Bedeutungen; cf. Hacking 1975:49-53 for a discussion
of the translation and retranslation problems of Bedeutungen in
language philosophy]. That is, education is an English word-thing, a
function which can be dealt with (e.g. said and talked about) as a
thing. One can get it, have it, miss out on it, and even incorporate
/it. Erwer is not a Meriam word-thing; it is a way of signifying some 
other thing, a form of signification. In its simples sense, it is a 
form of and for signifying a building [meta, lit: house] wherein the 
process of education takes place, an erwer meta, or 'schoolhouse'. 
But it is not for designating a building, nor is it of_ something 
called education' it is a form of and for a significant process which 
is usually localized in particular buildings with the participation 
of persons who are erwerare— 'embodying a state of being in the 
presence of education'.
I noted above the teacher who remarked 'I lernem bat em no lern'
as an illustration of the sense of the pidgin ' lern' as it may
comprise both 'teach' and 'learn' in English. And also the students
who, although ' oli no lerne dans' ['they aren't learning the/to
dance'], were nonetheless erwerare. I suggested that provisioning
was a better comparative notion than 'improvement' when looking at
(i.e. interpreting) a sense of educational process in which there is
no causality to undergird an implicit teach— learn directionality.
/Consider the following remark, made by an erwer le for language whose
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principally Eastern Islander students were not picking up the 
Western language which she was instructing: "Dem kids oli bi lern an 
lern dat langgus bio mipla bat oli no lernem" [Those (them) kids, 
they've been learning and learning that language of mine but they 
aren't learning it].
Of course, I could have translated her remark thus: Those kids 
have been studying and studying that language of mine but they just 
aren't getting it. Or I could have glossed over the teach-learn 
duality of the pidgin verb lern and rendered it: Those kids have been 
taught that language and taught that language but they just can't 
learn it. The problem with translation (translation proper in 
Jakobson's sense [Jakobson 1959]; what Steiner [1975:260] terms 
"interlingual translation" (Steiner) is that translation entails 
what I call transframing. Transframing is implicit in a great deal 
of ethnography and linguistics and sociolinguistics. Gregory 
Bateson first began the explication of it, as far as I know, in 1940 
(see "Experiments in Thinking about Observed Ethnological 
Material"), when he spoke (Bateson) of "having got some sort of 
conceptual frame within which to describe the interrelations between 
clans" (1973:52). The initial sense in which Bateson 'transframed' 
was in using a concept from biology which dealt with animal 
segmentation in order to analyze social relationships (cf. Naven). 
What has interested me is that he used a modern Western (albeit 
scientific) frame in order to apprehend an latraul framework, (it was 
a later use of frame by Bateson [1955] which Goffman cites as 
precedental to his [1975; see pp.7, 40-41] theoretical development 
in Frame Analysis.) Moreover, he reintroduced that frame— i.e. 
brought it 'back' from New Guinea social organizational 
analysis— into modern Western thinking, but he did so by using it 
anthropologically rather than biologically. He began to talk about 
complementary and symmetrical relationships (Bateson 1936; 1973 
passim, esp. pp.41-2, 50-53, 64-5) among people (rather than radial
symmetry and transverse segmentation in animals).
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This sort of transframing is incorporated in my proposition of 
'education' [erwer] as a Meriam primary framework (and, subtle 
differences aside, as an Islander [i.e. all Torres Strait Islanders] 
primary framework). Transframing is that which reduces the 
absurdity of "When Islanders are getting an education, education 
isn't what they have after they get it". Semantically it is 
relatively easy to distinguish erwer from 'education'. Education is 
not something that can be 'got' via education. And there is no past 
participle, no way to say that some Islander 'was educated'. If 
derwerare happened in the past, one is said to 'have been being 
educated' [dewerda] (or, 'have been being taught', 'have been 
learning', etc.). Perhaps the colloquial usages of 'school' come the 
closest in English to erwer: being schooled; getting some schooling; 
was being schooled. The only aspect of erwer that is not present in 
'school' is the necessary (and, in erwer, explicit) component of 
valuable content. That is, in the vernacular, 'getting schooled’ has 
an incidental component of curriculum, of some sort of valuable 
information being processed; in erwer the valuable information is 
central rather than incidental (and in this aspect, 'education' 
connotes something closer to erwer). Leaving aside the 
discontinuity, however, 'school' becomes a relatively faithful 
formal translational device. Erwer meta is literally a 
'schoolhouse'; derwerare can be the vernacular 'schooling'; erwer 
kebile is 'school boy'; and, allowing nominal equivalence of 'man' 
and 'master', an erwer le can be a 'school master'.
But, unlike 'school boys', erwer kebile never leave school'
/parents can never visit erwer le at any place other than school. For
that matter, they can't even visit "erwer le" at school— that is,
though they may physically visit (pay a visit; seek, to question or
converse with) the person who is erwer le for the duration of a
/lesson or series of lessons, the person they visit is not erwer le,
✓  /for he is not their erwer le. Nor is erwer le ever visited by 
'parents', even as he is visited by the brothers-in-law, 
sisters-in-law, cousins, aunts and uncles, distant relatives,
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acquaintances, and strangers who are in fact the parents of his erwer 
/kebile. That is, though it is true, in an English- 
language/Western-tradition context, to report 'several parents paid 
a visit to the erwer le' (providing that a visit was paid to an 
Islander instructor by several parents of students of his), such a 
report is not true in any Islander context.
Transfraining in Interpretation
/Such a report of a 'visit of parents to the erwer le' is most 
simply untrue because it does not answer the question, What's going 
on here? (see pp.18-19, above). It is instructive to explore just 
how it fails. George Steiner, whose description of "hermeneutic 
motion" is the inspiration for my "motion of the contentious self" 
(see Steiner 1975, Ch.5), describes the three principal failures of 
literary translations which are unfaithful to their originals: 
diminution, magnification, and transfiguration of the original 
(pp.396-407)• But, although ethnographers share with translators 
something of the interlingual motion which Steiner calls hermeneutic 
("The translator invades, extracts, and brings home" [p.298], little 
has been written which exposes the similarity of the motion of self 
of the translator and the ethnographer. The ease with which 
dissimilarity may be ascribed has, I think, to do with the apparent 
preeminence of the personal physical movement of the ethnographer 
away from his 'home' to the homes of his informants, a movement which 
stands in apparent contrast to the 'motion' of the hermeneuticist who 
may never physically leave his study. And yet, though the 
ethnographer insinuates himself physically into the world of the 
other, he must also, in the words of Sir James George Frazer 
(1931:237), "apply for information to the mine of a Zulu or a 
Hottentot" [emphasis added]. Or, as Steiner says (of translators, 
P.300), "We encircle and invade cognitively".
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More than this, ethnographers share the translators' risks at the 
'bringing home' of the other, risks of importation which "can 
potentially dislocate or relocate the whole of the native structure" 
of the ethnographer or translator, and risks of self as "we come to 
incarnate alternative energies and resources of 
feeling"— alternatives which are for some, and at some times, so 
pervasive that "writers have ceased from translation, sometimes too 
late, because the inhaled voice of the foreign text had come to choke 
their own" (Steiner, p.300). For Steiner, the fourth and final stage 
of the hermeneutic motion is "compensation", or "restitution" 
(p*395) , the restoration of parity between the translation and the 
original without which the translation paradigm is "dangerously 
incomplete" (p.300). Without this final stage, the 'motion' of 
translation is denied, and the resultant stasis of individual or 
society locked in the third (incorporation) stage evident in 
translators (or ethnographers, or explorers, etc.) who have gone 
'native' or 'troppo' and in receptor-societies which have instituted 
such skewed importations as cargo cults.
I have turned to Steiner's proposition of a 'motion' of 
translation in order to appose something of a motion of ethnography 
in which the ethnographer also "invades, extracts, and brings home", 
but in which there is a different fourth stage. Or, rather, there is 
a fourth stage in which a further operation must occur: the operation 
of transframing. (The sense in which transframing is a 'further 
operation', additional to the operation of "compensation" in the 
final stage of hermeneutic translation, is that in which an event 
which occurs in another culture does not expose its own framework(s) 
in the way that an original text does.) Goffman (1975:22) has 
suggested that "social frameworks provide background understanding 
for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of 
an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being". 
In Chapter 9 of Frame Analysis —  "Ordinary Troubles"— he itemizes the 
common problems which occur in "misframings" which entail 
ambiguities of frame or errors in framing.
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Misframings are common, and their duration often depends upon the 
duration of the context which supports them (Goffman [p.309] cites 
Bar-Hillel's [1954] discussion of "indexicality" in presenting the 
problem of English-German bilinguals hearing nein as 'nine' in 
conversation with one another). But ambiguities in primary 
frameworks "seem typically short-lived and for a good reason: 
because these frameworks are fundamental to the organization of 
activity, because a whole tissue of organization derives from each, 
any point of doubt will usually be resolved quickly by information 
from a multitude of extraneous sources" (Goffman, p.305)* It is this 
information from "extraneous" sources which occasions both the 
embarrassment and relief in the war veteran who, having returned 
home, dives into a snowbank at the sound of a backfiring car which he 
has (in some sense) 'taken' to be a rifle shot. The resolution is 
accomplished, in this case, by "clearing the frame" through sharply 
attending to surroundings (pp.338-9) which become apparently 
insupportive of the mistaken premise that the sound was a result of 
"guided doings" (p.22) rather than something "purely physical" (or, 
a social rather than a natural framework).
It is precisely this possible 'clearing of frame' which focuses 
attention upon the existence of something like a 'framework of 
frameworks, an organization which has to do with what Clifford Geerta 
has called the "context of intelligibility" (1973)* That is, in 
order for frames to be misapplied, or to be mistaken, there must be 
some more fundamental order of organization in which their 
unintelligibility is intelligible. In some respects this may be 
simply a more fundamental framework (Goffman, p.22), but in others 
the appeal to a more comprehensive order of organization is not so 
clearly an appeal to another (albeit larger or more fundamental) 
framework. It is in this rendering intelligible of an organization 
of experience in another culture that the language of ethnography, 
like the language of translation, "has its own status of 
vulnerability, of unhousedness, of elucidative strangeness because 
it is an instrument of relation between the foreign tongue [or
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culture] and one's own" (Steiner 1975:395)* The vulnerability is 
acute, for the language must serve both exegesis and explication.
Simmel noted the importance of language in human interaction as 
"the type, as well as the essential instrument, of these common 
elements" in the ideational worlds of men (1950:315)* "A collection 
of human beings...becomes a society only when the vitality of these 
contents attains the form of reciprocal influence; only when one 
individual has an effect, immediate or mediate, upon another" 
(1959:315)* Language, especially the language of talk, is both the 
means and meanings of this attainment. In Simmel's terms, it is an 
'essential instrument' of both social forms and individual (cf. 
Simmel 1959:314-15, passim; 1950:40-44, 385-87; Weingartner 1959), 
embodying and embedding a dual reciprocity: "between the non-logical 
and contingent reality of the ideational process and the logical and 
teleological selection we make of it in order to show it to others" 
(1950:315); and between "processual life in the narrower sense and 
its counterplay of persistent forms" (Kantorowicz 1959**5)*
The point here is that social phenomena have to do with both being 
and becoming, with human life as process. This comprehension is 
elemental in Georg Simmel's philosophy and sociology (as it is in the 
works of Heraclitus and Hegel and Heidegger). What is essential is 
to understand that the very separation of being and becoming belies 
the single reality of any social phenomena or process. In order to 
correct the erroneous epistomology which undergirds such artifice 
there must be a reformulation on the order of Anthony Wilden's 
BOTH-AND (1972:203-29)* That is, human life is BOTH-AND 
being-becoming in process.
Kantorowicz (1959:3) has suggested that it is this meeting and 
fusing of "the old poles of being and becoming" which lies at the 
core of Simmel's thought, of his concept of life which "includes both 
open flux and closed crystallization; both the process of life 
incessantly newborn and the entities which emerge out of life". 
Process and entity are subsumed under Simmel's formulation of "mere 
aggregations of individuals" who are transformed "into specific
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forms of being with and for one another" (1959:315)* The explicit 
subsumption of "with and for", and its reciprocal simultaneity, 
echoes in Wilden's "cybernetic both-and thinking" (1972:226). and 
it is intended in my proposition of the language of talk as both the 
means and meanings of attainment of such forms (see p.27, above). It 
has, perhaps, been most clearly stated recently by Sansom (1980:1) in 
his analysis of "the specified grounds _of and for relationships" (my 
emphasis) among members of urban Australian Aboriginal 
fringe-dwelling groups, and their shared knowledge which is "both 
produced by and the basis for social action" (p.2, my emphasis).
In order to obtain his analytic purchase, Sansom (ibid.) provides 
"a translation in which Aboriginal models of social organization are 
fairly represented" to which he contributes a "commentary of 
interpretation" in order to "make something of the words I heard and 
the actions I observed". It is his explicit duality of translation 
and interpretation which is so important: it is, in its whole, an 
exegesis and an explication— a BOTH-AND translation-interpretation. 
This approach has considerable affinity with Bruce Kapferer's recent 
(1979) presentation of Sinhalese healing rites in which he addresses 
himself to "the purposes for which social activity is explicitly 
organized" (p.108: Kapferer notes the prior urgings for this 
approach by Geertz [1966] and Kaplan and Manners [ 1972 3). His 
examination of performance is a contribution to the question, "How 
does a healing ritual cure?" (ibid.) , one which centers on the vital 
presence of "an attentive audience" and "the achievement of a cure, 
as understood and received by ritual participants" (p.148). Both are 
concerned with how it is that social actors understand their 
activities and actions, and with how it is that these understandings 
may themselves be understood. In part this has to do with (and is 
dependent upon) what Steiner calls "the final secret of the 
translator's craft...this insinuation of self into otherness" 
(p*359)* It is an "understanding of understanding" (Steiner, 
p.414)*
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Steiner poses the question, "To what extent is culture the 
translation and rewording of previous meaning?" (p-415)- His 
argument, that "meaning is a function of social-historical 
antecedent and shared response" (p.465) is persuasive. "We are", he 
writes, "so much the product of set feeling-patterns, Western 
culture has so thoroughly stylized our perceptions, that we 
experience our 'traditionality' as natural" (p.462). Goffman has 
proposed the importance of frames in the production-reproduction of 
this 'naturalness':
Moreover, what people understand to be the organization 
of their experience, they buttress, and perforce, 
self-fulfillingly. They develop a corpus of cautionary 
tales, games, riddles, experiments, newsy stories, and 
other scenarios which elegantly confirm a frame-relevant 
view of the workings of the world. (The young especially 
are caused to dwell on these manufactured clarities, and 
it comes to pass that they will later have a natural way to 
figure the scenes around them.) [1975:563]
My gloss of the Islander (Meriam) word/concept of tonar echoes 
Goffman's sense of "corpus" here. But I include an additional 
aspect, one which renders frames as incorporate in the tales, games, 
etc. That is, the stories and legends and conventions which comprise 
the Islander tonar do not so much 'confirm a frame-relevant view' of 
the world as frame the world. These contexts, in and of which frames 
are elemental, these "roots of determinism which underlie the 
'recursive' structure of our sensibility and expressive codes" 
(Steiner, p.462), are "embedded in our semantics, in our conventions 
of logic" (ibid .).
As Geertz has urged, "societies, like lives, contain their own 
interpretations" (1973:453); when one attends to cultural forms one 
is attending to "an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles" 
(p.452). In analyses of collective forms which recognize them as 
'saying something about something' (a tag which Geertz [p.448] takes 
from Aristotle), one is faced with a problem in "social semantics" 
(p.448). Geertz's analysis of the Balinese cockfight shows it to be 
interpretive— "a story they tell themselves about themselves" 
(p.448)— a text for "a kind of sentimental education" (p.449) in
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which "the Balinese forms and discovers his temperament and his 
society's temper at the same time" (p.451)* This simultaneity of 
'formation and discovery' lies at the heart of analyses such as those 
by Kapferer and Sansom. It bespeaks the BOTH-AND thinking of Wilden 
and, because it explicitly attends to the individual (temperament) 
and to the society (temper), it evokes Simmel's "forms of sociation" 
(1959:314-15, 319-20, passim; cf. Wolff 1950:lxiii on 
Vergesellschaftung ['sociation']), especially those forms which 
mediate between the individual and culture (cf. 1950:257).
Such mediation of society appears in Kapferer's (1979:148) and 
Geertz's illustrations of the importance of the audience, which is 
involved intellectually (Kapferer), or kinesthetically (Geertz, 
p.451n) in the focused gathering and its process. In Sinhalese 
healing ritual it is essential for the definition of the cured 
patient; for the Balinese at a cockfight it is for learning "what his 
culture's ethos and his private sensibility (or, anyway, certain 
aspects of them) look like when spelled out externally in a 
collective text" (Geertz, p.449). As Simmel pointed out long ago, 
the importance of society— as audience, for Kapferer's analysis, as 
consociates for Sansom's, or as co-participants for Geertz's— is 
that "society's 'in front of' the individual is, at the same time, a 
'within'", an import which is particular "as regards the genesis of 
cognition" (1950:258; 257). This is important for the Sinhalese to 
know he is cured, for the fringe-dweller to know "what bin happenin'' 
(Sansom, p-136), for the Balinese to discover his temperament.
Expulsion: An Educational Short Story
In this concluding section I want to return briefly to the logic 
of the act of expulsion. I have taken the title of this section from 
Clifford Geertz's suggestion (see preceding page) that the cockfight 
is, for the Balinese, "a story they tell themselves about
M  / ✓themselves . So is expulsion a kind of story the Meriam le tell. The 
difference is that it is a very very short story. It has only one
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antagonist, and only one protagonist; it is only 'told' once, and its
telling takes about two minutes. Nevertheless, as a 'story' it is
/  /part of the tonar, known to all Meriam le, and they attend to its 
telling no less as audience than are the audiences at cockfights. 
Sufficient unto its comprehension (by Islanders) is the logic of how 
persons come into being (i.e. become.
The logic of how persons come into being. This is a very thick
sentence, redolent of 'realpeople', and tonar, and
erwer/education— and of the educated men who govern the process.
Wittgenstein suggested that to "understand a sentence means to
understand a language" (1958:1/202). It seems to me that this
underscores the terrible tenuousness of interpretive 'language', of
the language of any interpretation of social and cultural 'texts'
which must engage what I have called transframing. That is, in this
case, no Islander (to my knowledge) would propose that he understands
a rare and extraordinary event such as an expulsion because he
comprehends 'the logic of how persons come into being'.
Nevertheless, this is exactly the comprehension which informs his
understanding of the expulsion. He understands that children do not
always become persons , and he knows that they may not fail to become
persons as a result of his neglect of their education. He knowns that 
/ /all Meriam le are responsible for seeing that all educable children 
receive the provisions of the tonar, and that the way of 
being-becoming educated is provided in the framework of
erwer— 'being in the process of provisioning-reception'. He 
'learns' by engaging his teacher and his subject-matter and his 
tonar, all at once. He says, E kerbi oderwerlare..."We are currently 
in the process of him being out teacher." He 'contracts' a kab le 
[dance-man] to be erwer le [education-man] thus: Ma kerbi mar a kerkar 
kab derwerare..."We shall be in the process of you teaching/us 
learning your new dance." This is not a request; there is no 
question. There is only a (known) kab le, some erwer kebile, and a 
new song: Someone Who Knows + Someone Who Doesn't Know + Subject 
Matter. As long as this calculus is attended to, uneducated children
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are being in the presence of education to become educated persons.
And as long as the process keeps working there is nothing for the
educated men, the pedagogues, to do, save provision of themselves as 
/erwer le.
But any failure of the erwer-system, any incident extraneous to
the framework, occasions the governance of the educated man. When a
new dance doesn't get provided, when a dance-student can't find a
teacher, when an instructor doesn't know or can't provide some
crucial subject-matter, then an educated man steps in. While the
erwer-system is not self-correcting, the tonar is; and the educated
man, the man of knowledge, is the Corrector par excellence. He is the
only one who may move the comprehension of a situation out of the
framework of education, who may place it squarely in the reality of
the tonar. He is the only one who may speak extempore for The People 
/of Mer.
He is, above all, the artist of the social form. From the palette
of tonar he paints the picture of the way to be; he shapes from the
coloratura of everyday life with a knife of True Speech the stories 
✓ /which the Meriam le tell themselves about themselves. He is the 
Prime Listener, the one who has heard all the stories and watched all 
the enactments of them; as such, only he may cease listening in order 
to pronounce the tonar. He is primus inter pares, but his equals are 
all dead and gone; yet the Way which he utters is the Way which they 
uttered, the corpus which they now inhabit as he creates it. And he 
and he alone is responsible, only he is actually able to respond to 
the dictum of the Way.
Everyone else may only be, yet must be, responsive. As the 
✓ /children of the Meriam le become persons they respond to the 
provisioning of and by their elders. Elders and children are 
correspondents within a framework of education according to the 
logic of how persons come into being. When the father of the 
assaulted girl set out for the railway station he said he was going 
to 'teach that boy a lesson' . When the thumpings and pummelings had 
failed, the girl's relatives sat dumbfounded around a pot of tea,
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saying 'Boy, I thought he'd learned his lesson'. He was too old to 
spank, and too young to kill. Not yet a real man he couldn't be 
permanently exiled; and he had no real parents to arrange his 
absence. He didn't seem to be responding... and they had no responses 
left.
No one called in the educated man. Only he could author his own 
entry into the situation. For only he could assume the risk of 
perpetrating a person not coming into being, only he could send 
someone away, out of education to fend in the tonar which he did not 
yet inhabit. He found the young-man. The young-man was silent, and 
did not run away. And the man of knowledge told him a story about 
himself in a single sentence. I don't want to see you around here 
again.
Endnote.
The young man has been gone for quite some time, perhaps a year or
more. He may return; he may not. But if he does return it will not be
/
until he has become le, a person. Even if his more-or-less adult body
/
comes back, without a le 'inside' he will reside as non-person, a man 
of no account.
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That people actually understand what 
their tongues are babbling. And that 
eyes do shine to understand, and that 
responses are made which indicate a soul 
in all this matter and mess of tongues 
and teeth...
Jack Kerouac, 
Satori in Paris
CHAPTER 5
Bar kak mir. To talk with no curves.
To talk with no curves is to talk straight. In the islands of the
/  /Eastern Torres Strait, the country of the Meriam le, talk which is
straight is talk which has no curves. Bar kak mir [literally
curves-without-talk] speaks truth, as the path of a good arrow is
true. It is powerful talk, talk never used unwisely nor unadvisedly.
/The language of such talk is Meriam mir, the spoken language of the
/  /  /  /Meriam le, the people of the island of Mer. Generically, Meriam mir
is the traditional language of the Eastern Torres Strait islands and,
among it's colloquial speakers, is the name of the traditional
language as it is spoken by those Eastern islanders who still speak
it. But it is a generic terms, this name for their language, and is
taken to be so among its speakers. It is, finally, the language of
/ / / the Meriam le; and while the language of Mer is spoken throughout the
✓  /Eastern Torres Strait, the Meriam le are the people of a single
/island. And the island of Mer is the island of traditional
✓ /authority. It is, originally and finally, only the Meriam le who 
enable bar kak mir.^
There is a sense among the speakers of the Eastern islands that 
talk is more or less real. The Meriam mir is kar. In the lingua 
franca of the islands of Torres Strait, kar has been rendered most
commonly as prapa. But prapa is certainly directly from the
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ii it 43pidginized "proper" which arrived with the Bislama y pidgin of the
Pacific beche de mer and pearl trade in the nineteenth century. So,
/  /  /in translating kar into prapa, the Meriam le translated out of Meriam 
mir and into Torres Strait Creole— into a language wherein there is 
no authority. The kab kar of the Meriam le [lit: dance real]
translated into the prapa dans. The problem has been that there are 
no 'creole dances' , so to speak. That is, in translating the name of 
the dance out of the language, the dance itself was put into a domain 
of unrestricted dance.
/This is not to suggest that a traditional Meriam kab kar,
performed correctly and well, is a different dance, or less of a
dance, when so performed in the Torres Strait Islander communities
which have grown up in the cities and towns of modern
Australia— despite the fact that these are Torres Strait Pidgin
speech-communities whose Eastern and Western and Central Islanders
share only their creolized lingua franca. What it does suggest is an
acute problem arising from the preclusion of re-translation. That
✓  /is, whereas kar was initially translated as prapa by Meriam le who
were translationally defining and naming their dance to Torres
/Strait Islanders who did not command Meriam mir, they could not in
/turn allow retranslation of unrestricted prapa back into Meriam mir
kar. At the most mundane level, there is the problem inherent in the
additional adverbial meaning of prapa. Prapa translates variously
into English as "proper" and as "properly", as well as into
contextually expanded meanings of "rigorous", "careful",
"attentive" and "attentively", "correct" and "correctly", and more.
/It means nothing in Meriam mir to speak of 'kar kab'— transposing the 
literal "dance real" to 'real dance'— but the transposition of prapa 
dans renders an adverbial and accepted meaning of prapa, dans prapa. 
This is commonly heard from adults instructing misbehaving 
youngsters who are learning to dance: "Dans prapa!" The cessation of 
their misbehaviour, as long as they have learned the dance, may bring 
the affirmative encouragement, "Gud. Now yupla make prapa dans!"
And, in creole, such encouragement may be given upon the successful
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performance of any dance. But its use to encourage learners of a kab
/ / kar would be to admit the Meriam kab kar, the real dance of Mer, to
the domain of any dance.
/I suggested above that it means nothing in Meriam mir to speak of
(the transposition) kar kab. I was sacrificing accuracy for brevity
in order to make my point about transposition. But this speaks
exactly to the reality of translation from one language to another
among the four principal languages extant in Australian mainland
Islander communities (Meriam mir, Western language, Torres Strait
Creole, and English^). It is misleading for me to suggest that it
/"means nothing in Meriam mir to speak of kar kab". In doing so I am
/utilizing a sense of 'meaning' which is not commensurate with Meriam
mir. In fact, there are two possibilities for that transposed form:
1) it is never said; 2) it is not Meriam mir.
I can imagine, in the case of the first possibility, that children
and other persons who are learning Meriam mir might say "kar kab".
And in this way that particular erroneous transposition may be
uttered. But, as long as children and others who are learning the
language persist in making such errors, they are not taken to be 
/speaking Meriam mir. Which is to say that they are, for the duration
of their learning, generating utterances which are the second case:
✓ / not Meriam mir. The reality of this is that meaningful Meriam mir
[mir encorapases "word", "speech", "talk", "utterance", and
"language"] is only Meriam mir. A speaker is not taken to be more or
✓less meaningful as he learns more or less coherent Meriam mir;
/rather, until he commands coherent Meriam mir his speech permits no
meaning whatsoever. While it is useful to occasionally describe
speech, as I have done, as 'meaningless' or an 'meaning nothing',
such uses are admitted only for analysis or exposition. It would be
/wrong for me to propose actual examples of 'meaningless' Meriam mir,
✓  /  /for such are impossible. For the Meriam le, Meriam mir is the gateway 
to meaning.
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It is not unique that speakers of a language take that language as
encompassing all meaning. But it may be relatively uncommon for the
/full implication of my statement of Meriam mir as the gateway to
/meaning to be granted. Yet this is exactly the case: Meriam mir
✓ /enables access to all things meaningful to Meriam le. I should
/mention that there is no synonym in Meriam mir for the word
"meaning". And there is a measure of infidelity in my using it
focally in analysis or exposition. However, since its absence in 
/Meriam mir precludes my glossing or paraphrasing some existing word,
I shall establish it as my own device, and refine it as I require it.
/  / /When I say, for the world of the Meriam le, that Meriam mir enables
access to all things meaningful, I am simply saying that the language
enables access to all matters of import, of power and authority, of
✓  /consequence. And it is in language that Meriam le are empowered to
monitor access to matters of import. The gateway to meaning is, for
/outsiders too, the Meriam mir. And the gatekeepers are its speakers.
The question which emerges from this initial assessment of
mir— of words and talk and the language in which such happen— is who
it is that 'gatekeepers' of the Meriam mir come to be. Certainly it
/is possible to learn to speak Meriam mir, and, as I have suggested, 
for the duration of the learning of the language there is no way in 
which the learner may be taken to be a 'gatekeeper'. Moreover, the 
notion of a duration of learning is commonly held. The learning of 
language is taken to be a task of serious mien, and one of some 
considerable duration. It is uncommon, in the multilingual mainland 
communities, for a young man to be taken to be a speaker who has not 
reached age twenty-two or so. There is a kind of operant normative 
ideal which posits the acquisition of 'real speech' at about the same 
time that a young man comes to be taken as a 'real man’ . And there is 
a reciprocity which operates publicly on these two aspects of 
personhood. Only the most extraordinary of men may be taken to be a 
'real man' without command of 'real talk'. Among the middle-aged 
men's voices which hold sway in Islander communities there is always 
the grating suspicion of nuance that such ostensibly 'real' men are,
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finally, lacking. It is not so much that they are excluded from daily 
events, but rather that in events of 'final' import it must be kept 
in mind that such men are 'really' disqualified. As their disability 
is a consequence of their lack of speech, so is their silence at 
final events a consequence of their disability.
It is at such events of grave or final import, those which I call 
final events, that speech abilities and disabilities are critical. 
The rare man who is taken to be a 'real' man for all practical 
purposes is confronted by the critical event in which his disability 
renders him no longer a practical participant. In a final event the 
ostensible 'real man' may not be a real man. For in a final event 
only the man who commands the mir kar may speak. Final events are 
invested with meaning, with consequence. The actual event itself is 
a consequence of the crisis which engenders it, and the actions 
attendant in and from the event must generate the solution to the 
crisis. That is, it is the final event which must be the means to 
solution. For the resolution of the crisis to be a consequence of the 
actions which comprise the final event, the actors whc participate 
therein must be men of consequence. Men of consequence are men whose 
speech generates consequences. Speech which generates consequences 
is real speech— mir kar— for only 'real speech' has meaning, and 
only in real speech can a man mean for real things to happen, real 
things to be known.
It is in such critical events that the implicit regulations of 
speech-action may be made explicit. In the arena of the mir, the 
arena which is the domain of everyday talk, the monitors of language 
are de_ facto. Those with relatively more knowledge of words and 
language are free to instruct others' and corrections of misspoken 
words, erroneous verb forms, mistaken grammar are common. Misspeech 
is rife in the mainland Islander communities. Conversations among 
half a dozen or more people proceeds according to the nominal lingua 
franca of the group. Utterance is likely to be initially in the 
language of greatest proficiency of the speaker. Wholly English 
dialogue is rare, but English words and phrases are common.
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Conversations about railway work are commonly marked with railway 
words. Island men have worked for Queensland, New South Wales, 
Western Australian and Northern Territory railways for forty years 
or more, and there is much talk of "ties", "rails", "fettling", 
"laying track", "foremen", "leading hands", "supervisors", 
"subcontracting", "carts", "cars", and "companies". The most common 
railway conversations are among mixed groups of Eastern, Western and 
Central Islanders, and Torres Strait Creole, the lingua franca of the 
islands and of Islanders on the mainland, prevails. Many of the 
railway words in the creole occur in their pidginized forms, where 
"rails" is rel and "compan(ies)" is kampani. But in unconstrained 
conversation the speaker is most likely to say his railway words 
according to his normal practice. An Islander who is a leading hand 
on a Queensland Railways fettling gang may be relatively proficient 
in (railway vocabulary) English, and say "leading hand" in speaking 
of his position with the railway. A young Islander newly arrived on 
the mainland from, say, Darnley Island in the Eastern Torres Strait, 
may be working on the railway only long enough to earn his fare in 
order to go to the Kimberlies in Western Australia in order to seek a 
reputedly well-paying job in mining construction. He is likely to 
refer to his gang boss as a lidingan [/lidiijan/] , or generically as a 
bas bio mi [boss of my, my boss] where ’bosses’ needn't be 
categorized as leading hands, foremen, and supervisors.
Neither the leading hand nor the newcomer in casual employ,
however, will translate general or specific categories of
supervisory people or positions into traditional langauge. The
leading hand may be a Saibai man, or a Mabuiag man (i.e. born on the
Western island of Saibai, or Mabuiag, or of Saibai or Mabuiag
parents), but he will not translate "leading hand" into Western
language; nor will the young Darnley Islander translate his boss's 
/title into Meriam mir. Leading hands do not exist in the islands of 
the Torres Strait. Simply, no railways exist in Torres Strait. More 
importantly, neither do leading hands. And finally, neither do any 
equivalents of such as a "leading hand" might be in traditional
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/
society. There is no generic term for 'boss' in Meriam mir. There
are no general 'bosses' . The absence of a generic equivalent renders
/
translation problemmatic. The Meriam mir speaker who commands also
creole and English may, having spoken of bas bio mi in conversation
with assorted Western and Eastern Islanders, turn to an English-only
speaker at his side and render the explicative translation "my boss" .
✓ /
But, should he be required to translate for an older Meriam le in the
group, he will say kara bas, using the Meriam mir "kara" [my;mine]
but retaining the creole "bas" in translation.^
Problems occur when unfamiliar foreign creole or English words 
/
are introduced in Meriam mir. When equivalent words are unavailable,
the foreign word must be explained. The explanation necessarily 
/
occurs in Meriam mir, and must be rendered by a more or less 
/competent Meriam mir speaker. In everyday conversation, it may be
/
that the speaker who introduces the foreign word in Meriam mir simply
/
does not know, or does not recall that word's Meriam mir equivalent.
/
In such simple and passing cases he is briefly notified of the Meriam
mir by whichever other speaker first realizes the error. The most
/senior and competent Meriam mir speaker present monitors the
dialogue. He may or may not speak, depending upon how much attention
he is paying or how important he takes the explanation to be. Where
/
he has not been the Meriam mir speaker to correct the utterer of the
/
foreign word, he may or may not refine the equivalent Meriam mir. In
matters of unimportant translational explication he may not speak to
the issue at all (and if he is dozing he will not be awakened to
(literally) pass sentence). He is not required to be the one to
correct the original misspeech, nor must he adjudicate disputes over
competing translations of the foreign word. If, however, he does
/
propose the first Meriam mir equivalent, his is the final word on the
subject. He may, if he does so, be only interested in reducing a
potential delay in the proceedings; he might be waiting to make a
point of his own and not want to wait while others less capable in 
/
Meriam mir dilly-dally over a translation or correction which is
obvious to him. Whatever the case, if he speaks he speaks last.
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The language monitor in any situation is known. He is the 'real
man' present who is the most competent speaker of Meriam mir. His
authority is extraordinary, for his jurisdiction is the mir— the
matrix of meaning, the generator of consequence. It is he who
commands the mir kar. Where the situated speech of others may be
taken as more or less meaningful. And his pronouncements on language
are _de_ jure, for he speaks to the mir from the mir kar.
My suggestion of a de_ jure language monitor is commensurate with 
✓ /statements of Meriam le about their mir. But I am, in distinguishing 
a position of de_ facto and de jure authority over language,
Sabstracting from the much more general Meriam corpus. Among other
aspects of my abstraction, in distinguishing de facto and de jure I
risk a characteristic distinction which is only a situational
✓  /distinction among the Meriam le. That is, a language monitor is what
I have called de_ facto when he is present and either not speaking or
not speaking to the question of mir. His monitorship becomes de jure
✓  /whenever his speech is to the point of language. A Meriam le who is a 
/monitor of Meriam mir may come to be recognized as something of an
authority in English, and may correct speakers who are learning
English, or who utter English words in other speech. His
'monitorship' of English is, however, never more than de facto. As
he monitors the English speech of others he acts as does any de facto 
/monitor of Meriam mir who commands relatively more knowledge of the 
language than does the speaker he interrupts to correct. His actions 
in monitoring language other than his own mir are only instructive, 
and any claim he may make to correctiveness is grounded in his 
observed competence as a speaker and in his reputation. His 
reputation and competence may be enhanced by his proven or reputed 
ability to invoke authoritative sources, and an Islander who speaks 
English will be rarely challenged on his corrections of the English 
of others if he has attended English-only schools, can use an English 
dictionary, or can invoke the opinions of more or less recognized 
English language authorities (e.g. writers, journalists, lecturers
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in English). But he may never claim jurisdiction over the language,
and is always liable to be challenged, contradicted, or ignored.^
The point of this comparison is to identify what I referred to
/  /
above as the "general Meriam corpus" . If Meriam mir is the gateway to
/
meaning, the Meriam 'corpus' is the domain wherein meaning has its
being. "Corpus" is my translation of the Meriam word tonar
[/tonar/;/tonar/^], a word which Meriam le translate variously as
"culture", "way", "style", "custom", and less commonly "practice"
and "knowledge". Tonar is occasionally rendered in creole as we
[/we/;/we/] or pasen [/pasfcn/-/fasen/^®], but is normally accepted
by creole hearers as a reference to the original tonar (or to its
Western equivalent, powa). While we or pasen are commonly
/
retranslated back into Meriam mir tonar when they arise as nominal
/references to the Meriam concept, otherwise indiscriminate uses of
we or pasen (such as in description of habits or manners of others)
/
are carefully translated into the Meriam mir for the actual 'ways' or 
practices described. To allow translation of any old we or tonar 
risks the degeneration of tonar into a generic term for just any old 
practice. Tonar, unmarked, is heavily value-laden. The tonar of 
other peoples, in so far as they have any identifiable corpus of
values and customs, are lesser tonar. To speak of the tonar of others
✓
when the actual practice or body of knowledge has no Meriam
equivalent is to identify the alien practice; to speak of the tonar
/
of others as comparable to Meriam tonar is to derogate it.
Derogation is suspended by modification or specification, and the
'such-and-such' customs of another people may be compared more or
/
less favourably with the contrasting Meriam tonar. But where no 
redeeming customs or practices have ever been discerned in an other 
people, the term for 'so-and-so's tonar' becomes an expression of 
approbrium, often held up to misbehaving and recalcitrant children 
as a model of their expected demise if they fail to rectify their 
behaviour. The childspoken to harshly with "Kolera
tonar!"— Whiteman' s custom!— knows well that he has gravely
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, 49erred. The pattern of his behaviour has not been provided or
/  /allowed for by the Meriam corpus, the Meriam tonar.
This is not to suggest that nothing of cultures or customs outside 
/  / /the tonar of the Meriam le has become integral Meriam tonar. Quite to
the contrary, the Island people who reside in the mainland Australian
towns (including the Meriam people among them) have largely
accustomed themselves to common public Australian town-dwelling
behaviour. And the Island child whose table manners have been
/corrected with admonitions of "Kolera tonar!" may, as he grows up and
enters the Australian workforce, be advised to pay attention to 
/kolera tonar as he learns how to behave with his fellows at his first 
casual construction job.
At the extreme, the first Torres Strait Islander apprenticed in
the hotel trade (in 1978) has had to learn a 'job tonar'— the customs
and practices extant in his chosen field of employment— which is
almost wholly a kolera tonar. The apprentice entered the hotel
trade from a devout fundamentalist Christian family, a family of
professed tea-totallers which lacks virtually any etiquette of
social drinking (i.e. any 'drinking-tonar'). Except for the serving
of those of his customers who are Islanders, he has survived as an
apprentice to the extent that he has learned to behave as a principal
functionary in a domain of kole drinking tonar. Which is to say
that he has had to behave according to the corpus of rules and
practices for social drinking in (local) white culture, whether or
not he is able to formulate the generative aspects of that while
culture or, even, whether or not he is able to formulate the actual
rules governing his own day-to-day presence behind the bar.
/Insofar as his behaviour is within the domain of kolera tonar, and 
is exclusively or solely so, the Islander in the Australian workforce 
embodies no fundamental problems. Work is not the whole of life, and 
work which is not encompassed by traditional tonar is not liable to 
the dictates of that corpus. The young Islander apprentice in the 
local pub is an extreme case. The aspects of Whiteman's culture 
which provide the 'drinking-tonar' according to which he retains his
154
job are virtually never in conflict with any Islander tonar. He is
constrained to learn English pub vocabulary, and to behave behind the
bar according to pub sociolinguistics and decorum. And, although
this requires the whole of his learning how to become a 'real man' to
be done outside the pub and work hours, neither is his behaviour at
work admissible in discussions among his elders regarding his
maturing (or not) into a potential 'real Island man’.
Problems occur for the worker whose job requires his behaviour in
a domain of competing tonar. The vast majority of employed Islanders
in the mainland towns work for white entities. Certainly the
companies and firms and agencies who employ Islanders have been
/generated by, and in, and according to kolera tonar. But in contrast 
to the extraordinary case of the pub, most employing entities are
engaged in work which is governed more or less by traditional rules
/ / / and custom. For the Meriam le on the mainland there is Meriam tonar
for nearly all of his possible job opportunities. The Islander who
becomes a builder's labourer brings in him to the construction site a
corpus of rules for behaviour and decorum governing the construction
of houses and communal buildings in the Islands. He may, in fact, be
prevented in particular circumstances from even getting the job in
the first place.
Around noon on Friday I stopped by to see if Koiki was 
free for lunch. It had become our occasional habit to duck 
the midday North Queensland heat for an hour or so. We 
would retreat into one of the two or three coffee houses 
along the main street and bask in air-conditioning, 
flavouring our talk of what had been going on lately with 
freshly brewed coffee and maybe a curried egg sandwich. I 
hadn't seen him for a couple of days, so before he could 
tell me his usual story about how much work he had to do 
and how many people were waiting to see him, I reminded him 
of his doctor's orders to stop working so hard and learn 
how to take occasional breaks from the pressure. He'd had 
a long and hard morning and was easily persuaded. We went 
to what was becoming our favourite coffee shop. And the 
Danish proprietor ensured his establishment as our 
favourite when, seeing us coming through the window which 
looked onto the shopping mall, he had planted one black
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coffee and one cappucino at the cornermost of our two usual 
tables.
I told Koiki that I had been in the city yesterday and
had looked for him around lunchtime. He said that a couple
/of girls had arrived on the mainland yesterday from Mer.
Their plane landed at around 10:50 in the morning and they
had fronted up at his office at 11:15 or so, straight from
the airport. They were here to look for work, and for a
place to stay, and wanted Koiki to help them get organized.
So he'd had them wait around until his lunch hour and then
the three of them toured the central city area while Koiki
pointed out 'Island places' in the city. He'd taken them
to his bank and introduced them to his bank manager so they
could open savings accounts to put their excess traveling
money into, and so they would be able to cash paycheques if
and when they found work. On the way back from the bank
/they encountered some Meriam countrymen shopping, and all
eight or ten of them decided to continue swapping stories 
/of Mer over lunch.
A cousin of the new girls was there, a young man in his
mid-twenties, along with an older maternal aunt of his who
wanted to know all about the girls' mothers, cousins of
/hers whom she hadn't seen since she left Mer twelve or 
thirteen years ago. They went into the cafeteria on the 
ground floor of David Jones department store, went through 
the queue for their food, and shoved a couple of tables 
together so they could all sit and talk.
Koiki started to chuckle. He said the young man had 
started to eat his chicken with his hands. I figured it 
for barbecued chicken in a paper bucket, or maybe fried 
chicken and chips thrown on a plate, and wondered why this 
was funny. Koiki caught my look, and shook his head, still 
repressing his chuckle.
'Mmph. No.' he said. 'Chicken with all kinda sauce and
vegies all over it...an' he just picked it up.' I laughed a
bit with him, then, but was still not sure which of the
/transgressions of kole etiquette were laughable.
He said the old auntie was aghast. She stopped eating 
and reached across the table to pick up the young man's 
fork.
/ /'Agera tonar! Agera tonar!' she said in a disgusted, 
forceful whisper, and tapped him on the arm with his fork. 
He dropped the food back onto his place, and everybody had 
a good-natured giggle, especially when they noticed that 
the new girls, fresh over from the islands, were already 
eating with their forks.
Fortunately the young man was still young enough to be
excused a transgression which, given his youth, would only
be taken as incidental. His mistake would have been graver
/had there been any kole eating with them, for the
transgression of the knife-and-fork rules would have
pointedly insulted any whiteman whose very tonar was so
blatantly ignored. But I was surprised that anyone so old
could still be admonished, even by his own aunt and among
/relatives, with the very strong 'Agera tonar!1
I had seen little children picking up dirt and putting 
it in their mouths have their hands slapped with a 
whispered 1Agera tonar' ["(Australian) Aboriginal 
practice", or "Aboriginal culture"]. But among adults 
this was normally an epithet. And it was, when uttered 
between men, a curse which was usually prevented from 
causing a fight by the intervention of an older man 
present, if the potential combatants were fortunate to 
have an elder there. Koiki said that one of the funny 
things about it was that the old woman must have been 
really disgusted to make such a big thing of it. All she 
would have had to do was remind him that they were eating
in a kole place, and were eating kolera lewer [whiteman 
food], and so he should eat according to kolera tonar. 
Part of the reason for the younger people’s delight was the 
excess, and perhaps the slight error, of their old lady. 
It certainly wasn't the same sort of thing that had 
happened to Eidi.
A week ago a windfall of four jobs had come up with a 
construction outfit that was known to accept Islander 
applicants. The word had gone out .and the Islander 
job-getting network had mobilized to locate five of the 
best known out-of-work construction workers, put them in 
contact with the Commonwealth Employment Service in order 
to obtain CES introduction cards to show to the foreman 
first thing Monday morning. (The CES cards were proof not 
only of the validity of the unemployed status of the 
applicant, but also proof that the applicant was listed in 
the CES construction labour pool and had been referred, 
usually by telephone, in advance to the personnel officer 
of the company listing its vacancies.) This had been 
accomplished. And working fathers and uncles with 
functioning and registered cars had been organized to get 
the applicants out to the construction site on the edge of 
town by 7:30 Monday morning. The Islander record with this 
construction outfit was a good one, and pains were taken to 
ensure that only good and regular workers would be the 
Islander applicants. It was known that, barring incident,
157
it was possible that all the vacancies could be filled by 
Islanders, and the prosepct of scooping any non-islander 
applicants added to the excitement of getting young men 
into jobs.
Sidi had been selected as one of the five applicants. 
The selectors were an informal aggregation of older men 
with acknowledged experience in whiteman jobs who assisted 
Koiki, the Islander expert in obtaining jobs 
'whiteman-style'. They had proposed him despite the fact 
that he had lost his last construction job shortly after 
flattening a foreman who had insulted him. There was no 
question that an insult had taken place, nor any question 
at all of his response— given the proviso that his story 
of the event was accurate— having been inappropriate. But 
there was a risk of alienating this particular employer, a 
risk which had to be weighed against the number of kids 
Eidi and his wife were having to support on unemployment 
benefits. There were other factors in his favour over 
younger and unmarried men still able to live with their 
parents and relations. And in the end Eidi appeared on 
Monday morning at job-granting time. By Monday evening I 
had heard that the four jobs had gone to the four younger 
Islanders, but that Eidi was still out of work.
I asked Koiki over our third coffee what had happened. 
I hadn't seen Eidi since last week, and nobody I had talked 
to had been able to say anything more than the job had not, 
apparently, suited him. The nuances of the reports, 
however, indicated a confrontation of some sort had 
occurred, or had nearly occurred, and that this was 
typical of Eidi. Whatever the case, the patchy reports 
indicated that this was one of those things which I 
shouldn't be surprised at. Not knowing as much as I was 
credited with, I had been neither surprised nor 
unsurprised. Finally I got to ask Koiki about it.
'Eidi he turn up on time,' Koiki said, 'but he sense 
/that kole foreman no like him.'
'Why?' I asked. 'Because he knew him? Or did Eidi do 
something?'
'No. Because he Island-man. Eidi knew this foreman no 
like Island-man.'
'But what about the others? They're Island men too.'
'They Island, but they too young,' Koiki said. 'They 
not know.'
I asked Koiki what he meant by this, and how it was that 
Eidi knew this foreman didn't like Islanders. Did the 
foreman do something, or say something, to give Eidi the 
impression that he disliked Islanders?
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/'No. Eidi he just sensed it. Maybe this kole no like 
black man, maybe he only no like Island-man. So Eidi say 
he already got a job, sorry, and he do 'way.'
I was incredulous. 'Eidi sensed the foreman didn't 
like Island men so he told him that he already had another 
job!? He said he was sorry to bother them, and then he just 
left?'
1 Wao' [(/wao/ - /wav/) = affirmative exclamation, akin
to "Right!", or "Sure!"], Koiki nodded. 'This proper 
/ / /Meriam tonar. When Meriam le sense he not welcome he must
-
go quietly away. In Meriam tonar, meriba adgizera tonar
[lit: our ancestors' time], one of the Old Ones went to a
village he didn't know. He waited outside the village and
people come out. He sense they no like him, he not welcome
at this village, so he tell them he must go on his way. He
say this mamor Meriam tonar [lit: true Meriam way]. When
-
he come back to his people, he tell them, Meriam mir kar:
/  /when Meriam le sense he not welcome, he must go quietly 
away.'
I understood then the ambiguity in the earlier, patchy accounts of
Eidi's encounter with the foreman that Monday morning. I ought to
have been both surprised and not surprised: It was mildly surprising
that Eidi, known to be a competent and experienced participant in
/whiteman scenes, had opted for the uncompromising code of Meriam
tonar: but, having done so, it is not surprising that he did not take 
/ /the job, for a Meriam le may not enter or remain where he is unwelcome
and he must go quietly away. It was to Eidi's credit, among his
countrymen, that he behaved as a mamor Meriam le [true Meriam man]. 
/Meriam tonar did not require that he opt for behaving according to
its strictures. The scene was not an Island scene. The foreman was
kole, and the language of hiring and firing is (except for
all-islander crews on the railways, or cane-cutting, or on fishing
boats) English. It does not discount his behaviour that he was
/unable to announce his exit from the scene in Meriam mir. In fact, in
the case of extricating one's unwelcome self from an
English-speaking scene, the extent to which one is able to make one's
untroublesomeness and courtesy evident is the extent to which one
/conforms most closely to the stricture of Meriam tonar.
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Later reports from those hired at the construction site indicated
that the foreman looked momentarily nonplussed at Eidi's apparently
having arrived at job-granting time with a job already in hand; but
there were no indications that his was more than fleeting interest.
Certainly I was the only one asking such questions, and the foreman's
reaction after the fact was in no way part of the account. It was
sufficient to the tonar that Eidi had been courteous, had not made
anything of what was taken generally to be simply common racial
prejudice, and had left. The event was never recounted as exemplary
of Eidi s proper behaviour as a Meriam le. To do so would have been
to impute that he was not, or to allow the interpretation that it was
✓ /somehow possible to be a Meriam le sometimes, and sometimes not. The 
implication of whim, of personal choice in the matter of being a
/ / xMeriam le inherent in such an imputation would impugn the Meriam 
tonar.
There is a sense in Koiki's explanation of Eidi's behaviour of
tonar as 'corpus' . His reference to the story of the Old One was not
prompted, nor was there any thoughtful hesitation during his
statement to break the tempo of the flow from recounting Eidi's
encounter with the foreman to recounting the Old One's encounter with
the strange villagers. Moreover, the critical instruction "he must
go quietly away" is faithfully recorded in both instances in my
account here. That is, Koiki's final utterance in the tale of Eidi's
recent encounter exactly presaged his final utterance in the tale of
the Old One. And this final utterance, though rendered in English,
was an exact rewording into English of a recorded instruction, the
instruction of the Old One to his people of several centuries ago. It
/  /was the Old One s instruction _to Eidi to be Meriam le: go quietly 
away.
Explicit references to the Old Ones, and to the ways of the 
ancestors are relatively infrequently made. And it was quite some 
time before I was comfortable with the notion of tonar as corpus. 
Accounts such as this one of Koiki's certainly underscored the 
translational idea of 'corpus' as it began more and more to press
160
itself on me. The mundane problem, or one of them, was that "corpus" 
was not apparently in any Islander's English vocabulary. And tonar 
was translated for me as "culture", and "custom" by more or less 
fluent English speakers, and much more often was translated into 
creole we or pasen. The real problem, vis ä vis my comprehension, was 
the increasingly refined distinctions made (for my benefit) between 
the tonar and the mir. The paramount distinction became that of 
mamor and kar, of truth and reality.
I suggested above the meaninglessness (or, senselessness) of 
saying 1 kar kab' ♦ Such is simply not the way to say 'real dance' , 
which is properly said "kab kar". And my misspeech, when I said ' kar 
kab', was simply and passingly corrected by whichever man or men in 
the group were authorized to monitor my language. (My nominal age 
during my sojourn with the Islander people was around forty, which is 
a few years older than I actually was. In my ignorance of the 
language, almost every man around was 'authorized' by his greater 
proficiency to monitor my speech, given the proviso that he was at 
least as old as I was taken to be.) These relatively more proficient 
speakers were what I have called de facto monitors, people who could 
correct my grammar and pronunciation by interrupting me in 
mid-sentence and who could respond to my questions about my erroneous 
speech (so long as such elaborations were appropriate in the 
situation). They could not correct each other's speech with such 
aplomb, but were generally free to argue over whether or not the 
initial correction of my speech was the 'most correct' correction 
available. So there were a lot of arguments over my speech and over 
corrections of it, but very few corrections of each other's 
speech— and no arguments.
Such misspeech and correction is the domain of the mir, of the 
common language. It is the arena of the _de facto language monitor, 
and the speaker who interrupts to correct the speech of another makes 
a claim to de facto monitorship. When corrections of points of fact 
are made, monitors claim (or assert) the authority of expertise and
command over specialized vocabulary. The interruptions are
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authorized after the fact, according to whether or not exception is 
taken to their claim to greater knowledge or experience. Exception 
to corrections of my speech were never made by me, for I had only the 
minimum authority: the authority to listen. (For a long time I had 
not even that minimal authorization, and was by definition unwelcome 
in Meriam mir speech-scenes.) My authority to listen, and to attempt 
to respond in mir when spoken to, enfranchised my presence, but not 
my unprompted utterance.
But my misspeech was so frequent that my errors generated a large
number of disputes over correct mir. I was not party to the 
S2disputes^ , but was obliged to accept the final verdict. The final 
verdict in cases of my errors was always given by the speaker who 
established final de facto monitorship in each situation. And I was 
on occasion presented with two conflicting 'correct' versions, and 
sometimes even by the speaker who had proposed the 'less correct' of 
two versions shaking his head in the direction of the 'winner' and 
reiterating his version to me sotto voce ♦ All of this action and 
interaction proceeded, as I have said, d^ _ facto, in and about the 
facts of the common language. But there were, early in my sojourn, 
instances which seemed invested with more import than others. I have 
since learned to take these less frequent and more important 
incidents as more consequential, for I learned to recognize the men 
of consequence. In the domain of the mir it is the man of consequence 
who commands meaning.
The presence of a man of consequence renders any de facto language
situation de_ jure. There are not, on the Australian mainland, many
/  /
of these men. But all of them are known to the Meriam le on the 
mainland, and in conversations which turn, from time to time, to 
matters of talk, they are closely watched. He may or may not be 
otherwise a person of means or authority (though among those few on 
the mainland he is likely to be), but his is the jurisdiction of 
talk, and his verdicts are final. He may not engage in _de_ facto 
disputes over more or less correct mir. De facto disputes over
correcting the misspeech of a learner may go on in his presence, but
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only so long as he does not indicate his interest in the matter. He 
is teacher and adjudicator and source, and may allow informed 
discussion or dispute to continue in the interests of the education 
of those disputing their proposed corrections. But his indication of 
interest in any such matter commands silence, for his is the vested 
interest. He is the language monitor de jure, and a single downward 
nod of his head suffices for him to express his verdict.^ There is 
no rejoinder, nor rebuttal, and it is extraordinary for even the most 
assertive posers of corrections to take sotto voce exception to the 
verdict. Those who do so are reminded with a commanding "Ssst", 
usually followed with their whispered name if they persist. And such 
whispers are from others, not from the language monitor, for in 
making the persistor mindful of where he is they are seeking to 
defuse the situation. Were the persistor allowed to continue to 
express exception to the 'verdict', the whole situation would 
escalate into confrontation.
Confrontations between a de jure language monitor and another’s
/Meriam mir occur, though seldom. It is not possible for the de_ jure 
monitor to be unknown (i am restricting this discussion to mainland 
scenes), so confrontations are, by definition, escalations. The de 
jure language monitor is the speaker of consequence, and his verdicts 
over disputes in the mir are final dicta. The speaker who expresses 
his exception to a verdict challenges the jurisdiction by his very 
expression. The language monitor may not let such expressions of 
exception pass except at the risk of his office, a risk which is
exacerbated by the limited number of language monitors on the 
54mainland. That is, a challenge which risks the very office of the 
de jure monitor, when there are no other de jure monitors available, 
risks his being 'deposed' and the 'office' left untenanted. The 
spectre of the ensuing free-for-all, of the unchecked suzerainty of 
de facto verdicts over the mir, weighs heavily on the incumbent 
monitor. While exception may be momentarily taken among others, 
especially as they discuss and learn the implications of the 
'verdict', the monitor may not permit exceptions to him. As teacher
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and source he is obliged to enable speakers to improve their 
language, and he may well allow ad hoc disputations to his verdicts 
among those discussing them. He may or may not participate in such 
discussions. If he does he does so with caution, for his 
responsibility as teacher must not be overwhelmed by his presence as 
source: he must allow sufficiently free discussion in order to enable 
the mir —  the common speech —  to be informed by his pronouncements of 
the mir kar. Except as ancillary issues of language dispute may 
require his intervention, either requested or proferred, the 
language monitor is seldom readdressed during discussions whereby 
the consequences of his dicta are consolidated. Hut in the case of 
his verdict being disputed to him such consolidating discussions are 
preempted by confrontation. They may be deferred until later (they 
often are, with discussion of the final correction resuming after the 
resolution of the confrontation), or they may be simply forgotten or 
disregarded. Whatever the case, the potential discussants are 
rendered audience at the instant of the utterance which protests a 
verdict of the monitor. The monitor eschews his presence as teacher, 
momentarily, when a protest to his decision as adjudicator 
challenges him as source.
The protest is, then, a matter de jure. Insofar as it persists in 
a confrontation of the monitor it escalates the confrontation from 
the domain of adjudication toward the domain of source. The de jure 
language monitor is in final position. He has no appellate 
jurisdiction, for his is the jurisdiction of first and final 
arbitration. There is no more real speech than the mir kar. In 
taking exception to the dictum of the monitor the challenger pretends 
to consequence; his pretense is his claim to meaning. For meaning is 
a matter of consequence, and the mir kar is its means. All speech 
events are, by his de jure pronouncement, final events.
The language monitor is enjoined to be careful and accurate by the 
burden of real speech. His mir kar is by definition precise and true, 
and exceptions to it are not voiced lightly. Also, in arguments over 
points of langauge, when one of the disputants looks like heading for
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a confrontation with the language monitor, another speaker will
often assert himself as a de facto monitor in order to maintain the
dispute in the arena of the common mir. But when, despite all efforts
to the contrary (which may even include the monitor himself ignoring
the developing situation ), a protest is said, everybody else gets
out of the way. They will physically move if they are obstructing the
monitor's and protester's clear view of each other, and may even
leave the room. They monitor their facial expressions and
potentially expressive limbs in order that they do not signify
participation. And they fall quiet.
There are two principal reasons for this quietude at the lodging
of a challenge to the language monitor. On the one hand, nobody but
the perpetrator of the challenge wants to be taken for announcing the
challenge; on the other, if they fail to keep silent they may be
taken to be in de facto alliance with the protester. These two
reasons are related, subtly different, and have to do with
consequence. Challenges are, as I have said, never lodged lightly.
And challenges of a single individual are made by more than one
person only under a cloud of cowardice. Nobody fights the battles of 
✓ /a Meriam le_ for him. This is a dictate to be found in the corpus of 
/the Meriam tonar, and one which is reiterated on the occasional
battlegrounds of the streets of mainland towns. To require an ally
against a single opponent is to signify fear; to engage another as
the witting accomplice of a fearful man is shameful. Moreover, a man
attacked en masse is bound by no strictures of fair play, and the
most extraordinary displays of deadly proficiency are found in the
/ /legends and tales of Meriam le who were attacked while outnumbered by
enemies. A challenger, therefore, who requires allies is in implicit
contravention of tonar, a contravention which, if made explicit,
✓  /threatens his identity as a Meriam le.
The second reason, that of defacto alliance and prevention 
thereof, is more commonly an effect of the silence of those not 
lodging the challenge (as against the first silence which bespeaks a 
motivation grounded in tonar). That is, the notice of challenge is
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easily given and obvious because the challenger is the only one 
speaking. Everyone else, including the language monitor, is silent. 
This is the consequence of the delivery of the verdict of the 
language monitor. His is the final say in all matters of language. 
When his say is a verdict, a pronouncement of and in the mir kar, it 
admits no rebuttal nor comment. In passing judgement he may speak 
only the mir kar, for judgements of talk are of themselves real 
things. And the mir kar is silence, for by definition further talk is 
inconsequential. The consequences of final utterance lie in the 
domains of action and of knowledge. When a final utterance is a 
judgement (correction or verdict) of language, the consequences are 
twofold: in the domain of knowledge, the pronouncement must be
henceforth known and remembered as mir kar; in the domain of action, 
there must be no talk. And this is so. Depending upon the severity 
of the correction by the language monitor, and depending upon the 
investment made in proposing his erroneous speech (or correction of 
another's speech) by the speaker, a silence of some seconds follows 
the pronouncement of the verdict. Ipso facto if anyone is talking he 
is challenging the judgement.
This post-judgemental silence places a mandate of meaning on the
utterance which breaks it: the silence-breaking utterance means
56challenge. This is the only possible meaning. In matters of 
judgement over minimally important points of talk, the person who 
'accidentally' keeps talking (having, say, not noticed that a 
judgement was being made in another quarter of the conversation) is 
chagrinned. His chagrin is obvious, and is accurately taken to 
reflect his having realized what was going on. Once he has realized 
what was going on, he is silent. His comprehending, if late, silence 
is often signified by a slight bowing of the head; but, however he so 
signifies he may not, for instance, apologize, for apology is 
utterance and utterance during post-judgemental silence is 
challenge. In acknowledging his error and in signifying it by being 
silent as soon as he realizes his gaffe, the errant speaker 'erases' 
his utterance. This is critical. He is no way retracts it, neither
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what it was he said nor what he meant. The distinction between 
whatever he said and whatever he meant at the time is dissolved by 
the dictum of the mir kar. In speaking he meant to challenge. When 
it becomes obvious that he was not entering a challenge (to the 
judgement which he wasn't, obviously, aware was proceeding), he is 
deemed to have not spoken. And the language monitor may not make the 
mistake of taking his unaware utterance to have been a challenge, for 
by signifying his 'erasure' the speaker has, post facto, never 
spoken, and the monitor who takes the now non-speech as challenge 
risks the humiliation of making something of nothing. In this 
convoluted logic of mir and mir kar the monitor who generates 
anything of consequence from an erased utterance not only misuses his 
office, but also debases the mir kar by attending in real speech to 
an utterance which never 'really' occurred.
This dual silence after a judgement has to do with the domains of
truth and reality, with (as I mentioned above) distinctions of tonar
and mir. The duality of silence to which I refer is the silence of
the language monitor after he delivers his verdict, and the silence
of those present at the delivery. The distinction is between having
nothing to say and being speechless. It is exact, though this
particular analytical distinction is most often explanatory rather
✓  /
than diagnostic among the Meriam le. The language monitor who has 
delivered his verdict has nothing to say, having just delivered a 
final utterance in mir kar. He waits, silently, for any discussions 
among his hearers regarding his decision, discussions which he does 
not participate in; or he waits, sometimes anxiously, for challenges 
which may rarely ensue; or he waits, along with everyone else, until 
the requisite silence has passed-^ and discussion of non-language 
matters may resume. The agent of his silence is meaning, for he may 
not speak without consequence and the consequence of meaningful 
judgement is silence. The domain of his silence is the mir, the 
language, and is a particular consequence of his office as utterer 
and monitor of the mir kar, the source of all mir and the precedent
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for all adjudications of mir. He is silent. He is the only one who 
may speak. And he has nothing to say.
The speakers who make up his audience embody a very different
silence, a silence of a different order. They are not momentarily
not-speaking; for the moment they are speechless. They have no mir.
To choose to speak from speechlessness is to enter the constraints on
meaning which inhere in silences of the mir kar. The meaning of the
breaking of post-judgemental silence is restricted to challenge, and
challenge of the monitor may not be made with impunity. The choice to
speak is not the choice of speaking and not speaking, it is the
choice of challenge versus speechlessness. Post-judgemental
silences are defined by, and happen in the domain of, the mir kar.
There is no inconsequential mir kar, and only the monitor and the
challenger may speak mir kar out of silence. The domain of the
everyday mir, the common speech, is by definition suspended.
More-or-less real speech is unwelcome in the domain of the mir kar.
Those who keep silent after the delivery of a verdict are, in their
/
speechlessness, keeping the tonar. This is the Meriam way. The 
corpus is almost never explicated. It is sufficient unto each 
incident that the would-be challenger is reminded of the severity and 
risk of his action.
The burden of proof and illustration on the challenger is
enormous. In challenging a monitor of language he lays claim to
superior knowledge and more skillful command of the mir kar. There
is , as I have said, no appellate jurisdiction of mir kar. The appeal
of the challenger must, therefore, be made to the monitor and the
audience. The audience, to the extent that they have complied with 
/Meriam tonar, have already exempted themselves from the 
confrontation. It is no small thing for them to rescind their own 
exemptions. They must not only risk alliance with the challenger, 
but also each risk contravention of the mir kar, even to the extent 
that active listening is participation in speech. And the 
probability of the challenger requiring the monitor to 'overturn his 
verdict' are slim, for in doing so the monitor either risks his
168
position as supremely able speaker or he admits to error in the mir
kar. And in the mir kar there can be no error.
Notionally this is because errors are unreal things. Errant
speakers, such as the speaker mentioned above who continues speaking
through a post-judgemental silence, do not 'correct' their errors.
They cannot. Real speech may not engage unreal things. What such
errant speakers do is render their mistaken utterance unreal. The
language monitor who has rendered a judgement in mir kar cannot
render it unreal. Once mir kar is uttered it is out there, in the
public domain, and it is a real thing. It may not be made 'unreal' ,
nor can its utterer qualify it after the fact. He cannot modify it at
all. He can't even apologize for it. So the best the challenger can
hope to do is make his point and leave. If he does so nobly, and with
courage, his community has grounds for moving to reduce his exile.
In doing so, when they so choose, their appeal is public and is
grounded in the values of forthright and courageous individual
action. Their implicit claim for redress is wider rather than
higher, and is public rather than privately made to the language
monitor whose decision was challenged.
This wider more public appeal is a wider and more public appeal
made in light of the tonar, the corpus which is wider and larger than
the mir. It is also a corpus which is more public. The values and
/prescriptions provided by Meriam tonar are generally known to all 
✓ /Meriam le. Where specifically precedental myths and stories are
/restricted, the template for Meriam behaviour which they encode and
/  /provide is not. Most Meriam le will not know certain stories of the 
legendary activities of cult heroes, for they are not privy to the 
cults which possess them. But all will know of the fundamental 
values of courage and knowledge which those stories underwrite. It 
is in light of these values that appeals may be made to invite the 
challenger back into the action of the community. This appeal is 
implicit rather than explicit, and is often in the form of utterances 
pointed to induce responses from him in public (especially where his 
silence vis ä vis the language monitor had become a more general
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silence) and pointed invitations to him for his attendance at (or
increased participation in) non-language matters of community
activity. Until such time as the language monitor challenged is
replaced (effectively never, until his death), the transgression of
the mir kar stands, and is never either referred to or alluded to.
The grounds for his resumed inclusion are the grounds that he is a
Meriam le. To the extent that his challenge is remembered (and it is
never forgotten by everyone) , he may ameliorate the blot on his
/  /life-record as a Meriam le to the extent that his transgression is
transformed into merely an error (either an error of mir, reduced in
its effect as he becomes a more competent speaker, or an error of
personal judgement, reduced in its effect as he becomes more
m a t u r e ) . But the best it can ever be is an error. And this is a
problem. For, just as 'erroneous' speaking of the mir kar is
assigned to the domain of unreality, so is erroneous behaviour as a 
/ /Meriam le assigned to the realm of untruth. The assignment is at
times explicit, and it is said (by those senior men who are
authorized to make such far-reaching pronouncements) as some once- 
✓ /Meriam le , those who have succombed to the degenerative influences of 
a life-style of drink or of the pervasive adud tonar [bad culture, 
ranging from bad practice or bad (i.e. poor) custom(s) to the extreme 
of bad (i.e. defective) culture.] of white or Aboriginal society, 'E
/  /  /  f— /  /  ->nole mamor Meriam le' [lit: He no/not true Meriam lej.
✓  / /  /The point is that a man degenerates from Meriam le to nole Meriam
/le by accumulating errors of tonar. He may do so by contravening
Meriam tonar (i.e. by acting in adud tonar or [creole: ] bad pasen) ,
or by adopting behaviour commensurate with the customary and
characteristic adud tonar of another society. It is important that
✓  /he may not degenerate in his capacity as Meriam le by committing
errors in speech. While the corpus of the tonar informs good speech,
both in manner and style and in what is said, and while the mir kar
(and in everyday life, the common mir) is the means of access to the
tonar— what I have called the gateway to meaning— the domains are
✓  /critically different. A Meriam le who gains extraordinary
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proficiency in the mir kar, as language monitors do, does not become
✓  /something other than a Merjam le; rather, he becomes an extraordinary
one. A man who is a known speaker of the mir kar who outdoes even his
own usual high level of proficiency at a public speaking event is
applauded, and the audience acclaims his speech in the manner of
/'Hear, hear!'. But the Meriam mir acclamation does not record his
verbal efforts so much as his personal prowess. That is, the
applause is not accompanied with cheers of, say, debe mir [lit: good
speech]. Complimenting the speech efforts of another is not done
without risk of insult except to a child who is learning the
/language . The man who presumes to speak in public in Meriam mir must
a priori command the mir kar. To compliment "real speech" with
something like 'good talk!' is to reduce the reality of the mir kar
to a domain wherein good and bad are applicable. What the audience 
/ / / / -shouts is "Au debele! Au debele!" [lit: Very good-man!; colloquially
translated, for instance, "Good man! Good show!"]. Granted that the
speaker commands the mir kar, he had demonstrated superior command.
/  /  .He is already a Meriam le (he must be in order to address a formal
/ s *public event of Meriam le), and has enriched his presence as _le_ with
the addition of skilful public command of the mir. And it is so that,
finally, it is in skilled and knowledgeable individuals that the 
/domains of le and mir may coincide.
/To achieve this coincidence of le and mir, in the highest
achievement the coincidence of tonar and mir kar (so far as command
of the entire corpus and ideal command of real speech are possible
for one human being), is to become educated. The educated man is the
most man there can be. As long as there are educated men to learn 
/ /from, any Meriam le can learn all of the tonar there is to know and
CQcan learn to speak the best possible speech. 17 Among Island people
the reverence for education is deep-rooted and profound. It is
/ /virtually impossible for a Meriam le to be taken for an educated man
if he does not (yet) command the mir kar, for the Meriam mir kar is
the language of the educated ones. (Similarly it is virtually
/impossible for a non-Meriam person to become educated, for the domain
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of education is the Meriam tonar.) In language, the language monitor,
the educated speaker who is teacher and source and judge over
language, is the actual gatekeeper to the learning of meanings. He
must literally accept the would-be language learner. He is obliged
by the tonar to assess the willingness and ability of the potential
student of the mir kar. In the days of the Torres Strait cults, even
up to the days of the contemporary Islanders' grandparents, this
assessment was public announcement of readiness and acceptability
for initiation into the ways of educated men. Nowadays it is
assessment of readiness and acceptability to study with the local
language monitor. On the mainland, students are few and far between.
And the poignance of the educated man's regret is keen, for, finally,
✓ /without educated men there may be no true men, no mamor Meriam le.
It is only the educated men who may know consequences, and who may
✓ /be able to deal with whole meanings. The Meriam le invoke this
responsibility and obligation of the educated man to the rest of the
Meriam people in the idiom of bar kak [lit: curves without]. The tao
of the Old Ones is known, and it was a troubled and confusing way,
'straightened' only by heroic efforts of educated men, men of
✓  /forethought and foresight; the tao of contemporary Meriam le is an 
eventual one, one whose 'curves' must be met and straightened by 
educated men.
The man who is educated in the ways of dugong and the making of 
baur [spear] throws his spear only once, for the baur of the educated 
man flies true and bar kak and, flying true, confirms that it was 
made and thrown by an educated man. The men who go to sea with an 
uneducated navigator are unwise, for only the educated man may 
navigate bar kak through the reefs and currents of the Torres Strait 
or the North Queensland coast. Those who listen to uneducated men, 
even to those who appear to speak well and use the words of the mir 
kar, listen at their own peril. For meaningful and consequential 
speech is powerful, and commands action and knowledge. It is only 
the educated man who known the tonar and may perceive consequences
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\I
and dangers which lesser men do not see. It is only, in the end, the 
educated man who speaks the talk with no curves, the bar kak mir.
I had received an invitation on Thursday evening to
come to my cousin-brother's house for "kikem lewer". I
knew lewer to be food, and that kikem was the time of day
ranging from early afternoon to midnight. The invitation
was explicitly extended to me for both me and my wife, but
she worked until late afternoon and I didn't know yet
whether it was less discourteous to show up on time alone
or for both of us to arrive late. The best translation of
"kikem lewer" I could get was creole "aptanoon kai-kai";
but such a literal translation of the Meriam mir of the
invitation was little help in the dilemma. And there was
no chance for error. This was not only my first visit to
the home of my cousin-brother, it would be my first formal
meeting with the Aule [literally (and respectfully): Old
Man] who was staying there. I had only just been publicly
'authorized' as an acceptable 'learner', and would be
/expected to be well-behaved in the presence of an Aule♦
I ran all over town until I procured an English 
translation just in time to get cleaned up and get both of 
us to the house in time for 'evening meal'. We were 
welcomed into "our house" [meriba meta:our house, where
'our' includes both speaker and those spoken to], had
/kikem lewer of traditional Meriam cuisine, and retired for
/tea and talk with the Aule and his wife.
/’ Lare em stadi we bio yumi,' my cousin-brother said, by
/way of introduction, to the Old Man. 'Em wante lern tok✓bio yumi ana prapa Meriam tonar. Em sabe pisin ingglis ana 
/kebi-kebi Meriam mir.'
[Larry he studies our ways....He wants to learn our 
/language and proper Meriam tonar. He understands 'pidgin
English' (i.e. the vernacular name for Torres Strait
Creole) and a little bit of Meriam mir.]
/Aule turned to me. 'Yu stadi tonar bio mipla yu mas
lern langgus bio mipla.' [(if) you study our culture you
must learn our language.]
'Wao,' I said . ' I sabe kebi-kebi Meriam mir.'
'No good! ' The Aule speared the air between us with his ✓ /finger. 'Nole kebi-kebi!— Au Meriam mir!'
/'Mmmm. I wante lern prapa tok bio yupla,' I nodded.
[Uh-huh. I want to learn proper talk of yours.]
/
The Aule half-rose to his feet. 'Prapa tok?! No "prapa
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✓ / / / 
tok"! Meriam mir! Yu lern mamor Meriam mir!-- Meriam mir
kar!...BAR KAK MIR!
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Apollonius of Tyana said silence also 
is a logos. Do not wonder that I know 
all languages since I know what men do 
not say.
Philostratus, 
Life of Apollonius
CHAPTER 6
The License of Silence:
Means of Inaction in Torres Strait Talk
Silence among Torres Strait Islanders is a means of social action, 
and the significant Islander is one who, among capacities, is able to 
be silent and to command the silence of others. Silences are more or 
less meaningful in Islander talk on the mainland of Australia, 
sometimes varying in meaningfulness according to the variously 
meaningful languages in which the silence occurs, and sometimes 
employing meanings of silence which refer to domains of action 
outside language. Silences are language-bound by one language, 
linquistically bound to the domain of all (available) language, and 
unbound by language but bound by culture and custom. And there are 
silences which are doubly meaningful (such as those which are 
comprehensible both to monolingual speakers of the language 
not-spoken during the silence and to speakers of any of the other 
languages extant in Torres Strait Islander speech communities); and, 
rarely, silences which are trebly meaningful, powerful silences 
which invoke culture as they break talk.
My intent in this chapter is to pose a trinomial Islander silence, 
and to present a discussion of Islander silences grounded therein. 
The discussion is necessarily explicative, for in proposing a 
trinomial system I am making propositionally explicit the domains of 
action and inaction implicit in Islander talk. These domains may be
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referred to, notionally and ideally, in Island talk, but they do not 
comprise any Islander meta-linguistics of silence. My effort here is 
thereby rendered analytically descriptive rather than 
translational, for there are no corresponding terms in Islander talk 
to what I use to label domains of the meanings of silence.
In Chapter 2 I discussed how specific 'jumps' from the familiar 
(familiar usually by virtue of being in or of one's own culture) to 
the alien otherness are facilitated by language. From George 
Steiner's suggestion that we might call the capacity of language to 
put other than that which is the case, "alternity", I proposed to 
call those possibilities which have not occurred— outcomes which 
might have been, eventualities which failed to 
eventuate— alternities. Loosely speaking, any human silence may be 
said to imply certain alternities. I have suggested above that 
Islander silences may imply alternities of talk (other words which 
might have been said in the situation) or alternities of action 
(actions other than speaking which might have been done in the 
situation). But alternities are much more specific than these two 
general classes of action-alternities and speech-alternities. They 
are as specific as the differences between what happens and what 
might have happened that can be discussed by any human participant or 
observer.
In the preceding chapters I have used what I might call the 
'general alternity' of anthropology: what happens (in one culture) 
versus what might have happened but did not (since it happened in 
another culture according to the regulation of that culture's 
happenings). In this one I shall detail the happenings of a meeting, 
one of the interminable evening meetings of Torres Strait Mainland 
social organisation. And from time to time, in order to explicate a 
natural silence by reference to whatever that silence took the place 
of, I shall detail an alternity.
I do so by using the alternity of language to bring 'the case that 
is not the case' (after Steiner) to life in order to compare it with 
the life actually lived and witnessed. Later (see the Conclusion:
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Storytime) I shall discuss why in my view it is by stories that such 
comparisons may be made. For now let me begin the actual account of a 
silence-filled meeting, which account I shall for my own part fill 
with specific alternities which I will then stand aside from and 
discuss.
A dozen or so Islanders are sitting in a rough circle of 
chairs drawn together in one end of an Islander 
meeting-place. They are waiting for the meeting to get 
under way, and fill the time with talk of the day's 
happenings at the railway yards, news from back home in the 
islands, possible plans for sending a Torres Strait Dance 
Team to the upcoming Show in Bowen and how to raise the 
money for transport and lodging of twenty or thirty kids 
and adults. It will be a couple hundred miles round-trip, 
and overnight lodging of black Islanders in white 
Queensland towns always requires some forethought. Soon 
the problems of sending a dance team monopolize the talk, 
and advice of adults who have previously chaperoned dance 
teams to the Bowen Show are solicited.
A car door closes in the street outside the 
meeting-place. Footsteps are heard on the footpath 
outside. Talk continues inside, but ears are cocked at the 
footsteps and a couple of men near the door stop talking 
for a moment in order to listen.
Nothing more is heard for a second or two. Then, all of 
a sudden, footsteps on the front stairs.
All talk stops; every head turns to the doorway.
[Silence.]
The silence is potent. It is a reaction to an occurrence which is 
extrinsic to the business of the meeting. It is also extrinsic to the 
goings-on which are the conversational talk at the moment. It is an 
example of the kind of silence which I call immanent silence. It is a 
break in the action of talk, a break necessitated by potential 
reorganisation for action. The talk stops because the required 
action of dealing with the sounder of the footsteps may not entail 
talking to him. Disembodied footsteps which, by discernment of their 
sound and direction, promise the entry of their owner into an 
Islander place are the footsteps of an intruder. Intruderhood is an 
identity grounded in the facts of Island life; it is open neither to 
debate nor to speculation. The heads did not turn because the
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approaching person might he an intruder, but because only intruders 
make disembodied footsteps. The talking ceases because it is 
impossible to listen to talk and listen to activity at the same 
time— and because the activity of an intruder is more pressing than 
almost any talk.
There is no telling what may be required in dealing with the 
intruder. He may turn out to be a kole-man or markai-man [whiteman 
(Eastern and Western dialects, respectively)]. In that case, except 
when the logic of his approaching this Islander meeting-place may be
rr\
reasonably inferred from his actions0 , the Islander present with 
the best command of English will likely be called on to approach him 
on the stairway and find out what he wants. And there is a remote 
possibility that what he wants is something bad or troublesome, when 
whatever it is he wants is determined, and that more-or-less 
defensive action may be required even after the intervention of the 
interpreter. He may turn out to be the proprietor of the building 
which houses the meeting-place, the only whiteman with legitimate 
(if impolite) access to the building while a meeting is being held. 
In that case his business, if he presses it despite the obvious 
meeting taking place (as many white Queensland landlords of black 
Queensland tenants are wont to do), will have to be taken care of 
before the meeting may be convened. (The reason for this is twofold: 
Islander business may not proceed in the presence of persons not 
privy to Islander affairs; and it is discourteous to proceed with 
private business when that entails ignoring an outsider who has a 
legitimate interruption.) He may be an Aborigine who, seeing a 
congregation of black people, assumed it was an Aboriginal meeting 
and approached the meeting-place with the intention of joining in. 
Usually, in this case, he sees his error as soon as he gets close 
enough to distinguish Islander physiognomy, and goes on his way 
without there being any necessity for talk.
Whatever the eventual identification of the maker of the 
footsteps, there is dead silence from the moment of realisation of 
approach. I have posited this case as that of immanent silence
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because, in their silence, the Islanders embody the immanence of 
subsequent action. That is, the silence of which this is an example 
is not, somehow, immanent in the footsteps of the intruder; nor does 
the silence itself generate any activity out of itself. It is, 
rather, a silence of potential action, and the action which is 
prepotent in the silence is action disconnected from any action 
preceding the silence. A group of singers practicing some new songs 
will cease drumming, singing, and strumming guitars at the approach 
of footsteps.^ Their silence is an immanent silence (and may be a 
relatively more potent one than usual if their singing has masked the 
approach of the footsteps until they are very [i.e. 'dangerously'] 
close) , and the action which signals the end of the silence may be 
talk, or physical movement, or other action in which they do not 
return to their songs. In the cases which I collect under the rubric 
'immanent silence' there is nothing in the silence which promises 
anything more than something is going to happen (next). In many 
cases (though probably not in most), the ensuing action is the return 
to the business at hand. There is no feeling at these times of having 
got ready for something which didn't happen. That is, there is no 
sense of unfinished action. The relief which attends the exhalations 
of pent-up breath is the relief of having prepared to get ready for 
anything which might have happened. And it's just as well that it 
didn't.
All talk stops; every head turns to the doorway.
[Silence.]
A man steps up the last step into the light of the 
doorway.
(_A black man. )
He scrubs his feet on the edge of the step to dislodge 
any mud from his shoes.
(An island-man.) A few people begin to exhale the
tension.
He raises his head and turns to enter the
meeting-place.
(The Chairman of the meeting! Whew!
'Hello,' says the Chairman to the meeting at large. He 
turns to some countrymen, ' Debeki. ' [Meriam mir: 'Good
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evening.']
'Debeki marim,' one of them answers. 'Nako ma nali.'
['Good evening to you. How are you?' (lit: How you
going?)]
'Si kak,' he answers, indicating the speaker with a 
tilt of his chin. 'Nako.' 'Okay. And you?' (lit:Badness 
none. How?)]
'Au si kak.' ['Pretty good .' (lit: Very badness none.)]
As the Chairman makes his way through the circle,
speaking and nodding here and there to those assembled, a
good-natured but accusing call comes from a Western
Islands woman seated near the head table which the
Chairman is heading for. Her husband, recently deceased,
was a countryrnan of the Chairman' and she herself is his
distant cousin by one of the infrequent but not unknown
Eastern-Western marriages which have linked the two halves
of the Torres Strait on occasion since the cessation of
warring hostilities and mutual distrust between the
islands of the Eastern and Western Strait in the last
/century. Though she speak pretty good Meriam mir, and the 
Chairman commands a working knowledge of Gomulgau-ya, 
their shared common language is Torres Strait Pidgin.
'Vai yu bi do that?(l)' she calls out to him, loud 
enough for the rest to hear her jocular accusation and 
mock-fanning herself as if to disperse the severe sweat of
terror. 'Wai yu no singaut? Yu bi meik mi prapa 
62frait!' She drops her head down and slightly away, 
indicating to her now-attentive audience the 'enormous' 
wound she has just received at the hands (or, feet) of this 
frightening Chairman.
The Chairman glances at her, briefly and askance (to 
make sure that she is joking). A couple of other people 
chuckle. The Chairman continues toward the head table.
[The Chairman is utterly silent.]
The silence of the Chairman is his option. Which is to say,
technically speaking, in the quadrilingual speech communities of
Torres Strait Islanders a man spoken to in this jocular and
mock-accusatory manner by a woman who is able to do so (by her close
personal relationship with the man addressed, e.g. a woman who is
maik le, as this one is: see Chapter 7 next) has the technical option
of speaking or not speaking. Usually he does not speak. He makes his
choice to speak or not to speak according to whether or not he can
think of any rejoinder which is skilful enough to overcome the tacit
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acceptance of (even, as in this instance, jocular) criticism which 
his speaking at all will entail. If he chooses to speak, he will he 
making a literal exception to the rule of silence. In most cases he 
will be silent. And his silence is what I call consequent silence. 
Only the gifted speaker at a time when he is inclined to exhibit his 
skill with language, or the less-gifted speaker whose better 
judgement to remain silent is overcome by his pique, will engage in 
the utterance which is the exception to the rule of consequent 
silence.
I shall elaborate on this kind of silence, and on the logic of 
what has been said immediately prior and the common consequences in 
Islander talk of such silences. Let me return to the story in the 
meeting-place and suggest some possible events which might have 
occurred subsequent to the silence of the Chairman. (N.B. These are 
only subsequent actions which might have taken place which I have 
drawn from similar speech events for the purpose of elaborating my 
description of the consequential nature of this kind of silence. I 
shall return to the actual events of the meeting below.)
...[The Chairman is utterly silent.]
Everybody finishes chuckling at the Chairman having 
been 'caught out' by the Western woman and returns to their 
conversations, or rearranges themselves for the start of 
the meeting.
The Western woman gives a sniff of mock-indignation to 
no one in particular, then ceases the repartee and readies 
herself for the business at hand....
In this possible vignette the consequences of the Chairman's 
silence is another silence (a kind of silence which I shall discuss 
later). In terms of the action it is a silence, but it is not 
strictly dictated by the silence which the Chairman opted for in 
response to the mock-accusation of the Western woman. The woman 
gives a sniff of indignation to show that she is 'unimpressed' by the 
silence of the Chairman (she is still pretending). But her sniff may 
or not be heard by anyone, and it is certainly not directed at the 
Chairman. For her, her sniff is the mock-defiance of rule-breaking:
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in the rules of the repartee his silence was the closure, indicating 
any of several things but all of them requiring the cessation of the 
exchange. There is a kind of you-can't-tell-me-not-to-sniff. She 
sniffs more or less loudly, depending upon whether or not, in her 
estimation, the audience is sufficiently interested and the exchange 
sufficiently humourously pointed for her to command their attention 
in asserting her mock-superiority without their implicit verdict 
that she was overacting— making too much of the occurence. However 
loudly she sniffs, she does so only after being momentarily silent 
immediately following the realisation of the Chairman's silence. In 
this vignette, I have had her then give a little sniff, and then 
conform to the silence of everybody else. They, in turn, have gotten 
over their chuckles and giggles (more or less loud and long, 
depending upon how humourous the exchange struck them individually, 
whether or not they deemed the Chairman to be in a mood for such 
repartee, and whether or not the humourous appreciation of a few 
vociferous chucklers had infected the entire group) and have fallen 
momentarily silent before either preparing for the meeting or 
returning to their conversations. These options of the Western woman 
and the audience are all possibilities for action which is a 
consequence of the Chairman's consequent silence.
...[The Chairman is utterly silent.]
He proceeds toward the table, giving no indication of 
engaging the Western woman's mock-criticism and 
accusation.
As he nears the end of the circle, a nephew of his on 
his immediate left suddenly throws his legs out in front of 
him and slumps down in his chair in a demonstration of the 
aftermath of having just barely survived a terible fright.
'Weeiii...' he growns, 'Mista Seaman [pidgin: 
chairman]’. Yu bi gib mipla prapa prait. [You gave us an 
awful fright!]'
The Western woman picks up on this, fanning herself 
more vigourously and lengthening her face into an extreme 
parody of pouting hurt.
A few others join in with 'injured' exclamations of how 
he might have been a ghost or a boogey-man.
1S2
The Chairman turns to half-face back to the audience 
and twinkles his eye. 'Wao.' he says. 'I bi ghost.' 
[You're right. I am a ghost.' (lit: Right! I am ghost.)] 
Eyebrowns raise in mock-fear of this ghost. A couple of 
clowns make moves as if to get the hell out of there.
Some shared laughter, a few closing remarks on how many 
ghosts there seem to be lately, and the group settles down 
into the routine of the meeting....
In this possible vignette the good will and communal good feeling 
and ready-to-joke state of the group enable the expansion of the 
dyadic exchange into a communal joke. The silence of the Chairman 
and the waiting silence of the group are both broken by the creative 
humour of the Chairman's nephew. In his exagggerated feet-throwing 
and slumping he establishes without room for doubt both the joking 
tenor of the group (which he has been able to assess while the 
Chairman was still absent) and his reading of this exchange as having 
potential for communal expansion. He is good at being funny, and 
does his relief-from-terror act well. The laughter of others is 
immediate, and the slide from audience appreciating his performance 
into participants in the terror is quick. The Chairman would have to 
have pneumonia or something if he failed to participate in the joke, 
especially after these huge feet were thrown right into his path. 
Any failure to participate after that would be the act of a petulant 
spoil-sport (or someone too ill to either perceive the communal 
jocularity or too ill or preoccupied to come up with the energy to 
participate).
In this vignette I have enabled the Chairman to give a 
particularly creative retort: in admitting to ghost-hood he removes 
any possibility of being made the butt of the expanded joke as it 
builds in the group whose communal possession it has become. The 
point is changed from lack of consideration of a human actor to the 
characteristic lack of human consideration by ghosts. Everyone 
knows enought about ghost-fear to act terrified at their 
near-escape, whether or not they each entertain beliefs in ghosts. 
The expansion of the dialogue of mock-accusation/silence is a 
consequence of the Chairman's silence. It is not caused by it; nor
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does his silence dictate the actions of his nephew or the subsequent 
popularity of them as they propose the expansion and elaboration of 
repartee into joke. But the actions of the nephew and the Western 
woman and the group are enabled by his silence. They would not have 
been optional consequences (or, perhaps better, consequential 
options) had he not opted for consequent silence after the woman's 
mock-criticism and display of fear.
Let me propose a couple of possibilities which would not have been 
possible (which is to say would be extra-ordinary actions of an 
Islander in the position of our tardy Chairman) . What I want to 
illustrate is that the domain of consequent silence is the domain of 
talk.
...She drops her head down and slightly away, 
indicating to her now-attentive audience the 'enormous' 
wound she had just received at the hands (or, feet) of this 
frightening Chairman.
The Chairman continues on his way to the table, 
greeting those seated along his way.
Such action by the Chairman would be impossible. He is both 
continuing his own speech-action and not acknowledging hers. Given 
that he is not unhealthy or hard of hearing on his right side or 
otherwise not in full possession of his faculties, these are both 
transgressions of the code of talk. He is allowed to 'ignore' her 
mocking utterance, but he must 'say' he is doing so by being 
conspicuously silent. And he may not generate new speech-acts on his 
own behalf (such as greeting people for the first time, i.e. not 
responding to their initial greeting which may have been uttered 
concurrently with the Western woman's jocular jibe) without first 
finishing the speech-action which she had initiated. What I have 
called consequent silence is silence in the domain of talk and 
subject to its jurisdictional rules: by expressly not-talking he is 
'saying his silence'.
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...'Wai yu bi du that?(l)' she calls out to him, loud 
enough for the rest to hear her jocular accusation and 
mock-fanning herself as if to disperse the severe sweat of 
terror.
The Chairman pauses and, interrupting her, says to a 
man on his right, 'What's she talking about?'
This eventuality is impossible. He has, however jokingly, been 
directly addressed. His error in responding to a third person is a 
double one: he has failed to respond to the speaker; and he has 
involved a more or less unwilling ally in what is a dialogic 
exchange. Until he establishes his share of the authority of the 
dialogue by entering into it with the initiator, he may not expand 
its participants. If he is truly in the dark (if, for instance, her 
nuance has not been sufficient to express the joking frame of her 
reference to his unannounced approach) , he must ask the speaker for 
clarification. One of the few, and uncommon, means at his disposal 
of legitimately addressing a third party, or the group in general, is 
to immediately and jokingly impugn the full faculties of the woman. 
He may, if he has quickly perceived that he is about to be on the 
receiving end of a good-natured goad, turn to the man on his right 
(or to the group at large) and say something like 'Did anyone hear 
anything?...Hmmm...Sounded like a woman's voice.' This
shorthandedly makes the joke a communal property, and at the same 
time turns the tables on the woman. She has not got to come up with a 
pretty good quip or lose the duel after having just begun it. (Since 
I have already mentioned ghosts, I'll offer a couple of common 
successful humourous breakings of the interlocutionary rule: The 
Chairman might have followed his "...Sounded like a woman's voice" 
with a further "Must be ghosts in here" accompanied by a conspicuous 
search of the rafters and corners of the room which do not lie in the 
woman's direction; the woman, having had the tables turned on her and 
unable to come up with a return table-turning, might say, after the 
Chairman's "...Sounded like a woman's voice", mock-hiding in her 
chair and with a small voice, "No. No woman— only ghosts."
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...She drops her head down and slightly away, 
indicating to her now-attentive audience the 'enormous' 
wound she had just received at the hands (or, feet) of this 
frightening Chairman.
The Chairman stops and turns to her, solicitously, not 
yet aware that she is joking.
'Sorry,' he says.
This is impossible, for in addressing the Chairman the Western 
woman has addressed (as she and everyone else knows) a man from the 
Eastern islands. While he does have the commonly exercised option of 
consequent silence or the less commonly exercised option of saying 
something (less common for its explicit exception to the normal 
silence, an exception with a large attendant burden of being witty 
and creative) , he does not have the option of saying that he is 
sorry. Such an unthinkable utterance would be a noteworthy 
transgression, one which, if it ever occurred, might have other 
Eastern Islanders in the group dropping things and banging their ears 
to see if they heard right. The importance of this impossibility 
likes in its ignorance of the rules for Islander talk, and 
specifically in the rules for talk and language of the Eastern 
islands. That is, in speaking rather than in opting for silence the 
Chairman admits to his 'unthinkingly unannounced approach' (within 
the frame of the joke) and announces his intention to join in. In 
this light, the serious apology is senseless: there is no way that he 
can be apologetic within the joke (that is, the premise of the joke 
is in the imputation of premeditated fearsome behaviour), and there 
are no means of deferring the joke itself other than by being 
silent— and thus allowing consequent silence to merge into emergent 
silence (which I shall discuss below). The only possibility for 
'Sorry' to be a possible response is in the case of the Chairman 
being a Central or Western Islander who is pretending sorrow as his 
contribution to the building joke. A Western Islander might say "Oh. 
Sorry, missus." and exaggeratedly enquire after her welfare, making 
suitable murmurings of hope for her recovery from this terrible 
event. My guess is that such an option would be rare (even among
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those Islanders from the West to whom this possible option is 
restricted) , and would be an especially creative and funny 
table-turning on the perpetrator of the joke.
But for this particular Eastern Island man, this Chairman, there 
is no option to even pretend sorrow. The reasons for this are plain, 
if somewhat complex, and have to do partly with the jurisdiction of 
the domain of Meriam mir and partly with the wider jurisdiction of 
the tonar [Meriam mir: (variously) culture, custom, practice, habit, 
way], the corpus of precedents which provides the rules for 
constraints on proper and formal Eastern (and, more particularly, 
Meriam [i.e. 'of (the island of) Mer']) Islander behaviour.
The constraints of the mir, the language, are simple: there is no
word for "sorry". Ipso facto there is no way to express sorrow by
talking. By "ipso facto" I am invoking the logic of the facts of life
(and of language) of the Meriam people. (That is, I am not making a
comprehensive assertion that there is no way to express sorrow in a
language which has no clear translation of the English word "sorry";
what I am invoking is an explicit logic, often voiced in explanation 
✓ /of Meriam ways to outsiders by Meriam people, that there is no way to
express sorrow when there is no word for sorry.) However such a
language-culture situation came about, it is true that there is no
word 'sorry' and that none has been invented or borrowed in order to
/fill the 'gap' . Before a Meriam man could say he was sorry in pidgin 
he would have to be authorized to say he was sorry in Meriam mir (to 
the extent that he has learned his traditional language and its rules 
for use). His mir does not authorize him to say he is sorry...to 
anyone... ever. Moreover, his mir and his culture [tonar] explicitly 
prevent him from ever using any equivalent form to express his sorrow 
in words, words of any language. He may not say 'Oh. My mistake.' He 
may not say 'I didn't mean to not announce myself, missus.' He may 
not say 'Sorry, I bi poget' [pidgin: Sorry, I forgot]. He may not 
(were this meeting a suitable gathering for the use of English) say 
'My apologies.' In the domain of language, the impossibility of this 
Chairman making this utterance is the unavailability of this
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expression— in his own mir and , by extension, in other tongues. The 
restriction of consequent silence is that the response must be either 
an expression of silence or an exceptional expression of words. The 
restriction of the language of the Eastern Islands is such that 
'sorry' is neither a silence nor a word.
Let me continue to use this last impossible vignette in order to
introduce my third way of silence, the emergent silence. I suggested
above that Eastern Islanders in a group which witnessed one of their
countrymen saying he was sorry might be so shaken that they would
drop things and start checking their hearing. I was not, in
suggesting that, translating some culture-specific scenario
difficult to transfer out of its context. Rather, I was suggesting
something of the enormity of such an utterance and what it might
generate in its listeners. I am precluded from describing any such
occurrence and its aftermath by its never having happened in my
presence or to my knowledge. My postulated scenario for an event
which couldn't happen is based on inferences from other kinds of
responsive behaviour occasioned by Eastern Islanders who are present
at mentionings or discussions of sorrow by others. When people who
are not Eastern Islanders talk about sorrow, say they're sorry, or
otherwise express being sorry, Eastern Islanders react. They may bow
their heads to indicate nonparticipation or to nominate disinterest;
they may leave the conversation (or even the room); they may
(occasionally) exclude themselves from the sorry-conversation by
generating new and different conversations with those around them.
Their children learn very young that expressions of sorrow (i am
restricting this to primarily verbal expressions, for the nonce)
which they may pick up on the streets are dicta non grata. What they
/learn instead is that when other peoples are sorry, Meriam people are 
silent.
/This is the one common aspect of all Meriam reactions to somebody 
saying they are sorry. The Meriam people (and, more or less 
rigourously, the people of the other islands of the Eastern Torres 
Strait) are always silent. They may fall silent and then go away.
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They may fall silent and then change conversation partners. They may 
assume the silence of explicit disinterest until something else 
comes along. This is an example, and is an extreme example, of what I 
call emergent silence. The telling thing about emergent silence is 
that it is a silence of inaction; it is being silent when and because 
there is nothing to be done. It is not expressive, though it may be 
indicative where it is accurately perceived. It is not a way of 
'saying something' ; not even a way of 'saying' shut up to the person 
who has mentioned being sorry. Its consequences are strictly 
individual and personal, and are limited to the duration and severity 
of the anxiety of remaining in the presence of expressions of sorrow. 
The Islander who succeeds in extricating himself from a conversation 
in which 'sorry' has reared its head has not done so as a consequence 
of the distressing utterance so much as to avoid the consequential 
aggravation of his distress. He cannot, for example, succeed in 
preventing his distress by immediately departing, for his distress 
is immediate upon his hearing of the word. The best he can do is 
avoid the increase of his distress which is bound to happen if those 
people keep talking that way. If he is stuck in conversation with 
some whiteman or other non-islander who insists upon reiterating his 
apology for some slight, or for some real or presumed insult, the 
best he can hope to do is turn off his hearing. It is, sometimes, as 
if it will be possible to reduce the volume of the Whiteman's voice 
by altering its angle of impact on the ear, and the Island-man will 
bow his head, raise it, tilt it from side to side, shake it, jerk it, 
and try to slide it back on his shoulders without moving his body.
I mentioned in my discussion of the final 'impossible' 
possibility of concluding the repartee between the Chairman and the 
Western woman that the only way to defer the joke itself (even for a 
non-Sastern Islander, who may be able to say 'sorry') was to be 
silent— and thus allow consequent silence to merge into emergent 
silence. This implies another example of emergent silence, one which
is not frought with personal distress but which nonetheless embodies
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this silence of inactions. Since this is what actually occurred, I 
shall return to the real story of that meeting:
The Chairman glances at her, briefly and askance (to 
make sure that she is joking). A couple of other people 
chuckle. The Chairman continues toward the head table.
[The Chairman is utterly silent.]
The Western woman, head still dropped in the pose of 
having been ill-treated by the unnanounced tread, glances 
at the Chairman out of the corner of her eye to see if he is 
preparing a rebuttal. The intermittent chuckling tails 
off. The audience watches the Chairman to see if he is 
constructing a late reply, and the woman to see if she will 
twist the barb by capitalizing on his implicit admission 
of having intentionally crept up on the assembly.
She raises her head slightly and begins to face toward 
the Chairman who is now seating himself at the table. It 
looks like her mouth just starts to open when the Chairman 
raises his head. The face on his head holds little promise 
of jocularity.
The audience, quietly awaiting the development or not 
of the joke, see that there will likely be none. They 
slide from the silence of communal anticipation into the 
individual silence of waiting for action. With the 
meeting looking like starting, there is no time to resume 
conversations with each other; the Chairman's 
businesslike visage entertains no likelihood of 
extraneous conversation; and the Western woman is still 
engaged with the conclusion of the abortive fun with the 
Chairman.
Meanwhile, the woman notes the look on the Chairman's 
face, figures that his silence at her jibe is all the 
response she'll get, and thinks better of continuing the 
joke. She raises her head, sits up in her chair, and drops 
the make-believe fan back into her lap where it becomes her 
right hand again.
The Chairman, preoccupied with the business of the 
meeting, organizes the opening business and raises his 
head to call the meeting to order. He has probably noticed 
the silence and expected to find, as he lifted his head, a 
group of people as eager to get on with the business and 
get home as he is. What he finds is some faces still in the 
last vestiges of ready-for-joke; others are simply vacant. 
Nobody is ready for his business, and most of them don't 
look ready for much of anything. He appears momentarily
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perplexed. And, whatever he was about to say, he doesn't 
say it. He just sits there.
The silence was total for about a minute and a half, and probably
longer for some of the audience. It was an emergent silence. Not only
was there no talk, but there was little movement, and none that made
any appreciable noise. It was a silence which was caused, in a sense,
by the natural conversational developments which led up to it. But
as those developments were by and large the result of clear options
taken up or not, I have called this category of silence 'emergent'.
What happened was that a general silence happened, a general silence
which emerged from the situated action which preceded it, but which
was in no way a required consequence of either the situation or the
action. What characterizes it is its inactivity, even unreadiness
for activity, and the difficulty of generating activity in the face
of it (e.g. the Chairman who stopped from calling the meeting to
order, or announcing the first item of business, or whatever he was
about to say, and sat at the table without closing his mouth). Unlike
/
the distressing emergent silence of Meriam Islanders faced with 
apologies, there was no anxiety or dismay in this silence just before 
the meeting. It was simply a silence in which, for a moment, there 
was nothing happening.
Most importantly, I think, emergent silence as it occurs among 
Islanders during speech-events is distinguished from both immanent 
and consequent silences by its concurrent aggregation of individual 
silences. It is as if the silences of each of the particpants are 
'collected' in the temporary situation of no talking and little noise 
that I have called the emergent silence. In a fictionalized account 
of the meeting of the Islanders which comprises this story I could 
present the 'thoughts' and states of mental response with novelistic 
license. That is, from the omniscient point of view of the novelist I 
could simply ensure that this last general silence was in fact an 
emergent one by making the silent participants inactive and more or 
less unthinking for the duration of the silence.
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I have, of course, presupposed an accordance of this real and 
obvious minute and a half of group silence with my definition of 
emergent silence in my description of it; i.e. I have posited certain 
mental actions: "the woman notes the look on the Chairman's face", 
she "figures that his silence...is all the response she'll get", and 
she "thinks better of continuing the joke"; I have the audience "see 
that there will likely be" no further development of the joke' and 
the Chairman to have "probably...expected to find...a group of 
people as eager to get on with the business and get home as he is" as 
he raised his head.
I have done so in order to describe this emergent silence as fulüy 
as possible. The problem with doing so for emergent silences, and 
the warrant for supposing thoughts and individual mental states of 
being, is that the 'fullness' of an emergent silence is its 
emptiness. And the silence is not only empty of even thinking about 
preparing to organize subsequent activity, but also empty of 
invitation to so organize: it is a prohibitive silence. After 
noticing these silences in meetings of this particular Islander 
constituency over a period of the incumbency of this Chairman I asked 
him about them. He did not share my curiosity about the nature of 
them, but he did aver that they were characteristic and of a type. 
About his hesitation in opening meetings against this kind of silence 
he said, 'Well, what can you do with them? You just have to wait.'
This is what I refer to by the characteristic prohibition on 
organization, or the absence of invitation to be organized. And, 
although emergent silences are aggregations of the silences of each 
participant, they are silences which are felt to be a property of the 
group. In my telling of the story of the meeting I lump the audience, 
the ten or so participants aside from the Western woman and the 
Chairman, into an undifferentiated aggregation of individuals in 
order to characterize the impression that the silence is a group 
silence. It may have been on that occasion that seven of the ten were 
waiting for the meeting to begin and that the Chairman overlooked 
them and saw only the three who were obviously not 'with it' . Or it
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may have been that most of the members of the audience deemed the 
Chairman's minimal response (his consequent silence) to the Western 
woman's opening gambit to have been cursory, and had fallen into 
consequent silence; they may have exchanged glances, remarking to 
each other the cursoriness of the response and implicitly in their 
silence and explicitly with their eyes shared the nature of their 
consequent silence. It may have been that the audience was just a 
bunch of people, each of whom had their own kind of silence, and the 
Chairman failed to utter the opening of the meeting after opening his 
mouth to speak because he thought he heard someone approaching the 
meeting-place and had assumed an immanent silence of his own, as the 
rest had done at his unheralded approach.
But my guess is that these things did not happen at this meeting. 
And my account is faithful to the best of such educated gueses. 
Unspoken interactions among Island people are subtle and often 
brief, and I would have been unable to see all glances tendered by 
people commenting with their eyes on the recent exchange of the 
principals. But nobody caught my eye, and nobody appeared to answer 
the tendered glances of others with glances of their own. And the 
Chairman, upon ceasing his not-quite-begun opening remark, did not 
watch the doorway, but cast his eyes slowly across the audience. An 
audience waiting for a meeting to start would be exceptional if its 
members were not attending to the Chairman who would signal the start 
of business; as exceptional as would be a group of Islanders silently 
commenting upon a breach of etiquette by one of their fellows who did 
not accompany their silence with expressions of dissatisfied 
crossings and uncrossings of legs and commentaries of raising 
eyebrows and rearranging dresses.
Insofar as I commanded the Islander grammar of eye-contact and the 
vocabulary of meaningful personal mannerisms in public settings, my 
account of this emergent silence is true. Had a few people fallen 
into emergent silence while everybody else did something different, 
the silence would not have been noteworthy (unless it was the 
Chairman, and only the Chairman who had, since only the Chairman's
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silences are problematic at the opening of an Islander meeting) , and 
may not have been noticed. However truthful my account, it is an 
account of an emergent silence insofar as the states of (silent) 
being which I have inferred did inform the silent action of the group 
at the meeting. Whatever the actual responses of the individuals 
present, it is certain that the incident exemplified one of my 
trinomial classifications, for it is certain that there was a minute 
or two during which no one spoke nor made any noise. And actually, in 
the speech communities of Islanders, silences are not simultaneous 
absences of talk and noise, but various absences of three things: 
talk, noise, and action.
Silence is what is missing
The problem with describing silence is the problem with saying 
what isn't happening during the silence. There is in any description 
of silence a fundamental opposition of something vs. silence. Even 
this characterization is misleading for the context in which silence 
is the given something and non-silence is an assumption of a 
primordial matrix, a grid of values composed of sounds laid over 
original silence, or a silent grid overlaying original noise. The 
Big Bang theory of the origin of the Universe posits an original and 
all-encompassing noise. Whether or not there was some 
'pre-Universe' matter present before the Big Bang, there is a notion 
that, whatever it was, it was quiet. The account of Creation in the 
Christian corpus is a little less explicit about primordial 
noisiness or silence. In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was 
God— and since God is infinitely present, the word has always been. 
Whether or not this Word comprised the ordering of noise or the 
breaking of silence is left up to Christian theologians. But there 
is a fairly general agreement that the Word is God's and that men are 
constrained to behave accordingly. Ancient Greeks posited 
primordial Chaos, out of which came Order. Certainly, in this 
account, human speech was subsequent to the original ordering of the
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Chaos, and can be taken to be more-or-less orderly noise. But there 
is a feeling, I think, that Chaos was awfully noisy before the 
orderly supervention.
In those contemporary cultures which have an Hellenic or 
Christian heritage there is a sense in which we may pose questions of 
the value of silence over noise, or of talk over disorderly noise. 
And it makes sense to appeal to a corpus of previously-asked 
questions when proposing contemporary solutions. Richard Bauman has 
written of the particular problem posed to early Quakers who were 
enjoined to eschew mortal means in their pursuit of the Spirit which 
was God's Truth. Mortal means included human language, and this 
generated a pointed ambivalence in those who would presume to speak 
Truth in human tongues. Though "Friends began very early in their 
history to meet together for mutual reinforcement and the comforts 
which derived from spiritual unity", "worship consisted in the 
inward attainment of the Spirit" (Bauman 1974 : 148 , 149 ,  
respectively). There was not only the ideal needlessness of words, 
but also an additional sense of words being human and thereby 
suspect.
The problem was that "both Quakers and non-Quakers required some 
form of guidance in the attainment of the proper inward experience, 
and here silence alone would not serve— words were often 
indispensable" ( 1 9 7 4 : 1 4 6 - 7 ) .  The solution, proposed by early Quaker 
ministers, was via an explicit reference to the Christian corpus: "if
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any man speak, let him speak as the Oracles of God" ( i  Peter 4 - 1 10^)  - 
Thence, while at meetings of the Friends, "each member of the meeting 
followed his own silent way to the attainment of a direct inward 
experience of the Light", there were openings "in which speech was 
not only appropriate but necessary. ..when a member of the meeting for 
worship— any adult member, of either sex— became sensible in his 
attendance on the Inner Light that the Spirit was leading him to a 
means of helping them to reach inward to the Light..." ( 1974:149)*  
As Bauman reports, even with this license for divinely inspired 
speech, most people did not speak much. It was those who were moved
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to speak more often and who "were especially effective in fostering 
the spirit of worship...who were recognized as ministers" 
(1974:152). And even for these apparently Spirit-moved talkers 
there was early appeal to Christian precedent for their authority: 
"The use of words in the work of salvation, is to awaken such who are 
asleep in sin, and to turn them, as Paul turned the heathens, to an 
inward guide" (1974:153)*^
My point in borrowing this example from Bauman is to annotate my 
formulation that silence is what is missing. From Bauman we get the 
clear idea that human talk precluded the attainment of the Spirit for 
the early Quakers (cf. also Bauman 1970, 1972). In a sense, in the 
midst of talk which was mundane and not of divine inspiration, the 
Spirit was missing. Whether or not the would-be worshippers present 
were sufficiently informed and guided along the path toward the 
Light, it was certain that attainment of the Spirit could only occur 
(and inspired speech only come out of) not-talking: silence was what 
was missing.
In the Chaos of Hellenic mythology the sense of what was missing 
is not so clear. I have suggested that Chaos strikes me as having 
been noisy. I think this notion of primordial noise reappears in the 
cacaphony which ensued at the opening of Pandora’s Box, and in the 
irrevocable 'noisiness' perpetrated by the proliferation of human 
languages upon the destruction of the Tower of Babel and other 
mythical statements about noise and order in speech. Whether or not 
there are grounds for suggesting that sounds may only be 
distinguishable one from another by the sometime-occurrence of 
no-sound, it is legitimate to suppose that silence was not an 
attribute of Chaos. That is, not only was the orderliness of the 
sensible sounds of speech (both divine and human, in the case of the 
early Greeks) missing in Chaos, but silence was missing.
The astrophysical Big Bang theory gives a very different 
primordial picture. Without attending too rigorously to the 
speculations of astronomical theory (and ignoring for the purposes 
of this chapter the fact that the Big Bang is only one of several
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theories about the creation of the universe extant), I have suggested 
the sense of silence before the Bang. There may have been some 
'little bangs' going on; there may have been a kind of 'reverse' 
solar wind, all the universal matter moving toward the center of what 
would have been the Bang. Whatever was missing before the Big Bang, 
it caused a lot of noise when it was, all of a sudden, no longer 
missing. And after the Bang, silence was what was missing.
Some of the differences between these theories of noise and 
silence and orderly sounds are akin to the differences between the 
kinds of silence which obtain in Islander scenes. I have found it 
useful to characterize Islander silences according to 'what is 
missing’. Sometimes words are missing, sometimes something else is; 
and sometimes it is the silence that is missing. The problem for both 
analytical and descriptive characterizations is the problem of 
establishing and 'describing' something that 'isn't there'. This 
problem is somewhat ameliorated when we deal with general cases, with 
types of silence'which have generic identity within and among whole 
societies. In this view I can say that there are times, in most 
societies, when silences occur in the absence of talk, and that some 
of these occurrences may be in the absence of someone to talk to 
(when the silent one feels like talking), or in the absence of a 
particular someone to talk to (when the silent one feels like talking 
about some particular thing which he and the absent interlocutor 
share), or in the immediate absence of talk which answers or responds 
to something said (by someone) , or simply in the absence of any 
talking (there may be nothing that anyone wants to say).
But even the relatively straightforward description of silences 
which are the soundless discontinuities in talk becomes problematic 
for individual instances. While it is usually clear that some kind 
of talk is what is missing, the problem for description is what kind 
of options for speaking are not being taken up, and are any of these 
expressly (meaningfully) being eschewed by those who would take them 
up. In the most constrained (and usually formal) talk-scenes, 
express not-talking is usually obvious to participants and audience.
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The actor who forgets his lines and is not experienced enough to ad 
lib across the forgotten dialogue, or indicate to his fellow players 
that they had better help him cover his mistake by keeping the show 
going, may have the unfortunate experience of having his cue 
whispered too loudly from off-stage and of his distress offering the 
audience nearby some extra amusement. There is no possibility that 
the actor has expressly refused to utter his lines; and the point of 
the silence is, further, that talk is what is missing, that it is 
missing 'by accident', and that even an ad lib— some kind of 
talk— would be better than the disruptive silence.
In the case of a wedding ceremony celebrated in what is ^hought of 
in the Western world as traditional religious style, there is much 
less possibility for the conspicuous not-talking of the groom to be 
taken for a talk-error. The officiating priest says 'Do you take 
this woman to be your lawful wedded wife, to have and to hold in 
sickness and in health, 'till death do you part?' If there is 
silence, a number of things may have occurred. It may be that the 
groom has expired in mid-ceremony. Many of the humorous take-offs on 
weddings have played with this potential for silence, a silence 
mostly unheard of. A daydreaming groom may be had to say, 'Huh? What 
was that?', or, 'What was the question?'. Or he may say, 'Till 
death?...That long, eh?';or play on the 'sickness and health' line by 
asking his bride how she is feeling before he commits himself. 
Whatever the case, for a real-life groom to be silent would be 
extraordinary. That is, in this highly constrained talk-scene he may 
not ad lib, and there is little chance that he has forgot his only 
line ('I do'). The parents of the bride would be normally warranted 
in their distress at the silence of such a groom. The only reason for 
his silence is his not wanting to reify the commitment whose extent 
he has just realized. Folklore has it that many more grooms simply 
fail to show up at the wedding than fail to utter the critical assent 
during the ceremony.
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For each of these mundane examples, the silence is a silence amid 
talk. Whether the consequences are the continuing action and 
dialogue of a play or the much longer actions and dialogues of a 
married couple, the silence is a silence because words are what are 
missing. Richard Bauman has underscored the silence of early Quakers 
as silence of missing words: "Although silence became the Quaker 
metaphor for the suppression of every kind of worldly impulse, 
activity, and inclination, the reference from which it was 
generalized was speech" (1974:146). Keith Basso has written of 
silence among the Western Apache which occurs when words are no 
longer sufficient to enable the event to continue (Basso 1970). 
Occasions for such silence are tense, and often the silence marks the 
inability of the Indians either to conclude the event or to engage a 
medium of action other than words. Such silences occur when the 
Apache participants "give up on words". Had there been, prior to the 
ensuance of such silences, any means of talk for continuing the 
action, such silence would have been precluded. Or, had talk ceased 
when action was called for, such silence would never have been an 
option. Such silences are not exactly, as they are in the examples 
above, ’amid' talk. Rather they follow talk which has occurred and 
stand in the place of talk which might have been. But, although 
different, they are nonetheless silences in which it is talk that is 
missing.
There are occasions of silence amid talk in which it is not clear 
what is missing. The Western Apache of Basso's study explicate what 
is missing in the tense and ambiguous silences which Basso described 
by saying that they have 'given up on words'. We are not, however, 
always party to or privy to such explications. Karl Reisman 
introduces his description of the virtual absence of silence in the 
'noisiness' of "contrapuntal conversations" in Antigua (Reisman 
1974) with reference to Basso's description of Apache silence and to 
some of his own experience with silence in Scandinavia. He says that 
"some Danes appear to 'nourish' silence as one might appreciate a 
cozy fire", and recalls an occasion of a visit by an American friend
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whose habit in conversation was to 'fill gaps' of silence. Though 
there were no obvious conflicts between the Danes and the American, 
"by the end of the first evening these kindly Danes could stand his 
presence no longer— simply because an evening without silence was 
emotionally intolerable" (1974:112). Reisman knew these Danes, and 
knew something of the common rules for Danish talk as well as 
something of the feelings of the value of regular silences. But he 
describes what he calls "the extreme silence in my own experience" 
which he had among some Lapps in northern Sweden. His neighbours 
would drop by his borrowed sod house every morning "just to check 
that things were all right". "We would offer coffee. After several 
minutes of silence the offer would be accepted. We would tentatively 
ask a question. More silence, then a 'yes' or a 'no'. Then a long 
wait." These visits occurred daily. Each visit lasting an hour and 
broken by six or seven exchanges. Reisman hazards a guess that the 
silence was one of "the difficulty in expressing one's feelings" in 
northern Scandinavia, and "perhaps part of their silence was simply 
that they didn't have anything to say". But he says explicitly, "I 
don't know what any of these silences represented" (1974:112-113)* 
Reisman has made some sense of these Scandinavian silences out of 
his experience in and with them, and out of his observation that 
conversational silences increase, and "the amount of speech per hour 
decreases" as one "goes north in the Scandinavian peninsula" 
(1974:113)* But in telling us that he does not know what those long 
silences represented, he is saying that he did not know exactly what 
was missing. That is, he was able to describe conversational 
silences of various frequency and duration by making reference to 
common conversations (for instance, those in English) in which the 
amount of talk far outweighs the amount of silence; but he was not 
prepared to state that the long silences of the Lapp neighbours 
represented 'talklessness'. In fact, he has roughly outlined a hint 
of a Scandinavian value on silence, and a notion that there are times 
(which may be relatively frequent) that it is talk which is 
interrupting silence: that silence is what is missing. Reisman goes
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on to juxtapose this common and obvious silence with the almost 
complete lack of silence among Antiguan villagers.
Torres Strait Islanders on Australia's mainland are neither 
mostly silent nor mostly noisy. Actually, in Reisman's sense of 
noisiness of the Antiguan villages with their simultaneous and often 
loud utterances by any and all at the same time, Islanders are rarely 
'noisy'. Talk, which may at times be boisterous, and occasionally 
simultaneous, is rarely disorderly. It is ordered according to what 
is happening. Islander silences, then, are orderly, and are ordered 
according to what is not happening. Sometimes what isn't happening 
had better not happen; and it's good that there is silence. 
Sometimes what isn't happening ought to be; and there is a problem of 
either bringing the silence to an end or of bringing the situation 
which has generated unwelcome silence to a close. In either case, 
the silence is characterized by what is missing, and what is missing 
is either talk or something else.
In the first of the three kinds of silence which I introduced— the 
immanent silence of a group awaiting the embodiment of heard 
footsteps (and any subsequent actions)— what is missing is talk. It 
is talk which is going on at the time the footsteps are heard and 
which stops, abruptly. The silence often spreads from those nearest 
the door (and from those with the most acute hearing) to the rest of 
the group. The spread is rapid and, if it has completely spread 
before the 'intruder' is seen, is total. Everyone ceases whatever 
talk he was engaged in in order to be cognizant of what's going to 
happen next. There is also absent, for the duration of immanent 
silence, the talk which could otherwise have proceeded had no 
footsteps been heard. That is, immanent silence which occurs during 
talk is the silence of the talk which is missing at its outset and 
which will be returned to at its cessation. Whether or not there will 
be a second interruption of the action of talk, such as in the case of 
the nominal intruder materializing into an actual intruder and 
having to be dealt with (without any talk whatsoever in the extreme 
case of silently throwing him out), immanent silences are silences in
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the domain of talk. And an immanent silence which occasions 
consequences prohibitive of returning to the action of talk which 
preceded it is no less immanent, for it is not the events 
characteristic of the silence which have prevented the return to 
talk, but extrinsic events due to interruption. And, unless the 
promise of the talk of the meeting is rendered after the fact to have 
been 'not really worth it', the meeting will resume, and its 
talk-business returned to, even when the delay extends to a week or a 
month or to the time of the next scheduled meeting. The talk which 
was missing for the duration of the silence will resume.
The second kind of silence— consequent silence— first occurred 
in the story of the meeting as the response of the Chairman to the 
opening barb of the teasing woman. As in the case of immanent 
silence, what is missing in consequent silence is talk. But in a 
consequent silence the talk that is missing is specified by the 
situation, by the frame in which the utterance of which the silent 
response is a consequence is couched (in the case of the opening 
gambit of the Western woman, a joke), by the mood and state of being 
of the respondent, by the specific intentions of the participants and 
of their audience, by any existing relationship between the 
participants, and by their identities (such as the primary identity 
of the Eastern Islander precluding his saying he is sorry) so far as 
they are known and appreciated by the participants and their 
audience. Where immanent silence is occasioned by events extrinsic 
to the talk which is interrupted, consequent silence is occasioned 
precisely by the utterance which precedes it. Moreover, consequent 
silence is not an interruption. Consequent silence is expression. 
It is expressive exactly of the words which, being known options for 
rebuttal, are not spoken. The silence is an option among other 
options, all other options requiring speech. During consequent 
silence it is not merely general talk which is missing, it is the 
specific rejoinders which might have been uttered. In opting for his 
silence, the Chairman is 'saying' something which he could not say by 
saying any of the other options for rejoinder at his disposal. He may
202
not feel witty, or like participating in the joke; he may be inwardly 
struggling for a creative and table-turning response until it is too 
late to utter one without losing face (i.e. having his 'slowness' 
made apparent); he may have been preoccupied and only realized the 
barb after it was too late to render a quick and witty turn of phrase 
in response. Whatever the reason, he renders the common response of 
consequent silence.
Consequent silence takes the place of talk, of saying some more or 
less precise and delimited thing, while immanent silence is a quiet 
time during which talk is not happening. Consequent silence happens 
when the initiator and the audience are waiting to see what the 
respondent says. The sense of the difference is present in common 
phrases which Islanders use to describe or characterize such 
silences, such as they may do when reporting their events to others 
afterward. In the consequent silence of the Chairman's response, he 
is said to have said nothing: ' Emi spik nating' ['He said/spoke 
nothing]; during the immanent silence of the group awaiting the 
footsteps, they are said to have not said anything, or to have not 
been talking: 'Oli no tok', 'Dempla no bi spik' ['They didn't talk', 
'Those people didn't speak/weren't talking']. A further difference 
lies in the likelihood of either of these two speech-events to be 
reported. The Chairman's tacit surrender to the Western woman's 
one-upmanship may be reported to anyone interested, perhaps during 
the course of retelling noteworthy incidents of successful repartee. 
The raconteur may, at the urgings of his audience's 'what'd he say? 
what'd he say?' , prepare them for the joke on the Chairman by shaking 
his head and rolling his eyes at the 'terrible way in which ALL 
menfolk EVERYWHERE' have been let down by the silent response of the 
Chairman..."Emi spik nating."
But it is unlikely that the silence of the group awaiting the 
owner of the footsteps would be ever characterized, even during the 
retelling of the incident. There would be no point. Once he had 
announced the approach of the footsteps, his audience would have 
known that everyone fell silent. They would have fallen silent had
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they been there. Silence is what happens when someone hears an 
intruder. It must. A bunch of babbling people can't listen to 
footsteps. Only children would fail to be silent (and only children 
very young would not have yet learned the rigourous rule of group 
silence which attends such portentious sounds). I can imagine that 
the reporting of someone's conspicuous talk having broken the 
immanent silence might occur (though I have heard neither of such an 
incident nor of any such report). And had the Chairman identified 
himself aloud just before coming into view, the report of his 
breaking of the silence would be reported, and would engender 
empathetic relief in the hearers of the report commensurate with the 
relief at those present who heard him say who he was. But it would be 
senseless to have to characterize such a silence, unless the 
storyteller was particularly adept at creating tension in his 
audience and told them, portentiously, 'Dempla no bi spik!...and 
then answered their unspoken questions by announcing the sound of 
footsteps. The fact that talk is absent is conspicuous because talk 
was going on prior to the immanent silence. But the absence of talk 
has nothing to do with the content of the silence, a silence which is 
as marked by its lack of even minimal activity as it is by its lack of 
speech. The possibility of ensuing action is immanent in such 
silences, as immanence absent in consequent silence. The
characteristic difference is one of waiting: the Chairman is obliged 
by the joke to wait and see if there is any further rejoinder to his 
silence, whether he wants to or not; the group hearing footsteps is 
interested in waiting to see who it is and if they are going to have 
to act.
The third of the three kinds of silence— emergent
silence— happened in the actual story of the meeting in the quiet 
interlude between the joke and the commencement of the meeting, and 
ensued after the Eastern Islandman Chairman said 'Sorry' in one of my 
'impossible' renditions. Whereas both consequent and immanent 
silences have to do with the absence of talk, emergent silence has to 
do with the absence of action, And in the case of emergent silence,
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the action which is absent is generic. The order of difference 
between generic action missing during emergent silence and the 
specific action missing during immanent silence (as in the potential 
action of dealing with the intruder which was, for its being prepared 
for, specifically 'missing' during the immanent silence which opened 
the story of the meeting) is the order of difference between the 
generic talk missing in immanent silence and the specific talk 
missing in consequent silence. The subtle distinction makes both 
description and analysis difficult, for both are necessarily a_ 
posteriori for dealing with instances of silence. The further 
subtlety is the distinction between talk as action and talk as 
speech. By this I am not making a descriptive distinction between 
two 'kinds' of talk, one of which is putatively 'active' and the 
other somehow 'inactive'. Rather I am generating an analytical 
distinction of formal differences between silences in order to 
inform the differences of content which inhere. The distinction is 
inferential, and is inferred from a wide range of separate and often 
apparently disparate occasions of silence. The motion of the 
inference is expressly toward the formulation of gestalts of 
silence J which both inform and inhere in Islander knowledge and 
action. My trinomial system of silence is an articulation of the 
second-order analysis which finds a coherence among the silences, 
silences in which not-talking and not-acting variously inhere, and 
three categories in which the various silences cohere.
The difference between an emergent silence which absents talk and 
an immanent silence which absents action is a difference of priority. 
In both cases the absence is happenstance, and has to do with the 
nature of talk as action. In emergent silence, talk happens to be 
absent because all noisiness is absented and talk makes noise. In 
immanent silence, action happens to be absent as long as it is being 
silently prepared for, and any talk signals the end of the immanent 
silence. Emergent silences occur after talk 'runs out'— after 
whoever has been talking has nothing more to say and in the absence 
of anyone else speaking, either by changing the subject of talk or by
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remarking or commenting on or developing the just-finished talk of 
the principal speakers. Emergent silence just happens. Immanent 
silence does not just happen, but is necessitated by (usually 
extrinsic) happenings. For the moment of emergent silence talk is 
simply not important; for the duration of an immanent silence 
not-talking is vitally important. Whereas any sort of (socially 
acceptable) talk breaks the emergent silence and may signal its 
closure, talk which interrupts immanent silence is dangerously in 
the way of everyone else's listening' talk which breaks emergent 
silence may be followed by a second emergent silence, but talk which 
breaks immanent silence (contra erroneous utterance which interrupts 
it) moves the action from silent listening to explicit organization 
for action (or may itself be the action, as in the case of the first 
person to addressed an intruder).
For consequent silence, talk is speech. That is, the action of 
the event is speech, and the consequent silence of one or more 
speakers is an expression. It may be requisite expressed silence, as 
in the silent response of a child justly reminded by a parent to 
behave himself where the child may neither talk back to the parent 
nor apologize. Or it may be the optional response of the Chairman to 
the opening remark of the woman. Whichever, it is response. It may 
or may not, in its turn, generate subsequent response; it may 
disallow subsequent response, as in the case of an Islander dance 
master who, in speaking to settle a dispute regarding the correct 
dance motion, responds to the appeal of the disputants by delivering 
what is defined by the cultural rigour of expertise as the final say 
(which allows neither rejoinder nor comment, and permits no 
response). Consequent silence is an 'utterance' which stands in the 
stead of any and all spoken responses which the silent responder, his 
interlocutor, or anyone attending the conversation, can think of 
that he might have said.
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The license of silence
Implicit in the preceding discussion have been rules for when 
Islanders may be silent, and rules for knowing when, in various 
silences, they are not talking and are not doing other things which 
may or may not include talking. I shall turn finally to what I call 
the license of silence. In my opening statement I characterized 
silence as a means of social action, and mentioned the significant 
Islander as one who may be silent and who may command the silence of 
others. Islander silence is warranted by accords of talk and custom, 
and it is this 'warrant' which my notion of a license of silence 
invokes.
But more than simply being warranted by Islander rules for talk 
and by customary rules for speech-behaviour, silences may be 
commanded by certain people. These are the people to whom I have 
referred as "significant Islanders". Significant Islanders vary 
according to the events and situations in which they act. In my 
terms, an Islander may be significant in one situation and not in 
another; and everyone in one situation may be significant, and no one 
in another. Furthermore, there are instances of persons who are 
relatively significant, vis a vis each other, in some situations. 
Significance is my term; it is not a translation of some type of 
individual so named or referred to in Islander speech-communities. 
Which is not to say that the behaviour of such persons whom I have 
designated 'significant' may not be noticed (it usually is), nor 
remarked (it often is, especially if the significant action is seen 
after the fact as the turning point of events which, promising 
failure, resulted in success). Rather, what I have done in 
collecting examples and reports of noteworthy behaviour during 
speech-events under the notion of 'significance' is to elaborate on 
the descriptive congruence of importance in order to infer an 
analytical congruence of signification. The Islander whom I have 
termed the 'significant' one is the Islander who may, in various
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situations and with varying degrees of impunity, both signify 
occasions as silent and designate the silence of others. It is 
exactly this ability which my subtitle is redolent of: means of 
inaction.
Silence as a means of inaction has to do with the form of silence 
and the what-is-missing that are its contents. I have referred above 
to notional Islander distinctions between talk as speech and talk as 
action. When silence is a means of inaction during speaking-talk, it 
is expressive and meaningful. It is a way of speaking without 
talking, and its silent meaningfulness is its eschewance of those 
relatively delimited things which are expressly not said As the 
groom who does not say 'I do' is not about to be married, the 
(Eastern) Islander who does not say ’Sorry’ is not about to be 
apologetic. When the rules of utterance require his apology (N.B. 
these must be rules governing inter-islands or inter-ethnic 
conversation, for there is no such rule in the Eastern Torres 
Strait), his silence is pointed and explicit: not being able to both 
act sorry and retain his Eastern identity, he means to retain his 
identity and his silence is his means of inaction. Whether or not the 
dire choice of values with which the Islander has just been presented 
are known to his interlocutor, the Islander who wants to remain one 
is faced with a speaking-talk situation in which he may not speak. 
And, since the action of speaking-talk activities is a priori speech, 
the Islander is prohibited from acting.
In a conversation with a discerning Central or Western Islander 
who has prior knowledge of the Eastern prohibition on apologetic 
speech or behaviour, the Eastern interlocutor only has to wait, doing 
nothing, until the conversation resumes. Moreover, such occurrences 
are infrequent among mixed groups of Islanders, since there is a 
general Torres Strait-wide devaluation on apologetic behaviour, 
despite the possibility of being able to say a word for sorry in the 
language(s) of the West and Center. Apology plays no big part in 
Islander-only scenes, and apologies are demanded only in
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extraordinarily rare situations. And they are never demanded with 
impunity.
There is, too, a more subtle ordering of the incidental 
relationships of speakers in talk situations which informs the 
rareness of apology, and which has to do particularly with the 
explicit silence of Eastern Islanders. Talking, and the silences 
which are not-talking, are ordered according to who may speak. 
During a conversation of nominally equal Islanders, significant 
speakers emerge from time to time according to subject-matter which 
arises over which the significant speaker commands some knowledge or 
expertise. It is impolite to interrupt the informed or knowledgeable 
speaker, and even impolite to interrupt the speaker who is claiming 
expertise or knowledge until it is clear that his claim is unfounded. 
Such interruptions are thought to be unwarranted among equals, and 
are explicitly offensive to the speaker who has a well-known command 
of a particular vocabulary or subject-matter. That is, in 
interrupting another speaker the interruptor commands his silence, 
for two people may not speak at once. The immediate question is has 
the interruption been warranted by superior command of vocabulary or 
knowledge.
Only superior command of language (e.g. vocabulary) or greater 
knowledge may warrant interruption. These two domains are the only 
domains of what I have called 'significance'. And to command 
language and knowledge is to literally command talk. In the story of 
the Islander meeting above, the Chairman came into everyone's view in 
the light of the doorway at about the same time. I parenthetically 
indicated the general relief at seeing that the footsteps did not 
belong to an intruder. In this instance, the relief was collective 
and at the same time individual. Each anxious person saw who the 
intruder was at more or less the same time, and were relieved, 
silently except for exhalations. But had someone nearest the door 
had a sooner view of the Chairman, he or she might have uttered the 
identification to the group at large. For those who had still not 
seen the approaching Chairman for themselves, their relief would
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have been only marginally later than the relief of the first person 
to sight him (whose relief might have been exhaled in the same breath 
that the Chairman's name was announced). Had this happened, the 
relief of the group would have been commanded by the announcer of the 
Chairman's identity' and the warrant for command would have been the 
incidentally superior knowledge of having first identified the 
intruder. Any erroneous interruption of such an immanent silence 
would be disconcerting, and in dire circumstances even punishable, 
because the interruption of immanent silences frought with 
consequences is an unwarranted interruption.
The extremely punishable case (punishment comprising anything 
from corrective remarks and criticisms after the fact to ostracism of 
some duration or even virtual banishment) is that of the uninformed 
interruptor who, mistaken about the identity of some intruder, 
announces the wrong identity. Had someone announced that it was the 
Chairman who was approaching, only to have it be someone resembling 
the Chairman but bent on mayhem, the unwarranted claim of the 
erroneous announcement would be inexcusably dangerous. The group 
which had been readying itself for the possibility of having to deal 
with an intruder would have been caught unawares, mid-way through an 
exhalation of relief, and been disadvantaged in the confrontation 
with the actual intruder.
Talk, then, is serious business, and business which is not entered 
into lightly. There is no irresponsible utterance among Islanders. 
There are only irresponsible people. People are irresponsible to the 
extent that they are uneducated. Islander children are not deemed 
born irresponsible; rather they are simply neither responsible nor 
irresponsible. In having, at birth, neither knowledge of 
consequences nor command of language they are simply utterly 
uneducated. Education begins in earnest after the growing child has 
acquired a necessary minimal command of speech (around age 4-6), and 
accelerates as the child matures toward an adult ability to deal with 
important knowledge. The child who matures unable to behave and talk 
responsibly is not said to be 'still a child'; he is said to be
210
'uneducated'. This is a terrible thing to say of another Islander, 
or of the offspring of another Islander. It is the final 
condemnation of non-islander cultures, or those perceived as lacking 
any redeeming features whatsoever, to say— not that they are 
'uneducated', leaving the possibility that they may (someday) 
be— that they are "people without education". The utterance which 
suggests that a fellow Islander is 'acting uneducated' is one frought 
with the potential for combative confrontation. It not only invoked 
for those known Islanders who are adults who regularly act 
irresponsibly, but those non-islander cultures which are 
characterized as uneducable. The worst thing that may be said of one 
Islander by another is that he is a member of some other ethnic group 
known to be utterly without education, and such a pronouncement has 
yet-unspoken potential in any utterance which is critical of the 
'educatedness' of another Islander.
On the rare occasions when educatedness is aspersed, the response 
is silence. The reasons for this have to do with awareness of the 
importance of any talk which addresses education and with knowledge 
of the consequences of acting on such talk. All Island people have a 
vested interest in education. The leaders of the most powerful 
quasi-governmental agencies in the islands of the Torres Strait 
(which 'agencies' included everything from the supreme leaders of 
the religious cults to the entities charged with civic 
'administration' and order and to the ranking members of each clan 
who were charged with responsibility for that clan's communal 
participation and support) prior to the arrival of missionaries and 
subsequent colonial presence in the late nineteen-hundreds were 
known as the "Educated Men". A vast majority of Islanders who have 
fled the constraints of the islands in the past twenty years say they 
did so in pursuit of education for them and for their children. Both 
their being Islanders and their being on the mainland of Australia 
are fundamentally undergirded by education. To say that another 
Islander is lacking some education is to imply that he is 
fundamentally flawed. The impact of the implication is the
psycho-physical inference which it presents: the adult Islander 
imputed to be uneducated suffers the inference from his 
as-if-uneducated bahaviour that he is like the mentally deficient 
Islander children and the socioculturally deficient 
non-islanders— that in not (apparently, or allegedly) acting like an 
adult who ought to be by now well on his way to becoming educated, he 
risks being taken for an uneducable.
The response of an Islander so aspersed is silence. He is on the 
horns of a complex and troublesome dilemma, a crisis of not-talking 
and not-acting. Whoever has impugned his educatedness (and even 
dared to assess his educability) has obviously claimed license of 
silence. That is, the declarer entertains no response, or none other 
than silence. The next-thing after this punitive remark depends upon 
the ordered relationship between the two principals. That is, 
depending upon their relationship, the domain of the response will be 
either action or talk. The declarer has not cast aspersion on an 
equal with assumed impunity. He well knows the potential response 
may be action as easily as it may be talk. Implicit in his utterance 
is his claim to warranted speech (in this case, criticism); in his 
expectation of the silence of the other he claims a licence to 
command the silence of others. The respondent has two choices: he 
may accept the command to be silent or he may refuse to do so.
In either case his action (insofar as it conforms to Islander 
prescriptions for action) will be silent. If he accepts the 
criticism, and implies his acceptance of the claimed warrant of 
superior knowledge, his silence is emergent. That is to say it is a 
silence which follows talk, which is a silence of inaction, and which 
may or may not be in turn followed by a resumption of talk. It is a 
silence which allows for various states of being by the silent 
respondent— he may be contrite, he may privately regret his 
momentary 'slip' into unacceptable behaviour; he may be resentful of 
having his relative insignificance publicized; he may simply have 
fallen into the prescribed silence of the justly criticized— but 
which is not expressive of his particular state of being. For the
audience there is no telling what the nature of the reception of the 
criticism has been, only that confrontation has not been chosen; and 
they may silently entertain their own assessment of the justice of 
the criticism and contemplate what each of their responses might have 
been had they received the criticism. It is not up to them to 
disclaim the exercise of the warrant unless they are prepared to 
criticize the utterance of the critic, and they do so only by 
invoking a licence of even greater knowledge and at the risk of 
provoking an even more significant confrontation.
If the respondent is not prepared to accept the specific 
criticism, but has no wish to challenge the general warrant of 
superior knowledge or command of language of the critic, his silence 
is immanent. It is akin to the immanent silence of the group at the 
onset of disembodied footsteps. It is the silence of preparation for 
action in a situation in which action is defined as talk. He will not 
be able to readdress his specific error if his critic makes it plain 
that his criticism is absolutely the last word on that subject. But 
this would be rare, and especially rare among consociate Islanders 
who have some communal responsibility for one another. His silence 
indicates to the critic and to the audience that there will be no 
confrontational challenge. But he may well signal to the critic that 
he feels he has been unjustly criticized (normally by momentary 
eye-contact), or intentionally or inadvertently indicate (by 
head-shakes or hand-movement) that he intends to pursue the specific 
criticism later (because he took it to be unwarranted, or because he 
did not understand the particular linguistic or cultural licence for 
criticizing that action in that context) . In the case of immanent 
silence (which may not be easily distinguishable to an observer until 
after the fact, perhaps when the question of the specific criticism 
is raised), the respondent's preparation to ready himself for 
readdressing the criticism is prepotent in his silence. The Islander 
so criticized does not have the option of taking exception to the 
criticism without challenging the critic. In order to do so he must
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wait until he can raise the criticism as a subject-matter in its own 
right, and his waiting is characteristic of immanent silence.
There is a third way in which the respondent may accept the 
command to be silent. He may express consequent silence. The problem 
is that an educated Islander may not express consequent silence at 
having been, even justly, criticized. An adult Islander criticized 
for uneducated behaviour only compounds his uneducatedness by 
expressing consequent silence. The nature of consequent silence is 
its stance in place of a delimited range of audible expressions. For 
the criticized Islander there are rio audible expressions available 
among his options. His options are broadly to either accept the 
criticism or to refuse to do so. For the Islander who chooses to 
accept the criticism, there are two options, both inaudible: 
emergent silence, or immanent silence. Because there are no optional 
words, there is nothing for consequent silence to express save the 
erroneous (hence uneducated) assumption that there is something else 
he might have said. Islander children who have acquired the bad 
habit of apologizing from non-islander classmates may go through a 
period of responding in consequent silence. Their elders are quick 
to point out the error of uttering an apology, and the child learns 
quickly that this is not the Island way. But until he is educated to 
a command of Islander silences, he may respond to criticism in silent 
apology for having erred. This is one of the rare examples of the 
occurrence of consequent silent response to criticism. The 
apologetic look on the learner's face usually gives his consequent 
silence away, and parents are quick to educate the learner to the 
value of immanent silence— in which the learner is simply silent 
upon receipt of criticism, but free to raise the point of proper 
Islander behaviour later. In the case of the emerging adult, 
consequent silence may be honestly expressive of distress at having 
erred— and adults present may allow it to go unremarked if it is 
deemed that the erroneous behaviour was expectable at the stage of 
education which the learner has reached, and that nothing but 
unnecessary embarrassment can be gained from reminding the learner
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of the differences between silences which he is already fully 
cognizant of (even though he does not yet competently command them). 
The adult Islander who expresses consequent silence at having been 
criticized does so only at the risk of admitting that he is an
r r
uneducated child. The adult Islander whose consequent silence is 
explicitly a silence in the place of apology runs the even greater 
risk of being in contravention of cultural proscriptions of 
identity; of being taken for someone who is simply not an Islander, 
rather than for an Islander who cannot control the rules of speaking 
which have to do with criticism.
The critic is also silent after he utters his criticism. Among 
equals who have no vested interest in claims to relatively superior 
knowledge, and between whom only helpful and incidental criticism 
passes, the silence is consequent silence. Since the equally 
educated have no reason (nor grounds) for mutual criticism, equals 
are equally uneducated. They may criticize each other in the 
interest of mutual edification, of testing their own knowledge, or in 
inconsequential tests of notional 'superiority'. Such things are 
common among Islander adolescents, and are less common as they 
mature. It is also possible for an adult who is, or who has been 
nominated for a particular event or skill or body of knowledge as, an 
educator to await the comprehension of his critical instruction by 
his student in consequent silence. But such critical instructions 
are, by definition, corrections rather than criticisms; and the 
teacher who awaits a response from a learner assumes the consequent 
silence of educational dialogue (having been able to think of no 
further exemplification of his point, or simply having nothing else 
to say until his student's comprehension is evident) rather than a 
consequent silence after criticism. (Also, the educational 
situation defines the relatively educated and uneducated, precluding 
the possibility of impugning the student by delaring him to be 
uneducated.)
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The silence of the critic is, therefore, immanent silence. He 
knows that the addressee of the critical utterance has the option of 
refusing to accept the criticism. His is an immanent silence because 
it is a silence of inaction. He known that the response (or 
eschewance of response, or deferral of response) to his criticism 
will be silent. And he is charged with the responsibility of his 
licensed criticism to have uttered the final word. He must to the 
best of his linguistic ability have, in manner or in style, provided 
no admission for audible response; and he must have made no error in 
invocation of cultural prescriptions of Islander comportment. His 
silence is one in which he awaits acceptance or refusal. In waiting 
for emergent or immanent silence (more commonly the former), he is 
simply inactive; in waiting for refusal he is tense with anticipation 
of being attacked. He may be more or less relaxed or tense, depending 
upon his anticipation of the response, which is in turn based upon 
his assessment of the gravity of the criticism he has just uttered. 
He may have criticized someone only recently granted adulthood, in 
which case there is no question of warranted challenge, and only 
minimal chance of the young adult 'losing his head' by announcing a 
challenge of which he will think better later. Or he may have,in the 
other extreme, just criticized someone his own age or older, someone 
who doesn't like him much anyway, and who is not prepared to let what 
he chooses to take as a character assassination pass unchallenged. 
If this latter is the case, the immanent silence of the critic is 
tense with his readiness to receive the challenge.
Criticisms which are refused provoke crises which are almost 
never seen. By his refusal the challenger's action promises 
disrepute for the critic, for the culture and language which licenses 
him, and implies the irresponsibility of all those who adhere to his 
directions. In the extreme, there may be a fight between the 
challenger and the critic. Such fights are exceedingly rare (perhaps 
fewer than one every twenty years), and bring disgrace upon all 
Islanders by their occurrence. And the onus of consequences lies 
almost entirely on the challenger, for the critic who is performing
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his corrective and educative function is the protector of all 
knowledge and of the language which provides access to it: he is 
neither permitted to overlook errors of speech or "behaviour, nor 
allowed to defer criticism of any transgressor— not even in the face 
of an angry and overpowering challenge. To the extent that he has 
accurately perceived an error of talk or comportment he has no option 
but to correct it immediately. And although the possibility of 
physical combat between Islanders is remote, it is nevertheless 
present in every potential confrontation.
The distress of the transgressor who (feels he) has been unjustly 
criticized is exacerbated by the dictum of refusal: while acceptance 
may be expressed in the silence of talk, refusal must be silently 
enacted. The unjustly criticized man is a man who has been attacked. 
There is no other definition possible for Islanders. The rigour with 
which this rule is applied varies somewhat from island to island, and 
among Islander communities in mainland towns. But the various 
applications are different according to whether or not the addressee 
is empowered to assess the justness of received criticisms, or 
whether or not the utterance is deemed to have been critical or some 
sort of less potent instruction or educational correction. The rules 
for response to attack do not vary.
There is only one rule: retaliation must be immediate, fierce, and 
successful. In explication of this rule to youngsters or to 
non-islanders who have been granted permission to learn Island ways, 
the cultural corpus is often invoked. Stories of legendary heroes 
prove not only their uncompromising and instant retaliation, but 
teach that victory (and vindication) may be dependent upon swift and 
sure response. This holds for stories of wars with competing 
islands, or whole villages or tribes from the Papuan coast, as well 
as for tales of individual combat. The rules for debate prescribe 
forthright and crisp speech; but the rule of retaliation prescribes 
no speech whatsoever. When the enormous implications of this 
invariant rule first struck me, I was reminded of the 
challenge-and-response rules of the cat-like aliens called the
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"kzinti" in Larry Niven's novel Ringworld. An earthling had just 
survived a near- (and certainly fatal) battle with a kzin whom he had 
challenged, in the rigueur of saving face, "Tooth against tooth, claw 
against fingernail". A kzinti ambassador saves the situation, but 
takes the opportunity to comment on the earthling's brave but very 
un-kzinti challenge: "I found your challenge verbose. In 
challenging a kzin, a simple scream of rage is sufficient. You 
scream and you leap." Such an ideal challenge would serve Islanders, 
though it would be found distastefully noisy.
It is just such potential retaliation, silent and immediate, 
which governs any refusal of warranted criticism. Islanders do not 
attack one another. Islanders may not sustain any attack with 
retaliating. In the end, the second of these cultural dicta will 
apply, for an Islander's personal identity as Island-man [Pidgin: 
Ailanman] is sustainable in isolation. That is, while the first 
dictum has to do with social identity— since an attack must 
incorporate both attacker and attacked— the second has to do with 
the record of individual behaviour, and its accordance with 
(culturally) ideal behaviour, which informs and sustains personal 
identity. In the final assessment, it is the individual who lays 
claim to Island-man identity. The question of his assessment of 
himself as concordant with the assessment of him by his fellows is 
the question of dissociation. No one may stop him from acclaiming 
himself a full and proper Islander— which is exactly what he does in 
refusing criticism of his behaviour— but they need not listen to him 
as he does so. Since they (i.e. generally) may not command his 
silence (because they are not warranted to license silence), and 
because he has refused the command of silence from a significant 
Islander, they expect that no only may command him to be silent when 
he persists in claiming cultural precedents for his controversial 
behaviour, (in theory, he could 'win' the confrontation. But the 
consequential double shift of responsibility and duty away from the 
significant critic in order to invest the challenger with them would
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be unheard of: the warranted critic never loses.) They are left with 
no option except that of not listening to him.
For the challenger who won't be silent, the organization for not 
listening is the organization of denying him an audience. The degree 
of gravity of his transgression informs the extent to which such 
organization is articulated (e.g. ' Is he_ going? . . . Oh, I don't think 
i/we feel like going.), and the extent to which it is made explicit 
(e.g. 'I'm/we're not going if we have to listen to him spout off.'). 
For optional-attendance events, the denial of (specific or 
incidental) audience will likely be organized by ensuring that he 
will not attend. It is relatively easy to exclude anyone from 
family-only or single-island-only events by either indicating that 
he is unwelcome or by explicitly not inviting him, since Islanders 
must conform to the cultural prescription that they neither attend 
nor remain where they are not welcome. But among groups whose 
membership is given as consociate— groups whose members share 
island-group, island, village, intra-village community, name, or 
family origin— or those whose membership is defined as consociate 
for the term of membership— e.g. dance teams, churches and 
congregations, in-laws, schools, celebrants of marriages or other 
important events— there is no way to absent the transgressor by 
indicating that he is unwelcome.
Welcomeness or unwelcomeness is not an identification available 
to members of consociate groups. A participant in an event which is 
not limited to attendance by consociates may express cnsequent 
silence to a non-consociate whose absence from the event is sought. 
In doing so, his silence stands explicitly in the stead of an 
invitation, and is commonly understood in its consequent meaning. 
(Often the would-be inviter is not a perpetrator of the unwelcomeness 
of the invitee, and may not be in accord with it' his consequent 
silence is nonetheless both meaningful and explicit, although his 
intent may simply be to save the prospective unwelcome attendant from 
the distress of showing up where others deem him unwelcome, or the 
increased distress of showing up expecting to be welcomed and having
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to conspicuously discover that he is not welcome and leave.) But such 
an expression of consequent silence is not an option among 
consociates, for there is no invitation for the silence to take the 
place of. Consociates are by definition welcome at events of their 
group(s)...more precisely, welcomeness is a no-thing among 
consociates. Decisions to attend an event at which others would 
rather not see him, and decisions to prevent the attendance of 
someone the group would rather not see, are decisions potent with 
dissociation. For events whose stipulated attendants are an 
aggregation of non-consociates gathered together for a particular 
event, dissociation is a priori. But for events whose attendants are 
consociates, potential dissociation of a member is dangerous to the 
group.
There is no way for a group to indicate that a particular member 
is unwelcome at, or for the duration of consociate activity (as when 
a challenge arises during the course of a meeting or other event, and 
is a challenge which promises to escalate into confrontation). The 
group may not want him to attend. But if they do not, what they do not 
want is disruptive and dangerous incidents. If they are silent in 
response to the unwanted member's solicitations about plans for the 
upcoming event, their silence is not consequent silence. It cannot 
be, for there is nothing which they might have otherwise said. That 
is, there is no delimited range of audible responses plus consequent 
silence from which they choose silence. His solicitation of 
consociates requires nothing more in response than whatever each of 
them feels like saying. If he were to utter solicitous remarks to 
people who were not his consociates, he might well be soliciting an 
invitation or other expression of welcome. But this couldn't happen 
among Islanders, for Islanders are culturally prohibited from 
soliciting welcome: they are proscribed from entering where they are 
not welcome, a proscription both on solicitations which may engender 
dishonest invitation and on explicit solicitation which might 
engender a refusal of invitation which would in turn require the 
instant retaliation of any solicitor who deems invitation to be his
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right and refusal of invitation to be, therefore, an attack. Thus, 
the silence of consociates which ensues at solicitous remarks of a 
troublesome fellow is not the consequent silence of non-invitation 
or unwelcome. Nor is it expressive of responses which might have 
addressed the subject of the upcoming event which the recalcitrant 
consociate has raised. That is, it may be that any or all of the 
group members might have thought better of joining a discussion of 
the plans for the event with this troublesome colleague, but their 
silence does not express their decision. They are not obliged to 
answer. There is no Islander stricture which demands that subsequent 
responses conform to subject-matter, nor that conversational 
openings must be accepted or even answered.
In this case, in the case of no one feeling like talking to the 
transgressor about upcoming events, he is faced with an emergent 
silence. His interlocutors either do not feel like talking to him at 
all, or they would rather not talk (to him, or in the implicit 
inclusion that his physical presence mandates) about their plans. 
There is, in this case, no stress in the silence (though there may be 
some anxiety in the solicitor, if he takes the silence to be 
reflective of the enduring censure of his consociates). Nor is the 
silence stressfully directed at the solicitor, since as unexpressive 
silence is is not an expression. Emergent silence is not even a 
response; there is no way that the solicitor can take the silence to 
be an answer to his opening remarks (the fact that it was subsequent 
to them notwithstanding). If he responds _to_ the silence, he must 
make his own grounds for taking the silence to have been expressive; 
he must ex post facto render the silence a consequent silence. This 
is exceedingly rare, since the advent of emergent silence signifies 
that, while no one yet feels like talking to him or expressly 
planning for his eventual return to full participation, his 
transgression is not generally held to have been worth any further 
action or censure. Any Islander who would make such an emergent 
silence into an explicit consequent silence runs either the risk of 
exposing his shame or regret at having earned their disrespect, or
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the greater risk of offending them by presuming to tell them what 
they 'said' in their silence. (And he runs the personal risk of 
reifying a degree of approbrium which he fears is still present but 
which in fact has passed as the group gets over whatever it was that 
he did.)
It may be, however, that the solicitous consociate accurately 
perceives that the silence which greets his opening remarks is not 
the 'empty' emergent silence of simply not answering and not doing 
anything about the solicitation. He may notice heads being turned, 
or slight movements away from the conversing group, or other 
attendant actions which are not noisy and which are neither habitual 
nor arbitrary. His perception of this response as an immanent 
silence is correct, and will be confirmed if he receives any brief 
eye-contacts from anybody sufficiently stressed by implications of 
his remark. These brief eye-contacts are both communicative and 
observant, and may be either or both during immanent silence. As 
communication they precede a potential retaliation (though they do 
not in any way commit the person establishing eye-contact to any 
action).
Islanders who establish brief eye-contact with non-islanders 
prior to retaliating against a perceived attack are not 
communicating their prepared attack, but are usually attampting to 
get information (sometimes they are trying to see if the perceived 
attack was in fact intended, or whether, for instance, they are in an 
interaction with a non-islander whose own cultural rules are 
preclusive of an attack-and-response definition in the situation). 
This eye-contact is incidental to the watchfulness of observation. 
When information can be got from the opponent's eyes, the brief 
eye-contact is in order to add any information communicated by his 
eyes to the general information available by watching his arms and 
stance (and any prospective allies which he may have present). This 
watchfulness of an opponent who is another person is the same 
watchfulness of the group meeting in my story who watched the doorway 
in order to see who was intruding. It is the watchfulness of
222
Observation which may or may not incidently include a watchfulness of 
the opponent's eyes.
But among Islanders who are cognizant of the habit and rule of 
watching potential opponents, the incidental meeting of eyes is
actual and communicative eye-contact. That is, information is
liable to pass both ways. The respondent who accompanies his 
immanent silence with a brief eye-contact lets the other know that 
his remarks have been stressful and potentially provocative. His 
glance is the meaningful eye-contact of the Islander about to
retaliate. Borrowing from Larry Niven's kzinti ambassador, we could 
say that, for Islanders, 'You look and you leap'. The rules for 
eye-contact and retaliation are this rigorous. Islanders do not 
meaninglessly or casually go around looking into other people's 
eyes. And a transgressor who generates an immanent silence by
reference (always implicit) to the fact of his censure knows it to be 
an immanent silence by any eye-contact which he receives. As in the 
immanent silence of a group readying itself for the possible action 
of dealing with an intruder, the action being readied for in the 
immanent silence among consociates which is marked by eye=contact is 
unspecified. But the silence is tense with preparation, and the 
solicitant member is warned by the glances of the group. He may 
respond during the eye contact with an expression which effectively 
retracts his statement. This effective 'retraction' will be allowed 
as long as the respondents are not (yet) formally offended. And they 
are obliged to await the next development by their immanent silence. 
That is, once immanent silence is entered, the action which marks its 
conclusion is action in response to whatever threat materializes 
from the potent interruption. Immanent silence is not the silence of 
'look and leap' retaliation. It is a silence full of readiness for 
possible action or reaction. (And a truly offended Islander who 
fails to retaliate when he perceives he has been attacked risks the 
shame of acting explicitly un-Islander, not only in that he fails to 
respond to an attack, but also in that he implicates allies [and 
shames them] by conforming to the immanent silence of others who do
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not perceive that they have been attacked and are not prepared to 
shame themselves by alliance with an Islander who would retaliate 
two-against-one against a consociate.) An Islander who commits 
himself to immanent silence is response to a potential intrusion by a 
human commits himself to the duration of the silence which may only 
be broken by further extrinsic action.
However, if the solicitant member's answering eye-contact does 
not indicate his 'retraction' of his remark, the action which will 
break the silence becomes immanent. The stress which he has 
generated in the group will either remain until the subject is 
changed (if they so allow the potential confrontation to subside), or 
it will build for as long as the solicitor remains (and does not 
indicate by demeanor or second eye-contact that he has now thought 
better of his decision not to retract). The stress will build until 
eventual retaliation is increased in speed or severity by the stress 
magnifying delay, or until the stress itself generates relieving 
action by the aggravated respondent. In either case, the retaliation 
will be excessive, and no longer in keeping with the actual degree of 
offense. And in the second case, the respondent risks the shame of 
not having been able to control himself, of not being able to handle 
his stress until such time as the offensiveness of the opening remark 
is confirmed. The rule of immanent silence is that the participants 
must be ready, but if their readiness sponsors its own action the 
actor is at risk of being taken to be flawed in his ability to act as 
an Island-man.
Such events rarely occur, and are prevented not only by the steel 
control of the ready-to-retaliate respondents, but also by the 
ever-present fear of disassociation. The solicitor who perceives an 
immanent silence, and the attendant build-up of stress, will 
normally extricate himself from the group. Since immanent silence 
may not be ended by anything but action, he is precluded from saying 
anything which will dismiss the offense. The only talk which may 
close an immanent silence is talk-as-action (such as addressing a 
non-islander intruder in his intrusion). The only action available
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to Islanders who find themselves in a prepotentially offensive 
situation is the action of attack-and-response, and there is no talk 
which is included in the action options for such situations. 
Moreover, any talk is predefined as an act, and the only actions 
available to the offender are to go away or to confirm his offensive 
remark as an intentional offense. Thus, any talk which so confirms 
the offense reifies it, and is correctly taken to be the act of an 
attacker. (And is also likely to be taken to be unnecessarily 
verbose, since his answering eye-contact would suffice to confirm 
his offensiveness and would be in proper accord with the rule of 
silence when attacking.)
The other alternative action which might generate the closure of 
the immanent silence is the offender indicating by the nature of his 
answering eye-contact that his remark was not intended to be 
offensive, but was intended to test the feelings of the group 
regarding the cessation of his temporary ostracism. An Islander who 
'tests' his consociates in this way puts the whole group in a very 
risky situation, and is ill-advised to attempt such a test without an 
exemplary command of the vocabulary of inflection and nuance. The 
'testing' utterer whose test is obvious in his eyes has failed. And a 
tester who is recognized for one is an especially offensive 
individual, for he has generated real action from unreal talk. And 
insofar as his original testing remark was not seriously uttered he 
is not a serious person, for utterance may not be of unvested 
interest. The particular riskiness of such a situation is in fact 
that the testing which is belatedly visible in the tester's eyes does 
not actually confirm that the opening remarks were offensive in their 
meaning, but instead preempts the meaning of the remarks in that it 
exposes a greater, and prior, offensiveness of manner. It is not 
that the utterer meant to say something offensive, nor that he meant 
to say something which allowed the possibility of being taken as 
offensive, but that his intended manner is one which is a priori
offensive.
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Its ambiguity, an ambiguity which accentuates the stress of an 
interlocutor who is readying for action or reaction and belatedly 
discovers that his reaction may not be one which he is preparing 
himself for, lies in its potential for changing the content of the 
utterance after the fact. To change the content of talk is to play 
with meanings, and playing with meanings in the Torres Strait entails 
playing with the cultural corpus which has generated them and wherein 
lies their referents. Islanders may not lightly play with the corpus 
which provides, prescribes, and grounds identity and which 
articulates the strictures on behaviour. Islanders who presume to 
play with the very grounding of Islander-ness must be demented. If 
their dementia is presumed temporary, it is characteristic of 
behaviour which slips momentarily into uneducation. If this is the 
assessment of the ’educators' present (those who are warranted to 
educate and correct others), then the manner of the 'tester' must be 
immediately corrected. When this happens (usually by a short and 
pointed uttering of his name directly at him by an 'educator'), the 
contents of the opening remarks are forgotten, for they were 
meaningless anyway. And the immanent silence of the would-be 
retaliator is broken by the extrinsic action of the educator, 
allowing him the relief of the group at the meeting who, in 
identifying the footsteps as those of their chairman, were relieved 
that what might have had to happen didn't have to. And the event, and 
its attandant immanent silence, is closed, with nothing remaining 
unfinished; for the man who would take the remarks of the uneducated 
seriously not only does his own real language the disservice of 
presuming that it would entertain unreality, but he also implicates 
himself as an attacker (since he is precluded from serious reaction 
by the now-unseriousness of what had seemed an attack) since serious 
and real attacks may not be made by the demented. And if he remembers 
the incident, and allows its bothersomeness to prevent it from being 
finished, he runs the very serious risk of presuming to expand his 
culture to include utterance and manner which is a priori unserious,
unreal, uneduated and excluded. He runs the risk of making a meaning
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where none was before, and implying that he is greater than the 
corpus of meanings.
Lastly, there is a further risk taken by the one who solicits the 
responses which will indicate his readmission in order to test the 
mood of the group. His consociates may discover that he has been 
merely testing them— trifling with them— and may conclude that his 
non-serious utterance presumes that the group was not serious in 
their original censure of him. Inherent in such presumption is an 
accusation (or assessment) that the group who censured him was not a 
group of serious persons. An entire group is utterly unlikely to be 
composed of individuals who are each simultaneously in the grip of 
temporary dementia (the only way that such serious business as 
censure of a member could be entered playfully). His accusation is 
implicitly an accusation of transcendant unseriousness (and, 
unreality), and one which implicates each and every member of the 
group. This runs the risk of permanent disassociation, for the 
utterer may face the immediate and simultaneous (and silent) 
retaliation of each of the men in the group he has just maligned. 
Reaction will almost certainly be physical, and decisive, for no 
Island-man may tolerate the attack entailed in an assessment that he 
is not in serious accord with the prescriptions for Island-men. He 
will be outcast.^®
Postscript. Means of inaction
Throughout this discussion of ways of silence among Torres Strait 
Islanders I have refrained from predicating my trinomial silence on a 
basis of relative value or import. Nevertheless, there is a notional 
scale of silences, one which I apply in the artifice of analysis, but 
which strikes me as commensurate with the socially situated actions 
of Islanders if not a translation of some utterable scheme for 
weighting silence extant among Islander speakers. Certainly in the 
last section on the license of silence I have moved from usually 
incidental and explicitly optional consequent silence— standing as
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it does in place of speech, and as a kind of explicit but silent 
'utterance'— to the final example of permanent casting out of a 
member of a group at the close of immanent silence. Emergent 
silence, as I have presented and exemplified it, has a curious medial 
position. In standing in the stead of all speech and all action it 
stands in the stead of none. It is the silence of incidence and 
happenstance; and is meaningless, for it may neither generate 
responses to it nor serve as a past reference for subsequent action 
or speech. It is noteworthy only by those who did not participate in 
it at the time and only for a. posteriori criticism (such as the 
criticism of a Chairman faced with emergent silence and prevented 
from ending his own immanent silence who chastises the group 
afterward for not being ready for the meeting; or the ethnographer 
who gives it meaning by establishing a system in which the 
meaninglessness of such a silent category renders each categorical 
instance meaningful).
And, although I have restricted the discussion primarily to 
silences which occur as breaks or transitions in the actions of 
speech-events, each of the three ways of silence may occur during 
happenings which are not situated in talk-situations. I gave the 
extreme example of emergent silence of an Eastern Islander faced with 
an uttered apology. While he is distressed, there is absolutely 
nothing which he may say or do. His distress is not the readying 
stress of an immanent silence, nor the thoughtful or reactive stress 
of trying to think of a rejoinder during a consequent silence. 
Without imputing an equal degree of distress, such extreme emergent 
silence is also the silence of an Islander pearl-diver forced to 
watch from the edge of his boat while his colleague is attacked 
thirty feet below by a shark. There is simply nothing which he may do 
or say; nor is there anything which he may meaningfully prepare to 
do. He may only privately imagine that he might have been still down 
there to help, or try to wish the shark away, or simply be seized by 
him imminent loss, (and he may, finally, cry out in the Meriam mir
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"Weiiiii"— the keening cry which pretends the release of 
unreleasable sorrow.)
There is even the possibility for consequent silence to occur 
outside of speaking-situations, though this is rare. A group of 
Islanders silently weaving dance costumes when a fellow weaver joins 
them would be expected to exchange greetings with the newcomer. 
Silence on the part of the newcomer or any of those already present 
would be consequent silence, standing in the place of a delimited 
range of greeting options. It may be the silence of preoccupation, 
and only a mild breach of etiquette, or it may be explicit expression 
of unwelcome directed at a newcomer who is not a consociate and has 
not been invited. The particular characteristic of a consequent 
silence which occurs not in the midst of speech is its explicit 
failure, by not occurring, to signal the opening of talk. That is, 
the greeting of the approach of a newcomer signals the opening of a 
speech-event of some duration, and consequent silence which stands 
in the place of it is an equally available option for the signal of 
opening. The uninvited newcomer met with silence is free to utter a 
greeting in response to the consequent silence of the group (though 
he is likely to simply walk away). Any subsequent silence would be 
unlikely to be consequent silence, for the talk which might have 
taken place following the greeting of the silently-met newcomer is 
not delimited. If he persists in remaining, and the feeling of 
unwelcome is more a feeling of exclusion, the silence which ensues 
may be the group's immanent silence awaiting his next move.
The point of this is that, within and without talk, there is a 
scale of probable consequences which informs my three silences. 
Consequent silence is an option in the domain of talk, and governed 
by jurisdictions of real and unreal talk and by the rules of 
speaking. Emergent silence is both not-talking and not-acting, and 
has its referents within the individual (and private) domain of each 
person present, though it is nonetheless real and socially 
meaningful for the non-participant who is faced with it. Immanent 
silence is the silence of not-talking and not-(yet)acting, wherein
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the absence of talk is prescribed by the priority of (potential) 
action. While consequent silence will probably end shortly (by 
someone saying the next thing in the dialogue), emergent silence only 
happens to end (when anyone present feels like saying or doing 
something), and immanent silence must end. The educated and 
significant Islander is one who known the consequences of silences, 
and who, insofar as he is specifically or generally significant, 
commands a vocabulary of silence. The significant Islander, 
warranted by his position as educator and knowledge-holder, is the 
one who may, finally, command the silence of others.
This command of others is the warrant to license silence. The 
significant actor who goes to the doorway to take care of the 
intruder who has materialized into a non-threatening but 
non-islander human being enables the immanent silence of the group to 
merge into relief and emergent silence. They do not have to talk, 
they do not (now) have to prepare to deal with an intruder, they may 
return to whatever had concerned them— and if they become silent 
rather than resuming conversation or action, their silence is the 
emergent silence of having nothing to do for the moment. They do not 
even have to attend to the handling of the intruder by the 
significant Islander, for by his significance he is obliged to know 
how to handle such things, or at least to not volunteer to do so 
unless he knows what he is doing. They may, during the course of the 
handling of the intruder which promises to become threatening, 
resume an immanent silence of preparation, but they do so as a result 
of the extrinsic developments of the handling having broken the 
emergent silence into which they have fallen. It is, in this sense, 
the action of the significant Islander which is the means of inaction 
of the group. And if he is forced to intervene when some less 
significant person who has attempted to handle the intruder fails to 
do so, his command of inaction is explicit: by his active 
intervention he explicitly not only enables the group to be inactive, 
but means for them to be.
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The significant Islander who is present at an utterance which is 
liable to engender a train of conversation resulting in un-Island 
talk of behaviour may actually command the inactive silence of the 
group simply by making eye-contact with the principal conversants. 
He lets them know that, whether they are aware of the probably 
consequences of their talk or not, in his educated estimation the 
talk is liable to become offensive of to contravene certain cultural 
dicta. His silence is immanent, and his look indicates that he is 
preparing for the action of confrontation if the conversation 
continues. It is only the look of the significant Islander which may 
be corrective or educative without being challenging, and only his 
look which may be the means of inaction of the group. Such a look 
from an insignificant Islander would not only not be understood to be 
educative (for he has not the significant warrant to educate, let 
alone to command the silence of others), but also not be understood 
to be expressing the challenge of the system of Islander knowledge, a 
challenge to which mere humans may not respond.
Finally, it is the look of the significant Islander, the man 
charged with the welfare and education of his people, which is both 
his means of inaction and theirs. They may (and must) engage no 
further action, and lose no face in doing so. He is enabled to 
refrain from uttering or enacting an explicit censure, for by their 
inactivity they acknowledge the meaning of his silence look. For all 
of the potency of action prescribed for Islanders by their culture 
and via their language, it is the potent preventiveness of inaction 
which provides final cohesion. The man who commands the means of 
inaction is the one who protects people, and who saves the language 
and the way. His and only his is license of silence.
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"Who am I, Master?" the boy asked. 
"Who will I become?"
"You are yourself," Olem said, "but 
you are both yourself and Author of your 
Self. Remember this, for it is not 
widely known."
"Oh, no!" he cried. "I am doomed to be 
only me!"
"On the contrary," said the Master, 
"you can only be yourself by being 
someone else."
Olem's Tale, 
The Ruel of the Seven Hundred
CHAPTER 7
Meriam to Meriba (the motion of the contentious self)
I want to present in this chapter something of a journey and,
along with the journey, an account of a way of looking at such
'journeys'. The tale of the journey will be necessarily abbreviated,
since it is that sort of story which is abstracted in order to
analyze some aspect or other of it. The account of the way of looking
will be necessarily detailed since it is, as far as I know, a new way
of looking. The journey is my own venture into Islanderhood— my own
specific example of the general case of anthropologists becoming
participants in the societies they study. And the account is a
/theory, one of those things Paul Valery called a fragment of some 
autobiography.^
The question of becoming a member of another society is a question 
little-asked. Certainly, whatever this becoming is, it is done more 
or less successfully by every ethnographer. And, whatever it means, 
it has something to do with the identification of the anthropological 
outsider-cum-insider. Such identifications of membership occur 
within societies as well. For instance, a doctor who is untrained, 
or who, for some other reason, has failed to satisfy a statutory 
licensing authority of his capacity to practice medicine, may be free
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to open a surgery until his contravention of the law is discovered by 
those enfranchised to prevent such behaviour. His assertion comes 
into conflict with the social (legal) rules of ascription, and if he 
is discovered he will be prevented from continuing the conflict. 
Such conflicts (or discrepancies) between asserted and ascribed 
identity also occur in domains which, though not governed by law, are 
nonetheless formal.
Over the past ten years or so the convention for noting other 
names which someone assumes, particular in the case of known 
criminals, has undergone a transformation. The older convention was 
to list such pseudonyms as aliases, e.g. John Thomas alias Tom Jones. 
The latter convention has introduced a neologism into the vocabulary 
of policemen, criminals, rock stars, and the newsmen and writers who 
report such persons' activities: 'aykayay', an anagram from "a.k.a." 
(or, aka) , the initials for "also known as". It may have been that a 
criminal taint inhered in alias which was unsuitable for reporting 
stage names, writer's pseudonyms, etc.; or that alias tainted the 
accused who had not yet been tried and convicted; or, perhaps, that 
alias came to be known for its denotative reference to 'on other 
occasions', and the more general aka allowed for the possibility of 
persons who were known to some others by one name and to different 
others by another (even on the same occasion). Whatever the 
reasoning (if any), there has been a reduction in the instances of 
alias and a concurrent increase in the reference aka.
Both of these examples of discrepancies are examples of 
ascription conforming or not to legal rules or to known ascriptions. 
There is also the discrepancy which arises when a person asserts a 
name which is resisted. When Cassius Clay, Jr. announced that his 
new name was Muhammed Ali, sportwriters and fans were nonplussed. 
For some reporters there was a period of years until the champion was 
referred to only as Muhammad Ali, the interim references comprising 
firstly a period of insisting on Cassius Clay and secondly a long 
period of reporting both names. The problem here was different than 
it is in the case of aliases or other multiple concurrent names, or
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in the case of labels of functional identification such as medical 
practitioner. I propose that the fundamental difference is a 
difference of content. That is, in all three examples there is a 
conflict of form, of formal reference to the individuals involved and 
to their (formal) behaviour. The pretending doctor is formally 
enjoined from both acting in the manner of a doctor and from 
referring to himself as a doctor through a process of law. Persons 
accused of law-breaking are lately less often referred to as 1 alias 
So-and-so' until they are formally identified as criminals through 
convictions (and other persons, outside the domain of law-breaking, 
are rarely said to have an alias in avoidance of the criminal 
connotation of having to hide one's 'true' identity, a connotation 
formally embedded in the term "alias"). But in the case of the 
heavyweight champion boxer changing his name there is a conflict of 
the content of Ali himself. It was, literally, the content of self 
which generated the formal conflicts over what to call him.
Georg Simmel, from whose sociological and philosophical 
distinctions of form and content my notion of form and content of
self is derived, put the distinction this way:
I designate as the content— the materials, so to speak— of 
sociation everything that is present in individuals (the 
immediate concrete loci of all historical 
reality)— drive, interest, purpose, inclination, psychic 
state, movement— everything that is present in them in 
such a way as to engender or mediate effects upon others or 
to receive such effects. In themselves, these materials 
which fill life, these motivations which propel it, are 
not social. Strictly speaking, neither hunger nor love, 
work nor religiosity, technology nor the functions and 
results of intelligence, are social. They are factors in 
sociation only when they transform the mere aggregation of 
isolated individuals into specific forms of being with and 
for one another, forms that are subsumed under the general 
concept of interaction. ([1908] 1959:314-15)
Of this interaction, Simmel wrote:
Human interaction is normally based on the fact that the 
ideational worlds of men have certain elements in common, 
that objective intellectual contents constitute the 
material which is transformed into subjective life by 
means of men's social relations. They type, as well as the 
essential instrument, of these common elements is shared 
language. (Wolff 1950:315)
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In twentieth century America, personal and individual names are both 
assertive and ascriptive. The name is an element of shared language 
which may inform "objective intellectual contents". Had Cassius 
Clay, Jr. undergone a private religious conversion to the Black 
Muslim faith which he was content to leave private, the content of 
his name may not have generated public concern. That is 'Cassius 
Clay, Jr. ' may have changed only for Clay, and only in its reference 
to the individual who had previously not been a Black Muslim and who 
now was. Whatever the reasons of religious dogma or convention, 
whatever the personal impetus, Clay was interested in publicizing 
the fact that a very important content of self— of him, as he saw 
himself— had changed. He chose to change his name to one which was 
commensurate with the tenets and origins of his new faith.
The ensuing public disconcertion had to do exactly with the 
changed form of Clay's changed content. In ignoring the new form, 
those who persisted in addressing Clay as Cassius Clay were refusing 
to participate in the reification of the new content. His taking of 
the name of the Prophet proposed a heresy missing in the politically 
historical statement of Malcolm X, who had refused to wear a surname 
not his own. Public comment ran not along the lines of whether or not 
it was a good thing to do, or whether or not it was a good way to get 
his point across, but along the lines of whether or not such a thing 
was to be allowed. That is, not whether name-changing was allowable, 
but whether content-changing was allowable. And the point had to do 
with this particular content, this new and strange faith. The 
members of the boxing (and general) public were not obliged to 
observe Cassius at his daily prayers, nor were they even invited to 
meet his Muslim mentors. Cassius did not make the tenets of his new 
faith public meat, nor require of his public anything but that they 
recognize his name.
One of the operations which occurred during Ali's tendentious 
name assertion was the social distribution of knowledge: knowledge 
of Ali's new name, knowledge of what brought it about, knowledge of 
Black Muslims and what their religion constituted, and
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knowledge— often incidental— of the opinions of the sportswriters 
and others who were taking public issue with the young champion 
boxer. In a sense, the eventually widespread accord with Muhammad 
Ali's new name is explicable in terms of the sociology of knowledge 
of Mannheim (cf. Mannheim 1952) or Schutz' later critical 
redefinition of the importance of the mechanism by which knowledge is 
socially distributed (Schutz 1964, esp. p.121 ert seq.). But, as 
Berger and Luckmann have pointed out, "the sociology of knowledge 
must concern itself with the social construction of reality"; "the 
sociology of knowledge must first of all concern itself with what 
people 'know' as ' reality' it is precisely this 'knowledge' that 
constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could 
exist" (1971:27). In allowing Ali's name change a public currency, 
Ali's public 'realized' the change from Cassius Clay. Berger and 
Luckmann point out, in their discussion, after Dürkheim, of the need 
for religious community in order to maintain the identity of the new 
convert. As they say of the Biblical conversion of Saul of Tarsus, 
although the conversion itself was a private affair, "he could remain 
Paul only in the context of the Christian community that recognized 
him as such and confirmed the 'new being' in which he now located 
this identity". And they point out, as was the case for Ali, there 
are those "who will say, 'Come off it, Saul'" (1971:178).
The conflict is between the presentations of those who will 
disallow the new self and the presentations of those who will present 
the new form, and in doing so reify the new content. The critical 
difference between Saul and Muhammad Ali is the difference between 
the two communities of context. Saul was transformed into Paul and 
entered the Christian community upon which he depended for the 
sustaining of his new identity. Ali was a member of a community of 
professional boxing both before and after his conversion. He had, 
presumably, no problem among the community of Black Muslims. His 
problem lay in the boxing community. It was not the problem that he 
had become (in the religious sense) 'a new person'; it was the
236
problem made by the fact that the same person— the boxer— had a new 
self.
But even this is not enough to explain the (apparent) need for 
Ali' s self to be popularly realized. That is, Ali was not content to 
be an aka, the also-known-as of two names with two separate 
currencies. Precisely, he was not content to be known as Cassius 
Clay. Whereas Paul, in accepting the reality confirmation of his new 
(in C.H. Cooley's sense) 'primary group', rendered those who would 
say 'Come off it, Saul' members of now-'secondary groups', Ali made 
everyone who would call him by name into a primary group. For Ali, 
the act of saying his name transformed anyone into a 'significant 
other' (cf. Mead 1934:154ff) more accurately, it demanded of the 
other that Ali be (or become) significant. The point of this is that 
the name, Muhammad Ali's name, became publicly important as both a 
form of being and a form for action. The act of addressing Ali could 
no longer be completed if the form of address was Cassius Clay' the 
spoken (or written) act of referring to Ali as Clay generated 
reactions to the form which were not responses to the content of the 
reference.
Simmel wrote,
In any given social phenomenon, content and societal 
form constitute one reality. A social form severed from 
all content can no more attain existence than a spatial 
form can exist without a material whose form it is. Any 
social phenomenon or process is composed of two elements 
which in reality are inseparable: on the one hand, an 
interest, a purpose, or a motive; on the other, a form or 
mode of interaction among individuals through which, or in 
the shape of which, that content attains social 
reality.(1959:315)
In this sense, each social phenomenon which entailed the 
disagreement between Ali and those who called him Clay constituted a 
disputed social reality. The form Clay was not commensurate with the 
Black Muslim content of Ali's asserted identity. The general 
adoption of the new name followed the general awareness that the 
societal form of previous currency— the name 'Cassius Clay'— had 
been successfully 'severed from all content' by Muhammad Ali. With
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that public acquiescence the severing of content was complete, 
leaving only the diehards and eccentrics (and those whose need to 
show 'I knew him back when...') still calling the heavyweight 
champion, 'Cassius'.
In each of these cases from my own society— the physician caught 
'practising without a licence', the aliases which have become akas, 
and the boxer Muhammad Ali— I submit there is a distinction of form 
and content of person, or actor. For persons with aliases there was,
I suspect, an automatic aspect of content which was unsavoury, 
automatically unsavoury upon the announcement of an alias. Whether 
or not this mode of referring to alternate forms of address came 
about, as I have suggested, in order to avoid casting unsavoury 
aspersions on savoury persons who came to be known by more than one 
name, it has certainly been true for a time that "aka Tom Jones" does 
not signal some villain known in the police files by this and other 
names. In any case, for the time being the change of form has changed 
the signalled content.
But in these two cases, there is no certainty that it is the self 
of the quack or the crook which is at stake. In fact, it is highly 
unlikely that the 'self' of the quack will be involved at all (unless 
it proved to be the case that, rather than being an honestly 
pretentious quack he turns out to be a deluded would-be physician). 
And in the case of aliases, persons have them not as multiple forms 
of address for a self but as different forms for addressing the same 
person, (if this were not the usual case, the more unusual cases 
could appear as, say, Mr Hyde aka Dr Jekyll.) But in the case of 
Clay/Ali, there was no simple duplication of forms for addressing the 
same person (though a few reporters writing shortly after Clay's 
conversion did make the mistake of "also known as"). There was, on 
the contrary, a different person. Which is not to say that everyone 
said there was a different person; far from it (some sportswriters 
still call him Cassius Clay). But which is to say that Muhammad Ali 
said there was —  that is, he was— a different person. And this new
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person could no longer answer to that Clay name in good faith, plus 
he wished to conform to his new faith with a new name.
Now, because it all seemed so very important to him, and because 
he risked ostracism and censure and the loss of the very popularity 
which so obviously sustained him as a public figure, I shall take it 
that Ali experienced a change of self. As far as I am aware, he did 
not ever use that word to signify the changes which had occurred and 
he had made. And even had he done so, we would still have to do much 
the same sort of interpretation on his speech-as-action in using the 
word 'self' to talk about himself as we have to do on his 
actions-as-action in interpreting that the content of what I call the 
self was what was at stake in the conversion from Clay to Ali. I have 
used this example because it is one common to much modern anglophone 
idiom; that is, because I need some generally known example which 
most readers may be acquainted with. I want to suggest that what was 
different in Ali (compared to Clay) were some of the 'contents of his 
self'. Specifically, of course, his religion was different. And 
almost as obvious a difference was his new-found aggressive black 
separatist economics. Certainly his new Black Muslim 'spiritual 
advisor' was in the news, as were some of the new additions to his 
entourage.
All of these differences were outside of him, however, and can 
only be used as evidence for the major changes which must have 
occurred in him in order that he would allow all of these to happen: 
Old friends could no longer gain access to him; several white 
comrades were barred from his rooms; long-time members of his 
entourage slipped quietly away. I do not suggest that such major 
changes are strange, or new, or rare. In the days of the Jonesville 
mass murder-suicide, of so-called creationists demanding equal time 
to teach biblical biology in schools, of a born-again Christian in 
the White House, it may be that such changes are more common than 
ever before or, at least, more commonly accessible. What I do 
suggest, after Simmel, is that this relatively new entity, this thing 
called a 'self', has both form and content. Furthermore, I want to
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talk about the process by which the content of self attains social 
reality for any question of self is a question of social reality.
"...or, as we say, Meriam people"
In November of 1977, having pitched my Coleman "Villa Del Mar" 
high-roofed tall-windowed tropical tent in one of Townsville's 
caravan parks, I prepared each morning to venture out into town in 
search of the Torres Strait Islanders with whom I was planning to 
ingratiate myself in order to insinuate myself into their community.
I say 'venture in search of' for I had but a single name, an 
address to go with the name, a notion of island-of-origin (Torres 
Strait Islanders, no matter where they are found, always hail from a 
particular island, and an island particularly in the Eastern or 
Western or Central group— this bloke whose name I had been given by 
two countrymen of his in Sydney on the way up to pitch my tent in this 
meteorologically [30°c] and sociologically barbecued campsite 
hailed from the Eastern group and from, I was pretty sure, the 
principal island of that group: Murray). I had been to the address 
I'd been given. It was a house out in the flat suburbs growing fast 
up the river in the same part of town as the campground.
The first two times no one had been home and I had returned to my 
tent in the 34-degree (Celcius) 10:30 am heat to let my blood thin 
out from a winter in Canberra and relieved, anyway, at having the 
first occasion of me making a cross-cultural ass of myself with these 
Island people delayed.
I was not to be continually reprieved, however, and did manage to 
find the lady of the house at home one afternoon. I did most of the 
talking, got little more from her but "Mm." a few times and an 
address where her husband was to be found during the day. That 
conversation, as well as the next several ones spread out over the 
nearly tendays it took me to show up in a place where this husband of 
hers was at the same time as he was actually there— as opposed to his
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having been 'just here', or 'he'll be back any minute now’, or 'he 
came the second after you left yesterday', and 'too bad; hard to 
believe you could miss ' im three times in three days'— took place 
with me standing a step or two down from the landing of her front 
porch and her in the doorway, leaning against the doorjamb with, 
likely as not, a teatowel in her hand and this unchanging look on her 
face. I'd say I still hadn't caught up with him and she'd say 
nothing. I'd say, regularly, who it was in Sydney who had told me to 
look him up (—  'look him up' ! ha! but what was I to say— that I had 
been given this man's name and I was planning on bothering him so 
much for so long that he was going to tell me not only the story of 
his life and the lives of his Islander countrymen but the most 
intimate details of his life with this woman and their children since 
he came to the Australian mainland?) and she'd nod, say "Mm.", and 
I'd leave, trying not to do anything wrong this early in the piece 
without knowing the first thing about Islander right from wrong. 
And, though we did talk about those strange days much later (when we 
had become family and shared intimate details of our lives), I always 
forgot to ask her if she had meant to be as ruthless and 
well-practised as a Fortune 500 company executive handling a rival 
corporation: she always made me open the conversation; if I obviously 
needed information, she always made me ask for it with abased 
explicity; if her husband hadn't been at the place she said, her 
short nodding "Mm." said 'message received', waiting for me to make 
quite clear any accusation I might have intended knowing full well 
that I did not dare; she kept me a step or two down, putting even my 
six feet two half a head below her eyes, just high enough still so 
that she didn't have to point her head down at me but only drop her 
eyes down along her nose. It was no wonder that the first and early 
message well-received was that she had a chip on her black shoulder 
as hard as a half-kilo of anthracite coal and didn't care in the
least if I ever did find her old man.
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But I kept coming back with my tales of having just missed him at 
that place he was alleged to be at every day, and assumed my proper 
place two steps down off the porch, and finally she began to believe 
that I was just too pathetic to warrant her wielding that hunk of 
black coal at (they never do believe just how pathetic ethnographers 
are until they actually run into one, lumbering around on the fringe 
of another culture as if his entire life depends upon just one person 
inviting him in...which is exactly the case, of course), and I could 
not possibly be a member of that other cast of Where- 
can-we-find-your-husband, the ones with the warrants and the 
uniforms. (it was this last that put the tiny bit of fearful 
reticence in her manner, the bit which kept me for so long from 
realizing a tack to take in our conversations; it was the bit of fear 
that she so hated, and had grown to hate the whites who had put it 
there and which kept her always afraid of just singing out, or 
closing the door, or whatever...and so it kept me on my perch, two 
steps down, with an imperceptive awkwardness which strained our 
early encounters but served humbly well in the long run.)
When I finally found her old man it was as if I were only the 
visage which needed putting on the tales of my visits. I had been 
'just there' and 'not quite in time' and 'only just missed’ for a 
week and a half, at his house, at his work, and even at one of the 
offices in town where he was known to call in from time to time. I 
told him who I was (he said nothing) and who it was who had given me 
his name (nothing) and mentioned another mutual acquaintance 
(nothing). I told him I had visited with his two countrymen in Sydney 
on the way up (he said nothing), and that one of them— I was reduced 
to stupid reiteration, having exhausted my three topics of 
interest— had told me to look him up. (Still he said nothing.) 
Finally, standing as I was two steps down from the doorsill of the 
building where I had finally found him, and getting bored with the 
two-steps-down-and-a-pace-behind feeling that I was starting to get 
around these Island people, I said that I was wanting to learn 
something of Torres Strait Islanders, and that I had come to
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Townsville because I had been here before and knew that there were a 
lot of Islanders here and that's why I had been checking with his 
countrymen to see who to talk to here. He said, "Mm."
So here I was on my same perch: different stoop, still two steps 
down. I have no idea whether this guy means to be as fierce and black 
as he seems certainly to be making himself out to be. (Later I would 
learn that this is the way you look at strange white men if strange 
white men have ejected you from pubs, ganged-up to beat you up with 
the impunity of North Queensland Saturday night bravado having 
mistaken you for an Aboriginal, carted you off well dressed and sober 
for being found drunk-and-disorderly (which meant for being in the 
wrong pub, or rather, in any but the one right pub, the 'blackfellas 
pub') and chucked you into jail overnight and you torn between 
just-a-borning Black Power righteous indignation and the wife you 
knew would be frantic with worry until they let you out.) So I 
started my litany again, hoping for at least his "Mm"-refrain until I 
could figure out something else to do (and while I worked my 
centering exercises to remind myself that I was younger and bigger 
than this Malcolm X lookalike and had no reason to feel as scared as I 
did) :
I've come up from Canberra to study Torres Strait 
Islanders.
(Glare.)
I know some fellow Torres Strait Islanders of yours.
(-.)
One of them said to see only you and nobody but you in 
Townsville.
(Nod.)
(— My flattering subterfuge had cracked him? I pushed 
on — ) Yeah, he sure did. Every time I mentioned a name 
he said No, you!
(Glare.)
I've been looking all over for you.
(Silently: So— ?)
You see, I'm from university and Torres Strait Islanders 
in—
Island people.
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—  terest me since they have recently...(he spoke!?) Huh? 
uh...Pardon?
Island people! No "Torres Strait Islanders": Island 
people.
Ah. Well, Island people interest me since—
/...or, as we say, Meriam people.
And that one stopped me. Cold. And stopped cold as I was I must
have been less pensive, or dropped my pose, or had my benign
confusion read from my face easily because the next thing I knew we
were both walking out to the shade of the trees in front of the
building. I had somehow fallen in step with him. He had miraculously
descended the two steps and began talking as he strolled the thirty
feet to the shade. And as it dawned on me that this "Meriam" he had
said was the living pronunciation of the miriam/Miriam I had seen in
print, from Haddon's reports from the last century through some of
Jeremy Beckett's recent anthropology. He was saying something about
his people being the people of Murray Island. He may have called them
"Meriam le" way back on that first day; he would likely have, but my
notes are patchier than my memory, and mostly I was trying to look as
if I were paying attention and trying not to walk too fast, nor too
far behind, nor too far forward— there would be a gate only wide
enough for one at a time! (i tried an unobtrusive half-step lag just
as we approached it which seemed at the time to work just
fine...later I understood that he would have assumed his unthinking
right of first passage and would only have noticed me had I barged
ahead) and all the while my feeble brain was making my very first
living Torres Strait Islander social fact: There's a 'we' for whom 
/"Meriam people" is a better way of saying "us" than "Torres Strait 
Islanders" is. (Later, so many months later when all of this had 
become part of me, I was bragging to a friend of mine whose roots were 
Scotland's Outer Hebrides about his regard for these people from 
Australia's outer islands with whom he claimed the kinship of 
disenfranchisement and the second-class citizenship of ethnic 
minorities since the times of Culloden and before. Working with them 
in the North Queensland towns he took pains to avoid insulting them.
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I told him the Island people thought 'Torres Strait Islanders' to he
a name after some White bloke whom they recall sailing by, and
advised him to at least say 'Island people', "or," I said, "as we 
✓say, Meriam people".)
"A brown Jay Gatsby— "
So what to call this glaring, fierce introduction to the Island 
people ("...or, as we say, Meriam people")? Jay will do for now. 
Always this problem with real live ethnography. Do you call them by 
their real names, especially the courageous ones like Jay, the ones 
who have always been willing to try their luck and take their lumps
and niggle out a decent life for them and their kinds in this so so
white state, always on the lookout for the ones with the necks
sunburnt from bending forward to kick the abos out from in front of 
the pub?
By next chapter I'll probably be calling him 'my man' or some
other such corny pseudo-Black American hipster handle. But Jay, the
brown Jay Gatsby will do for now. He reminds me always of Muhammad
Ali (that's who Hunter Thompson called "the brown Jay Gatsby", which
is where I borrowed the tag) . A scrapper as well as a semi-pro boxer
(one of the first of a long line of Islanders still carrying the
Queensland colours into Golden Gloves and Pacific Games rings) . Took
on three whites somewhere down at the Sovereign Hotel/railway
station end of town one night and nearly cleaned them up all by
himself (they left before they were down, probably because they
figured it would cost them too much to really mess up this Island
Ali) . Three death threats personally telephoned to him one day (and
one threat to burn down his house with his wife and children inside),
and sure enough, there we were (WE!?), going on about our nightly
business at the housing cooperative while three carloads of the
/current enemy faction were cruising around the houses of some Meriam 
families waving rifles and yahooing like TV-Indians around covered 
wagons. Funny, except here we are, Jay with his They-
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aren't-going-to-scare-me-C'mon-Larry and me trying to remember that 
AUTOMATIC move for getting at the blade that's strapped to my leg 
(anthropologists making retrospective speeches about those 
ethnographers who've bravely given their lives in pursuit of 
knowledge is one thing, but the savages in this place are civilized, 
and carry point-two-two rifles in their Holdens).
But I am getting ahead of my story. My story is supposed to be in 
support of the idea that a self is a social reality, that we can now 
begin to discern just how social realities come to be, and so we may 
be able to begin to understand how seifs come to be. The self in 
question is, of course, mine. It is my Island self. It was never a 
very complete one, and is less so nowadays, much less so than that 
night when I left my wife Cherie to sit with Jay's wife and kids until 
three a.m. with the shutters closed and the kids taking turns dimming 
the lights and peeping out the door every time a car turned onto 
their suburban street. Partly it is less because of the effort of 
coming round to writing about it, part of the price paid for taking 
the writing as seriously as the research; no censorship, but much 
discarded or, if not exactly discarded, put aside certainly until the 
time when it is possible to put that (whatever it was) into words. 
Imagine trying to put into words the reality of internecine black 
politics when the memory of the clearest statement of it is the 
memory of leaving your wife and kids at the mercy of some crazy who's 
going to come with guns and fire. Now imagine trying to write it, in 
English, so that neither melodrama nor readers' scepticisms colour 
it irrevocably. Today I would not have left her; that night it was 
the thing to do.
In order to talk about the hugely encompassing idea of 
mind-self-society of George Herbert Mead (something like Harry Stack 
Sullivan's "self system" put into its full anthropological context), 
Paul Pfeutze coined the term the social self. With it he compared 
Mead with the I-thou of Martin Buber. This is the self I am concerned 
with, this social self. It cannot exist without its own history; it
cannot exist without the history of its others. Even to say exist is
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but a figure of speech. Better to say The Self is not sensible
without its historicity. The Self (any self) has not got to where it
is without its Others having got to 'where' they are. Lacan calls the
Other simply the rest of the system in which the subject is involved,
and the "discourse of the Other" is the unconscious subject, the
subject which poses the question of the subject's being. The
problem for anyone interested in the social construction of the self
is to learn to glimpse its construction materials just as soon after
they appear as he can. One of the commonly accepted drawbacks of
anthropological research, or at least of that staple usually called
'ethnographic experience' is that the ethnographer does not get to
learn all that he comes to know in the same way the members of the
society do, having been gradually socialized since their childhood.
But the corollary of this is not so commonly accepted being, as it
is, hardly recognized: the ethnographer has a tremendous opportunity
by virtue of his adulthood to observe himself in the process of
becoming a self that (usually) no other adult human being has ever
before become— not even the members of the very society he enters!
Do Islanders remember the first time they are called "Islanders"?
(Who knows? I never asked, not ever being able to figure out a
neutral way of asking; and I never heard of anyone else asking.) Do 
/the Meriam people remember, each of them, the first time they were
✓ . ' called Meriam people? (I do. But I began as not-Meriam, a beginning
they cannot have.) Do they remember the first time a Meriam man
deigned to signal to them his admittance of them at least to the
first outer circle of knowledge, in the way Jay did me by finally not
making me continue saying 'Torres Strait Islanders' 'Torres Strait
Islanders' like some dumb honky refrain and letting me know at least
that the mob I was going to study had a way of reckoning themselves, a
way important enough to make sure I got the message on my first day on
the job? — Of course not. They get to learn "Meriam people" first
and then figure out that white maps mark them down as the
geographical descendants of Captain Torres's discovery. For finding
/out what being one of the "Meriam people" means, the best method is
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to find one— as I found Jay— and apprentice yourself to him. But for
finding out what becoming one of these people means, for that you've
got to find an anthropologist. You have to find someone willing to
begin to act in terms of a 'discourse of the Other'— that is, to
begin to construct a self— for an Other (Lacan: "the rest of the
system") never before encountered.
Fortunately the human kind is a sense-maker par excellence.
Without, say, unavoidable psychological pressure or chemically
induced sensory perturbations, making sense of another culture is
not intrinsically any more difficult than making sense of an alarm
clock ringing: plunk any sample of Homo sapiens down into the room
where the other culture is and he will immediately begin making sense
/of it. Of course, when that bell rings out "Meriam people" he may
hear that as an alternative to the exoteric label he took in, and
register it 'merely' as another way of saying "Torres Strait
Islander". He makes thereby the same mistake as the sense-making
organism does when it 'hears' the wake-up alarm as merely another
telephone call or dreams a remembered bell. (The anthropologist's
problem is that even armed with illustrations such as this one, he
has never encountered any Islander 'bells'...so his dreams are as
untrustworthy as his wakeful senses, providing not even those
nocturnal wrongnesses which help keep the days right.)
So I apprenticed myself, without telling him, to this brown Jay
Gatsby. And he took me on, without (i was to find out later) telling
me. And, as it turned out, he had taken me on for the same reasons
that I had 'apprenticed' myself to him, that hot day in Townsville.
"A brown Jay Gatsby— not black and with a head that would never be
white. " That's what Hunter Thompson wrote of Muhammad Ali; it
serves my Jay also. Why did he take me on? Beyond the fact that I am
what is known as a 'quick-study' , I'm still not sure. The only clue I
/have rests on the Meriam idea of education, the idea behind Chapter 
4, and which I return to below.
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Whatever the reason, or for no reason at all, he became the agent 
and agency of my inculcation. Are all Island men courageous? Yes, I 
think so. At least by my sense of common Anglo standards of risk and 
the taking of 'reasonable chances' they are. But am I to know? I 
think all United States Marines are courageous, and all 
anthropologists are (so I obviously reckon courage 
action-in-spite-of-fear rather than fearlessness). Maybe every 
single Island man I ever met is measured against the first entry into 
the discourse of my Island Other, this scrapper who would never be 
white. "Us and the Maori!" he used to tell me. "Us and the 
Maori— the only Island people never conquered by the white man."
Some people write their novels and others roll high 
enough to live them and some fools try to do both— but Ali 
can barely read, much less write, so he came to that fork 
in the road long ago and he had the rare instinct to find 
that one seam in the defense that let him opt for a third 
choice: he could get rid of words altogether and live his 
own movie.
(Thompson again.) So there we were in his movie, me with this 12-inch 
blade strapped to my leg, checking the release snap at the same time 
as I'm wondering if I really want to get to the point of having to 
stick some black fool just because I'm apprenticed to the wrong movie 
(but knowing withal that I will err on the side of my own survival if 
we do get caught).
A Content of Self
The 'motion of self' which this chapter is concerned with is mine.
And it is, by extension (but, I hasten to add, an extension made only
by my reader on his grounds) the motion of self of others who have
either changed seifs or changed contexts of self. Shortly before the
Indians-circling-the-wagons incident I had occasion to receive the
/ultimate acceptance into the life of the Meriam people.
(Had I not, or had it not been hardly a week old, or had it not 
been this very man whom I accompanied half as brother and half as 
bodyguard, or had not the memory of the relief at finally having no
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more worries at all about some Islander pulling the research rug out 
from under me— Kemo Sabe, look like you speak with whiteman fork 
tongue after all. Adios.— or had it been a month or two later, after 
I had been accused by a member of government of single handedly 
causing the rift between the Islanders and the Aborigines, or after I 
had dropped off an Afro-and-dashiki bedecked southern Black 
Power-type at the airport and been immediately picked up by the 
police on one of those 'well...uh...dope. That's it: Dope! Maybe 
you're...uh... smuggling dope' unofficial arrests. ...or this, or 
that, or who knows?...I may have been not so quick to get armed and 
into the thick of it.)
But as I said, who knows? This is exactly the problem of paying
strict attention to the facts of consciousness while knowing full
well that it is, as Lacan says, the subconscious which poses the very
72questions of the conscious subject. In any case, I had been finally 
accepted.
We had been sitting in a coffee shop, Jay and I. We had remained
seated at the table in a kind of unbelieving aftershock, though not
so much a shock as a new after-feeling. Some of the leading men from
the islands of Saibai , Badu, and Mabuiag had just left to go on about
their business. All six of us had had a long lunch talking about
problems facing the Islander community as a whole. There had been no
rancour, no secret sneering between the toasted cheese and curried
egg sandwiches; nothing whatsoever of the endemic Eastern-Western
conflict had raised its head. By the time coffee was served they were
comparing stories of their first visits to each others' island groups
as boys on pearling luggers or IIB supply boats, tossing into the
conversation words and phrases of each others' languages, and even
comparing notes on genealogies by mentioning their dually-related
in-laws (the ones who are invariably referred to on less salutary
occasions as traitors to their island group). And I'm trying to not
/fail to laugh when Meriam laughter is called for (but trying to avoid 
being caught joining in the laughing when the only ones laughing had
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been there back in the old days— I being the one Islandman without 
any but the most recent of 'old days').
I am trying so hard to participate that I forget to observe. It 
fails to dawn on me that I have been allowed to stay for a meeting of 
island leaders when it is a meeting attended only by leaders(l). Not 
only am I distracted by having to avoid permitting these gracious men 
to embarrass themselves by having me turn out to be not nearly so 
competent in their languages and graces as their generous (not to say 
optimisitic, even inflated) assessment of me, but also I am still 
suffering that peculiar feeling of having been cast adrift which 
comes on us when we commit one of those social gaffs whose context 
makes them especially unbelievable. Like the Army public relations 
officer who leaves the reception for survivors of Pearl Harbor on the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Japanese attack saying, in an 
attempt for just the right mix of soldierly comraderie and civilian 
elan, "Well, men. Sayonara!", I had, not two weeks before this 
historic meeting, managed to address a group of my fellow Islandmen 
in Aboriginal pidgin! (i could have picked any other lingo for my 
faux pas but that one...like my Army PR-man who could at least have 
said "Ciao" if he couldn't be satisfied with Good-bye.) Everything 
had come to a screeching halt that night while they sorted out 
whether or not a gross error in judgment had been made in respect of 
my entry into the community. And I was still waiting on pins and 
needles to see if the 'fellow' had dropped out of "my fellow 
Islandmen" before I had even got used to it rolling off my tongue.
So they have left and I, thinking back on that day, must have been 
as little present as that first day I met Jay, waiting to see if I was 
to be shown the door, shut out of Islander ethnography at this 
hopeless stage— seven months plus into the fieldwork— of too much 
invested to turn my back on it and too little to do anything with.
"Good meeting," I said to Jay.
"Mm." he nodded. We sat some more. "Prapa Islandman, dempla," he 
said after a while, musing, surprised as ever to find that out about 
the men of the Western islands (Real Islandmen, those guys).
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I was thrilled, beside myself with investigative glee. I had
announced in a pre-fieldwork seminar at the national university an
interest in changing social forms and in "the domains of cooperation
and conflict(l) among Islanders in town". I had proposed to
investigate an earlier suggestion that Islanders were adopting a
75Torres Strait Islander identity in favour of that of home islands , 
particularly in light of Jan-Petter Blom's notion of the 
organization of ethnic identities depending not "on cultural 
diversity per se, as generally assumed in anthropology, but rather on 
the assignment of particular social meanings to a limited set of 
acts"
And here it all was. In a coffee shop in a Townsville arcade the 
casual lunch among menfolk, heretofore reserved for groups 
restricted to those of same-island origin, or at least to same island 
group (and even then mostly restricted even so to relations from 
those other islands of the group), had become an all-Torres Strait 
event! This is what Simmel meant by life being both more-life and 
more-than-life.
By saying that life is more-life, Simmel declares life 
to be a process. Life is a motion; specifically it is a 
motion which constantly reproduces itself, pushes beyond 
itself. "The present of life consists of its transcending
the present.
This sense of motion is a real motion, each moment dissolving into 
the next. It is compatible with my sense of motion of self, a sense 
in which the self ’moves' from one identity to the next (or to none), 
from one context to the next. And the self, seen now from its former 
context, now from its current one, is more-than-life, having become 
one of
the objects which life creates by virtue of the formal 
principles implicit in experience. Whether we consider 
contents only as they are shaped in experience, whether we 
focus upon an ideal world that is implicitly generated by 
experience, or whether we attend to a human work as a 
material embodiment of experience, the structure in 
question "possesses its own meaning, a logical coherence, 
some kind of validity or stability, independent of its
7 f)having been produced and being borne along by life."
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I have said something of my sense of meaning, of meaning as the 
next-thing in a situation. Here is Simmel's sense of meaning— a 
coherent validity independent of its having been produced by 
life— one which has informed my own thoughts on this matter (though I 
cannot recall how my thinking followed my reading of his), and which 
I now read to fit with my own: the coherent validity is the 
next-thing, the meaning, so long as someone is there to make the 
meaningful connection (or so long as the situation can be remembered 
in order that the meaning be construed as the next-thing, though its 
'nextness' may stretch far beyond our normal reckoning of contiguity 
as continuity).
For the meeting in the coffee shop, the potency of making a 
meaningful association of All-Torres Strait was tangible. But it 
was, I think (that is, I thought so then, and upon reflection shortly 
thereafter, and later upon analytical reflection), only tangible for 
me. That they did proceed to a form for All-Torres Strait social 
action which came to be called Islandmeeting is part of the 
next-thing after that casual lunch in the Permanent Arcade, (it is 
that sense of "meaning" where someone asks, 'What was the meaning of 
those Westerners and Easterners at the same table that day in June of 
1978?', and the answer follows, 'What it meant was that they could 
have a second lunch when they needed to in order to figure out how to 
get all the Island people together to try to stop all the health and 
housing and legal support services being taken over by Aborigines who 
would lock the Islanders out. That lunch meant they could have the 
Islandmeetings!) And that was part of their retrospectively assigned 
meaning (in the way that subsequence is designated after the fact), 
nominating or discovering the prior which permitted the event in 
question to be 'next'thing. At least one of them said, rather 
bemusedly after a particularly successful Islandmeeting called to 
present the Island people's case to some visiting officers of the 
Commonwealth's Office of Community Relations, something about how 
this "all-Torres Strait business emi stat pastime lo dat Coffee 
Spot".
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So all of this generally meaningful community activity is
proceeding ("produced and being borne along by life" as Simmel put
it). But so too is the less commonly attended to sociology of the
construction of a social self. In particular, the self of the one
person at that lunch almost squirming in distinctly un-Islandman
fashion (no one, East or West, squirms when they eat) at the prospect
of finding himself one day to have been present at the kernel of a new
ethnic group. The Westerners depart, Jay and I exchange our "Good
meeting", "Mm. Prapa Islandman, dempla." Then, when I'm still
leaping into the imagined future of somehow all Islanders getting
together and forgetting that the Westerners can't stand the mincing
pedantic picky-ness of the Eastern This-and-thats (Able-able: from 
✓ /Meriam mir able— THIS or THAT— which Western Islanders hear as every 
other word out of the Easterners' always-overspecifying mouths) and 
the Easterners can't stomach their huge counterparts from the 
Western reaches whom they call The Slobs (Gom le: which they say 
means 'body people', or 'eaters of bad food', but which is merely a 
corruption of the name of the people of Gumulaga for themselves and 
their island), I forget my Islandman self that my ethnographer self 
ought to let my anthropologist self monitor during construction.
"God," I say, as it finally dawns on me that I have just been 
present at a lunch attended by, and only by, island head men, "I 
can't believe it. Jay, I have been sitting here with all these prapa 
au-le."
Ever so slowly, but the slowness of tiny fits and jerks of
unbelieving realization dawning and being rejected and pressing
depite the rejection, Jay begins to raise his head. His disbelief
makes him play with the handle of his coffee cup, squint a little as
if peering at the person he thought I was until the moment I opened my
mouth with that, ducking the moment when his eyes will raise all the
way and he'll have to see me as the person I am now/have just
become/reverted to for a moment?— and (this is the frightening
one)— have always been. It's this last possibility which really
/slows him down: What if this Lare, whose very name has been
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predicated upon his having inculcated Island content, what if he
turns out right now?is turning out right before Jay's very eyes?turns
out to have always been despite every trust and teaching and
counsel.. .what if he turns out to be after all only Larry,
/half-anthropologist half-kole? How could anyone but some half-assed 
white kole-man say that? HOW COULD I HAVE JUST PRESENTED HIM TO THESE 
IMPORTANT MEN AS A PRAPA ISLANDMAN HIMSELF? AS NOT JUST AN ISLANDMAN 
BUT AS MERIAM IB, A COUNTRYMAN TO BE RECKONED WITH, A MAN OF MER?! ? I 
HAVE JUST INVITED TO MY TABLE THE TOP MEN FROM THE THREE MAIN WESTERN 
ISLANDS KNOWING THAT THEY WILL TAKE MY SILENCE REGARDING LARE AS 
WARRANTING HIS PRESENCE HERE AND HE SAYS WHEN IT'S ALL OVER THAT HE 
CAN'T BELIEVE IT!? WHO DOES HE THINK HE IS? WHO IS HE?
He raises his head, finally. And even though he has taken what I 
realized later was an interminable time about it, I am only just 
starting to get the feeling that something is wrong. His fingers 
leave the coffee cup handle, his squinting and relaxing stops. He 
raises his head the rest of the way and fixes me with this look, of 
which the questions in caps above are the best translation I can 
render in English. It begins to dawn on me, as I fumble around for 
something to say in a time where nothing will do, that the contents 
of my Island self are seriously on trial, not only my Aboriginal 
pidgin gaff but now this one. And I still don't know what this one 
is.
A Precision of a Different Kind
I have offered the reflective questions in ALL-CAPS as a 
'translation' of the look I got from Jay. The problems inherent in 
making ethnography— in making on paper with discursive prose what 
were the facts of a life lived in its audial and olfactory and visual 
presence— are extraordinarily exacerbated by any unwillingness to 
ignore any of the contents of the experiences which were the 
substance and the process of the ethnographic research. I offer 
these capitalized questions as the content of Jay's look, in the same
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way that I offered the impressions and vignettes of the preceding
section as something of the content of my self, a self which 'moved'
/  / /from half-anthropologist half-kole to Islandman, to Meriam le; and 
which, as I left the coffee shop story, threatened to move right back 
again.
I use CAPS in the same way students of communication use CAPS for 
the glosses of the signs in sign language, or the glosses linguists 
assign to native vocabulary, or the way in which initial-codes become 
acronyms (like Anzac, and Nato, and George Lucas's Star Wars robot 
"Artoo Detoo" [R2D2]). Do I intend that these be read, uncritically, 
as Jay's? No. I intend them, like any other kind of gloss, as my best 
reading, rendered in the language of presentation (in this case 
English), of the content of the experience of receiving that baleful 
look.
This is a use of language which is different from the normal 
scientific use of language. Scientific language is posited upon the 
idea of tertium quid, the third thing, the thing which stands apart 
from the writer and the reader— from the laboratory worker and the 
audience to whom he is reporting, or from the experimenter and those 
planning on duplicating the experiment, or from the laboratory 
worker and the audience to whom he is reporting, or from the 
experimenter and those planning on duplicating the experiment, or 
from the surgeon and those who would learn his technique— and which 
may be related to the text by absolute one-to-one correspondence with 
the words from the text. In this use of language, the language may be 
taken to serve as the tertium quid because the text is taken to be a 
perfect map. And it may be that matters having to do with the 
contents of persons, and with their formal expressions, and with the 
changes from context to context and ensuing alterations in content 
which I have called 'motions of self’, will be someday dealt with in 
formal scientific language, when the possible differences between 
one person's 'Island-self' and another person's 'Island-self' are 
negligible, and the idea of a 'Such-and-such self' is old hat, part
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of the everyday lingo of the social reality construction of persons, 
like _id_, and ego, and sub-conscious.
This is not yet the case. We have learned in the anthropology of 
communication to be reluctant about taking any map to be such a 
perfect stand = in for its territory. Lao-tsu and his the way which 
can be told is not the true way (Tao te Ching) begins to have more 
practical application that even early Western afficianadoes once 
thought. If I say, using the upper- and lower-case of normal prose, 
that those were Jay's thoughts as he looked at me, I am on shaky 
ground. Not only am I liable to the kind of amateur epistemology (How 
do you know that? I suppose you can get in people's heads?) that is 
rife in post-Schutz social science, but also I do myself a double 
disservice. That is, I make two errors of a discursive nature. In 
the first error, I permit the reading that I am presuming to render 
private thoughts, assigning them like a novelist would in order to 
make my story come out as I wish. In the second I risk the 
interpretation that I am using language in a scientific manner, and 
that I expect the reader to take the words I write as the words he 
reads, and to take both of them as a correspondence with the reality 
they describe.
It is this second error which is the less easily handled (the 
first has been dealt with merely by my insisting that I have used a 
glossing method signaled by capital letters). In part, my insistence 
on discussing my sense of what constitutes meaning is meant to inform 
this possibility for error: if meaning is, as I maintain, the 
next-thing in any human situation, then the meaning of what I have 
written is in the reader (first it is in me, as I am my own first 
reader, insofar as I am capable of that very difficult endeavour). 
When this happens, all such blather as this page and a half just gets 
in the way of reading on to see what I have to say next. But when one 
of the humanities, in this case anthropology, becomes tainted with 
the brush of 'social science', then it is no longer easy to justify 
laying any and all misreadings at the feet of the reader. For those 
readers who understood that I was not presuming to render the
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thoughts of ray brown Gatsby, they may skip to the next page. But for 
those who did not, these formal remarks proffer a caution. 
Scientific language has not yet established a convention for mapping 
one-to-one correspondences in respect of the very real social facts 
of our construction of ourselves as persons by 'reading' others' 
reactions to us, and actions pursuant to those reactions, and so 
forth. We are, therefore, unable to avail ourselves of such 
conventions (and, moreover, I suspect that as soon as any get 
established, human beings will begin reconstructing social 
epistemologies of personhood on the grounds of the new psychological 
establishmentia, just as we have inculcated Freudian theory as the 
basis for post-ego psychologies).
What we must do, if we wish to convey the bases of the actions 
whose constituent events informed changes in persons, is to make 
those events on the page. And we do not have the however attractive 
option of acting as if there is some vocabulary that we may use which 
will ensure our blamelessness as anthropological writers, permit the 
smug response to the mis-reader, 'Go get yourself a dictionary if you 
don't know what I mean' . In particular, we must work to be as true to 
that which we take to be the premises of the actions of our subject 
peoples as we can, admitting all the while (though I think not, in 
the future, with the explicit attention I have felt myself obligated 
to in the present work) that we are constrained by cross-modal 
transpositions, translation, glossing, and so forth. I have been 
true to what I call Island idiom. I am suspicious of efforts to 
analyze communication which take as their notional goal some cause 
for which observed communication is an effect. My guess is that 
communication, equipped with a memory able to recall past 
communications, has nothing more than, or less than, or different 
from, communication at its base. And it is this which keeps us to 
Lao-tsu's "middle way": if the reality of communication and, thence, 
of the social beings we are made, is one which has at its root the 
construance of meaning, then ethnographies must report events from
which the reader can construe the right meanings.
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The alternative, the scientific way of positing verities with 
which positive correspondences are made in order to pose some 
ethnographic scene for the reader's perusal, leaves us trapped 
between positivism and the poseur: unable to put how it really was we 
are obliged to pretend that it was how we posit it, locking us into an 
unending cycle of dictionary-making, always arguing over the way to 
posit the tertium quid to get it closer to reality, prevented forever 
from using the one reality which we have at hand, the living natural 
language which we share with our readers. So when I write that 
rendition of my reading of that look which promised, over a coffee 
shop table in Townsville, that all of my work at making myself into 
an acceptable Islandman was about to go for nought, the meaning of 
what I write is in the reader's reading of that half-paragraph as an 
account of a look which promised that the poor young anthropologist 
was in imminent danger of having all his work on making himself into 
an acceptable participant in order to observe such goings on as the 
first ever meeting of Eastern and Western Island leaders 
naturally-occurring in the urban Mainland scene about to be erased.
It may be that the reader will make an interpretation that that 
young anthropologist ought to have been paying attention to the form 
of his own interacting and not to the changing content of 
inter-island relations. Such an interpretation accords with my own. 
But both are interpretations, mine based on memory and having been 
there and the reader's on an exegesis of my text. In any case, there 
ought to be agreement possible on the text in respect of which 
readings and interpretations may or may not agree. For a writer 
writing about his own self (as ethnographers who would discuss the 
social construction of another social self must), the fork between
posing and positivism is acute. The only hope is that put by Lacan:
It is not a question of knowing whether I am speaking about 
myself in conformity with what I am, but rather that of 
knowing whether, when I speak of it, I am the same as that 
77of which I speak.
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The saving grace of a view of communicational reality which hinges 
on the primacy response— of hearing over speaking, reading over 
writing, 'reading' a received look over giving someone a look— lies 
in the trusting the reader to give a full and honest reading to the 
written text: Trusting him to pick up any nuance of posing, to reject 
any implicit wheedling, to make his own assessment of the events 
presented. Of course this requires us to write the events themselves 
and not our interpretations of them. It also requires us to write as 
fully as we can, putting down enough information about who we were as 
participants as we do about who and what we saw as observers. Only in 
this way can the reader have at hand the wherewithall to make the 
readings we must trust him to make. And, again, because we are bent 
(in ethnography, though not always in ethnology or in anthropology) 
on doing things with our language rather than about it, we have to be 
as precise as we can.
Hamlet, Horatio, and Marcellus walk upon the castle 
platform awaiting midnight and Hamlet’s father's ghost. 
Hamlet says, "The air bites shrewdly; it is very cold," and 
Horatio answers, "It is a nipping and an eager air."
So writes William Gass in his essay on "fiction and the figures of
life", "Life in Terms of the Toenail".
Hamlet and Horatio do not think of it as cold, simply. The 
dog of air's around them, shrewd and eager, running at 
heels... The nature of the weather is conveyed to us with 
marvelous exactitude and ease, in remarks made by the way, 
far from the center of action; so that we find ourselves 
with knowledge of it in just the off-hand way we would if, 
bent on meeting a king's ghost, we too went through the 
sharp wind.
"If," as Professor Geertz likes to quote Northrop Frye, "we go to see 
Macbeth to learn what a man feels like after he has gained a kingdom 
and lost his soul, Balinese," he tells us at the end of his essay on 
The Cockfight, "go to cockfights to find out what a man, usually 
composed, aloof, almost obsessively self-absorbed feels like when, 
attacked, tormented, challenged, insulted, and driven in result to 
the extremes of fury, he has totally triumphed or been brought 
totally low."78
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But if, I should like to add, we read The Cockfight in order to 
find out what a people do take to be real when, as we read in Geertz's 
opening paragraph, they "deal with people not part of their life who 
yet press themselves upon them as though we [the Geertz's] were not 
there...nonpersons, specters, invisible men", then we might read 
Hamlet to hear our own forbears account for the weather "in just the 
off-hand way we would if we too went through the sharp wind." As Gass 
says,
If we knew the temperature was ten degrees and the wind 
force five, we might imagine rather well how cold the wind 
would feel... Perhaps one can say that the scientist works 
always through a quantitatively abstract system, and that 
his purpose seems to be to find ways to represent the vague 
and informal qualitative content of experience within a 
rationally well-ordered formal scheme. ...Shakespeare has 
introduced an altogether novel set of concepts; novel, 
that is, with respect to the idea of weather as such; and 
it is through these concepts that we understand the kind of 
wind and cold we're in, just as, through the mathematical, 
the scientist tries to understand the experienced weather 
too.
But the difference is that ten degrees and force five only support 
an understanding if both the scientist and whomever it is he is 
describing the weather to have already been in such a wind and 
assigned this particular tertium quid— 10°/Force 5— to that 
experience. The difference is the absence of assignation. Hamlet 
and Horatio can, with only the words they leave us witness, as Gass 
puts it, "give us the dog of the air itself”. "And," he continues, "I 
think it will be obvious to anyone who fairly examines the meaning of 
Shakespeare's language that it renders the weather with a precision 
quite equal to the precision of the scientific, although the 
scientific precision is of a different kind."
The Motion of the Contentious Self
For us, here, the 'dog of the air itself' is the beast we have come 
to call the Self. My suggestion is that we take the observed reality 
that persons change who they are and, in the light of the twentieth 
century discoveries of the social, communicational, interactional
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nature of these things we call persons, bring to bear upon them Georg 
Simmel's distinction between form and content. In this way may we 
speak of persons who, still taken to be who they once were, begin to 
change into who they will be taken for. Charles H. Cooley said, "The 
imaginations people have of one another are the solid facts of 
society." Consider the gape-jawed eighteen-year-old Islander who I 
surprised in Canberra once by having a white face and talking Torres 
Strait Pidgin at the same time. He said, when he finally regained 
himself, that he never imagined a white person talking his language.
That was a case where the formal self (white and no-Pidgin)
changed to the new formal self (white and Pidgin) in short order.
Nevertheless, there was a time when, in respect of this one Island
boy, I might not have been able to sustain my Island-self. In a more
sophisticated millieu he might well have used the stereotypical
response of les Frant^ais to the honking anglophone struggling
(however fluently in actuality) with the French tongue who finally is
interrupted by, "My good fellow, do you mind terribly if we use
English?" In such a scenario the French self (or ray Island self) has
simply no expression. According to my proposed form and content
distinction, the French self has no form. This does not mean that the
anglophone can't speak French, nor does it deny that he is somehow
/able to understand French and even wander around the cafes and 
patisseries. What it means is that all of these capacities are 
denied formal presence and must remain as content: they are part of 
the contentious self.
This notion of a contentious self permits a handling of a unitary 
human nature without insisting upon observed similarities among 
human beings. In his theory of the self,^ Roberto Unger writes,
In the tradition of our culture, three topics have 
dominated the study of human nature. The first is the 
problem of the connection between human nature and 
history. The second is the choice between the 
essentialist and the relational view of humanity. The 
third is the question of the place the individual occupies 
in the species. A theory of the self can be defined by the 
position it takes on these three issues.
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With some of the flavour of Simmel's more-life and more-than-life,
Unger writes of human nature as
a universal that exists through its particular 
embodiments, always moves beyong any one of them, and 
changes through their sequence. Each person and each form 
of social life represents a novel interpretation of 
humanity, and each new interpretation transforms what 
humanity is.
More than this, an idea of the content of self lets us reckon 
persons as they change their forms of social life, recognizing that 
for the rest of the contents of that person no change is being 
undertaken. We can also attend to the very contents that are 
changing, sometimes faster than the general social reality in which 
the new embodiment becomes embedded, sometimes slower. In his story 
"Cassius", Sam Toperoff brings Cassius from the boy in "a rickety 
second-floor gym over the toughest poolroom in the colored section of 
Louisville" to Muhammad Ali refusing to take the Army oath of 
induction— "During the administration of the oath, when the 
inductees were asked to take one step forward, Mr Clay— or Mr Ali, as 
he prefers to be called— refused, and at that moment he became liable 
to prosecution..." (Lt. Col. Pidgeon, Publicity Officer). Hunter 
Thompson writing of The Champ and his entourage three weeks after the 
unexpected defeat at the hands of Leon Spinks said of Bundini Brown 
("Ali's alter ego and court wizard... the man who came up with 'Float 
like a butterfly, sting like a bee"') and executive spokesman Hal 
Conrad, "They have been around for so long that they had once called 
the boss 'Cassius', or even 'Cash'."®^
All of this is evidence that Cassius became Ali...that someone who 
was called, called himself, "Cassius" has disappeared into history. 
The self of those contents, the contents called by that formal name, 
is gone; in its place is a different self. But this new self went 
through a time of being a contentious self, as Cassius/Muhammad moved 
from Clay to Ali.
"The car is what you'd call borrowed. An' the 
registration jus' ain't here right now."
Ali has been pulled over by a Southern police officer. His license
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has expired. There is no registration in the glove compartment.
"You know I saw your last fight on the tevee, an' I just 
wants to say it don't matter a lick to me what you calls 
yourself, you're the gaddamned best I ever have seen. 'An
»181I saw Joe Louis when he was in his prime."'
Muhammad Ali starred in a play which flopped some time after 
announcing his allegiance to the Nation of Islam. The billboards 
read:
Muhammad Ali (A/K/A Cassius Clay) 
in a new musical
BUCK WHITE
The William Cayton documentary film AKA Cassius Clay took its title 
from that billboard, the narrator of the film says, "Black Muslimism 
changed more than his name. His draft classification was changed 
from 1y to 1a." Muhammad said,
"The draft that’s another thing tha’s against mah 
religious beliefs." He said, "I took that step back 
because I'm a Muslim."
My intent here is to record the motion of the contentious self of
a known person, a figure who made that motion public (only a few
weeks passed between his joining of the Black Muslims before the
Sonny Liston title fight and his announcement of his allegiance to
The Nation of Islam on the morning after the fight). 'Contentious'
is more than simply a reminder that the action of the construction of
self is, during contentious motion, action proceeding on the
contents of that changing self; it is also a mnemonic for the
contentiousness which attends many of those changes, many of which
are formally contested by the society of the person's former self.
/
In a sense, a fighter like Ali or a would-be Islander like Lare 
contends with the society who are his Others, sometimes flowing with 
their acceptance of his new identity sometimes waiting with bated 
breath to see if they take him to jail or ask him for his autograph. 
And all of this time the Others have to be taking counsel on whether 
this new content of self ought to be formally recognized, with all of
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the ensuing changes in the social fabric which such formal 
establishment may entail.
This was Jay's problem as he raised his grotesque stare to my 
slowly-realizing eyes. He was trying out any kind of interpretation 
which might make my 'I can't believe I was here’ sound like anything 
but that naive utterance so tainted with spectatorship that there is 
no way around the fact of its own admission of having been not there 
at all...at least, not present at the reality of what had just 
occurred. (And, too, it may have taken him by surprise, he having 
been just as desirous of savouring the first-time-ness of it all, and 
being rudely brought down to earth by this 'I can't believe it'-fool 
across the table.
"...Of course you were here," he said, with an almost 
plaintive exhalation. All of a sudden the first glimmer of 
the reason for the hard look took me.
"No. No, I didn't mean— uh— I mean— uh, not me being 
here but just it happening at all. The meeting."
"— Mm," he said, not quite relaxed but clutching at 
anything.
My earlier faux pas with the enemy pidgin leapt to mind, as had all my 
earlier gaffs and errors. I knew that I had slipped, had failed to 
attend to my presentation of self in the excitement that my ongoing 
but informal anthropologist-self had had to contend with. So I went 
on to talk— to babble, really— about East-West relations— and about 
poor opinions of one another, showing my general grasp of the 
historical situation, and loading my 'conversation' with as much 
evidence of good solid Islander education as I could muster.
Jay relaxed, taking (I guess: we never ever talked about this, and 
I can't wait until he reads this account) my unbelievable utterance 
as having emerged from that earlier, white, university self which was 
by definition full of unbelievable contents. And as I saw him relax 
my life passed before my eyes, but in reverse of the normal doomed 
man's backward movie. The motion of my contentious self played then 
and for days afterward.
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/I recalled that first day, when I first heard "Meriam
people"..."as we say". And the first dinner at a brother's house,
where his wife greeted mine with "Welcome, Sisi" , neither having seen
the other before; and we were greeted with "meriba meta" , Our house
where the 'our' includes those spoken to. We were so moved. But my
contentious motion oscillated between these rich moments of
understanding and participating and being just too slow: Once I had
/been showing off my smattering of Meriam mir, demurring with what 
must have been utterly transparent false modesty when someone gave me 
what I took to be the enormous compliment,
"Yu prapa Island boy now."
I batted my eyelashes, or whatever gesture I thought back then passed 
for 'Aw, shucks', and said
/"Kebi-kebi", using the Meriam mir reduplicative 
for 'little', meaning that I thought I was doing 
pretty good myself.
It turned out that they had been making a small and wholly 
appropriate compliment that I was at least a boy now, in my Islander 
content, and that was, while a far cry from being a man, still not to 
be ashamed of (providing, of course, that it didn't go on too long). 
And what I succeeded in doing was disproving the premise of their 
compliment by articulating the obvious (what else would an Island boy 
be but a 'little-bit' of an Islander!); I also succeeded in offending 
them by presuming to correct their utterance, a formal action 
reserved for those better spoken and more educated.
But things were not alway so bad, though for a very long time they 
seemed to be two steps forward, one or two steps back. The trauma of 
that luncheon passed with Jay, still worried, but having replaced his 
uncomprehending distress with a kind of comprehending exasperation, 
saying
"Of course you were here! You were accepted long ago as 
/a learner of the Meriam tonar. Now you know meriba way."
He shook his head, still not absolutely sure some terrible 
mistake hadn’t been made. "WHY DID YOU THINK WE LET YOU
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STAY?”
I just tucked in the corners of my mouth and nodded that 
I'd finally got the message.
/
In the end, the transition from Meriam— the label Jay had used to
tell me what his 'we' were called by those who, though 'they',
Others, were yet worthy enough to know at least that —  to meriba (the
/
"us" that means all of us, as opposed to the 'us-not-you' of Meriam 
mir keriba) was made after the fact. And, as usual, it was in a 
situation where I could not jump up and down with the glee I felt, nor 
shake my head with emotion.
A visitor had arrived from Torres Strait, one of the first of the
springtime passers-through, en route to the west to see relatives or
find work before the heat of summer sets in. I knew him by name, and
that he was a cousin-brother to me through Jay. He'd been away from
the Townsville family for a number of years, and the tears were
flowing freely evening after evening as we all gathered at the
/
brother's house. The first evening was limited to maik-le, that
/ /curious group to which each Meriam le belongs, composed of siblings
and in-laws and cousins and friends; but not all siblings, and by no
/means all cousins or in-laws, and, for some maik-le, more friends and
friends' spouses than blood relatives. This group is the be-all and 
/
end-all of Meriam life. It is the group that men get weepy at the
thought of such wonderful loyalty and support; the group that women
/
may give up their babies to, if one of their maik-le should be 
childless. Sometimes it reminds me of Jules Henry's description, "a
n 82kind of community Self, generating Self-substance for everybody".
It is the one group where no member goes wanting, and no leader lacks 
support, even for unanimously disliked projects. It was the last 
group that I knew about (long after I figured out families, and 
extended families, and adopted families, and tribal groups, and 
tribal affiliations and alliances, and island groups). It was the 
last group I could name. It was, finally, the last group to which I
was admitted.
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Jay took me up to meet his cousin-brother, spying him and calling 
out his name and grabbing me and saying "There he is" all at once. He 
was so excited. Everybody was. We went up and before I could figure 
out what to do Jay said,
/"Lare, this one," pushing me forward. "Emi prapa / /Islandman. Meriam le." Our cousin-brother started to 
smile. Then Jay turned to me and said, "Meriba maik-le."
And that was all I remembered for a very long time. By his
/  /announcement that we were all maik-le I became maik-le to all. I was
speechless (though I kept speaking, automatically.) For the first
/time, and forever— maik-le is for all time, those whose homes are 
always meriba meta (like Robert Frost's "The Hired Hand" for whom
home is, when you go there, they have to let you in), those whose
/ / / maik-le are maik-le to you— I became said to be maik-le. The
contentious motion could finally stop, having arrived at a self whose
identity couldn't be removed. And I had been the one addressed!
Almost a year later, when Cherie and I had returned to Canberra
and Jay and his wife visited us there, we were driving a sightseeing
slow route home from the airport. As we passed the university and
approached O'Connor, the suburb just off campus where we lived, I
explained that this was the suburb where a lot of CSIRO people lived
(they worked at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation on nearby Black Mountain), and of course quite a few
university people. And, I said, there were some public servants and
a lot of government houses—
/"And one Meriam meta," Jay said, delighted and proud
✓ /that the presence of the Meriam le had spread all this way.
But even that, with its formal confirmation of my Island self could 
not match that evening in Townsville when my Island self stopped 
contending for every inch of recognition, where the contentious 
motion stopped.
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"Never trust the teller, trust the tale," said Lawrence.
Susan Sontag, 
Against Interpretation
CONCLUSION
STORYTIME: Toward an Anthropology of Idiom
Anthropology has long been marked by its predicative 
preoccupations. Not content with the older ways of history and 
philosophy, early anthropologists sought new objects for their 
ethnologies, objects who became the subjects of the new 
ethnographies. Practising anthropologists who are sensitive to 
their own praxis have, for some time I think, become increasingly 
uneasy at this flip-flop of subject and object. Subject and object 
have lost so much mutual contradistinction that the difference 
between the seminar which opens, 'The subject of my study was the 
Yahoo belief in the divine nature of poetry...', and the one which 
opens, 'The object of my study was the Yahoo belief in the divine 
nature of poetry...' , is a difference at its most charitable reading 
of speaker's style and more probably merely one of whim. In any case, 
it is a distinction once born of grammar which no longer serves even 
those ethnological theorists whose own structuralisms are in debt to 
the linguists.
My own guess regarding this fuzzing of a once strict exclusiveness 
is that it is evidence of a more general realization that the real 
stuff of a world no longer even ostensibly anglophonic is not, not 
surprisingly, best got at using an anglophonic epistemology. Much of 
this realization has come with the growth of anthropology. But it is 
a realization which may have its growth stunted if the anthropology 
which fed it falters on the idealist liberalist imagined import of 
the question of whether those we study are subjects or objects. The 
resolution to this problem is as simple as the imagined problem is 
simplistic: if those persons whom we study remain Others they are
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doomed to remain subjects AND objects, always Others; but if they are 
permitted to come alive with us in our studies then the us-ness of Us 
will strain and stretch and take them in.
But to say the resolution is simple is not to say a simple 
solution. It is no mean task to bring the studied Others to life. 
For that matter, it is no mean task to bring anyone to life on the 
printed page. Nor is it necessarily the task of anthropological 
writers to dissect (as I have done here) their own attempts to 
breathe the life literately into their subjects. But it is very much 
the task of the anthropological reader to read life into those 
objects. It is for this reason that I complained at the outset of the 
absence of a genre. It is commonly thought that a genre is a vein of 
writing. This is wrong. What a genre is is a vein of reading. Works 
found in the same genre (pornography, say, or ethnography as soon as 
we get it) are found there by virtue of being read in the same vein. 
The genre of science fiction— to say nothing of the new one of 
'speculative fiction'— was not born until the second scientific 
fiction was read and thought to be in the same vein as 'that other 
funny book'. The genre known as the New Journalism was decades 
behind Terry Southern (and the writers selected as the stars of this 
new genre by Tom Wolfe are wondering at being put into the same boar 
as each other and who the hell made Tom Wolfe the Dean, anyway?^) 
decades in which a growing readership was just waiting for someone to 
name all that stuff they were reading that was 'just like a novel'.
So what would a genre of ethnography look like? I don't know. 
These 'what is so-an-so like?’ questions always remind me of the 
scene in the bar in Hal Ashby's film Coming Home where the Marine 
captain on R and R is asked, "What's it like?" and answers from very 
near the edge of terror, or perhaps lonely senselessness, "I can't 
tell you what is's LIKE...I ONLY KNOW HOW IT IS." — Of course he was 
wrong in his presumption that anyone cared what Vietnam WAS...his 
social construction of reality was operating from a flawed 
epistemology which held that referents are real, that what is said is 
somehow equated with what is known...and later, unable to locate
270
Vietnam (locate is, remember, a transitive verb in reality 
construction, in matters of the mind) unable to locate Vietnam 
outside of the Demilitarized Zone which was his self, he put that 
self to rest, (i might add, forcing a little a fit with the epigraph 
for this conclusion, that the Captain who Bruce Dern played for us 
found himself to be the only teller of his tale of Vietnam, and it was 
a teller he could not trust: the solid part of the tale he did leave 
behind, to be told by the others who told it to him, the thing he 
could trust to go into Vietnam and come out again. He left the 
uniform of the United States Marine Corps hanging neatly on the beach 
where he drowned.) What we can expect is that the genre will look 
like its first one or two entries. The task is to assign them and 
thereby the genre.
I think, then, that a genre of ethnography would have to recognize 
a kind of notional reversal of the traditional ethnological trust in 
words. That is, traditionally ethnologists have trusted their 
writings to a literate community presumed to share the language of 
the ethnography. This does not seem in retrospect at all untoward of 
them. Historians, psychoanalysts, physicists and philosophers all 
did the same. And when they had to name a concept unheard of, they 
simply did so, with some attention to tradition (to the tradition of 
naming, that is, not to the tradition of creative language), and then 
defined it. And everyone was party to this playing fast and loose 
with definition (the inherent contradiction between calling the 
records of previous usages which follow dictionary entries by the 
same name as the explications of meanings which followed these new 
concepts), probably because they figured that, like Bruce Dern's 
uniform, the language, the stuff this content was wrapped in, would 
always be there. But the language will only 'be there' as long as it 
is there and no longer. This is something that we have learned since 
Schleiermacher and his fellow hermeneuticists and since the 
translators from Wilhelm von Humboldt to George Steiner have kept 
reminding us. The language will be there only as long as somebody can 
do something with it.
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What this means is that spoken language will be there as long as 
someone can hear it. (The implication is intended: one surviving 
speaker of an aboriginal language can only be a source of idiolect, 
for he only hears himself in the same way we all do when we 
subvocalize the 'dialogues' in the stories we are constantly telling 
ourselves to and about ourselves.) Written language will be there 
only as long as somebody can read it. (This is the crucial 
methodological point for the ethnographer, the reason he has to be 
his own reader in the fact of the full knowledge that he always risks 
reading what he meant instead of what he wrote.) The problem with the 
Saussurian distinction between langue and parole is not that it is a 
false distinction, but that it promotes a false epistemology by 
suggesting in proposing a universal distinction that this is a 
distinction which takes everything into account (accounts for the 
entire universe of speech and language) rather than one which simply 
proposes that it may be everywhere made (universally applicable).
When it is not kept in mind that such distinctions as langue and 
parole and subject and object and emic and etic are only possible 
because there is a third presence, someone to somehow see or hear the 
difference, then the very practice of ethnography— of history, of 
psychoanalysis, of physics and philosophy for that matter— is 
reduced to some kind of two-party jabber. The distinction between 
who are the objects of the study (the aboriginal people studied or 
the colleagues countermanded) and who are the subjects of the study 
(the natives or the disciplinary forbears) becomes necessarily 
fuzzed. And the very real problem of untangling who and what the 
subject and object may be is reduced from the real and engaging 
praxis of reading to the officious hauteur of opining. Those of us 
who inhabit language, who write in order that we may written to, can 
but concur with Paul Goodman on one of the effects of the recent 
suzerainty of this idea that reading demands a direct object which 
might be not the actual tale read but some systematic thing like 
language...mistaking practice for code.
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My own reading of the problems of philosophy has been that 
philosophers of the past were not abused by language. They 
used the language and conceptions of their times and 
twisted them to say their own say; when I think away their 
old-fashioned formulations, as I usually can, I have 
almost always found that there remains a puzzling problem 
to wrestle with,that they did wrestle with and suggest a 
solution to restate in our own terms. I have not been 
impressed by any number of pseudo-problems that have been 
liquidated by merely linguistic analysis. Some have just 
been swept under the rug; others... tend to treat equally 
excellent intellects of the past as if they were little 
better than idiots who were caught in verbal traps, not
BAwrestling with living experience. H
The point of including this here is to illustrate a few
distinctions between reading and opining and to be able to refer to
this neat encapsulation while doing so. The import of doing so for
those of us who would essay things anthropological is the burden of
Clifford Geertz's advice to do ethnography by penetrating a culture
85as we would a literary text. In the excerpt above, Goodman says 
something of what strikes him upon penetrating the texts of modern 
linguists and philosophers of language apropos his reading of the 
past philosophers whom they criticize. As such it is a lesson in 
reading. The untutored reader of the excerpt might think that I had 
put it here in support of a position obviously concurrent with 
Goodman's own. (Though it would be unfair of me to write any reader 
familiar with Goodman into such a scenario of the untutored, at least 
any reader familiar enough to recall Goodman's admonitions against 
the 'truth' of literature and its use as 'evidence'. ) On the 
contrary, having found myself having taken up a position 
recognizably Goodman-esque, I suspected him of being one of the 
authorities— one of my authors—  of that current of thought which 
has brought me to my present position. That being my abduction, I 
reread him and, upon rereading, found the passage which I have 
reproduced here.
One of the notions extant among those au courant with the rise in 
what I might call sociolinguistic consciousness in the social 
sciences over the past two decades is an idea of a general 
nonspecific determinism which operates from language upon speakers.
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A kind of twisted 'the limits of my language are the limits of my 
world’ transitized to dictate: language limits my world. It is one 
thing to say with Charles Bally that the listener "is on the side of 
the language, it is with the language that he interprets speech".®^ 
it is quite another thing to say that the language makes the speaker 
or the hearer. As Goodman says, once he 'thinks away’ the 
old-fashioned formulations, it doesn't accord with his reading that 
those past philosophers were "abused by language".
This is not meant to be some fiat for the eradication of language 
as formative. It is meant to distinguish between formatives and 
formulations, between determinations and determinisms. I have 
suggested, earlier from Norman 0. Brown and again just there in the 
paragraph above the preceding one, that there are those writers who 
are my authorities— and that they are my authors for they have, in 
writing things, writ me. A small case in point is Paul Goodman's 
phrase "to say their own say". 'Say their say' , 'I say my say' , 'to 
say my own say': all of these have become part of my habit. We have 
some notion of "habit" as unconscious repetition. This kind of 
uncritical colloquial acquiescence serves as long as we stay away 
from the sorts of things nuns wear or the philosophy of Hegel or the
OOwriting of Borges or the anthropology of Bourdieu. But once we let 
these people in, we have to reckon with what they say. To do 
otherwise, to insist, for instance, on the limits of the colloquial, 
is to make all nuns into clones, walking around in the same 
interchangeable habits of whoever it was who first put those things 
on without thinking. This is, of course, not a very good reading of 
nuns' clothing. Readings ad_ homina are never very good: They are 
either, strictly speaking, misnamed _ad_ hominem (How can there be 
readings at all without the language of prior speakers?), or the 
useless "perfections of a fool".®^
The fool makes perfect utterances only by virtue of the readings 
such utterances are given. Only the reader can put in the 
perfection. This does not mean that the speaker or writer (or 
painter or sculptor, for that matter) must eschew those things which
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he knowns cannot be read. But it does require him to have found all 
other ways of saying his say to be wanting (Jacques Derrida saying, 
for example, that not only was Kroeber right to suspect the 
'fashionable attractiveness' of the word "structure" applied to 
society all of a sudden but also we have to know why eidos and complex 
and form and "Idea" and system were no longer sufficient— see the 
seventh entry under Notes to the Preface). And if he then must use 
things which cannot yet be read, we can but hope that he will teach us 
how to read them.
I think it is this last which will most likely stand in the way of 
my proposal for an anthropology of idiom. Particularly it stands in 
the way of those who would not have me bring Borges to bear on 
anthropology. Perhaps the best I can do here is to make my case. It 
is a case not so much for bringing to bear on the language of 
ethnography the writings of them who, though sensitive to other 
peoples and cultures, write mostly to and of their own; but more a 
case for explicit censorship. The censor who would have no Borges 
must now contend with me, must reckon with my saying here that the 
process of ethnography, which is in its 'second half' so much a 
literary process, is richer when it makes for its reader more than a 
sort of alien anacoluthon, words with no means of connection.
The Schedule of the Means
This view then frees us from bondage either to past or 
future. We are neither creatures of the necessity of an 
irrevocable past, nor of any vision given on the Mount.
Our history and our prognostications will be sympathetic 
with the undertakings within which we live and move and 
have our being. Our values lie in the present, and past 
and future give us only the schedule of the means, and the 
plans of campaign, for their realization.
These are the words of George Herbert Mead, taken from the same Carus 
Lecture with which I opened and closed Chapter 2. The argument I am 
making for a genre called ethnography wherein to engage an 
anthropology of idiom is an argument for permission to include the 
'schedule of the means'— the past and future of the language of
ethnographic reporting— in our present undertakings. The permission
275
that is required is specific permission to write ethnography in the 
idiom of the ethnographer. It is no less than this. For the three or 
four readers who read each of the thousands of anthropological 
doctoral theses written these days this is an unimportant argument 
(though it may, as it argues for a change in the future of the means, 
be important to those writing those theses) . But for the many more 
readers who read the several ethnographies which capture the 
readership of the discipline each year or two the argument for 
idiomatic presentation is important, for it requires a general 
assent _a priori, an assent which may entail those who would be 
generally up with their discipline acquiring reading styles which 
they need otherwise not bother accommodating. In any event, the 
requisite general assent must rest on a new recognition possible only 
within a community of discourse permissive of these reflexive 
demand-and-response processes while nonetheless fully cognizant of 
the coming and going of its members.
Mead's words, quoted above, capacitate our distinction between
the means and the schedule of the means. But in the case of the
ethnographic genre this must be a distinction of reading. The
'schedule of the means' is the language, language which is made up of
past readings. Which is, in turn, to say that the language is never
'there', but has always been there 'up until a second ago'. Of
course, when our sources are dictionaries or other published works
(ethnographies of speaking, say), this 'second' may have already
stretched to years by the time we consult it for the most immediately
past reading (or hearing) we can get. For instance, with the general
/decrease in the frequency of Meriam mir use in public talk in town in 
favour of Torres Strait Pidgin, I expect that the Meriam mir pakarar, 
with which I illustrated at the end of Chapter 1 one of those 
'Pluto-jumps' which make up the ethnographer's 'blinks' from his old 
culture to his new one, will have gone by now. When I say gone I do 
not mean gone from the face of the earth. In fact, I mean gone from 
the common hearing of Islander town talk. But when I say something 
like 'gone from the hearing' I am already moving from the schedule of
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the means toward the means, or, from the past usages which are 
language to the present ones which are speech.
Anthony Burgess has suggested, "It is best to regard the language 
as a growing corpus of words and structures which nobody can know 
entirely but upon which anybody can draw at any time— a sort of 
unlimited bank a c c o u n t . T h i s  is the kind of 'bank account' notion 
of language which has held sway for some time now, and it works just 
so long as we pretend that nobody ever says anything new. Burgess 
goes on, in the next sentence, to say, "It is not just the sum total 
of what has been spoken and written' it is also what can be spoken and 
written." It may be that this latter is all right for imagining 
potential acts of speaking the language, of saying new words like 
brillig, or like the arpworthy and focklespoff of Burgess's own 
family ("we are," he says, "entitled to regard these as part of 
English... they certainly belong to no other language, and yet they 
are recognizable linguistic forms''^); and of regarding them, once 
said, as part of the English language. But it is in this 'once said' 
that lies the rub. With the common collusion of 
speaker-and-hearer— indeed, if such assumption of commonplace 
collusion were not warranted there wouldn't be anything getting done 
with words anyway— we shift from the passive word-verb of "said" 
into the active reckoning of saying as how whatever was said got 
said.
This is an unwarranted shift. Everything that is said does not 
get into the language. Most of what babies say as they are piddling 
around with speech is forgotten, as is much of what ethnographers say 
as they cope with learning the new tongue of the people they study. 
In fact, the reason that little of this gets into the language is 
because so little if any of it is taken to say anything: What's Baby 
saying?— Nothing. What'd Cromwell say? [Wan emi spik?]— Nating. 
Nothing was said. Part of the question, then, is what would be the 
difference between Baby Burgess saying focklespoff along with all 
the other ficks and poofs of learning how to talk and later coining 
this new word which has its currency in the Burgess family idiom?
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Part of the difference lies in the constraint of information, part in 
the expectation or anticipation of meaning. Both of these are 
capacities of the hearer. While Baby is still a baby not even a 
language freak like Anthony Burgess expects meaning, or the fine 
balance between saying one thing and not another that provides 
constraints.
Stephen Tyler has put it thus:
Every act of saying is a momentary intersection of the 
"said" and the "unsaid". Because it is surrounded by an 
aureola of the unsaid, an utterance speaks of more than it 
says, mediates between past and future, transcends the 
speaker's conscious thought, passes beyond his 
manipulate e control, and creates in the mind of the 
hearer worlds unanticipated. From within the infinity of 
the "unsaid", the speaker and hearer, by a joint act of 
will, bring into being what was "said". (1978:459)
As soon as we know Baby is saying a focklepoff which is not 
fick-n-poof then the joint act of will makes a "said" of focklepoff. 
Once taken as something said, it must be reckoned with...accepted 
into the family idiom or censored. Burgess says, "A speaker speaks a 
word; a hearer hears it. If he understands the word he has stepped 
into the same area of sense as the speaker. J
In every act of saying is, as Tyler holds it to be, a momentary 
intersection between "said" and "unsaid", then it is the hearer who 
makes the intersection. Only the hearer can put in the 'more' when 
"an utterance speaks of more than it says". I was once successful in 
stopping the talk of sixteen assembled Islandmen by not saying 
something meaningful. I was just beginning to trust my rudimentary 
command of Torres Strait Pidgin enough to push myself into speaking 
from my feet in Island meetings. I pushed myself to my feet a little 
too soon and ended up with one of them in my mouth. I said, using the 
you-plural to refer to something the assembled company had done 
before my arrival, yufla bi du dat wanem... The silence was almost 
instantaneous. Maybe five conversations going on among thirteen or 
fourteen people just up and stopped. It was not quite the split 
second knife edge of the silence of immanent danger; but it was
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almost that fast, as if they had all heard something that sounded 
like a footstep.
Telling the story now I am tempted to really set the stage for the 
telling and say, "...something that sounded like the footstep of an 
Aboriginal at the door", for that was what it turned out to be. Only 
I_ was the Aboriginal... or if not exactly the nigger in the woodpile 
then at least tainted by past association with him. I had used a 
pronunciation not possible among my would-be close associates at the 
meeting. I had put /f/ for /p/. Fricative. Only Aborigines have, by 
the definition of the group then assembled, fricatives in their 
second-person plurals. I was so pleased at having actually 
remembered to use the Pidgin wanem instead of the pseudo-pidgin 
"t'ing" that I really thought there was something outside the door 
and I just hadn't heart the noise. I stood there like a dummy, 
listening. What I could not 'hear' was my excision from the 
consociation. I was being moved by my hearers into limbo, and it was 
a limbo straining towards the enemy, held only by my ties to one man. 
It was to him that the others turned, as I watched from my little 
capsule where I stood, still, mute as a thing.
"Wis we emi spik?" [How did he say that?]
"Wanem?", said my one tie to the world. In this case, something 
like 'Huh?'. I couldn't believe it. My one tie to the world as we 
know it and he wasn' t listening. I was doomed. I had, however, 
learned one or two lessons on Island style: When the shit hits the 
fan, pretend you knew it was going to. If any gets on you, pretend 
you don't notice it. If you can't do that, pretend you don't care, 
(if you're really good, convince everybody you wanted it to...offer 
them some.) Most important of all, without speaking, by standing 
still and tall and frowning slightly— but no more than men might when 
attending to anything which they have perfectly under control— you 
must make them believe it' s not your shit. This is what I did. 
Standing there in my little cocoon I acted as if I was quite prepared 
to wait until they ironed out their little problem and then proceed 
with my talk.
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"Emi spik diskain: YUFLA."
"----(?)", said my man by his uncomprehending face.
"FLA, FLA. Olsem age." (By his persistence I marked this 
newcomer, newcomer at least as far as I was concerned, as something 
less than a new friend.) I had heard enough of the stories, even by 
this evening in March (i had arrived in November), to imagine much 
more vividly than anyone who knew all the stories what happens to 
THOSE WHO SCREW UP. There was a guy who had beat up his cousin in 
Winton, the last railway spur line before nowhere. Nobody talked to 
him since. And that had happened in 1963- There was the now-old man 
who, decades before that, had uncautiously blurted out some secret 
knowledge that he was learning as a boy-beginning-to-becorae-a-man. 
They still called him "Boy", with all the vituperation of a signal 
lack of control over his own bodily functions, like his mouth.
My man caught my eyes, flick, like a snake's tongue, and I knew 
that he had just caught on, and that I was right: we were in trouble. 
My only hope was that we would get out of it...that he would get me 
out of it.
"----." His face changed languages. The uncomprehending flat
stare of the Pidgin speaker waiting to see what has gone on was
replaced with the nothing-given-away flat look of the Educated Man of 
/Mer. The expression did not change; this new look was fixed on his 
interlocutor.
"Wea em bi lerne abra agera mir?" the newcomer persisted.
[Where'd he learn to speak Aboriginal?]
Whew? I thought. Home free? My knees jellied a little, then
/jelled again. The only response to the hard look in Meriam mir is to 
remove the problem. Actually to solve the problem, though in this 
case the definition of possible enemy— me— required a solution of 
removal, either of removing the enemy or of removing the Islandman. 
So the belligerent newcomer had either to put up or shut up...to 
expel me or to leave himself. There was no room for talk. Especially 
there was no room for Pidgin-talk. (Probably he knew this, and that 
was why he chose the Meriam mir abra agera mir [his aboriginal talk]
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over the Pidgin words diskain [this kind of] and oslem age [like an 
abo] to refer to my wrong speech. I say probably, but I never got to 
ask him about that: My impression proved pretty much right, and he 
remained somewhat less than a friend throughout my stay.)
I relaxed a bit, took a little vicarious credit for putting him 
down, fielded a terse boy-you-just-about-fucked-me-up-with-my- 
people look from my man (which wiped all vicarious credit and most of 
my relaxation away), and stood there, trying to keep my feelings (Am 
1_ finished!? Is it all over?! Fieldwork down the tube; nothing to do 
about it but beg some new grants and start over somewhere else.) off 
my face (trying its hardest to project, Are you finished? All o v e I 
may resume?).
Talk about the footstep of the enemy sounding as your own foot 
enters your own mouth? I still get chills when I think of that. While 
I had been accounted for by my man at the meeting, his account with 
his fellows was on credit. And it took weeks of him sort of 
explaining that I had spent some time years before hanging around the 
Top End and probably some of that Aboriginal English they speak up 
there had rubbed off after all the boy is an anthropologist for god's 
sake and you can't expect them to not pay attention to other 
cultures, I mean it's not as if he was tutored by the abos or anything 
like that. Just a slip of the tongue.
There had been no question that what I had meant was to refer to 
the you-plural of the assembled company— yupla— when my talk, hardly 
listened to as it was (I would have said nobody was listening if the 
hush had not occurred), came crashing to a halt under the weight of 
the unsaid. It was an intersection, not to say a collision, between 
"said: and "unsaid", but only the hearers witnessed the collision. I 
could only reconstruct it afterward, treating it as a performance of 
speaking-and-hearing rather than being engaged in the talk. Paul
Goodman wrote of exactly this kind of tension:
Like all behaviour, speaking operates creatively not only 
from what the speaker has (the inherited code) but toward 
the end-in-view (what needs to be said in the situation.
And the hearer creatively adjusts to what is going on.
Thus, I have defined language as the tension between the
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i n h e r i t e d  code and what  ne e ds  to  be s a i d ,  and be tween  the  
s p e a k e r  and t h e  h e a r e r . (1973 :131  )
The c a u se  o f  t h e  t e n s i o n  i n  t h e  s t o r y  o f  FLA was my b r e a c h  o f  t h e  
id io m .  The r e a s o n  t h i s  i s  c l e a r  i s  b e c au s e  i t  i s  i n  t h e  id iom t h a t  
t h e  " u n s a i d "  l i v e s .  And b e c a u s e ,  i n  t h e  id iom ,  t h e  " u n s a i d "  i s  a 
l i v i n g  p r e s e n c e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and a l t e r n i t i e s ,  c a s e s  o f  t h e  O the r  
b o t h  p o s s i b l e  and i m p o s s i b l e ,  i t  i s  o n l y  i n  t h e  id iom t h a t  pe o p le  may 
spe ak  f r e e l y ,  s e c u r e  t h a t  t h e  " u n s a i d "  i s  t a k e n  c a r e  o f  by th e  one 
eye e ve ryone  ke e ps  on i t .  P e op le  may speak  t h e  id iom f r e e l y  (and h e r e  
' s p e a k '  h a s  t o  be i n  q u o t e s ,  s i n c e  sp e a k = s p e a k in g  p e r m i t s  by v i r t u e  
o f  i t s  c a p a c i t y  a s  a word i n  a l anguage  th e  a l t e r n i t i e s  o f  
p a r a l i n g u i s t i c  c om m unica t ion ,  k i n e s i c s ,  t h e  communica t ion  o f  
s i l e n c e  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  s i l e n t  l o g o s  o f  A p o l l o n i u s , ^  a l l  o f  which 
a r e  p a r t  o f  ' s p e e c h '  a s  I  mean i t ;  t h e  q u o t e s  t h a t  ' s p e a k '  s i t s  i n  
a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  n o t  t h e  b r a c k e t i n g  q u o t e s  o f  t h e  phen o m e n o lo g ic a l  
e p o c h e , b u t  the  r e a l  w r i t t e n  q u o t e s  o f  a d i s c u r s i v e  l a n g u a g e ,  bo rn  o f  
a l i t e r a r y  p r o c e s s  o f  e n g a g in g  a l i v i n g  id iom  cn a p r i n t e d  p a g e ) .  
P e op le  may spe ak  t h e i r  id iom f r e e l y  b e c au s e  They need n o t  f e a r  
i n t r u s i o n .  The t e r r i b l e  t h r e a t  o f  my n e a r - f a t a l  f r i c a t i v e  was i n  i t s  
t h r e a t  to  community.
A Community o f  Idiom
I n  moving from th e  s c h e d u l e  o f  t h e  means to  a community o f  p e r s o n s  
we a r e  moving from l an g u a g e  toward  id iom .  Th is  i s  t h e  i d e a  o f  motion  
which I  p r e s e n t e d ,  w i t h  some e x p l o r a t i o n ,  i n  C h a p te r  7« In  
p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s  m o t ion  I  was b r i n g i n g  i n t o  b e in g  a d i s c u r s i v e  id iom, 
one which migh t  s e r v e  my making s e n s e  to  my r e a d e r .  I f  t h i s  h a p p e n s ,  
i f  t he  r e a d e r ,  a s  B urgess  p u t  i t ,  " s t e p s  i n t o  t h e  same a r e a  o f  
s e n s e " ,  t h e n  my ' m o t i o n '  may be s a i d  to  be m e a n i n g f u l ,  to  have 
m ean ing .  I f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  to  t h i s  " s t e p "  o f  my r e a d e r  (and n o t e  how 
e a s i l y  o t h e r s  have found t h e  m ot ion  m etaphor  to  t a l k  a b o u t  what 
p e o p le  do when t h e y  make s e n s e  to  one a n o t h e r ,  and how e a s i l y  we can 
move from t h i s  s i n g l e  s t e p  o f  B u rgess  to  t h e  S t e p s  o f  Gregory  Ba te son
which a r e  a t h e o r y  o f  a whole sy s te m  o f  my ' m o t i o n ' ) ,  t h e  r e a d e r  u s e s
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"motion" to talk about the 'movement' of persons into a new persona, 
or into a new context of situation, and uses it unselfconsciously, or 
with the merest reference to my first use, a reference not as one 
refers to the so-called authority of a dictionary but as one may 
refer to the real author, then the discursive idiom which I have 
proposed and successfully used may become the idiom of a community of 
discourse. And, while I do not mean to make here a definition of 
community as constitutive of three persons, I do mean to make three 
the required minimum.
Two people may communicate in any number of ways. They may speak 
the same language and simply converse their communication. But they 
need not. Immigrants and tourists commonly communicate without any 
common tongue, without even the shade of common gesture. Still do we 
manage to make sense to one another. But this sense we make as we go 
about the business of trying words or gestures or faces that we know 
to see if they trigger a response (and then trying a response to see 
if, by the one triggered by that one in return, our guess about the 
first one striking home was accurate), this is a way of making sense 
using what we may think of as positive 'terms’. That is, we and the 
tourist we are trying to help both know that the information universe 
is restricted to what one of us can posit and the other posit in 
response. There is no need for a common language, and if there were a 
common language there would be no need for these peregrinations. 
Ferdinand de Saussure wrote:
Everything that has been said boils down to this: in 
language there are only differences. Even more important: 
a difference generally implies positive terms between 
which the difference is set up; but in language there are
only differences without positive terms.
It is in light of these differences, and of the distinction 
suggested by Saussure, that idiom comes most clearly into the light. 
Assuming that people speak a language when they speak (contra, e.g., 
speaking in gibberish or in tongues), what they do when they speak is 
to use the differences in the inherited code, the language (the 
'schedule') to restrict the meanings their hearers take. But when
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people are operating in their idiom they have the advantage of a 
communicative milieu in which the meanings are already limited. The 
disadvantage is for individuals at the expense of community. If an 
individual does not know the idiomatic way of saying what he wants to 
say, then he cannot. And his only choice is to propose to move the 
conversation from the idiom or not have his say.
When my belligerent friend said, "Wea em bi lerne abra agera mir?
the unsaid proposal was to move out of the idiom, a proposal signaled
/by his attempt at formal Meriam mir and the use of a full sentence. 
It was a kind of way of saying 'Can't we talk about this?' . And if it 
had been the case that the context of situation was one of language 
(in the North Queensland towns of the Islandmen the language would 
then have to have been the lingua franca, Torres Strait Pidgin), the 
only improprieties which I could see would be the impolite use of mir 
from his native Meriam mir when the Pidgin langgus would do fine (and 
since he was not proposing a difference encoded in the choice of mir 
over langgus) and the more fundamental error of using abra instead of 
either bl' em or langgus emi spik. (The second error would be the more 
fundamental for its increase of culpability: in saying abra, with the 
ambiguity of intention versus happenstance which English "his" has, 
he avoided making the choice required by pidgin between the 
relatively innocuous langgus emi spik [Wea em bi lerne diskain age 
langgus emi spik?— Where did he learn those Aboriginal words he's 
saying?] and the putting-your-money-where-your-mouth-is 
confrontation of bl'em, as in 'Wea emi get dat age langgus bl'em?' 
[Where'd he get that Aboriginal language of his?] with all the weight 
of possession, of that language belonging to him.
But it was not the case that the context of situation was
language. The context of situation was idiom. And in the idiom, as I
have already said, he had two choices: leave or make me leave. Since
I was not there of my own accord (my presence was licensed,
literally, by my man), the belligerent persister had to go through my
man to get me out. And he knew this. Nobody knew he knew this until
/he said Wea em bi lerne abra agera mir? Then we all knew; a posteriori
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we could reason what he had realized. The writing was on the wall 
when my man turned to fix this nuisance with that look. But the 
'wall' the writing was on was the wall of that face, and we had to 
wait to see if he had read it. He had.
Now, in language there is simply no way to have such an exchange.
The reason for this is that the situation has always to be societal
if the context of situation is language. If the context is idiom,
then the situation is communal. Language is of society; idiom is of
community. It is the absence of this distinction in the discourse on
ethnography of speaking and other anthropologies of communication
which has contributed both to a certain reticence among social
anthropologists to use the context of situation in sociololinguistic
research and a general absence of critical purchase on what the
speakers in ethnographies of speaking are doing as they move among
the means at their disposal. The modest suggestion of my title of
this concluding chapter is that a move in the direction of doing
0 5anthropology of idiom will be a step toward rectification. Not the 
least of such steps will be back in the direction of community.^ 
This is where the most anthropological value is in even such tiny 
vignettes as my FLA story: If we can learn to read those little 
'stories' in their idiom (which is the only way they can be read), we 
have some purchase on the constitution of community. My belligerent 
friend tried to skyhook into language in order to pull himself out of 
the situation he'd got himself into without having to cross my man or 
take himself away. No one had any doubt about what he was trying to 
do; they all just sat and watched the play unfold. All they needed 
was a few bags of popcorn to make it clear to even the utterly naTve 
observer that what was going on had become a performance. By 
invoking language over idiom he was bringing society down on 
community. Sometimes this would be fraught with peril, as it was 
when I, with a slip of the lip, made p an _f, and the whisper of the 
enemy turned talk into language. But my man had said, with his look, 
that he would be accountable for my actions. And they all knew, had 
always known, that when all the Islandmen were dead and gone,
285
subsumed by churches and cultures and all manner of foreign things, 
the black Jay Gatsby would still be there, a community of one, 
telling the tales of the Islandmen.
So it was on his head. They did not have to rally to the defense of 
their community this time. So they all sat back and watched the 
movie. There wasn't much to watch; they knew that. But still they 
checked each other's eyes for a twinkle here and there, getting ready 
to watch Mister Belligerence squirm a little, at least. And maybe, 
if they were lucky, he would stomp out with the pathetic but gutsy 
gesture which couldn't help but make a tempest in a very small 
teapot. If they were real lucky, he would throw me out! But nobody is 
that lucky. So there was little chance of seeing the belligerance 
lambasted out of him for the double breach of ignoring my man's 
acknowledgement of accountability and going directly after me 
without confronting my man first. (They were, of course, much surer 
of the dim prospects for a good lambasting eventuating; and I misread 
their glimmers of hope in the face of such dim prospects for hints of 
the imminence of just such an eventuality, thus the jelly in my knees 
which I now know was unnecessary.)
The beligerent's mistake was in not waiting for the response to
his
"Emi spik diskain: YUFLA"
an utterance which was obviously a repetition of his first question, 
and one which elaborated, in case the elaboration was needed, the 
cause of the question about how I was talking in the first place. His 
interlocutor said,
"----(?)"
which I could translate into an American idiom of the southeast, say 
rural Alabama, as a kind of slack-jawed Hahh?, or into the Rocky 
Mountain idiom of my childhood, a plain, flat Huh?, but which in the 
idiom of the Torres Strait Mainland is a straight-lipped full face 
with focused eyes and a slight frown. The blank could have been 
filled in by short-term memory in a second or two as the "...YUFLA"
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registered. But our belligerent buddy just couldn't wait. Whether 
he was after me or siezing a chance to pink my man while his guard was 
down, I don't know. Whatever, his greed got the better of him and he 
rode roughshod over the silence of a respectful querying look to go
"FLA, FLA..."
and if that weren't enough, to add the Aboriginal identification by 
now obvious to everyone
"...Olsem age."
Right here was when I started, unnecessarily, to get watery knees,
and everyone else started passing the popcorn. The greed was out,
and nobody gets away with riding roughshod over a silence. But
still, for the two interlocutors and for me as an interested party
sans voice, we were in the idiom. When my man changed his look, a
'change' marked only by his turning slightly to fix me with his eyes
and then back to his adversary, he did not change anything on his
face. The pidgin look for respectful query is the same face as the
✓  /buck-stops-here look of the Educated Meriam le. If you know the 
idiom it is easy to confirm this 'change', what I called "his face 
changed languages" in the story. The respectful query in pidgin is 
held either until more information from the speaker clears up the 
question or until the addressee figures out what's been going on. 
Once contact (eye contact or the notional contact of the aimed face) 
is broken the look stops; it can not be used twice without having the 
second be a burlesqued pidgin-query look. So when my man turned back 
to his adversary it could only have been in order to respond (if he 
had not yet prepared a response everything would have been held as it 
was until he had finished preparing one). And respond he did. Still 
in the idiom.
But in the idiom a change to native language out of Pidgin in
response to an attack constitutes an escalation. It raises the
stakes. (Mister Belligerence was a fool to push my man into
escalating since it is part of the very being of this community that
/my man is the accomplished past master of Meriam mir on the whole
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mainland.) By responding in a way which said nothing my man made it
perfectly clear that he considered being called to account a serious
matter, serious enough for the mir. (it might be possible to invent a
biography for some Central Islander with one Eastern parent and one
Western parent who had equal purchase on both native Torres Strait
languages, in which case he would have to signal whether the silent
/response was a silence in Meriam mir or in a dialect of the West, but 
in this case, there being no doubt that the adversay had been engaged 
and no possible silent response after an initial silent response in 
Pidgin, and no way in hell that my man is going to kowtow to this 
hyena whom he finally realizes is intent on nipping at his heels and 
not at all concerned any longer about what I may or may not have said, 
he quietly ups the ante.) And we are still in the idiom. I am still in 
my cocoon. People are starting to smile (and I don't know why). 
There is a very long pause on the part of the belligerent (and I don't 
know why, but I want to, since I know that now is when he has to drop 
me or go) . And we are still in the idiom.
And then Mister Belligerence says
"W..."
AND WE ARE OUT OF THE IDIOM. That quickly. Did not even matter what 
he said, what he was about to say. He spoke without moving when the 
only responses which had any meaning at all were movement: eject me 
or exit. My knees did their jelly-to-jelled reaction even as he was 
finishing
"...ea em bi lerne abra agera mir?"
He had called an Educated Man to account, by itself an act promising 
much courage, and couldn't go through with it. (Later, in much the 
same sort of scenario but over larger stakes, our belligerent friend 
did exit, stage left, and was not seen for three months.) The only 
meaningful responses were too costly for him. So he tried clutching 
at the straw of language, found it to be only a straw, and went down, 
meaningless by his own account.
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And I, I who had been the blamable cause of all this (I was to 
'grow out' of the rightful blameworthiness of my man as I became a 
better learner of the tonar, but the righteous blame of my 
belligerent friend stayed between us, him and me, to this day, as 
wrongful blame is wont to do), could but wait to see if the community 
at large would take my man's account for my misspeech (in effect, 
letting him 'carry me' until I established an 'account' of my own). 
They did; but I was not to know this for more than two months, and 
even then only by dint of one of those fortunate coincidences where 
the unsaid gets said in a kind of shocked Sure we forgot that little 
slip— Didn' t I_ tell you I 'm sure I_ must have told you. . .Didn' t I?( ! )? 
And all the while I'm saying 'Sure' with one or two open palm 
wrist-turnings and lower lip juttings (all the idiomatic gestures I 
can think of)— anything to keep him from catching himself up short 
with You mean you didn't know until NOV/ that it was OK? and giving me 
that inward look where he's not looking at me at all but trying to 
figure out how he could have been so wrong about me, thinking I was 
bright enough to keep my end up and now all of a sudden it's obvious 
that I haven't even noticed that they're still letting me hand 
around— but inside I'm right back with the Am I finished!? Is it all 
over?! Fieldwork down the tube thoughts of two months ago. I finally 
get to answer them: I ’M OK? IT'S NOT OVER! FIELDWORK IS SAVED!
Finally, in the same coffee shop where part of the story of the 
bar kak mir was played (Chapter 5), I got to write closure on the 
night of the infamous fricative (and on all the intervening 
fretting) . What I had been given was not only a release from my worry 
(a release which was effectively an erasure of the incident: though 
my _f had been different from the p it ought to have been— the _p of the 
Islander community's idiom— and although it had made a difference 
that night, it was not adjudged to have been one of those differences 
which make a difference to the community; as such, its value was nil, 
but a value ascribed a posteriori), but a concomitant confirmation of 
community membership, a confirmation found in the fact that he 
genuinely could not remember having allayed my fears within a day or
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two of the incident, a forgetfulness which signaled (to me, which is 
why I was so worried that it might become a signal to him) that the 
community was no longer monitoring who told Cromwell what ...so, if 
he didn't tell me everything was all right, some other member of the 
community would; and if they didn't either, then when it came up it 
would be already over and done with because I would have figured out 
for myself that everything was all right (which is why I was doing 
all I could to keep 'Oh, sure. Not to worry.' on my face and not the 
dead giveaway of OhGodOhGodYouMeanlt'sOKandlgettostay!?!).
The community to which I received this after-the-fact and welcome 
/entree was a community of idiom. Which is to say that the 
communicative milieu of this community was an idiom. Neither 
community nor idiom has priority, nor is the relation between a 
community and its idiom causal. While members of a speech community 
may be able to talk to one another without concern for whether or not 
each will understand what the other says, members of a community of 
idiom communicate without worrying about what each other means. My 
guess is that this is because it is in the idiom that the real work of 
organizing for community action and maintaining the human 
relationship which are the bounds of community is done. Because 
relationship, once created, are predicated upon their continuance 
(that is, that whatever happens next the relationship will still be 
there), and because community action demands ipso facto that 
something happen, idiom serves the work of its community. The name 
of this work is predication.
On the Predication of a Genre
I have argued, at times quite polemically, for the establishment 
of a genre which we might call ethnography. The argument is intended 
to promote the authority of readers over the ambiguity of editors, 
publishing houses, university presses, and social science journals 
who hold that things written about 'foreign', especially 'tribal' 
(which is not— or, not to put too fine an edge on it, not any
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more— to say 'native') peoples are ethnography. It is intended to 
eradicate the fear, a fear grounded not in well-founded concern for 
possible failings of scholarship but in bureaucratically-founded 
terror at prospective loss of prestige and position, that the payment 
of critical attention to this genre of writing which is the basis of 
anthropology might, in tossing out a poor ethnographer here or 
admitting a really interesting journalist there, ^  bring the whole 
enterprise crashing down upon a base turned to air.
This is nonsense. But whether or not it shall prove to be true 
that the science of anthropology is founded on 'air', the specific 
gain pursuant to the recognition of a genre shall be the advantage of 
being able to see just what the community of discourse of 
anthropologists is founded upon. There is a double entendre in the 
"predication of a genre" which sits astride this section. The genre 
of ethnography which I propose is a genre which shall be predicated 
upon a certain kind of knowledge gained through a particular endeavor 
most usually prepared for and informed by a special discipline. The 
discipline is anthropology; the particular endeavour is the gaining 
of entry into a strange community to see what life there is (the 
"passing through" of Chapter 1). And if this were all there were to 
ethnography there would be no reason to make such a to-do here about 
a 'genre', especially at the risk of irritating not only practising 
ethnographers with a feel for their craft but also those with various 
vested interests in ethnographies which might arguably constitute 
the status quo ante (as long as the debate is not engaged) and about 
which there ought be no argument so long as these criticisms are not 
permitted to render the ante. But this is not the case; this is not 
all there is to ethnography. There is, as I have said, the 'second 
half', the graph-half.
The graph-half is certainly predicated upon the endeavour which 
is this discovery and exploration of some native community and on the 
discipline which embodies the information about, and preparation 
for, such an endeavour. This is one of the double meanings of the 
'predication of a genre': that the genre itself, the writing which
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constitutes it, be predicated upon the knowledge gained from being 
prepared to enter and explore an alien community and the endeavour 
which is that exploration. But to say that ethnography be so 
predicated is to propose hardly a difference from the notional 
appreciation of the status quo; who would argue that ethnography is 
based on ethnographic research? Thus does my proposition hinge on the 
shifty label "the knowledge gained", even more on the whole 
injunction, be predicated upon the knowledge gained. And this is the 
second of the meanings of 'predication of a genre', a programmatic 
one: that the knowledge which the writings are based on be knowledge 
of how the alien community carries out the work o4^ predication.
The first meaning suggests that writings more properly placed in 
the category of ethnology or anthropology (writings such as the 
present work) have been loosely referred to as 'ethnographies' 
simply because they have been about some native tribe or other. This 
is the kind of error which would place Gerard K. O’Neill's The High 
Frontier in the genre science fiction because it is about "human 
colonies in space". Since O'Neill's work is the presentation of an 
argument for, and program for, the establishment of real colonies of 
real humans in the near future, it is an error no one would make. And 
it is an error whose hinge is workable in written discourse: about♦ 
The High Frontier is most certainly about human colonies in space. 
It even includes a 'letter from space' and a diary of a trip among the 
asteroids (an entry which reads very much like some of Robert 
Heinlein's science 'fiction'). O'Neill uses some fictional devices 
to present a realistic view of life on real space colonies perhaps as 
soon as 1990- 2005* But his is not a work of fiction, and would not be 
considered to be (even those who dislike the inclusion of fictional 
letters would ground their dislike in the shared knowledge that the 
fictional bits have no business in a work of science) . It is not 
fiction, does not belong in a genre of fiction, because it is about 
real people...he simply has a problem because some of the real people 
who will do the colony building may not be born yet, and anyway
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haven't built any yet, so he has them send letters that are like the 
letters that may someday be sent back to earth.
The difference between this work and the work of Heinlein or some 
other writer of fiction is that the characters in a work of fictionn 
are real people (so the letters sent are real letters), and the work 
is about something else (often about policial philosophy and ethics 
in Robert Heinlein's case). It is, of course, unfair shorthand for 
me to say generally that the characters in fiction are real people. 
Lots of fiction writers fail to make their characters come alive; and 
many more readers fail to make the people they read live. How do I 
mean that those characters are real? Simply because their entire 
existence is on the page. A1 we have to be able to do is read and if 
the writer has done his job (which is only the job of making 
characters readable people) we have enough in front of us to make 
them come alive. This is expressly not the case with non-fiction 
characters (as a rule, that is, though a rule which excepts many of 
the characters in the writings of the New Journalists). Most of the 
time the writers of non-fiction fail to give anything at all like the 
information required by the reader if he is to bring this supposedly 
'real' person to life. So we are left in a position of having to 
either take the writer's word that such-and-such person was 'the kind 
of person who would do blah', or that 'when so-and-so blahed no one 
thought anything of it’, etcetera, or to disregard the propositions 
based on such imputations altogether.
The same has been true for much of so-called ethnography. It has 
been as if the genre somehow conferred upon the ethnographer a 
warrant of reality for his characters, thus absolving him of any 
obligation to bring them to the page alive. The common objection to 
such incomplete accounts of the characters who people some of these 
ethnographies has been couched in terms of 'evidence'. The common 
law theory of ethnography. That somehow if enough exhibits are 
brought for both the prosecution (anthropological theory and the 
like) and the defense (the unique native society), the reader will be 
able to act as a duly constituted court of appeal sitting to confirm
293
(so hopes the ethnographer) the judgment of the ethnographer. The 
judgment we are likely to be asked to confirm is on the order of, 
'these people studied are like such-and-such', or 'these people have 
the x-type of social organization'. The problem with coming to 
judgments in this legalistic way is that there are no rules of 
evidence. And, to reduce the analogy to its absurd conclusion, the 
ethnographer is both prosecutor and judge in the first instance. So, 
as a matter of course, he is going to select 'evidence' and a mode of 
presentation which will guarantee the assessment of social types or 
kinship categories or whatever he, sitting as judge, found on 
reflecting upon his ethnographic data.
Playing at ethnography this way is playing with a stacked deck. 
The problem is not that the deck is stacked in anyone's favour...how 
could it matter if the ethnographer or the theoretically-committed 
reader 'won'? No, the problem is that the 'deck' is all the data we 
have— 'cards' on who the ethnographer met, what he saw, what they 
did, when they did it, and so on— and much of the information in that 
'deck' is in the very arrangement of the 'cards'. When the 'deck' is 
stacked by the ethnographer shifting around this fact and that bit of 
'evidence' for presentation in an ethnography, all of the 
information inherent in the order of those cards vis-ä-vis one 
another is lost forever.
These metaphorical comments on 'evidence' and 'decks' are meant 
only to point up the problems with using interactional governance in 
written discourse. Writing about human actions as if these observed 
acts are the ethnographic 'evidence' for some ethnological 
'judgment' is to confuse evidence with testimony (and thereby to 
misapply the legal metaphor) . And to reckon on the need for evidence 
at all is to presume the legalism of the discourse which entails 
writer and reader, a presumption doubly flawed: once for its mistaken 
assumption that legal methods may somehow ensure a judgment in 
respect of evidence over which there are no rules in a domain over 
which presides no judge, and twice for its misapplication of the 
interactional analog of a living courtroom with prosecutors and
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witnesses and judge present to the discursive exchange in which only 
the reader is alive and present.
My urgings, then, for the predication of a genre hark back, in 
part, to much the same sort of urgency felt by early European salvage 
ethnologists and by Franz Boas and his American cohorts. I am 
concerned that modern ethnography, much of which constitutes the 
selfsame saving of societies now known but fast disappearing or 
dissipating, avoid the pitfalls inherent in mistaking 
interpretations for versions. What I have been constrained to do 
throughout this work is to render my versions of Islander life on the 
Australian mainland, versions couched in discrete essayings of the 
modes and codes of the idiom of the Torres Strait Mainland; and to 
render details of my own idiom in order that the reader may make his 
or her own interpretation of my version. (One wag called this 
surrounding of several ethnographic chapters with two pair of 
ethnologically interpretive ones the 'method of the essay sandwich'. 
An apt tag, I thought, and a fitting one: It is a tag that 
works— predicates , does the work of our community of discourse— as 
long as everyone in the community commands the sandwich idiom.)
Toward the Anthropology of Idiom
I have suggested that the business of ethnography ought to be the 
accounting for the studied community's 'predicates', both what sorts 
of things the members of the community reckon their knowledge is 
predicated on (origin myths, custom, political hierarchy and social 
organization extant, and the like) and how it is that the work of the 
community— as I have called it, predication— gets done. My general 
proposition is that the entities of foreign worlds are fairly 
straightforward. We know pretty quickly that there are men and 
women, children; that there are abodes; that there are places, and 
usually places distinguished by general and restricted access; that 
there are tools, historical relics, artefacts, effigies, icons, 
clothing, animals, plants, and so forth. Every once in a while we are
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thrown by what a thing is or is for, but these occasions are 
infrequent and invariably noticeable for their curiosity. What we do 
not know nearly as quickly, as we insinuate ourselves into another 
society, are two things in respect of these quickly noted entities: 
One, we do not know how they are each accounted for by the community; 
two, we do not know how each is used in order to carry out the work of 
the community. Which is to say that we pretty quickly recognize the 
subjects and objects of our new community, and that we spend the rest 
of our time figuring out the predicates.
For instance, it was known before I left for North Queensland that 
the Islanders I would find there had an English-based pidgin from the 
islands. So this pidgin could be safely anticipated as one of the 
entities (objects) of the community I would seek to join. And more 
than that, the native Islander interest in language per se, in the 
commonness of Islanders speaking more than one, in the general 
knowledge of two or three languages existing in their own Strait 
islands, in the fact of their all being immigrants in a land not of 
their own tongues, all of these supported the expectation that the 
pidgin, like the other languages, might be one of the subjects of the 
community, a thing action taken in respect of or knowledge held in 
respect of. And it was. Both object and subject. What was not known 
(by me) was that it was a language predicated upon a set of phonemes 
which did not include /f/. And I did not know that Aborigines were 
also objects in Islander reality, objects who were predicated upon 
saying /f/. Nor did I know that being Aboriginal was a subject par 
excellence in the mainland Island idiom, and that differences 
between Islander and Aborigine were everyday knowledge upon which 
actions in respect of raising good Islander children and protecting 
Islander integrity were predicated. It was not that I was unprepared 
in regards the difference between /f/ and /p/ as made sounds. It was 
that I was unprepared for the response to my /f/ which signalled not 
that I had merely misspoken but that I, and maybe my man himself, had 
been guilty of a grave misrepresentation.
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My contention is that predication is accomplished in the idiom of 
any community (and that the existence of idiom is prima facie 
evidence for community). Briefly, idiom is what most children learn 
as a first speech. Thus idiom is not created by virtue of a grammar 
working on words in the construction of sentences. Idiom is created 
by children trying to make sense by making themselves heard. Hearing 
comes first. Idiom is a construction in sounds in respect of a 
hearing. Much later come the words into which sounds of sense may be 
broken' much, much later, and usually never, comes the grammar. For 
grammar, too, is a product of hearing, not of speaking, a product 
commonly interpretated by the linguists and other grammarians who 
hear it, but rarely by others and never by very many speakers.
In this regard the anthropologist is truly much like the children 
being raised in the community he joins. He listens for all he's worth 
just to hear one or two differences which, he sees from ensuing 
action, are meaningful differences in this new community in which 
talk sounds like this. If he's really venturesome he might try 
making one or two of those sounds to see if they make, coming from 
him, the differences they make when members of the community say them 
to one another. (This was exactly where I screwed up. While I did 
not make the utter mistake of failing to notice that no one ever said 
/f/— in fact, people did, and I knew they did— I spoke too soon,
before I had cottoned on to the extent to which I had been already
✓ / / assigned to my maik _le_, a group of Eastern Islanders, Meriam le, who
wouldn't be caught dead saying /f/ out of respect for their native
/tongue, the higher mir of the island of Mer. Thus I effed myself 
right into limbo where I was either an Aborigine somebody was trying 
to pass off as an Islandman, or I had been caught saying /f/ and not 
dead.)
Since the work of Austin, and Searle, and the advent of 
sociolinguistics and especially Dell Hymes' ethnography of speaking, 
this is just the sort of thing which sociologists and anthropologists 
and linguists have begun paying attention to, and reporting. It was 
in this investigative milieu that I prepared myself to go and do
297
fieldwork among the urban Islandmen. What I found was that there was 
little available preparation for how to go and listen: there was lots 
of stuff on speaking but nothing on hearing; a number of things had 
been written on how to do things with words (in the vein of Austin's 
lectures) but little on how to figure out what you're supposed to do 
when the words are to get you to do something.
Of course, there is little need for such programmatic writings. 
How to listen is the first requirement of any ethnography; and no 
ethnography gets anywhere with its research unless the ethnographer 
starts hearing and understanding. In fact, not only is there little 
need for such elementary considerations in ethnography, also they 
get positively in the way of the reader trying to read ethnographies. 
But this is not to say that ethnological treatises such as this one 
may not find room for just such elementary disquisitions on how 
ethnography happens.
I have characterized genre as the written counterpart of idiom. 
And I have proposed the recognition of a genre which we might agree 
to call ethnography. It would be the genre in which the work of 
predication in the communities studies by fieldworkers would be put 
into words. The words which each fieldworker used would be the best 
he could use in order to put his version of the idiom of that 
community. The criterion for best use would be how well he could do 
at making the sense that he gained, present as he was at the telling, 
be the sense read by his readers. When the community is the community 
of the ethnographer, and one in which there is a community of 
writing, much of the ethnographer's task is to construct a reading of 
readings, to show his reader how his studied community makes sense of 
written matter and predicates community action upon it.^9 But when, 
as is yet most often the case, the community studies is not literate 
(or has no written idiom despite the general presence of a written 
language, a language which may be a national, artificial, colonial, 
or other outside language), the problem for the ethnographer is 
complicated by his not only having to present ethnographic accounts 
based on translations or glosses of native words but also to render
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in writing events which took place in person. This is precisely 
wherein lies the reason for a genre in which we might do this.
A genre is constituted by writings which readers recognize as 
being of a piece, belonging to one another. Writings in the same 
genre do not belong to one another by virtue of shared form. Essays, 
for instance, are formally similar in that their content is also an 
evaluation of their content, but they are found generically in 
politics, jurisprudence, literary criticism, and biology. 
Rather, writing shares a genre by virtue of what the readers of that 
writing know in respect of it. And this is where genre, governed by
discursive laws rather than by linguistic ones, may be juxtaposed
101with idiom. Genre is constituted by readers, idiom by hearers.
The genre science fiction did not exist so very long ago. New 
Journalism is even younger. (New Ethnography is younger still, but 
probably was not a genre, its constituents linked by content, that 
is, by something the authors all knew rather than by something the 
readers did.) Science fiction and the New Journalism both came into 
being, as genres, because of their respective readerships. And 
because the early writers in each were read by prospective writers 
who emulated something of their style and shared some of their same 
concerns and interests, the genre was perpetrated. And because there 
exists a genre, readers may argue about who is or is not 'in' the 
genre (and these arguments may continue perfectly oblivious of 
whether or not the writer himself under discussion considers himself 
typical or not). Again, the reason this is possible is because the 
reality of the genre is in the reading.
Thus is the argument for the predication— the establishment by 
recognition— of a genre based on the same primacy of response upon 
which the studies of human communication which shall be found to 
constitute that genre shall be predicated. The anthropology of idiom 
will be facilitated by those studies in human social interaction 
which expose the idiom of the communities in which the actions which 
are that interaction take place. (And it must be remembered that the 
language of reporting is often the idiom of some community or other,
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sometimes taken lock, stock, and barrel into the language of the
society of that community of idiom, sometimes simply translated into
the writing of the ethnographer unawares— such as my use here of
'lock, stock, and barrel', a saying which dates from a time when
those three things were not only parts of a rifle but also separate
parts whose enumeration was required by anyone in that community of
idiom wanting to tell another that the whole damn gun had been taken.
But all kinds of people use that saying nowadays who know nothing of
10?what those three things are, but who know perfectly well that no 
one will mistake them on hearing to mean 'the whole bloody thing', 
whatever the thing. Contrast this with my use of 'take place' in the 
preceeding sentence about the anthropology of idiom being based on 
ethnographies of communication which expose the idiom of communities 
in which the actions os social interaction take place. This is one of 
those phrases once generated in an idiom which has moved right into 
written English [and Spanish: tener lugar; and French: avoir lieu], 
where it is so comfortable that there is no problem of how to 
punctuate it [no punctuation separating the two elements of the 
phrase] nor of how to decline the entire phrase [took place, taking 
place, would have to have been taking place; i.e. decline take in the 
singular and never use plural place(s)] , and none of the problems of 
moving it from spoken English into written and back again as there is 
for 'lock, stock, and barrel'— we never quite know whether to write 
it lock, stock and barrel, or use the extra comma for lock, stock, 
and barrel, or try to pretend to write it as it is said, all of a 
piece: lock-stock-and-barrel, lockstockandbarrel. Nevertheless,
'take place' is a predicate which has little to do with 
taking— except in the circuitous logic of saying that a robbery took 
place, as if in taking the money some place was taken too— and 
nothing at all to do with place. And as long as we do not attend too 
closely to the words, J as long as we do not spend our time as I have 
done here, we can get by with saying, and hearing, that human 
interaction takes place.)
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This leaves us with the glaring question of what these 
ethnographies of idiom shall themselves be predicated upon. I 
suggested earlier that they should be predicated upon the knowledge 
gained. By that I meant the knowledge that the ethnographer gains 
from, and while, being among the people he studies. This is, it seems 
to me, the solution to the problem of the black box, the problem that 
we do not know what happens between the words and phrases going into 
the brain-mind-body and the words and phrases and actions emitted in 
response to, or in respect of, those bits of information that went 
in. I suggested that what we, as ethnographers, do is move into the 
minds of the peoples we study. And as long as we do not pay too close 
attention to 'move' (or as long as we are willing to adopt the 
definition I outlined in Chapter 7), then this can be said to be what 
we do. Nor, it seems to me, are we obliged to at all apologize for 
thus engaging in such mindful activity without being able to chart 
what happens to the electrons and neurons and synapses and chemicals 
which do the work of the black box.
Which is to say that we need not, I would argue, feel any 
obligation to deny that what we do is make sense of human actions 
which were theretofore senseless though we cannot describe or 
explain the inner workings of the brain. For what we can do is 
explain much of the sense-making of the human mind. It is just that 
it turns out to be not any such thing as the human mind, but rather 
such things as countless human minds, some of which we are part of 
('our' mind is part of) as we attend to undergraduate education and 
training for anthropological research, and some others of which we 
become part of as we engage those alien persons who turn out to be 
members of very different communities and parts of very strange human 
minds. What we do know about the black box is that it participates in 
making sense. We have one very active century, backed up by many long 
centuries of scattered occasions, of ethnographic research, of proof 
positive that human beings can leave their own society bent precisely 
upon making sense of alien societies among whom they have chosen to 
go and live and make sense of. In addition to this, we have the
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apparently universal human ability to distinguish between knowledge 
and suspicion (between 'I know this' and 'I suspect that such and 
such is the case'), to distinguish what we know we know from those 
reckonings which we say we know when there is no need to pay 
attention to their predication.
This last problem bespeaks the difference between the playwright 
and the reporter of conversation. The playwright makes the players 
converse so that their meanings are clear to the third person who is 
the audience. The reporter of conversation is obliged to report the 
conversation as said, as the speakers were making sense to one 
another. This is the dilemma of the anthropologist who, as 
fieldworker, listens to his people make sense to one another and 
then, as ethnographer, must make them speak so as to make their 
meanings sensible to the audience. In the simplest sense this 
requires him to either gloss the native tongue or use native words 
with definitions in the language of reporting. It matters not to the 
current discussion which of these methods the ethnographer uses (i 
myself have used both, and various hybrids, throughout this thesis); 
what does matter is whether or not the ethnographer knows whereof he 
writes. This is what is crucial to the predication of a genre on the 
knowledge of the ethnographer: that the ethnographer only writes 
events when he knows what is going on
Still, having said that it matters not whether the ethnographer 
reports conversation verbatim or glosses native words to render 
those conversations in the English of the ethnography, and having 
said further that what does matter is that the ethnographer knows 
what he's doing, let me propose that here is exactly where lies the 
need for a genre. We might have said that it matters very much that 
the conversation is reported verbatim if the readers are 
conversational analysts, or that the native conversations must be 
glossed because the readers read only English. But these one-to-one 
matchings of ethnography-and-reader would require a ridiculous 
multiplication of versions. And in the end, with the plethora of 
versions thus produced in hand, we would discover that versions are
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the work of a single woman or man; that each version would in turn 
spawn a different singular version as it was read by each new reader. 
And that each two readers, discussing what they had read, would 
produce in discussion a further version. And so on.
Once a genre is established many of these problems disappear. 
Because, as J.P. Stern put it in his discussion of Lichtenberg and 
the genre of the aphorism,
in assigning the word "genre" to certain large or small, 
common or rare collocations of words we are tracing out a 
certain similarity of reactions on our— the 
reader's— part: a distinct feeling and understanding,
and any such assignation, in respect of genres known, such as
aphorism, or proposed, such as ethnography, has as its premise
the conviction that the categories of literature are not 
empty names signifying nothing, but meaningful 
designations of distinct kinds of literary expression: and 
hence also representations of distinct ways of responding
to the world.^^
My proposition is that ethnography is a distinct way of being in 
the world, a way of penetrating another society in order to inhabit 
the web of meaning there for the purpose of returning and writing 
down a version of that web. The requirement of idiom is that there be 
something there according to which that web is meaningful. In this 
view, there can be no evidence put by the ethnographer onto his page; 
there can be only the words and context of his discursive prose; 
there can be only the prose of his version. And his version must be a 
version of the meanings of his people; the version on the page can 
not be their version; the version on the page can not be the reader's 
version. All he can do is put for the reader the particulars of his 
own 'movement' in coming to terms with these people. And if he fully 
comprehends that the version which stands will be, in the end, the 
version read, he will use his own language to the full in order that 
the reader may read even more of the path taken than the ethnographer 
might intend or be aware.
It is this last which is the simplest of my propositions and which 
may prove the most difficult to entertain generally. And it has a 
little to do with my brief mention of the problem of the black box.
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Every ethnographer has as his central piece of sense-making 
equipment the so-called black box of the impenetrable workings of the 
human brain. Much of the 'making of versions' is black box work, as 
is the garnering of the information with which the ethnographic 
versions are constructed. But what we do know about human beings 
(and I shall limit myself here, broadly, to communication), is that 
they glance at many more things than they watch, they look at much 
more than they see, they see much more than they notice; they hear 
much more than they listen to, they listen to much more than they 
recognize; they read much more than they write.
What this means is that it is much more humanly possible to 
recognize than it is to constitute. We are much better at 
recognizing the right 'look' , most of us, than we are at creating our 
own fashions. We are much better at recognizing just the word we are 
looking for than we are at selecting it in speech. We are much better 
recognizing just the word we need when writing than we are at writing 
the right word in the first place. (Lichtenberg: In our fashionable 
poets it is so easy to see how the work has begotten the thought; in 
Milton and Shakespeare the thought always begets the wordJ ^ )  So it 
is not my contention that ethnographers are somehow better equipped 
than mere mortals for their journey (though they ought to be better 
prepared, by virtue of their education). But it is my contention 
that they will be much better equipped, having been there, to say 
what is and is not the right word or phrase or film or activity to use 
to say how life is in that other web of meanings.
If it were thus the case that the ethnographer needed but to sit 
around selecting among various possible descriptions of that alien 
life, his job would be not only considerably less fraught, but the 
resulting product would be considerably better, picked over and 
honed until only just the right words were used for each alien 
description. Since this is not the case, and since ethnography is 
most often the work of one who has been a singular visitor to that 
other society, the ethnographer is stuck with trying to be both 
student of his studied society and its presenter. But with the
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recognition of a genre suited to just such an activity, the 
apparent— heretofore, assumed— contradiction drops out. 
Ethnography becomes a genre by which its readers recognize in 
themselves similar appreciations upon reading the writings 
characteristic of the genre, writings which are characteristically 
ethnography and nothing else. Ethnography becomes the literary 
genre of those whose way of being in the world is to go and inhabit an 
alien web of meanings and construct that journey in writing. It 
shall be recognized by the writings produced, by their attention to 
the idioms according to which those webs are constructed (and 
construed).
This way of writing and reading, this way of being in the world, 
which we might call ethnography, shall make itself known by an 
especial requirement on writer and reader. In part, it shall be 
(accepting for the purpose of this description my definition of 
ethnography as the capture of idiom) possible for the reader of 
ethnography to gain purchase on both the ethos 'graphed' and on the 
ethnographer, a possibility inherent in a journey of 'capture' whose 
journeyman recognizes that just as the people whom he studies live 
not so much by way of their language but in it— surrounded by and 
steeped in the worlds which it holds for them— just so do he and his 
reader live in and surrounded by the language of the ethnography. 
This knowledge, coupled with his sure knowledge that the reader is 
always better than the writer at finding the right word, may free him 
to use his language to the full in trying to make sense of that 
strange other world which cannot yet be held in his language since no 
one before him could have put it there, but which will stand as long 
as his account is read.
The requirement shall be on the reader to permit the writer some 
freeway in his words, having to stretch them as he does around 
meanings which they have never had; on the writer to permit the 
reader some considerable purchase on the mind of the writer, knowing 
that he is the only link, however tenuous, between the alien mind 
which he has inhabited and the mind of the reader. As Stern says in
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1 07the course of his literary definition of the aphorism, first we 
define the literary analogue— in his case, for Lichtenberg, the 
aphorism; in this case the ethnography— to "a certain disposition of 
mind", and then
our definition established, we should be able to turn back 
to the originative mind, to see what consequences are 
implied in the definition for it; what that mind has also 
to be like if the definition is to retain the validity it 
originally appeared to possess; and whether the mind 
really is like that. We are thus trying to find out not 
"what people generally mean" but what one who had given 
some thought to the matter would have to mean in order to 
draw the utmost coherent meaning from the word he used.
And it is not to linguistic usage but to the insights into 
experience (literary and other) arising in the course of 
this examination that we shall appeal to sanction our 
undertaking.
In particular what we want to establish is a genre in which it is
to be taken for granted that the presentation of that other web of
meanings— the web of other meanings— shall be in terms of what one
who had given some thought to the matter would have to mean in order
to draw the utmost coherent meaning from the words he uses. In the
few tales which pop up from time to time in the present work I have
used, at different times, capitalization, punctuation marks,
idiomatic expressions from American and Australian and
anthropological slang, idiomatic phrases from Torres Strait Pidgin,
a word or two from Meriam mir. (And because this has been, in toto, a
work about ethnography and not ethnography itself, I have been free
to 'sandwich' ethnographic chapters between considerations of the
alternity by which words do the work of language, and the
alternatives of word choice and punctuation and sentence style among
which any ethnographer selects in order to make sense. Such
considerations ought to have no place in ethnography proper.) If
these selections have not made sense (— if they have been by turns
too evocative of stylistics or of metaphysics— )it is because I have
not trod that middle path between 'sarcasm as the condition of truth'
and running naked through the streets to announce my
1 ORfindings...between acute dissociation and obtuse enthusiasm. 
And, too, it may be that ethnology cannot be a middle way. Perhaps
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ethnology is always oscillating between the poles of tale and teller, 
paying attention as it must to both the content of the ethnography 
with which it treats, and to the substance of the ethnographer who 
wrote it. (Thus my general restriction herein to my own essays, 
since I may present myself as writer without fear or misreading and 
be answerable only to me in case I am wrong.)
STORYTIME: Tale and Teller
"Never trust the teller, trust the tale," said Lawrence. So wrote 
Susan Sontag in the essay with which I introduced the present work. 
"Interpretation," she wrote (and she is very much against it, though 
not in the sense in which Nietzsche, rightly for her, says, 'There 
are no facts, only interpretations'), "amounts to the philistine 
refusal to leave the work of art alone. Real art has the capacity to 
make us nervous. By reducing the work of art to its content and then 
interpreting that, one tames the work of art."^^ Sontag needn't have 
restricted herself to works of art. Native cultures too have the 
capacity to make us nervous. Though it has certainly been the case 
that many ethnographers, working not only during the heyday of 
cultural relativism, have sought to make native ways harmless by 
showing us their inherent logic. But saying that such ways make a 
kind of sense to those who practice them is not to make them make 
sense to us. And interpreting them only serves to make of the 
interpretation a tertium quid— like language is for most linguists, 
like culture became for Boas, like works of language art are for most 
literary critics— thus guaranteeing a logic, wrested from some alien 
behaviour and seized in a moment of ethnographic present, where there 
might have been the messy noisy behaviour itself, described as well 
as the ethnographer could and presented with the anthropo-logic by 
which the noise and mess might be seen to make sense, to have come to 
make sense to the ethnographer.
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So I have advocated using language to the full, and have used a 
few tricks here and there. This is not to say that ethnography should 
be like novels... Rather, it is to say that there ought be no 
disciplinary prohibition against ethnography being like novels (see 
Tom Wolfe on "Just Like a Novel" regarding New Journalism), but that 
ethnographies ought not be novels. Novels are marked by a teller 
telling a tale. The teller, the novelist, knows the tale because he 
is writing it. He may not know where he is going with it (where it is 
going with him), but wherever it ends up it will do so only by virtue 
of the teller telling his reader the tale. D.H. Lawrence, who was 
both a novelist and critic (who was both a teller of tales which were 
novel and a teller of tales about other works of art), told us to 
never trust the teller. He also said we could trust the tale. And we 
have some very good proof of his truthfulness in his own most 
untrustworthy Kangaroo. A.D. Hope, the Australian poet and literary 
critic wrote, "Even admirers of D.H. Lawrence have not had much to 
say in favour of K a n g a r o o ^ ^
Professor Hope counts himself a "hostile witness who thinks 
Lawrence an extremely overrated writer". He makes it clear that, in 
any case, "Lawrence had little chance even to know what he was 
talking about", but says "the shoddiness of his 'Australian setting'
reveals itself on almost every page":
when we find Australians on the east coast in easy reach of 
the bush lighting their fires expensively with 'chunks of 
jarrah' or when the village war memorial is surmounted by 
the effigy of a 'Tommy standing at ease'— though Lawrence 
knew the term 'Digger' and used it in the book— the 
carelessness is of the same order that makes Somers say he 
will sound his muezzin, or tell a story about white ants 
eating a litter of puppies, or take the blue-bottles on the 
New South Wales beach for some kind of octupus.
Lawrence was not in Australia long, saw little while he was here, and 
wrote, a few days before he left the country, "We haven't known a 
single soul here— which is really a relief". This is exactly why we 
do not trust the teller.
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In the same way we must be careful of trusting Professor A.D. 
Hope, who says Lawrence's white ants and blue-bottles are "more than 
mistakes excusable in a tourist; they are symptomatic of a sloppy 
attitude to his craft"; who introduces himself as a "hostile 
witness". Again, we cannot trust this teller to tell us a tale we can 
trust about D.H. Lawrence and the writing of Kangaroo. What we can 
trust in each case is the tale.
We can trust Kangaroo to weave exactly the tale it does, a kind of 
boring and mediocre psychodrama full of stereotypes which are in 
their turn full of errors. Our reading of Kangaroo cannot only show 
us the errors of fact (providing we read in possession of the facts 
of blue-bottles and white ants), but can support our own predication 
of trustworthiness... in the case of Professor Hope's reading none at 
all. We can trust A.D. Hope's essay to weave with but a few strands 
the warp and weft of Lawrence's time in Australia and Lawrence's 
writing of Kangaroo, and to show us a picture of a pitfully 
inattentive writer with an aggrandized reputation caring hardly at 
all for his subject country or its people; and to damn him in closing
with the very faintest praise,
...Lawrence, at the best, was only a minor Blake.
And there is me: you can trust me only on the page in front of you. 
As for my tale of tellers and tales here —  this very short one of 
Lawrence and Hope and Kangaroo —  I think much more highly of Lawrence 
as a writer than does the A.D. Hope of this essay-tale, and I think 
much more highly of A.D. Hope as an Australian than I do of Lawrence 
as one. When the subject at hand is the Australian idiom, Hope is 
right: Lawrence was awful. When the subject is brilliant and 
evocative writing, then Lawrence is good. (He is better in fact than 
Hope is at writing against Lawrence's depiction...but then that is my 
tale). But, as Hope reminds us, an-d this holds just as much for any 
ethnography as it does for a novel (and even more so for those places 
where the idiom is incomprehensible without a close reading of 
locale) :
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One might reply that the book was not written for 
Australians; but an author who sets a novel in a country 
unfamiliar to his readers has a responsibility to them 
which goes further than simply building up an atmosphere 
of the foreign or the exotic.
And yet, can we make these comments on novels and plays speak to
the problems of ethnography? I think we can, of course; but I think
so only in respect of some subtle distinctions. Where Hope rightly
chides the novelist for not doing anything more than 'building up an
atmosphere of the foreign or the exotic', most ethnographers have
their hands full trying to make the exotic seem mundane (as it is for
him when he's there in that exotic world). And yet the techniques for
using words are the same, though the preferred outcome (the reading)
be different. When Ursula LeGuin wants to establish her Earthsea
Trilogy in 'an atmosphere of the foreign or the exotic' she uses a
device used by other science fiction writers, a sort of
1 1 1anthropologese where the boy's aunt is introduced into the story 
thus ,
A sister of his dead mother lived in the village
redolent of the African mother’s brother and the corollary that some 
uncles were much more than just uncles (as this mother's sister turns 
out to be so much more than just another aunty). She also uses words 
such as
She kept busy those two days making dry wheatcakes for the 
voyagers to carry, and wrapping up dried fish and meat and 
other such provender to stock their boat, until Ged told 
her to stop, for he did not plan to sail clear to Selidor 
without a halt
'dry wheatcakes' (she couldn't have put 'crackers', obviously, 
without loss of exotica— but how can wheatcakes be drier than other 
wheatcakes, and what might a wheatcake be that couldn't be called 
something else?); 'voyagers' ('travelers' wouldn't do?); 
'provender' (almost as recognizably exotic by virtue of 
same-culture-different-era as 'vittles'); 'without a halt' (no one 
would risk the transitivity of 'halt' when 'stop' or 'rest' would 
do) .
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But what if, unlike our cohorts in anthropologese the science 
fiction writers, we want to render sensible a real world which we 
have visited and which is truly alien; foreign; exotic? What if this 
world has people who eat dry wheatcakes— do we translate them as 
'crackers' so as to make the foreign familiar? What if this world 
has, as does the world of Torres Strait, voyagers (people who just 
travel, by canoe in the old days, and by pearling lugger, and 
nowadays by train and plane and car)— do we call them 'travelers', 
and in making their journeys seem familiar do them the injustice of 
going from one place to another instead of always heading off for the 
next place? What if in this world 'stop' is what you do when you stay 
overnight with relatives or when you live somewhere for a time; and 
'rest' is almost exclusively reserved for old people who have no 
stamina; and 'stay' is something said only of another, as to those 
who have been your hosts when, as you leave, you say, politely, as a 
way of announcing your impending departure, "Well, you-all stay 
now"— how far this world can we ever use halt and claim for it any 
meaning at all (as we can claim no meaning for it in the world of 
Torres Strait Pidgin where these 'stop' and 'stay' and 'rest' are)?
No, to do this 'reverse' of what novelists do to make foreign 
countries foreign and science fiction writers do to make imaginary 
worlds alien would be to make the strangely mundane 
inconsequentially prosaic. Better, I think, to use the words— dry 
wheatcakes, voyagers— which convey something of the strangeness, of 
the alien differentness of that other place. But best of all would be 
simply not to censor. If 'dry wheatcakes' presents itself to the 
ethnographer whose people make some kind of unleavened stone-ground 
baps, then dry wheatcakes it is. While we may not know the 
intricacies of the literary process by which words come and are 
linked and whose linkages in turn cause other words and emendations 
and so forth, there is no cause for thinking the process to be 
different— less accurate, less trustworthy— for those who would put 
their language to work describing the real strange places of the real 
world from those who describe the unreal worlds of strange places.
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To construct a difference such as the one rejected here would be to
commit to a difference of process which is simply not true.
Moreover, it would be to propose a difference of product. And this is
not true either: all writers produce writings. There is no
difference of product between the book filled with printed words and
maps and pictures of 'Earthsea' and the book filled with printed
words and maps and pictures of Torres Strait. The difference is in
1 1 2what is known beforehand.
While the novelist has to learn to listen closely and well to his 
tale, as it spins out of him and spins him along, the ethnographer 
has to listen to the tales of others. This is the difference. 
Novelists are the authority for the tales they tell (they must be, 
they are the very authors of them); ethnographers at best only have 
authority for the tales they tell. And while the novelist, if he 
wants to be good, must learn to 'listen' to his tales, the 
ethnographer must learn to listen to the tales of others. And while 
the novelist cannot help but be there while his tale spins out 
(though there is some question about whether the 'he' that spins the 
tale has any kind of reality beyond that tale's telling), the special 
commitment of the ethnographer is that he be there at the telling. 
Only the ethnographer who is there at the telling, who has learned 
the idiom of the community and can bring his extraordinary human 
powers of discernment to bear, only he can distinguish the teller 
from the tale.
STORYTIME is my gloss for that aspect of situations when the 
context of situation is the idiom and the content is a story. My 
inclination so long ago when I began this thesis was to put STORY in 
caps, too, as a kind of notionally translatable or comparable thing. 
But what I have found is that stories, simple plots of characters 
doing things to one another in pursuit of something, stories quite as 
we generally understand them, exist everywhere I have looked. And 
these stories are not things. They are little 
processes-in-language, each one different in the telling. They are 
different in the telling each time not because the teller invariably
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makes some little error, or inevitably introduces some little 
variation; not because of some metaphor or esoteric dictum that 'you 
can't tell the same tale twice'. They are different even if they are 
written down, even if they are inscribed in printer's ink or chipped 
into stone. Their difference lies in the hearing. I think that 
stories may well exist among every people because I have heard them 
among those peoples with whom I have lived and travelled, (i also 
think that stories may be the closest thing in conscious awareness to 
how minds work...a predisposition which ought to be a cautionary one 
for those who would trust my tale without 'listening' to it for 
themselves.^  ^
In my introduction I spoke of stories as idiom. What I want to 
make clear now is that while _I may use stories (or, strictly 
speaking, STORY using the caps of glossed sign-language gestures, or 
of poetry where the glosses are not meant as translations but just as 
emotive approximations, or of THOUGHTS, where, as in my f-story 
above, I had to represent the thoughts that were part of the 
situation but which were not subvocalized and therefore technically 
not translatable into words but transposed into glosses) in a 
restricted idiom in order to present the salient features of 
mechanisms of communicative competence, I do not mean that stories 
ought to be taken yet to be universal. Nor, for that matter, do I yet 
propose to take idioms as human universals (though I think we must 
work toward that q u e s t i o n ) . W h a t  I do want to take as a universal 
is the universal problem of speaking as conduct, as habit, and of 
how this comes to be so...not in the speciously 'universal' of 
Universal Man Acquires Idiom— the headline catchphrase which an 
account such as mine might otherwise wear— but in the suspiciously 
prevalent, and therefore suspectedly universal, practice of real men 
just about everywhere being able to handle an apparent babble of 
languages spoken, written, called, signed, and invented. The codes 
and modes and metaphors which are, and are in, those languages, and 
in metalanguages in respect of them, are themselves handled 
meaningfully.
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In respect of this problem, I offer a few steps toward the 
anthropology of idiom. This is an anthropology which will have as 
its meat the ethnographies which seek to make discursive sense of how 
the infinite universe of alternity which is Language is constrained 
in and by the world of each idiom in respect of its language 
universe. STORYTIME is the times and situations when learners of the 
idiom are taught the restraints of alternity. It is in STORYTIME 
that speakers learn, among all they have learned to say, what they 
may mean. In the community of Torres Strait Islander idiom, 
STORYTIME takes place in islandtaim: any tale of clocks, of hours and 
minutes... any tale with these are suspect, tales which could not have 
happened in islandtaim and whose tellers are not to be trusted. In 
islandtaim the first thing may have happened a century ago and the 
thing which come apta, the next thing in that 'story', may happen 
tomorrow.
(You been watchin' that Morgan-girl?, one old Islandman asked his 
countryman in a pub one day in April of 1978. Yep, said the other, 
loose; really loose. Uh, agreed the first, turning to look out into 
the stark white of the Townsville street. He turned back to his 
countryman with a thought, That family of hers better be careful... 
them Morgan boys... , he mused, not unconcerned, You remember what 
happened to that Mary Anne— . His companion nodded over his beer, 
having already caught the other's drift, Been thinkin' 'bout that 
myselp. Both men returned to their beers, playing out in their minds 
whatever the scenario was their unpleasant reckoning had turned up. 
I drank mine, killing time until the first could introduce me to his 
countryman, which was why we came into the pub. In July or August I 
finally found out what that conversation was: the seventeen-year old 
Morgan lass had been shaking her tail in a wide enough swirl to be 
talked about; Morgans were relations of both men in the pub; sometime 
around a hundred and ten years ago, give or take, a girl in the same 
tribal group as the Morgans and these two blokes had shaken her tail 
once too often; the menfolk of her family, sad at the loss of a sister 
but not about to leave the problem uncorrected, bashed her nearly to
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death and then buried alive what was left. BEAT HER UP AND BURIED HER 
ALIVE! And the place is known. Was it true? Who knows; they say it 
is. Would they condone such a thing today? I think, having lived 
amongst 'em, they truly would. And when they said, You remember 
such-and-such to each other, they never distinguished between 
yesterday and eighteen sixty. Nor did they ever distinguish between 
what we would call a story or a legend or a tale and what we would 
call history or biography. No one said, 'Hey, you remember that 
story about Mary Anne— ', and I could never get anyone to understand 
me when I tried to distinguish that Mary Anne from that story. The 
only question ever was was it Island tonar...was it in the Island 
way. )
So, STORYTIME is ray gloss for when Islanders are learning how to 
be Islanders— and for those rare times when one or the other of us 
who were not born Islanders are admitted to the learning. Education 
to the tonar always takes place in STORYTIME, even when it is the 
STORYTIME of the young boy unobserved observing his father tie his 
lava-lava. (And, education in the white Australian schools never 
consists of STORYTIME, even though judgments by Island parents in 
respect of that education does, generating untold turmoil in some 
Island kids, turmoil which, since it could not have been a result of 
education in the tonar, has no purchase on the STORYTIME which can be 
its only possible alleviation.) STORYTIME is, too, the time of 
expulsion, when the old story of sarup gets told in its modern 
version (a weakened one, where the 'returnee' doesn't get killed any 
more, and may not even get bashed if he stays long enough away before 
returning). And STORYTIME is the times when the young white American 
anthropologist gets access to the stories of the tonar— that version 
of what he calls 'mind'— and receives the warrant for telling his 
version.
In Torres Strait Pidgin there are lots of little bits of stories, 
the constant comparing and joining of East and West which is the 
business of a lingua franca as its community is being constituted. 
But most of STORYTIME is still conducted in the traditional
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/tongues— for me, in the mir of my maik-le— and polite adjournment to 
island-group caucus is still common as Eastern and Western groups 
retreat to come to terms among themselves before negotiating a new 
conjoint reality in the Pidgin. And while STORITIME in both East and 
West accommodates each other's presence in Torres Strait, (and, 
grudgingly at times, for each other's ways), except for a seaman or 
two, and a boat-builder, and a few Japanese pearlers and the 
anthropologist Jeremy Beckett, nobody has ever gained presence 
throughout the Strait except a few Islandmen, heroes from the 
ancestors' time.
There are, then, no shared ways yet for acquiring skills in
respect of joint presence. (There is no STORYTIME for Pidgin, no
measure of meanings for how to be silent or inactive in mixed groups,
not even a glossary in Pidgin for excusing momentary traditional
speech.) There are no shared ways for whites and Islanders (STORYTIME
whites are ill-mannered and lacking in respect); there are no shared
ways for Aborigines and Islanders (STORYTIME Aborigines have no
culture at all [this, despite their famous 'Dreamtime'] and do not
even understand the meaning of respect). Finally, there are no
provisions for shared tellings, for those with mainland experience
at dealing with men from other islands and other cultures to
participate in modifying the tales of the tonar. In the STORYTIME
there are only the traditional tellers, and only they, who inherit
this authority, may be the authors of the new tonar. In this book
only one man did the telling. Every story in this STORYTIME was told
/by one man, the head of his family, head of my maik-le, and one-time 
heir apparent to the whole of the Torres Strait; a man so feared that 
his opponents refused to let him come home to his island...not even 
to see his dying father, not even to bury him.
This has been an ethnological weighing. I have weighed the
proposition of studying idiom by weighing my versions of this man's
✓  /tales. In the end, only he may tell the tales of the Meriam le, and I 
may tell only versions of his tales. Only in this way may we not 
cheat the idiom and, for us, its warrant in bar kak mir.
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Notes to the Preface
page 4 "...might live BOTH on my pages AND in their Australian 
towns." The capitalized BOTH/AND is a reference to Anthony 
Wilden's objection to EITHER/OR thinking about organisms and 
modes of existence. See Wilden 1972:222, 227n22.
page 5 "Because it proves that things both can and cannot be" is from 
William Butler Yeats' poem "The Curse of Cromwell", a poem 
redolent of Anthony Wilden's cybernetic BOTH/AND, and the 
dualism of Bateson, in the tradition of R.G. Collingwood, and 
William Blake, and Samuel Butler, a poem about living minds in 
service to dead bodies (viz. line 22: "That I am still their 
servant though all are underground.")
page 5 "The Case of the Planet Pluto" is section 3 of Chapter III 
Multiple Versions of the World, on pages 70 and 71 of Mind and 
Nature. Gregory Bateson died on July 4th, 1980.
page 6 "And after a few such retroductive exercises..." 
Retroduction, also called abduction, was Charles S. Peirce's 
addition to the conventional reasonings known as deduction and 
induction, in which the importance of hypothesis to generate 
explanation was stressed, especially for cases in which the 
same explanations, once generated, could be used to reason 
other phenomena. (See Philip P. Wiener, Values in a Universe 
of Chance: Selected Writings of Charles S. Peirce, pp.230 and 
368-373 esp. 372-3; Justus Buchler, The Philosophy of Peirce, 
pp.56, 150-156, 304-305; see also Israel Scheffler, Pour
Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead 
and Dewey, pp.13-82 esp. 58-75») In Mind and Nature (p.139)> 
Bateson characterizes abduction as "seeking other cases which 
will be anologous in the sense of belonging under the same 
rule", and (p.84) says we can flesh out explanation "by the 
process which the American logician, C.S. Peirce called 
abduction, that is, by finding other relevant phenomena and 
arguing that these, too, are cases under our rule and can be 
mapped onto the same tautology." In a short section entitled 
Abduction (pp.142-4) he writes, "The very possibility of 
abduction is a little uncanny, and the phenomenon is 
enormously more widespread than he or she might, at first 
thought, have supposed. Metaphor, dream, parable, allegory, 
the whole of art, the whole of science, the whole of religion, 
the whole of poetry, totemism, the organization of facts in 
comparative anatomy— all these are instances or aggregates of 
instances of abduction, within the human mental sphere."
page 7 "...condemned to see all practice as spectacle..." These 
words are borrowed from Husserl, actually from Pierre Bourdieu 
who borrowed them from Husserl for the opening of (the Richard 
Nice translation of) his Outline of a Theory of Practice, 
which begins (p.1): "The practical privilege in which all 
scientific activity arises never more subtly governs that 
activity than when, unrecognized as a privilege, it leads to
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an implicit theory of practice which is the corollary of 
neglect of the social conditions in which science is possible. 
The anthropologist's particular relation to the object of his 
study contains the makings of a theoretical distortion 
inasmuch as his situation as an observer, excluded from the 
real play of social activities by the fact he has no place 
(except by choice or by way of a game) in the system observed 
and has no need to make a place for himself there, inclines him 
to a hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to 
reduce all social relations to communicative relations and, 
more precisely, to decoding operations.... And exaltation of 
the virtues of the distance secured by externality simply 
transmutes into an epistemological choice the 
anthropologist's objective situation, that of the "impartial 
spectator", as Husserl puts it, condemned to see all practice 
as a spectable."
page 7 "...away from the analogues... toward the dialogues..." is a 
direct reference to the distinction made, and the programmatic 
position taken in regard of that distinction, by Dennis 
Tedlock in the Harvey Lecture for 1979, "The Analogical 
Tradition and the Emergence of a Dialogical Anthropology".
page 7 "...'a very great company, both living and dead: my
authorities, my authors'." is from the dedication to Love's 
Body by Norman 0. Brown, and is the precise confluence of 
author and authority which informs the present work.
page 7 "...shadowy dramas moving in the background of awareness." 
I. A. Richards opens Chapter Eleven of How to Read a Page, 
which is entitled "Mind, Thought, Idea, Knowledge" with these 
words, particularly pointed to my remarks on trying to use 
language to the full (as opposed to pretending that all words 
mean the same thing to everybody, thus neatly abrogating the 
responsitility of readership which sits so squarely on the 
shoulders of even the most scientific writer): "We now take up 
a group of words of which we may safely say that understanding 
them is understanding their interconnections. The senses of 
these words are so sensitive to one another that even to read 
them over in different orders is to set shadowy dramas moving 
in the background of our awareness. What we have to attempt is 
to bring these dramas— these interactions— forward, slow them 
down, and simplify them till we can follow them." To make the 
same point, anthropologists may be more familiar with A.L. 
Kroeber's (1948:325), "'Structure' appears to be just a 
yielding to a word that has a perfectly good meaning but 
suddenly becomes fashionably attractive for a decade or 
so— like 'streamlining'— and during its vogue tends to be 
applied indiscriminately because of the pleasurable 
connotations of its sound." Whether or not Kroeber's 
abduction, that it is the sound, is right, something is going 
on. Jacques Derrida (I978:301n2) comments on this very 
sentence of Kroeber's: "To grasp the profound necessity hidden 
beneath the incontestable phenomenon of fashion, it is first 
necessary to operate negatively: the choice of words is first 
an ensemble— a structural ensemble, of course— of exclusions. 
To know why one says "structure" is to know why one no longer 
wishes to say eidos, "essence," form, Gestalt, "ensemble," 
"Idea," "organism," "state," "system," etc. One must 
understand not only why each of these words showed itself to 
be insufficient but also why the notion of structure continues
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to borrow some implicit signification from them and to be 
inhabited by them."
page 8 "...all of what we are is what we are" is from the concluding
sentences to Richard Poirier's essay, "Rock of Ages": "Social 
evolution now depends on the older generation's willingness to 
try out new styles, new tones, new movements of mind learned 
from the younger generation it is also teaching, and on a 
corresponding capacity of technologically sophisticated 
societies to learn from the technologically primitive ones to 
whom it can bring the benefit of tools and machines. Everyone 
must study himself in those who otherwise seem alien. All of 
what we are is what we are."
(Notes to pp. 23-41 )
1. Ernest Becker, The Lost Science of Man (1971), p*94, quoting 
Georges Gusdorf 1900:384*
2. Franz Boas 1904:472.
3. Becker 1971:87•
4* Gusdorf 1960:399, quoted by Becker 1971:94*
5» See Norman Thomas di Giovanni, "Note on the Translation", in 
Jorge Luis Borges, In Praise of Darkness, London: Allen Lane 
(1975), pp.139-HO.
6. Jules Henry, Culture Against Han (1963), p.278.
7* Roy Vagner, The Invention of Culture, see pp.156-7 especially 
and passim.
8. Clifford Geertz, "Notes on the Balinese Cockfight", 1973:451*
9* See Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975; also Karl Popper, 
"Epistemology without a Knowing Subject", Ch.3 of Objective 
Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1972.
10. Or see Chapter 12 in Hacking, op. cit. , "Donald Davidson's 
Truth", and Hacking's own comments on such as Davidson and Grice 
therein.
11. Gilbert Lewis, 1980:221. Lewis's sentence reads in full "Here 
the main stresses in my argument on understanding and 
interpretation are, first, that the anthropologist is not free 
to speculate according to his fancies on the meaning of the 
rites, for then he may tell about himself and his preoccupations 
rather than those of the people he would wish to understand, and 
secondly, since 'meaning' is a word of such easy virtue (see 
Cherry 1966, pp.114-17; Leech 1974, pp.1-27), we would do well 
to be wary of its temptations."— As I discuss further along in 
the text, I have a couple of exceptions to take to this 
proscription of Lewis's, but would rather do it in the lesser 
arena of the footnote: May I propose a countersuggestion that 
there is nothing about anthropology which limits the 'freedom 
to speculate', and that speculation which is not "according to 
fancies" often the only educated guesses we can get about some 
culture or other; therefore, let us limit our speculation to the 
unfanciful and make sure that we always let the reader know when 
we are speculating. Let me also suggest that, as is evident in
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Lewis’s own absorbing and engaging study, the anthropologist 
always tells about himself... there is little else he has to tell 
about. The caution ought to be directed not at those who 'tell 
about themselves' but at those who, telling about themselves as 
we all do, don't know it yet.
12. Bourdieu quotes from Bally 1965, pp.58, 72, 109 on the opening 
page of the English translation of his Outline of a Theory of 
Practice.
13* The phrase "experiential core" is from Liam Hudson; see The Cult 
of the Fact, London: Jonathan Cape (1972) pp.173-178.
14. I'll stick this elaboration into a footnote in order to lessen 
the risk of occasioning just what Montague warns of: Promising 
to 'pay attention to what I write' is not a promise to write 
well (though it hurts to find later that some piece could have 
been written so much better), but rather a promise to be 
watchful on the reader's behalf. Because C.E. Montague's essay 
on "Easy Reading, Hard Writing" came to mind, I'll quote here 
the passage which did.
Some of these uncivil writers are prone to 
aggravate their offence by the sophisitical plea that 
matter is more important than manner, and that if 
your heart be sound you need not mind how you splutter 
it out. They feel they are so wise or so good that 
they need not be urbane.
The better-bred writer begins and goes in the 
faith that this is a free country, where no adult need 
read a line that he feels to be dull; every sentence 
of every page is, to the writer's prescient mind, a 
place at which one of another reader may take his 
spectacles off and protest that these are no sort of 
victuals to offer to a free white man. A godly fear 
of such incidents makes him treat every sentence he 
writes as a possible occasion for tedium. (P.137 of 
the chapter "Easy Reading, Hard Writing", pp.135-148 
of C.E. Montague, A Writer's Notes on his Trade,
Great Britain: A Pelican Book 1949*)
15* Alan Bass, "Translator's Introduction" to Derrida 1978: ix-xx; 
p. xvi.
16. See Writing and Difference (Derrida 1978) especially Chapter
Seven: "Freud and the Scene of Writing" ("Freud et la scene de 
/
l'ecriture" Tel Quel no. 26 (Summer 1966)), and La voix et la 
/
phenomene (tr. David Allison, Speech and Phenomena Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press 1973)•
17. Alan Bass, "Translator's Introduction", p. xvii.
18. This comment is from the Postscript to Farmer's book, written by
Theodore Sturgeon, which opens, "'So you're writing pornography
/now?' Thus spake one of the acquaintances of Philip Jose Farmer 
recently. The question seems simple and straightforward. It 
was, obviously, asked by a man who honestly felt he could define 
his own terms, and probably that the terms he used were so 
self-evident that they didn't need defining." The next 
paragraph, which I quote subsequently in the text, begins, 
"there is a vast number of honestly simple-minded people..." I
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have quoted rather more than I might have here not only in order 
to maintain a full enough sense of context for this eloquent 
statement on behalf of his friend and cohort, which makes the 
feel of a genre by those inside it (and which compares, even by 
so much as a list, two exclusive genres), but also because I 
could not resist, when looking for a brief but fully sensible 
example, Sturgeon's explicit use of "terms". I also borrow 
Sturgeon's use of "Labeler", which I use a couple pages hence, 
from the conclusion to that paragraph quoted:
These are the Labelers, and they are without 
exception the most lethal and destructive force ever 
faced by an species on this or any other planet, and I 
shall tell you clearly and simply why.
19* The quotations are from "Summary of This Book", the first 
section of his Notes for a Defense of Poetry which closes 
Speaking and Language, the last book he wrote before he died; 
see pp.226-7.
20. Speaking and Language, p.137•
21. Goodman's assertion has been responded to by one of those 
linquists: D. Terence Langendoen, "The Problem of Linguistic 
Theory in Relation to Language Behavior: A Tribute and Reply to 
Paul Goodman", Daedalus 102(3): 195-201. Several years later 
(the fieldwork intervened) I was moved in response to 
Langendoen to write a short article with a long title (ms. 
rejected by Language and Society May 17, 1979) "The Problem of 
Linguists and Language: A Tribute to Paul Goodman and Reply to 
Terence Langendoen" (photocopy; available from the author).
22. This consideration is of Comte and the positivists, notably 
Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language, Testability and 
Meaning), found on pp.107-113 of Speaking and Language. The 
quotation which follows is from p .117-
23« A detailed consideration of the problems of language, speaking, 
ethnographic writing, and the like, as they converge in any 
piece of (written) anthropology is in process. The working 
title of the book is Cloven Fiction, a short treatment, in three 
parts, of the problems of speaking considered as idiom, writing 
considered as genre, and the notion of vernacular which has the 
capacity to conjoin the two. The finished first third of the 
manuscript is entitled "Why, then, does language matter to 
ethnography?", after the title of Ian Hacking's delightful 
consideration of the 'motion' of philosophy out of Hobbes' 
'mental discourse' toward, according to Hacking, the 
"sentential knowledge" of today (Why Does Language Matter to 
Philosophy?, Cambridge University Press, 1975)• My working
title is from William Blake's rejection of the split world of 
mind v. body, of Descartes, which he called "Two Horn'd 
Reasoning, Cloven Fiction"; which I mention here to hook up 
Needham's and Borges's real imagination with Geertz and 
especially Goodman ("Suddenly, the line of dissent of Blake, 
Wordsworth, Shelley, William Morris the symbolists and 
surrealists no longer seems to be the nostalgic romanticism of a 
vanishing minority, but the intense realism of a vanguard" 
[Goodman 1973:231]•) The play on ethnography as 'fiction' (but 
cloven, cleaved both to fiction and from it, in that lovely 
genius English has for saying two things at once and making the 
said more than the sum of the parts) is a reference to Geertz's
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(1973:15) definition of anthropological writings: "they are, 
thus, fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are "something 
made", "something fashioned"— the original meaning of
fictio— not that they are false, unfactual, or merely 'as if' 
thought experiments."
24. Richard Poirier, The Performing Self (NY:0.U.P. 1971); from the 
Preface: "By performance I mean, in part, any self-discovering, 
self-watching, finally self-pleasuring response to the 
pressures and difficulties I've been describing. Literature 
and the ways of reading it proposed in this book can be an 
object lesson for other more distinctly political or social 
performance." (See also pp.76-85, 173, 186.)
25. (Whether I am right or wrong in my epistemology, I think it is 
crucial that my reader understand what I mean by meaning. I 
think meaning is real, that it is one of those 'differences that 
makes a difference'. Meaning is expressly not interpretation: 
"Meaning is not conveyed by speech or pointed to by speech; it 
is speaker and hearer making sense to one another in a 
situation" [Goodman 1973:34]. So there is no question of the 
speaker's meaning when he says close the door. He means for the 
door to close, to get closed. And the person he is speaking to 
is his means of closing the door. If the hearer doesn't want to 
do the speaker's bidding, then some other next-thing may occur: 
resentment; argument; acquiescence. In this case the speaker's 
meaning changes not, but the meaning of the exchange is 
different than it might otherwise have been— if the hearer 
simply closed the door; in any case, argument or resentment or 
reluctant acquiescence only happen, and typically they do, 
because the speaker and hearer made sense to one another in that 
situation. For any further meaning to become part of the 
discourse the discourse has to be expanded. If the speaker is a 
psychoanalyst and the door-closer is his patient then they 
might expand their own discourse to talk about (to try to make 
sense of) the resentment occasioned by the command. If there is 
some observer, the observer may establish or enter some 
discourse of his own in order to make an analysis of the 
'underlying meaning' of the witnessed exchange. Or it may be, 
as is the case, that some writer may make it all up in order, 
within his established discourse, in order to employ 
"metalingual operations with words or syntactic structures 
[which] permit us to overcome Leonard Bloomfield's forebodings 
in his endeavors to incorporate meaning into the science of 
language" [Jakobson 1956]. In any case the meaning is the 
next-thing. This is why epigraphs establish risks and why doing 
such anthropological things as ethnographies of speaking is a 
risky business: taking words out of their situation to make 
written meanings.)
26. In another work in process, one which has lain in abeyance 
during the tenure of this current research, I am exploring a 
theory of mind and self, commensurate with the one expressed 
herein but in more systematic detail. The title is Homo 
inabilis. Designed to reflect a true dualism of mind and body 
in Homo sapiens, a dualism between mind which is social, 
emergent, non-individual, differentiatable , non-localizable , 
and body which is individuated organism, species-specific, 
localizable, existent, the title 'Unable Man', signals a real 
difference between human behaviour which is a. posteriori,
(Notes to pp. 76 -77 ) 322
grounded in received notions, understood (and, thence, 
anterior) meanings, and human behaviour which is postulative 
and predicative, which seeks to make things and change things 
and discover. The thesis is that it is those things which we 
cannot do which are our motivations; that because we are human 
beings equipped with the capacity to sense alternity, that is is 
always to the Other that we are driven. The onus on students of 
human society and culture is, from this, to seek out what the 
extant alternatives are in any society, in any scene or setting 
or situation, in order to analyze the behaviour. The 
distinction is between the analysis of how something came to be 
(which we can guess at) and how someone is trying to make some 
other something come into being (which we, as ethnographers can 
participate in and observe and experience).
27* Bateson opens Chapter IV of Mind and Nature; A Necessary Unity, 
"This chapter is an attempt to make a list of criteria such that 
if any aggregate of phenomena, any system, satisfies all the 
criteria listed, I shall unhesitatingly say that the aggregate 
is a mind and shall expect that, if I am to understand that 
aggregate, I shall need sorts of explanation different from 
those which would suffice to explain the characteristics of its 
smaller parts." The list is,
1. A_ mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or 
components.
2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by 
difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial 
phenomenon not located in space or time; difference is 
related to negentropy and entropy rather than to energy.
3* Mental process requires collateral energy.
4* Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains 
of determination.
5. _In mental process, the effects of difference are to be 
regarded as transforms (i.e., coded versions) of events 
which preceded them. The rules of such transformation 
must be comparatively stable (i.e., more stable than the 
content) but are themselves subject to transformation.
6. The description and classification of these processes of 
transformation disclose a_ hierarchy of logical types 
immanent in the phenomena.
"This list," he wrote, "is the cornerstone of the whole book. 
The book must stand or fall, not by the particular content of my 
list, but by the validity of the idea that some structuring of 
epistemology, evolution, and epigenesis is possible. I propose 
that the mind-body problem is soluble along lines similar to 
those here outlined." ("Criteria of Mental Process", pp.91-92).
This is the spirit in which I have paraphrased from numbers 1 
and 2, and I concur with the proposition.
28. "non-ordinary reality" is used by Castaneda in The Teachings of 
Don Juan; see also in A Separate Reality.
29* The quote is from Mind and Nature, p . 117- In Chapter 2 of that 
book, in the section 13 entitled "Logic is a Poor Model of Cause 
and Effect", Bateson spells out the workings of a simple buzzer, 
say the circuit of a common doorbell. "The buzzer circuit is so 
rigged that...
If contact is made at A, then the magnet is activated.
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If the magnet is activated, then the contact at A is broken.
If contact at A is broken, then the magnet is inactivated.
If magnet is inactivated, then contact is made.
This sequence is perfectly satisfactory provided it is clearly 
understood that the if . . . then junctures are causal. But 
the bad pun that could move the ifs and thens over to the world 
of logic will create havoc:
If the contact is made, then the contact is broken.
If P, then not P.
The rf . . . then of causality contains time, but the 
if . . . then of logic is timeless. If follows that logic is an 
incomplete model of causality" (pp.58-9)*
Later, in the section in which he considers the paradox of 
Epimenides (pp.116-7), he writes, "When we ask, "Could 
Epimenides be telling the truth?" the answer is: "If yes, then 
no," and "If no, then yes." Norbert Wiener used to point out 
that if you present the Epimenides paradox to a computer, the 
answer will come out YES . . . NO . . . YES . . . NO . . . until 
the computer runs out of energy or encounters some other 
ceiling. As I noted in Chapter 2, section 16, logic cannot 
model causal systems, and paradox is generated when time is 
ignored."
On this matter, see also Anthony Wilden's discussion, 
prompted by his conversations with Bateson at the Oceanic 
Institute at Waimanalo (Hawaii) in the nineteen sixties, of the 
cybernetic "BOTH-AND" (Wilden 1972:217, 222-227).
30. Speaking and Language, p.109* This is apropos his discussion of 
Carnap and the positivists, and begins "So, against Carnap, I do 
not think there can be a rule..."
31. But see Geertz's discussion in the Cockfight essay 
(1973:412-453): "If, to quote Northrop Erye again, we go to see 
Macbeth to learn what a man feels like after he has gained a 
kingdom and lost his soul, Balinese go to cockfights to find out 
what a man, usually composed, aloof, almost obsessively 
self-absorbed, a kind of moral autocosm, feels like when, 
attacked, tormented, challenged, insulted, and driven in result 
to the extremes of fury, he has totally triumphed or been 
brought totally low." (From p.450 quoting Frye, The Educated 
Imagination pp.63-4.)
32. See Susan Sontag, "Against Interpretation", in her collection 
of essays by the same title Against Interpretation, NY: Farrar, 
Strauss & Giroux, 1965*
33* Feedforward ("the reciprocal, the necessary condition of what 
the cybernetics and automation people call 'feedback'") is from 
I.A. Richards, 'The Secret of "Feedforward"', Saturday Review 
Feb. 3, 1968, pp.14-17; reprinted in Complementarities
pp.246-253 (the quotations are found on p.247)* "The point is", 
Richards writes, "that feedforward is a needed prescription or 
plan for a feedback, to which the actual feedback may or may not 
conform."
34. Hegel uses 'habit' in a sense retaining inherent creativity; 
and the stretching of 'habit' to 'habitat'— the striving of a 
human self to inhabit its environment— can be felt in Borges's 
Preface to In Praise of Darkness ("...that mysterious habit of 
mine, Buenos Aires").
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35» Poirier holds,
Literary study can thus he made relevant to life not 
as a mere supplier of images or visions, hut as an 
activity' it can create capacities through exercise 
with the language of literature that can then he 
applied to the language of politics and power, the 
language of daily life. It's simply terribly hard to 
do this, however— to make this shift of muscularity 
of mind and spirit from one allegedly elevated mode 
of expression, where muscles can he most conveniently 
developed, to another mode of expression both more 
inaccessible and considered so ordinary, so natural 
as to he beyond inquiry. And yet in this transfer of 
activity, and in the reciprocations that would follow 
from it, is the promise of some genuine interplay 
between different and multiplying cultural 
traditions.
This is from his essay, "What Is English Studies, and If You 
Know What That Is, What Is English Literature?", pp.83-4, which 
appears in his collection The Performing Self (pp.65-85; the 
inspiration for the title is Gertrude Stein's question, "What 
is poetry, and if you know what poetry is, what is prose?", a 
vein in which each anthropologist must ask, what is 
ethnography?) Poirier begins this collection in light of the 
contemporary energy of dis-order and the fear of that energy, 
which "make the literary and academic issues I shall be 
discussing inseparable from larger cultural and political 
ones", and ends it saying that before he makes any 
recommendations generated by his studies of the intercourse 
between literary and larger cultural issues, he "would want to 
investigate the degree to which, despite any claims to higher 
culture, most men brutishly do not feel the burdens of 
complicity and brotherhood." He closes,
We must get to know the mystery of our incapacity to 
care enough even when forced to care more than maybe 
we ever can or should have been asked to. It is a time 
not only for pity but, I suspect, for self-pity, for a 
new anthropology, and a new curriculum.
36. See Steiner After Babel, p.222 and subsequent pages, also 
pp.414-470; see also Derrida "Violence and Metaphyics"
(1978:79-153, 314n.36, 3l6n.47) and Emmanuel Levinas Totality
/and Infinity (1969) on alterite; also cf. Douglas Hofstadter's
(Gödel, Escher, Bach) mention of Steiner on "alternity", with a 
subjunctive slant (one for which it seems to me he has not the 
warrant he claims) and his discussion of the human penchant for 
subjunctives (1980:642-3; 633-43 passim).
37* Thomas S. Kuhn, "Incommensurably and Paradigms", the final 
part of "Reflections on my Critics", in Criticism and the Growth 
of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970; reprinted as 
"Incommensurability and Paradigms" (final part only) in 
Challenges to Empiricism, ed. Harold Morick, Belmont CA: 
Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1972: 194-207.
38. Quoted by Ernest Becker, "Sketch for a Critical History of 
Anthropology" (1971:99), from Herskovits, Franz Boas
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1953:121-122.
39* Bronislaw Malinowski, "Whither Anthropology?", p.212—213» in A 
Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays 1944:211-221. 
The elipses replace the sentence "It is still in the fighting 
stage, engaged in the bellum omnium contra omnes so
characteristic of early disciplines."
40. Liam Hudson, p.12 of the Preamble to The Cult of the Fact.
41 * I^id*» P*1 3*
42. My orthography is my own, but I have derived it almost entirely 
from the orthography of Edward Koiki Mabo. Mabo's orthography
is derived from an orthography developed by his mother and other / / /
Meriam le_ who pioneered much of written Meriam mir in the 
1930rs\ The characters are all English letters and comprise a
/ rphonetically-derived alphabet of 21 Meriam mir letters |_the
/English letters C F H Q V X are unrepresented, and the Meriam
sound /e/ is represented by the marked E: E,e]. Punctuation
/marks are not systemmatically stable in written Meriam mir yet. 
Commonly, punctuation has been marked by periods (full stops)
only. Semicolons are never used; colons are coming to be used
/more frequently as Meriam mir is written more. There are no 
/hyphenated Meriam compound words; and double words, which are 
usually written hyphenated, are usually nominalizations of 
adjectival modifiers, such as kebi = little which doubles to 
kebi-kebi to signify a little bit, or small quantity or number. 
Exclamation points are rarely used, though lately I have seen 
them used in the writing (usually reporting) of dialogue. 
Question marks are not used; they are superfluous to the 
question-marking word Aka which is the initial word in a 
question.
43- "Bislama" is the phonetic spelling of the name of the beche de 
mer fish as it is pronounced in Torres Strait Creole, and 
particularly as it is pronounced by older first- and 
second-generation immigrants to the Torres Strait from the New 
Hebrides, Solomons, and other Pacific Islands. I do not mean to 
indicate a native historical linguistics which posits this 
language as either different from or prior to the modern pidgin 
or creole. Rather I am indicating that, whatever its name (then 
or now), a pidgin language is known to have arrived with the 
boats and crews of the Pacific beche de mer hunt in the time of 
contemporary Islanders' grandparents and great-grandparents.
44. Western Torres Strait traditional language is most commonly 
known in the Western Islands by the specific island origin of 
its speakers. I have refrained here from choosing a single 
reference in order to avoid the implication of general 
acceptability or universality of any such artificially generic 
term. Western Language is called Aitalaig-ya on Saibai, 
Badu-ya on Badu, Gomulgau-ya on Mabuiag; and it is known by 
different names even among native speakers on each of those 
islands. I learned to refer to it as Gomulgau-ya when I was 
among Mabuiag Islanders, as Aitalaig-ya among Saibai Islanders, 
and variously as Western Language, Westen langgus [:creole], 
and the colloquial Yagar-yagar.
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45* There may be grounds for suggestions that such words as the
pidgin (and subsequently creolized) bas [’boss'] have become 
/
Meriam words. While it is the case that the word bas appears in 
/otherwise Meriam mir conversations, it is marked by its known
domain of origin as a foreign word. It is not taken in isolation 
/to be a Meriam mir, nor is it declined in speech. Most
/tellingly, it does not occur in Meriam mir having to do with 
matters of import. That is, it is the rare position of bas which
/is an important position in Meriam tonar. It may matter, in 
important discussions, that a bas of a particular railway gang 
or cane-cutting crew is one man rather than another; but it 
would be of no particular import that his position is that of 
bas.
46. The exemplary case here may be Torres Strait Pidgin. This 
creole language is rarely written. There are no Pidgin 
dictionaries, nor lecturers in Pidgin. The only grounds for 
interruption in order to correct a creole speaker is awful 
mispronunciation or factual error. The authority of the
interruptor is post facto: if his 'corrected' or 'preferred' 
word is taken to be more correct or more preferable, then his 
interruption is authorized. He may be ignored, or his 
interruption dismissed. Interruptions are rare for other than 
reasons of fact. And only those with established and known 
expertise in a subject-area, or familiarity with a specialized 
vocabulary may 'monitor' creole speech. The easy analytical 
conjecture to be made— and one which is not belied by any kind 
of evidence from the mainland scenes— is that the creole mir 
has no wider and encompassing 'Pidgin-tonar' wherein monitors 
might be enfranchised.
/47- The unvoiced plosive /t/ in Meriam mir is normally more dental 
than alveolar, closer to an initial t sound in Irish or French 
or Russian.
48. Perhaps ' the most common pronunciation uses an initial 
combination of /p/ and /f/, much as in the German pfennig. (But 
cf. the story in the concluding chapter of my near-terminal 
confusion of these two sounds which are, at times, heard as 
mutually exclusively distinct.)
/49. Kolera tonar = Whiteman's culture, but a notion of Whiteman 
which has changed from the Scots and Irishmen and Englishmen and 
others who first arrived in the Torres Strait to the Australian 
culture of today. Initially the beche-de-mer and pearling 
boats arrived with (it is said) entirely black crews of South 
Sea islanders and a single white man. There were no words for 
white man, and the word for light skin colour was already in use 
as a reference to those Torres Strait Islanders who were lighter
coloured. The white man who arrived alone on the boat was seen
/to be always standing in the stern of the boat. Meriam mir for 
stern is kor, and the single white man was always seen "korem"
[lit: sternward] or "korge" [in the stern]. And it is common / /among modern Meriam le to ascribe to their forefathers a lack of 
knowledge that white men were human beings. Whether or not that 
was so at the time of the arrival of these fishing and trading
boars, the man in the stern became known as a "korle" [stern 
man], and later as a characteristic type of man, a white man,
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/known as "korle", a term for all whitemen which has come down to
/the present as kole.
50. The exception to the customs of social drinking as those of
/kolera tonar are the habits and practices of the Australian
Aborigines known to Torres Strait Islanders, which are seen as
/very different from those of the kole.
✓  /51. Kolera, as in kolera tonar, signifies a custom or practice of,
✓ /or belonging to, or from, the kole. In "kole drinking tonar" I 
have used the colloquial English "drinking" to indicate the
/drinking of alcoholic beverages because this word has no Meriam
mir. In this phrase, were 'drinking' a Meriam word, it would be / / clear that kolera, modifying tonar, must become kole in order to
indicate a type of (what would be in Meriam mir) 'drinkingra
/tonar'. In contrast, a putative 'drinking kolera tonar' would
/refer to some yet unknown kole culture which was wholly centered 
around the consumption of alcohol.
52. These disputes over my errors in speaking were never more than 
mildly antagonistic. The principal reason for this was that I, 
as a near non-speaker, could not be taken to be meaningful. For 
instance, no one engaged in a dispute over corrections to my 
errors ever asked me what it was that I had meant. In monitoring 
my speech they watched that words were said correctly, not 
whether or not I had said something of reduced meaningfulness: I 
was not yet authorized to mean things. Later, shortly after 
being authorized to mean things I said a wrong thing which very 
nearly meant I had to leave the community (see Note 7, above, 
and the Conclusion, STORYTIME).
53* Incidentally, until I learned this doctrine of final 
consequence, I was occasionally at pains to discern which of the 
proposed corrections of my error was the correct one. Amid, 
sometimes, four or five correctors, the last one to speak prior 
to the head-nod of the language monitor had uttered the correct 
correction, and it took me some time after learning the 
vocabulary of nods to learn their consequences.
54. There is a sense in which a hierarchy of de jure language 
monitors exists (or once existed) in the Islands. It is 
possible for a language monitor's dispute with another speaker, 
even a dispute which has escalated to confrontation, to be 
mediated by a de jure monitor who is the peer or superior of the 
disputing monitor. In exceptional cases it may have been that 
even the intercession of the superior monitor resulted in 
confrontation with the speaker, which in turn generated an 
intercession by a superior monitor. I have no knowledge of such 
disputes having occurred, though they are logically acceptable 
(if traumatic).
55* The language monitor may even keep silent when a challenge 
begins to be made. This is normally due to his desire to 
disallow very important business to be deferred by requisite 
talk-adjudication which is, in his opinion, both less important 
than the business at hand and not involving more than fleeting 
and incidental errors of speech.
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56. A direct inference from this regarding situations in which both 
Islanders and non-islanders are participating may be accurately 
made. For example, the whiteman at an Island event who keeps 
talking through a post-judgemental silence— even in 'private' 
dialogue with the person seated next to him— is taken to be at 
least crude and impolite when it is realized that his whiteness 
exempts him from being taken to have challenged the language 
monitor.
57* These silences usually vary from less than a second to as long 
as 3 or 4 seconds. It is possible, following confrontations 
over matters of severe import, for the silence between the 
challenger and the language monitor to be effectively ad 
inf ini turn. This rare silence ad_ infinitum occurs only when the 
two are still not talking to one another""(or to anyone) at the 
conclusion of the event at which the confrontation occurred. 
These silences must be conspicuously and explicitly broken, but 
the breaking of the silence may not happen for several days or 
even weeks. Such silences, when they occur, are dire and 
fretful things for everyone, and are taken by others to be 
unfortunate in their continuance (though not, usually, in their 
initiation). (See Chapter 6 The License of Silence, next.)
58. It is worth noting, I think, that he may never be ashamed. Shame
/is a manner of children, and is not a Meriam way. Even if he is 
privately regretful, he may not be ashamed of himself for his 
outburst. Nor may he ever mention the challenge except at the 
risk of invoking the entire context, and consequences, of the 
transgression. He may never apologize, nor is apology of any
sort ever required, not by the monitor nor by the audience of
/the time. There is no Meriam tonar for the sorry man, nor is 
there mir for expressing him.
59* The generic term for the leaders of the Torres Strait cults, 
which went into decline after the arrival of Christian 
missionaries in the latter half of the nineteenth century, is 
the same as the generic term for legendary men of prowess or 
skill or knowledge in particular areas of hunting, fishing, 
dance, songs: all are referred to as 'educated men'. The term 
has, then, a holy and sacred connotation in addition to its 
meaning of skill and demonstrated knowledge, and is not a term 
used lightly; nor is it heard but rarely on the mainland.
60. Extreme cases of logically-inferrable intent from actions might 
be those of someone who had been recently beat-up, or knocked 
down by a car, and who obviously approaches for succour. Cases 
of logical but less inferable intent might be those of the 
approach of a uniformed policeman or a wandering drunk. In the 
latter cases, it is not unreasonable that policemen or drunks 
approach doorways, although the reasonableness of their 
specific intentions awaits determination.
61. The case of singing is a special one, for the footsteps outside 
the building may not be heard until the intruder has entered. 
The silence which first greets him depends on where he is; i.e. 
as long as he is unseen and his footsteps therefore disembodied 
the silence will be immanent♦ But if his footsteps do not 
herald his appearance, the silence which greets his entry may be 
what I call consequent silence.
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62. This pidgin utterance translates 'Why didn't you call out? You 
made me really frightened!'. The more common pronunciation of 
the pidgin word for 'fright' (or 'scare', 'fear') is prait 
[/praXt/, with optional initial /p/ and heavily plosive final 
/1/]. This speaker habitually pronounces pidgin words which 
have existing English initial ft/ according to their English 
pronunciation.
63» From Bauman (1974:149), quoting Farnsworth 1663:9; Bauman notes 
(p.458, note 8): "This text, from I Peter 4.11, was a basic and 
oft-quoted charter for the Quaker ministry."
64* Bauman quotes Turford 1807-32-3 and (cf.) Fox 1657:103*
65. The perceptual Gestalten of the largely academic school of 
psychology known as Gestaltist, or Gestalt (cf., e.g., Ellis' A_ 
Source Book of Gestalt Psychology) have found currency among 
psychotherapists since the publication of Fritz Peris' 
theoretical statement in Gestalt Therapy (Peris, Hefferline, 
and Goodman) in America in 1951 (Tor later refinements, see 
Peris' Gestalt Therapy Verbatim [19691 and Fagan and Shepherd, 
Gestalt Therapy Now [l9 7 0 ] ) . While there is no strict 
convention governing the use of the borrowed German word, I use 
"gestalts" here to distinguish the perceptual-cognitive and 
affective 'wholes' which are characteristic of awareness in the 
view of the gestalt therapists who borrowed figure/ground, 
unfinished situation, and Gestalten from Gestalt psychology. 
"Awareness is characterized by contact, by sensing, by 
excitement and by Gestalt formation....Contact as such is 
possible without awareness, but for awareness contact is 
indispensable. The crucial question is: with what is one in 
contact?...Sensing determines the nature of
awareness....Excitement...covers the physiological excitation 
as well as the undifferentiated emotions....Gestalt formation 
always accompanies awareness. We do not see three isolated 
points, we make a triangle out of them....Only the completed 
Gestalt can be organized as an automatically functioning unit 
(reflex) in the total organism. Any incomplete Gestalt
represents an 'unfinished situation' that clamours for 
attention and interferes with the formation of any novel, vital 
Gestalt" (Gestalt Therapy, p.15)• One of the problems in 
looking at silence, and at silent (i.e. not-talking and/or 
not-acting) persons is the analysis of figure/ground where the 
principal actor, the figure of the analyst, is as silent as the 
ground of the group. The authors of Gestalt Therapy suggest 
that "the Gestalt psychologists themselves have not, on the 
whole, been sufficiently interested in the meaning of the 
ground"; they not that "in the figure/ground what is included in 
figure and what in ground does not remain static, but changes in 
the course of a dynamic development" ( p . 8 5 ) .  This merging and 
emerging of figure and ground has an affinity with the form and 
content of Georg Simmel's formal sociology, from which my 
developed use of form and content derives: "the category of 
content and form one of the most relative and subjective in the 
entire area of thought. What is form in one respect is content 
in another; and, upon closer scrutiny, the conceptual 
antithesis between the two dissolves into a merely gradual 
[opposition], having a determinateness which is between the 
general and the specific" (Weingartner 1959:34;  quoting Simmel 
1911: vol.II, p .309. Cf. also Wolff's The Sociology of Georg 
Simmel, and Simmel's "The Problem of Sociology" [tr. Wolff]
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which appears in Wolff 1959 along with the Weingartner article 
on form and content.) I have, throughout, distinguished 
figure/ground where personal mental states are informative, 
though I have not identified them according to their analytical 
identification as such, and have simply reported the state 
itself as expressed or inferred. My critical formal caution is 
that, in analyzing silence, and more so in naming categories of 
exemplary congruence, I am designating as a figure in my gestalt 
what is explicitly a ground for Islander actors perceiving the 
same situation. The critical distinction lies in contact, and 
in (after Simmel) the content of contact" "Contact, the work 
that results in assimilation and growth, is the forming of _a 
figure of interest against a_ ground or context of the 
organism/environment field" (Gestalt Therapy, p.277; original 
emphasis). Simply, for example, in my immanent silence the 
(normal) figure of the Islanders is the action about-to-engage 
(action which holds the promise of closure of the unfinished 
gestalt), while my figure is the noiselessness of their 
readiness against the ground of all Islander silences. [See 
Peris 1969 for an easily readable discussion of the gestalt 
therapy ideas of contact (e.g. pp.117—124), figure-ground 
(e.g. pp.65-67) and closure (e.g. pp.92-94).]
66. An interesting exceptional occurrence is the occasional 
consequent silence of even an adult Islander in responding to 
his mother or father, particularly where the mother or father 
has been a lifelong educator as well as parent. These occasions 
are never public, and only occur when the aging parent and adult 
child share each other's best interests and welfare. But they 
do happen, and may happen to an adult offspring who is in all 
other situations a significant person whose silence is unlikely 
to be commanded by others.
67. Prohibition (and proscription) of solicitation has problematic 
ramifications for the cross-cultural interactions on the 
mainland which involve Islanders with non-islanders, 
ramifications which are often remarked by Islanders distressed 
at their inability to figure out what these non-islanders are 
trying to do.
68. While I assert that this potential extreme dissociation is 
present in every such offensive confrontation, I should not 
like to give the impression that members of consociate Islander 
groups are ever actually cast out. To my knowledge, no one has 
been expelled from a given consociation for a very long time 
(and those who have dissociated themselves, or have been 
dissociated, from consociations of term-membership have done so 
invariably upon the mutual consent/dissent of themselves and 
the group, at least with after-the-fact mutuality if not during 
the dissociative incident). It is instructive, I think, that 
the stories in the cultural corpus which exemplify the errors of 
permanent dissociation are stories which usually conclude with 
the death of the permanently dissociated at the hands of the 
senior male members of the group. Given consociate groups 
(clans, families, villages) are unable (by their givenness) to 
render a_ posteriori 'redefinitions' that the transgressor 
'wasn't really a member'. The very being of the group is 
besmirched (at least) by the transgression of one who is still 
free to announce or claim group affiliation. My analytical 
guess is that members of given consociate groups who are left 
free to spread their heresies or to continue their heretical
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behaviour risk the very continuance of the group as a serious
consociation in the eyes and tales of all Islanders. In one
/
legendary story (see Chapter 7 Meriam to Meriha, next), a sister 
who fails to contain her indiscrete sexual pecadilloes is 
solemnly and privately put to death by her brothers. They are 
acutely sad at the loss of their beloved sister; but their 
sadness they may live with, while their loss of reality they may 
not. An unreal life is not a life. When I say that the 
possibility of death always in the offing is an "analytical 
guess", my 'analytical' refers to individual situated awareness 
of potentials. That such stories from an actual corpus are 
readily invoked is not a guess. Men who discuss transgressions 
which promise to develop into intolerable habits often do so in 
terms of fables. And their manner in doing so is invocation 
rather than evocation. That is, they do not say to one another, 
in the style of modern Western judicial proceedings, 'Isn't 
this like the case of the girl in that legend?; What they say 
is, "Well...you know what happened to So-and-so when her 
brothers found out..." The onus is clearly on the transgressor, 
for the prospective death-dealers have no leeway. Which is to 
say that, while punishment is education, death is eradication.
69» In "Poetry and Abstract Thought" (from The Art of Poetry, tr. 
Denise Folliot), Paul Velery wrote,
I apologize for thus revealing myself to you; but 
in my opinion it is more useful to speak of what one 
has experienced than to pretend a knowledge that is 
entirely impersonal, an observation with no 
observer. In fact there is no theory that is not a 
fragment, carefully prepared, of some autobiography.
He closed this essay thus,
I apologize for having chosen my examples from my own 
little story: but I could hardly have taken them 
elsewhere.
70. See Lacan 1957, 1966; and Wilden 1968:309 on Lacan's other as 
simply "the rest of the system in which the subject is 
involved"; also Wilden 1968:183. In essence, then, for Lacan, 
the conscious cognito is supplemented by an unconscious subject 
who may be the subject saying "I think" or "I am", but never 
both at once, since the question of the subject's being is posed 
at the level of the unconscious.
71. Hunter S. Thompson, "Last Tango in Vegas: Fear and Loathing in 
the Far Room" (Part II), Rolling Stone No.265 (May 18, 1978) 
pp.35-46. This and the subsequent quotations are from p.46.
72. Or as Popper and Eccles put it in their discussions at the end 
of The Self and Its Brain, by the time even the least conscious 
focus enters our awareness it has been interpreted and 
reinterpreted tens or hundreds or thousands of times by the 
sensory-brain-mind system. Or as Wilder Penfield put it 
(1954:297), "It is obvious that nerve impulse is somehow 
converted into thought and that thought can be converted into 
nerve impulse. And yet this all throws no light on the nature of 
that strange conversion" (cf. also Penfield 1974).
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73* The suggestion was made by Duncan and Kehl in their "Survey of 
Torres Strait Islanders resident in Townsville", in Fisk, 
Duncan and Kehl 1 974•
74. Jan-Petter Blom 1969:74. The seminar to which I refer was 
presented to the Department of Anthropology, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 26 October 
1977, entitled "Preparatory research on the Torres Strait 
Islanders in Townsville: An urbanizing ethnic minority".
75* Rudolph Weingartner 1959:36; and quoting (ibid:37) Simmel, 
Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel, 1922:10; 
"more-life" and "more-than-life" (Mehr-Leben and 
Mehr-als-Leben) op.cit.:20.
76. Weingartner 1959:53; including quotation of Simmel,
Lebensanschauung, p.23*
77. Lacan 1957:70.
78. Geertz 1973:450, and quoting Northrop Frye, The Educated 
Imagination, pp.63-4.
79* Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge & Politics, Chapter 5 The 
Theory of the Self, pp.191-235; see pp.193-5*
80. Hunter S. Thompson, "Last Tango in Vegas: Fear and Loathing in 
the Near Room" (Part i), Rolling Stone No.264 (May 4, 1978), 
pp.40-46.
81. Sam Toperoff, "Cassius", New American Review 10:90-98.
82. Jules Henry, Culture Against Man, p.279*
83* The reference here is to the collection of representative New 
Journalists by Tom Wolfe and E.W. Johnson (Wolfe and Johnson, 
The New Journalism) and the subsequent comments by some of those 
'collected' who were piqued at being (1) included at all (2) 
included with some or all of those 'other journalists' (3) 
included by Tom Wolfe— Who does he think he is!? —  (4) included 
as members of a journalistic dass when their brand of 
journalism was obviously in a class by itself; see, e.g., Wolfe 
quoting Jimmy Breslin ("There's no such thing as New 
Journalism, there’s only boutique journalism and real 
journalism.") and Hunter S. Thompson ("I wouldn't touch New 
Journalism with a ten-foot pole. I'm a gonzo journalist.") and 
other recruits to his "raggedy battalion" in 1980 interview.
84. Paul Goodman, Speaking and Language, p.123*
85* Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight" 
(1973:412-453), pp.416-7, 443-453; "Thick Description: Toward 
an Interpretive Theory of Culture" (1973:3-30), pp.9-12, 15-16, 
18-20. See also, for example, "From the Native's Point of View" 
(Geertz 1976).
86. The two which come to mind are,
Philosophers are mistaken to quote literary texts 
as if they provided another line of proof, a special 
kind of evidence. As a writer, I do not judge that I 
provide evidence. But I do go through the literary 
process to produce the text.
and,
(Notes to pp.272-273) 333
On the other hand, though I follow the sense, I am 
not intent on conveying any truth or message, but just 
the beginning, middle, and end of a whole literary 
work. I will strike whatever impedes or detracts from 
the whole, regardless of the "truth".
These passages are from pages 164 and 238 of Speaking and 
Language. They point up exactly the problem with proposing, as 
I do, a genre which uses living language to do ethnography, for 
it means that such a genre could not be at all counted on to 
confer some sort of automatic warrant of authenticity on those 
works adjudged its constituent members. And it would require 
authenticity to be the province of the reader in his reading and 
not that of some disciplinary warrant. This is, of course, all 
that "truth" ever consists in, and ought to prove no great 
burdent to ethnographers who are not constrained by the 
dogmatic strictures of the anthropological bureaucrats who may 
well cut them off at their purse strings. And in any case 
ethnographers ought to be aware of the arbitrary distinction 
made between writers and social scientists (again the words are 
Goodman 's).
Like everybody else, a writer has a day-to-day 
life; but unlike any scientist or almost any 
professional, a writer's daily life and course of 
life are relevant to his special work and may at any 
time appear in his sentences. He may say, "My 
experience has been that . . ."or "For instance,
yesterday I had a quarrel with my daughter and . . . "
I can think of only pastoral theology and 
psychotherapy as professions where this would not be 
out of place, since they deal face-to-face with their 
clients and speak ad hominem. If a social scientist 
uses such sentences, he is at once identified as a 
writer (and dismissed). (Speaking and Language,
P-159)
Dismissed? Perhaps. Think of how common it is to hear how of 
Clifford Geertz has attained his position of respect in his 
discipline in spite of his skillful and engaging writing? (as if 
the reality is the crats who man the bureaus and the craftsmen 
are expectably notorious.) Note the opening sentence to the 
Balinese Cockfight essay (cited in Note 3 above): "Early in 
April of 1958, my wife and I arrived, malarial and diffident, in 
a Balinese village we intended, as anthropologists, to study." 
In one sentence we have Goodman's "daily life and course of 
life", people "face-to-face" who "speak ad hominem"; yet how 
long did (now Professor) Geertz labour under threat of 
dismissal? (He is still being dismissed by those who would not 
read him.)
87» Charles Bally, Le langage et la vie (Geneva: Droz, 1965), p .102; 
quoted by Pierre Bourdieu (tr. Richard Nice) 1977:1.
88. The references, some of which I have made elsewhere already, are 
to: the colloquial name for the clothing worn by sisters of Holy 
Orders ("nun's habit"); B.W.F. Hegel who wrote of "habit as 
dexterity" in his Phenomenology of Mind (a use which I was again 
reminded of rereading Pierre Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory of 
Practice [see Bourdieu 1977;218n47]): Jorge Luis Borges'
Preface to In Praise of Darkness [Elogio de la sombra] which
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begins, "Without set purpose as the beginning, I have devoted by 
now long life to literature; to teaching' to idleness; to the 
quiet adventures of conversation' to philology, of which I know 
but little; to that mysterious habit of mine, Buenos Aires..." 
(consider, too, how much less easily led into the ignorance of
uncritical reading we are by the original version of that same
/
last phrase: ...al misterioso habito de Buenos Aires..., with 
its promise of 1 habitat', even 'habitation'); the hinge of 
Bourdieu's Outline which is the habitus, "systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions (having the feel of "a way of being, a 
habitual state" as well as "a predisposition, tendency, 
propensity, or inclination"— 1977:214n1)...predisposed to
function as... principles of the generation and structuring of 
practices and representations" (1977:72).
89. The reference is to William Blake,
The errors of the wise man make your rule 
Rather than the perfections of a fool.
90. Anthony Burgess, Language Made Plain, p.27*
91. Brillig is a word in Lewis Carroll's "Jabberwocky", a nonsense 
word but backed by "Carroll's disturbing assertion that 
nonsense languages, however esoteric, would be totally 
understandable to 'a perfectly balanced mind'" (see George 
Steiner, After Babel, pp.187ff)* Burgess gives arpworthy and 
focklepoff as invented family words; the words and the claim are 
quoted from p.27 of Language Made Plain.
92. Burgess, "Words", Chapter 8 of Language Made Plain, p.105*
93* See the epigraph to Chapter 6 The License of Silence, above. 
The quotation from Philostratus appears on p.256 of Norman 0. 
Brown's Love's Body, for which his citation reads, "Cf. 
Philostratus, Life of Apollonius, 1,1,19"*
94. Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours, p.120 of the Baskin translation 
(1959).
95* This is not meant to be unduly harsh on my colleagues who are 
ethnographers of speaking, and certainly not meant to judge 
them in the light of a hindsight made possible only through 
their efforts. The spirit of my criticism is in the sense of 
'true determinants' in this quotation from Dell Hymes' 
contribution to the 1969 Conference on Social Anthropology and 
Language at which he was a guest of the ASA:
...sociolinguistics has a contribution to make to 
what Wright Mills called the task of sociological 
imagination, that of enabling men to understand their 
lives adequately in terms of the true determinants of 
them; here the perspective provided by ethnographic 
and comparative studies, although of little 
engineering pertinence, may be of great intellectual 
importance. We have yet to gain the cross-cultural 
perspective on speech that we have on child-rearing, 
sex, religion. Both in linguistics and in social 
science, the roles of language in human life usually 
are assumed or asserted. Research that seeks the 
actual ranges and kinds of meaning that speaking and 
languages have, and the conditions that support or 
frustrate each, has hardly begun. ("Sociolinguistics
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and the Ethnography of Speaking", in the volume of 
the Conference, ASA 10, edited by Edwin Ardener, 
pp.47-93; the quotation is found on p.49, and Hymes 
refers there to Lefebre (1966, esp.Ch.8), Barthes' 
notion of 11ecriture (Barthes 1953), Bernstein 
(1964), and Hymes (1961, 1966), among others.)
My contention is that such "true determinants" of which 
Hymes here speaks, and to which he refers us in the work of 
others, are to be found in the idiom, for it is in the context of 
the idiom that such things as who may speak and when and to whom 
are clear, and it is the rules of the idiom which command the 
uses of both language and silence. It is no longer the case that 
"research that seeks the actual ranges and kinds of meaning that 
speaking and languages have" has "hardly begun". It is well 
underway. What has hardly begun, and what the present work 
seeks to be part of a beginning of, is research which seeks the 
range of meaning, speaking and language, but research wherein 
"range" is the range of Home, home on the range, or of the 
shooting range, and not tied to some map of scale or graph of 
spectrum. The 'range of meaning' is not at all an open range. 
It is a place where alternity is constrained (which is to say, 
where language is restrained), where exegesis is banned, and 
where interpretation is severely restricted. It is a place 
where people can be silent and not say what they mean if they 
wish, but it is the place where they must mean what they say. It 
is the place in the Rocky Mountain West where "What do you 
mean?" means What did you say? and "What did you say?" means Do 
you wanta fight? It is the 'place' on the Torres Strait Mainland 
where a look can mean hit me, hit him, or get out and a spoken 
answer is of no account. In the Rockies, such a rplace' is found 
on school playgrounds, and in shitkicker bars, and in Elks 
Clubs; on the Torres Strait Mainland it is in Aboriginal and 
Islander pubs, on the steps of the railway station, and in 
formal meetings. In either case, the place becomes such a 
'place' only when a community of idiom is assembled. You can 
bet on there being a community of Western idiom assembled in any 
Rocky Mountain shitkicker bar, just as you can bet on a 
community of Islandmen assembled in an Islander pub in 
Townsville. But even such sure bets are only bets, and you will 
have to go there, in either case, to make sure. This, for me, is 
the especial brief of the ethnographer: that he goes there and 
makes sure.
96. By 'back in the direction of community' I mean back toward the 
work of such as Redfield, Dorothy Lee, Ruth Benedict, Hortense 
Powdermaker, Mauss, Dürkheim, Weber— writers whom I read as 
having great concern for the constitution of human communities. 
And while this is a general, implicit tack, ray use of "context 
of situation" is explicit and meant to be specific. In a 
contribution to the same ASA Conference as was Hymes's above 
(see Note 13), R.H. Robins sketches the "context of situation" 
of Malinowski, later taken up by the first British professor of 
linguistics, J.R. Firth, as it "became the basis of a theory of 
meaning and a significant part of a theory of language during a 
period of the development of general linguistics in Great 
Britain...during the late 1930s and during the first decade or 
so after the war", losing some of its interest after Firth's 
death in 1960 and during the "exciting turmoil" which 
linguistic analysis and description was thrown into by
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Chomsky's Syntactic Structure (1957) (Robins 1971:33-46, 
p.33)• He lists Malinowski's essential points as he sees them 
(I shall excerpt, briefly, from his six points [pp*35-6]), 
points which Firth took up and built "into the centre of his 
theoretical approach to language" (p.36):
1. ...language as the vocal communication of thought 
was, as a definition, quite valueless...
2. Language was a 'mode of activity', like other 
socially co-operative activities...
3* Utterances were produced and understood not as 
self-contained events, but strictly within a shared context 
of situation, all that was relevant in the personal, 
cultural, historical, and physical setting in which the 
utterances were spoken and heard.
4. The meanings and uses of linguistic forms, words, 
and sentences, were acquired and understood from their 
occurrences in such contexts... The meaning relation 
should not be thought of as a dyadic one between a word and 
its referent, but.. .between the word in its sentence and 
the context of its occurrence.
5* [Consequently], the meanings of words and sentences 
are not universals that happen to be differently labelled 
in different languages... Translation is possible only in 
the unification of the cultural context...
6. The word was not the primary meaningful unit. This 
was the sentence. Sentences were what was uttered and 
understood, and word meanings were distillations or 
abstractions from the meanings, the contextual functions, 
of sentences...
Robins mentions a "penetrating and revealing application" by 
T.F. Mitchell (1957), but notes that such studies of context of 
situation are rare, not surprisingly in light of the criticisms 
of J.B. Carroll (1953), Lyons (in Bazell et_ slL. 1966), and 
especially Langendoen ("who," Robins says on p*44, "chides 
Firth and those following up his ideas with making context of 
situation 'a convenient dumping ground for people's knowledge 
about the world, their own culture, etc.'" [Langendoen 
1968:50]). Robins notes an "unpublished but circulated 
'working paper'" in which Langendoen is more sympathetic, but 
in which, according to Robins (and this is Robins criticizing a 
man who he finds "one of the ablest and most interesting" of the 
critics of context of situation), "he still fails to come to 
grips with the question of what shall and shall not peoperly be 
held to fall with that term 'meaning' in an adequate explanation 
of our lexical knowledge of our native language" (p.44)* In 
summary, Robins says that the Malinowski and Firth theory of 
context of situation brought linguists' attention to the study 
of meaning ("hitherto this topic had been rather left to the 
philosophers"), and he concludes that, "at least until it is 
replaced by something more effective, has something of 
indispensable value for both linguists and ethnographers."
97. The reference is to Ernest Gellner's "The Alchemists of 
Sociology" (1959) in which he wrote, "It is perhaps no accident 
that the most striking work on contemporary America has come 
from one who is not an academic social scientist at all, but a 
journalist." Gellner refers to W.H. Whyte, and to the "eyebrows 
raised among the pukka scientific sociologists". More 
recently, more in keeping with my own proclivities (but keeping
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still to America) , we may note the raised eyebrows at the 
inclusion of Hunter Thompson and Tom Wolfe (and Robert Pirsig's 
motorcycle) in academic anthropological curricula, evidence 
that anthropologists go wherever the ethnographies are found, 
whether or not they are found in ethnography.
98. Michael Young's new book, Sculptures of Los, which I have been 
privileged to read in MS., is just one such attempt to 
distinguish the author's own interpretive idiom while owning up 
to the very real literary fact that the written work is his 
version of the lives, and myths, and people-living-those-myths, 
a fact not lost on the subjects of the work (many of whom 
appeared earlier in Young's Fighting with Food) who, Dr Young 
tells me, can't wait to see their 'Bible' in print. The point is
that even the naive writer who presumes to put his 
'interpretation' of some people or other on the anthropological 
page will find the discerning reader shall take it only to be a 
version, grist for that reader's own interpretive mill. (See, 
on this point, Anthony Wilden's comments on Lacan's having 
given us a new reading of Freud, rendering an interpretive 
reading of what Freud thought was interpretation but which 
turns out to be, in fact, versions of patients lives accompanied 
by what bits of clues to Freud's own stance the reader can 
glean. [Wilden 1968:310; passim]. Better, then, for the reader 
to have the attention of a Michael Young or other mature writer 
for whom the point of the literary process is in the reading and 
who knows the task of the writer to be the putting of the best 
and most informed version he is capable and enough clues to why 
this is his version (who he is to have made such a version; how 
it is he sees in order that what he sees looks like this) to 
enable the reader to 'factor him out' of the account as he makes 
his own reading.
99. See as a prime example Jules Henry, Culture Against Man, pp.4, 
5-8, 45-99.
100. On biology I am thinking particularly of Lewis Thomas, whose 
biological essays won the National Book Award (The Lives of a 
Cell) ♦ But the problem of genre is found not only in the 
relatively unsuspected winning of a national award for writing 
by a biologist, but in what to call some of what writers 
themselves write. Tom Wolfe, a journalist who has published 
four books and three collections of essays was recently awarded 
the Harold D. Vursell Memorial Award for writing in book form, 
as though some members of the American Academy of Arts and 
Letters just couldn't bring themselves to say he wrote books.
101 . There is, too, a question of genre raised by the notion of 'oral 
literature' . I do not mean to ignore this possible
contradiction of my relegation of genre to writing. But I am 
not at all comfortable with the label 'oral literature', and 
suspect that it is another of those ubiquitous uncritical 
retroglosses, from modern literate culture back onto the 
primitives, so often perpetrated by those whose vested interest 
is in categorization for manipulation and not in the struggle 
for getting inside these oral genres and seeing if they are what 
literatures are, and must therefore be called
'literature'— because, say, someone were to discover some 
community where there existed two modes of hearing, one like 
listening and the other, a rare one certainly and not yet known, 
like 'reading'.
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102. This is one of those delightful things of which Pierre Bourdieu 
says 'that goes without saying because it came without saying' 
except in this case, as is the case for so much spoken idiom, 
the saying comes only with its saying and it is the meaning 
which goes without saying, often the derivation never coming at 
all and with no adverse effect whatsoever on the speakers who 
use it to mean 'the whole thing'.
103» The clearest statement of this problem of attending to words in
order to point up why we do not attend to them too closely when
/we want them to do their work is Paul Valery's in his "Poetry 
and Abstract Thought" (pp.52-81 of Vol.7, The Art of Poetry, of
The Collected Works of Paul Velery):
Allow me to add to these preliminary 
considerations one last remark and one illustration.
Here is the remark: you have surely noticed the
curious fact that a certain word, which is perfectly 
clear when you hear or use it in everyday speech, and 
which presents no difficulty when caught up in the 
rapidity of an ordinary sentence, becomes 
mysteriously cumbersome, offers a strange 
resistance, defeats all efforts at definition, the 
moment you withdraw if from circulation for separate 
study and try to find its meaning after taking away 
its temporary function. It is almost comic to 
inquire the exact meaning of a term that one uses 
constantly with complete satisfaction. For example:
I stop the word Time in its flight. This word utterly 
limpid, precise, honest, and faithful in its service 
as long as it was part of a remark and was uttered by 
someone who wished to say something. But here it is, 
isolated, caught on the wing. It takes its revenge.
It makes us believe that it has more meanings than 
uses. It was only a means , and it has become an end, 
the object of a terrible philosophical desire. It 
turns into an enigma, an abyss, a torment of 
thought....
It is the same with the word Life and all the rest.
Ctr. Denise Folliot)
104* One of the omissions among the threads of the warp and weft of 
Torres Strait culture— and a glaring one to Jeremy Beckett and 
others with first-hand knowledge of Islanders— with which I 
have elucidated this ethnological presentation is that of 
religion (_cf. Beckett n.d. for a well-wrought picture of Torres 
Strait religious politics). Religion is not included among the 
threads of education, talk-without-curves, islandtaim, and 
Torres Strait Pidgin simply because in respect of Islander 
religion on the mainland I don't know that I know what's going 
on. Sometimes I do; sometimes I think I do; and sometimes I know 
exactly that I do not. Were the present work an ethnography, I 
would argue for the legitimacy of my presenting just such 
occasional ignorance. Since it has been about ethnography, I 
have eschewed exemplifications which would necessarily have 
been complicated by explications of ignorance, (i may add, 
here, however, that while I may well anticipate an obligation as 
a member of the anthropological community of discourse to 
respond to those who would argue that the present ethnological
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presentation is mortally flawed by my inattention to Torres 
Strait religions in their weird and glorious detail, I feel no 
obligation to pretend to knowledge I do not in fact have simply 
in order to 'round out' some sort of picture of society with 
observations of religious behaviour de rigeur: Were I to do so 
the argument for attention to what the ethnographer knows he 
knows upon which the entire argument for the primacy of idiom 
and the exemplary stories permitted therein would be 
compromised.)
105* J.P. Stern, Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions, 
pp.191 and 189, respectively. Stern's efforts to define the 
aphorism within which Lichtenberg worked are to find the 
aphorism a "full genre", much the same as I am proposing to find 
ethnography:
A "full genre" I take to be a kind of writing each 
manifestation of which is distinct and
self-contained, and displays qualities and inherent 
forces recognizably different from those of other 
kinds, and not found elsewhere, (p.190)
Stern acknowledges the problem of describing a genre, "the 
nature of which is to be determined by the result of the 
description"— as Lichtenberg, his study, put it, "founding the 
thing to be examined upon the unexamined"— and refers to 
Michael Oakeshott's demonstration of the continuity between 
'description' and 'definition' (Oakeshott 1933, esp. Ch.IV), 
and cites Dilthey:
The coherent whole of a work is to be grasped from 
single words and their connections, and yet a full 
understanding of the single presupposes an 
understanding of the whole. This circle... occurs 
again in the relation obtaining between the single 
work and the literary genre to which it belongs." 
(Wilhelm Dilthey [Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,
Schriften, V, 330] quoted in K. Victor, "Probleme 
der literarischen Gattungsgeschichte" in Deutsche
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und 
Geistesgeschichte, IV [Halle, 193l], 438.)
It seems to me, however, that just such a hermeneutic circle 
operates on any of the (as Peirce called them) retroductive 
operations by which men come to their understandings, not least 
on the ethnographic operation of coming to terms with another 
society.
106. Excerpted from Lichtenberg's Notebooks, Stern 1963:302. 
Apropos this, Lichtenberg also wrote (ibid: 199),
I have drawn from the well of language nary a thought 
which I do not have and which I could not put into 
words.
The printer put: ". . . which I could not express in
words." On the contrary— in fact: Many a thought which I 
do not have and which I could not put into words I have 
expressed in words.
And, too, this puts me in mind of Liam Hudson's "all those 
messages that lie beyond the literal meaning of our 
utterance... a hidden stockpile of images, metaphors and
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echoes", and Paul Goodman saying he has "that kind of 
personality that first says and then initiates what it 
wants... I tentatively say 'I love you' and find that I love you. 
Or very often I have said what seems to he to be a bluff, beyond 
what I know or want, and it proves to be after all what I mean."
107. Stern, J.P., "A Literary Definition of the Aphorism", 
pp.189-226 of Stern op.cit.; the quotations are from 
Pp.191-192,  with original emphasis.
108. The reference here are to being 'between' Roland Barthes (or at 
least the Roland Barthes of the Preface to Mythologies [ 1957 
edition]) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Barthes wrote,
What I mean is that I cannot countenance the 
traditional belief which postulates a natural 
dichotomy between the objectivity of the scientist 
and the subjectivity of the writer, as if the former 
were endowed with a 'freedom' and the latter with a 
'vocation' equally suitable for spiriting away or 
sublimating the actual limitations of their 
situation. What I claim is to live to the full the 
contradiction of my time, which may well make sarcasm 
the condition of truth.
/The other 'pole' is Rousseau, as in Lettres Ecrites de la 
Montagne (1964 :686 ) ,  in the version used by Roberto Unger to 
introduce the Theory of the Self (Ch-5 of Unger 1975; p •192):
Silence your scorn, reader, if at times in this as 
in other parts of the essay I abandon the 
heavy-handed though frivolous sobriety we have come 
to expect in philosophic argument. Remember that all 
men, no matter how modest their contributions, are 
entitled to the answer Rousseau gave to the 
detractors of his enthusiasm: When Archimedes ran 
naked through the streets of Syracuse to announce his 
findings, what he said was no less true because of the 
way it was communicated.
109. Susan Sontag, "Against Interpretation", in Against 
Interpretation, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1965* On the
distinction between what a work is and what it is about let me 
offer, apropos of my own polemical restriction of ethnology, 
Sontag’s comment on art made "manageable, conformable" by 
interpretation:
But it should be noted that interpretation is not 
simply the compliment that mediocrity pays to genius. 
It is, indeed, the modern way of understanding 
something, and is applied to works of every quality. 
Thus, in the notes that Elia Kazan published on his 
production of A Streetcar Named Desire, it becomes 
clear that, in order to direct the play, Kazan had to 
discover that Stanley Kowalski represented the 
sensual and vengeful barbarism that was engulfing our 
culture, while Blanche Du Bois was Western 
civilization, poetry, delicate apparel, dim 
lighting, refined feelings and all, though a little 
worse for wear to be sure. Tennessee Williams' 
forceful psychological melodrama now became 
intelligible: it was about something, about the
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decline of Western civilization. Apparently, were it 
to go on being a play about a handsome brute named 
Stanley Kowalski and a faded mangy belle named 
Blanche Du Bois, it would not be manageable.
A.D. Hope, "D.H. Lawrence's Kangaroo: how it looks to an
Australian", in W.S. Ramson, ed., The Australian Experience, 
pp.157-173* "Even admirers..." is the opening of Hope's essay. 
The subsequent list of Lawrence's errors is from p .166. Apropos 
the blue-bottle 'octopus', Hope quotes Lawrence's description, 
which he says "is nearly all wrong as information but it is 
magical as a vivid impression:
The sea had thrown up, all along the surf-line, queer 
glittery creatures...[Hope continues the quotation 
for several lines, concluding...] They must have been 
some sort of little octopus, with the bright glass 
bladder, big as smallish narrow pears, with a blue 
frill along the top to float them, and the strings to 
feel with— and perhaps the long string to anchor by.
Who knows?
Who knows, indeed? He could have asked the next fisherman he 
met..."(p. 1 69) .
Ursula K. LeGuin, The Earthsea Trilogy, H'worth: Penguin, 1979. 
The quotations are from p.14 and p.148, both from A Wizard of 
Eathsea, Book I of the trilogy. On this question of 
'familiarization' and ’foreignization', cf. Robbe-Grillet 
(1963) on the literary culpability of "anthropomorphic 
analogies" which 'charge objects with flagrant human content'.
Lao-tsu taught,
Look at the village as village;
Look at the nation as nation;
Look at the universe as universe.
How do I know the universe is like this?
By looking!
(Tao te ching, ch.54; 
tr. Gia-fu Feng)
J.P. Stern, in his definition of the aphorism, recognized 
"the premise of any such definition is the conviction that the 
categories of literature are not empty names signifying 
nothing, but meaningful designations of distinct kinds of 
literary expression: and hence also representations of distinct 
ways of responding to the world... Granted the premise that 
'literature' is 'divided into' distinct 'kinds', as against 
'the confusion of kinds which is the inelegance of letters and 
the stultification of values'," he wrote (quoting Henry James' 
Introduction to The Awkward Age [1910]), "the respectable 
pedigree of these designations in the poetics of two thousand 
years, as well as their kinship with the 'humors' and 
'archetypes' in Western thought, will have to serve here 
instead of a deductive proof" (op.cit.:189—19Q> 349n93)* 
Stern's problem, after Lao-tsu, is that while the aphorism is 
certainly there, we cannot 'Look at the aphorism as aphorism' 
until after Stern, in the same way that the present work claims 
in a spirit of reluctant audacity that we cannot 'Look at the 
idiom as idiom' until after we see what an idiom is. And there
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is no reason to go looking unless other things don't work. 
Lao-tsu said the Tao that can be said is not the eternal Tao. 
And in the same way any aphorism of Lichtenberg's or Bradley's 
or whoever's that Stern gives us, he can only give us as 
aphorism: it cannot be_ an aphorism when Stern gives us it any 
more than can Lao-tsu's chapters be_ the eternal Tao, any more 
than can my instances of Islander idiom as idiom be_ the Island 
idiom. But the aphorisms Stern gives us can become aphorisms in 
reading, just as the Tao te ching becomes the Tao in doing, just 
as the Island idiom comes to life from time to time when the 
reader imagines the situations I describe and the context is the 
idiom. Otherwise we must admit the great Tao to be sayable in a 
few piddly verses, aphorisms to be any old bit of 'short, pithy 
prose', and idiom to be partible into language, situation, 
'paralinguistics', and so on. In fact, it is quite the 
contrary: Having recognized, slowly, and with much effort over 
time, these analytically distinguishable bits of human's 
speaking, it turns out that they only make sense as sense-making 
action because there is a communicative milieu in which we grow 
up learning when to use 'language', when to use 
'paralinguistics', when to use silence, (even when to use 
somebody else to do our talking or signaling for us). This is 
the milieu I have come to call idiom. Once said it is no longer 
idiom; henceforth it can be read by anybody as merely a name in 
English for what others have called other things. But this is 
the risk of language, to be misread. And it is more than offset 
by the capacity of language for alternity, for releasing us from 
eternal bounded actuality.
113* Having made much, perhaps overmuch, of genre in proposing how we 
might, as writers and readers, make the most of alternity in 
describing other cultures, let me defend myself by mention of 
another genre or two in which the problem of situated 
communication outside of what we understand the governance of 
language normally to be is dealt with.
The Zen koan is a genre which, when read by most Westerners, 
may be easily mistaken for, say, Oriental aphorism: it is short, 
pithy (we assume), and prose (rarely does versification make it 
through the translations). As we learn to read koans, however, 
we begin to understand something of the Zen idiom. That is, we 
learn that koans are meant to be answered (nothing at all like 
aphorisms. Reading further (to wit: getting practised
readings) , we understand that some koans may not be answered by 
words; some may be answered by any words at all; some may be 
answered by words and gestures (some of these by any words and 
one of several gestures and some by any gesture with a few 
chosen words); and some, in order to be answered, must not be 
answered. The koan is thus a genre in which there is a theory of 
language. For instance, in the koan on What Will You Call It? 
(one of The One Hundred and Forty-Four Koans, tr. Yoel Hoffman 
[1977]), Master Isan said, 'When I die, I will be transformed 
into a male buffalo at the house of the parishioner at the foot 
of the mountain. On the buffalo's lower left side will be 
written the five words, "This is the monk Isan." If you call it 
"Isan", it's a buffalo. If you call it "buffalo", it's Isan. 
Well then, what will you call it?'
We might say that this is often the way language turns up in 
idiom (or, when a community of idiom is denied, how language is 
often used to work double binds on subordinate interlocutors). 
Lewis Carroll has Alice say to Humpty Dumpty,
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"I don't know what you mean by 'glory'.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course 
you don't— till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice 
knock-down argument for you!'"
"But 'glory' doesn’t mean 'a nice knock-down 
argument'," Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a 
rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it 
to mean— neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can 
make words mean so many different things."
(Of course, this is so in 'language' , and is even comprehensible 
in the strange situation of Carroll's in which Alice plays 
ethnographer...but as ethnographers are, Alice is excused from 
much of the governance of the idiom. In particular, she is 
obviously freed here from the rules of who may command the 
rhetoric, of who may say what 'the question is' in the idiom.)
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is 
to be master— that's all."
In the koan, Kyozan is presenting the koan and, in doing so,
telling the tale of Isan. The koan ends, "Here Kyozan stepped 
out, bowed, and walked away." The answer, then, must be an 
answer to the master (all koans exist for teaching pupils) and 
not, as is sometimes the case, an answer as if to the Master
telling the tale within the koan (Ky5zan, but he has left the 
tale).
ANSWER
'My name is so-and-so,' the pupil says, giving his 
own name.
(The pupil then quotes a Zen scripture on the many different 
names for Confucius.)
Whether you say Köshi or Kyüchüji, it's still 
Confucius.
And, as long as we are in Zen idiom, not only are Köshi and
Kyuchuji the 'same', but also are Isan and the buffalo not the 
same.
Another genre, one even more easily bent to my own design 
here, is that of the "Subtleties" of Mulla Nasrudin, the 
mythical Sufi Master whose stories (the so-called 'subtleties': 
see Idries Shah 1964) are also meant as teachings, not so much 
through practice in the actions pursuant to them but more as 
'lights' with which to see through the scales ordinary 
perceptions cover our eyes with. (Some of these, too, are like 
aphorisms, or even like koans, such as the "Trust in Allah; but 
tie your camel first", which first came to me in a version 
attributed to Oliver Cromwell, a little-known Sufi: "Trust in 
the Lord; but keep your powder dry".) One of the old Sufi tales 
pictures a man so in need of a donkey (i forget exactly why) 
that he goes to great lengths to search one out, even to the 
extent of going to a foreign country and working himself half to 
death in order to save the money to buy an ass in order to get to 
donkey country... The punch line is about the stupidity of
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riding a donkey in search of a donkey. This is why we must not 
'ride' into a foreign community on the back of language in order 
to study language: If we do this, language is all we will
get— the tertium quid, an 'other thing' in respect both of us 
and our informants— and never the wherewithall to know when to 
use language, and which one to use, and to whom, and how...in 
short: never to know the idiom. Better to go in with nothing, 
for then, in order to learn how to communicate, we will have to 
learn the idiom.
114. Such questions for consideration in respect of such 
universality ("beyond ethnographic solipsism", as Edwin 
Ardener put it [l 971:lxvii]) as come easily to mind have to do 
with, say, upper and middle class school-society children who 
grow up with only an adult language in which they are 
prohibitively incompetent and no childhood idiom with which to 
say their say; adult immigrants who never get exposed to the 
earthy, no-holds-barred situations by which children learn the 
rules of the idiom, and so live either where one wo-rd has to fit 
all categories (my migrant Middle European neighbour uses 
"friend" when he means everyone from acquaintances to workmates 
to amigos to colleagues to buddies) or doomed to knowing the 
choosing without the choices, like an old thesaurus; persons 
inculcated into a restricted idiom whereby words are invested 
with an erroneous concreteness and double-binds or other 
neuroses develop.
115* Michael Oakeshott wrote in respect of one of his philosophical 
cornerstones— 'habits of affection and conduct'— "We acquire 
habits of conduct, not by constructing a way of living upon 
rules or percepts learned by heart and subsequently practised, 
but by living with people who habitually behave in a certain 
manner: we acquire habits of conduct in the same way as we 
acquire our native language." (Oakeshott 1933; c_f. Himmelfarb
1975).
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